43:0191(18)CA - - Transportation, FAA, National Aviation Support Facility, Atlantic City Airport, NJ and NFFE Local 1340 - - 1991 FLRAdec CA - - v43 p191



[ v43 p191 ]
43:0191(18)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:


43 FLRA No. 18

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

NATIONAL AVIATION SUPPORT FACILITY

ATLANTIC CITY AIRPORT, NEW JERSEY

(Respondent)

and

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

LOCAL 1340

(Charging Party/Union)

2-CA-00024

DECISION AND ORDER

November 21, 1991

Before Chairman McKee and Members Talkin and Armendariz.

I. Statement of the Case

This unfair labor practice case is before the Authority based on the parties' stipulation of facts under section 2429.1(a) of our Regulations. The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1), (5), and (8) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) by failing to furnish the Union with the transcript of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) hearing requested under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute. The Union requested the transcript in connection with a grievance that it filed on behalf of a unit employee, who was also the complainant in the EEOC hearing. The General Counsel and the Respondent filed briefs.(*)

For the reasons stated below, we find that the Respondent committed the unfair labor practices alleged.

II. Facts

The Union is the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit of nonprofessional employees of the Respondent who are located at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Technical Center, Atlantic City Airport, New Jersey. The Respondent is a constituent entity within the U.S. Department of Transportation.

By memorandum dated August 29, 1989, the Union filed a grievance on behalf of unit employee Eloise Beck, alleging that the Respondent had followed improper procedures in filling a vacant position under the parties' Merit Promotion Plan. On September 22, 1989, the Union requested that the Respondent provide it with a copy of a transcript in an EEOC hearing in a discrimination case in which Beck was the complainant. The Union alleged that the transcript contained information pertaining to the grievance. The Respondent replied that it did not have the requested transcript and could not supply it. On October 13, 1989, the Union again requested the transcript. The Union asserted that it needed the transcript to process the grievance. On October 16, 1989, the Respondent rejected the Union's grievance on the basis that the grievance was filed untimely and that Beck had unsuccessfully pursued an EEO complaint concerning the same matter. The Union submitted the grievance to arbitration.

The parties stipulated that the information requested is normally maintained by the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Transportation in a system of records and does not constitute guidance, advice, counsel, or training provided for management officials or supervisors relating to collective bargaining.

III. Positions of the Parties

A. Respondent

The Respondent alleges that Beck gave the Union a copy of the EEOC hearing transcript. Therefore, the Respondent argues that the General Counsel's position that the transcript was necessary for the processing of the grievance "is not supported." Respondent's Brief at 2. The Respondent asserts that the "Union had the information it was requesting from the Agency, was cognizant of the alleged wrong-doing, and had processed the actions through the grievance procedure" and that the "Union's right to pursue the grievance had never been hampered." Id. at 2-3.

The Respondent also argues that disclosure of the requested information is prohibited by the Privacy Act. The Respondent argues that the "confidentiality of the EEO process must be protected in order to minimize the potential for adverse consequences to the complainant and . . . witnesses" and "to prevent other employees from being deterred from filing complaints for fear that they might later be disclosed to third parties." Id. at 3-4.

The Respondent states that, as required by the Privacy Act, the Department of Transportation and its agencies have published a listing of systems of records that they maintain. One of the systems of records maintained by the Department of Transportation is Discrimination Complaint Files. The Respondent states that "[t]his system of files contains information regarding FAA employees . . . who are directly or indirectly involved in a discrimination complaint filed with the FAA." Id. at 5. The Respondent asserts that there are two routine uses set out for this system of records: (1) investigation of alleged discrimination (that is, investigative hearings); and (2) preparation of analytical and statistical studies and reports. The Respondent asserts that the "listing of routine uses does not include disclosure to union officials." Id. at 5.

The Respondent argues that, although there is no Federal sector precedent regarding union access to transcripts of discrimination hearings, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has ruled in a case arising in the private sector, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (International Union), that unions may not be granted access to such records. The Respondent asserts that the Authority should follow the rationale of the court and hold that Federal agencies cannot be required to give union representatives access to transcripts of discrimination hearings.

B. General Counsel

The General Counsel argues that, although the transcript of Beck's EEOC hearing was maintained and retained in the Department of Transportation's Civil Rights Division, the transcript was reasonably available to the Respondent and could have been produced on request. Citing Department of Defense Dependents Schools, Washington, D.C. and Department of Defense Dependents Schools, Germany Region, 19 FLRA 790 (1985) remanded as to other matters sub nom. North Germany Area Council, Overseas Education Association v. FLRA, 805 F.2d 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1986), decision on remand, 28 FLRA 202 (1987), the General Counsel asserts that the Authority has held that "information should be provided from other sources within an agency even if the information is not located at the level of exclusive recognition." General Counsel's Brief at 7. The General Counsel argues that the EEOC transcript was reasonably available because it involved only one document that was located in one office of the Agency.

The General Counsel also contends that the EEOC transcript is relevant and necessary for the Union to determine whether the Merit Promotion Plan procedures in the parties' collective bargaining agreement were followed in filling a vacancy and "whether a grievance was justified[.]" Id. at 8. The General Counsel argues that "[s]uch information is obviously critical to the [Union] in its evaluation of the strengths and merits of the grievance, and must lead to the conclusion that the information requested was necessary within the meaning of the Statute." Id. at 8-9. The General Counsel states that the Union's sole interest "was to determine whether the promotion procedure had gone forward properly." Id. at 9.

Further, the General Counsel takes the position that the fact that the Respondent rejected Beck's grievance as untimely and nongrievable did not relieve the Respondent of its obligation to furnish necessary information pursuant to section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute. The General Counsel contends that "[q]uestions over the interpretation of a contract, including whether something is grievable, are issues legitimately resolved through the negotiated grievance procedure." Id. Therefore, the General Counsel argues that a contention that a grievance is nongrievable does not negate an agency's obligation under section 7114(b)(4) to provide information relating to a grievance.

Finally, the General Counsel argues that the disclosure of the requested transcript is not prohibited by the Privacy Act. According to the General Counsel, "[t]here is no personal information to be protected in an EEOC transcript." Id. at 10 (footnote omitted). The General Counsel argues that "[a]bsent a privacy interest, the Privacy Act does not apply." Id. The General Counsel contends that, even if the Privacy Act did apply, "balancing a nonexistent privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure would result in release of the data." Id. The General Counsel asserts that release of the requested information would allow the public to see that the Respondent meets its responsibilities in handling personnel matters such as promotions in a manner consistent with law, regulations, and the parties' collective bargaining agreement.

IV. Analysis and Conclusions

We find that in the circumstances of this case, where Beck was the complainant in the EEOC hearing and the Union filed a grievance on behalf of Beck, the Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1), (5), and (8) of the Statute by refusing to provide the Union with a copy of the transcript of Beck's EEOC hearing for use in connection with Beck's grievance.

A. The Requested Information Is Necessary for the Union to Fulfill Its Representational Functions

Section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute requires an agency to furnish a union, upon request and to the extent not prohibited by law, data that: (1) is normally maintained by the agency in the regular course of business; (2) is reasonably available and necessary for discussion, understanding, and negotiation of subjects within the scope of collective bargaining; and (3) does not constitute guidance, advice, counsel, or training provided for management officials or supervisors, relating to collective bargaining.

It is well established that an agency is obligated under section 7114(b)(4)(B) to provide an exclusive representative of its employees with information that is reasonably available and necessary for the union to effectively fulfill its representational functions and responsibilities in the processing of employee grievances. U.S. Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D.C. and Internal Revenue Service, Helena District, Helena, Montana, 39 FLRA 241 (1991), petition for review filed sub nom. United States Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service v. FLRA, No. 91-1153 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 1991); Veterans Administration, Washington, D.C. and Veterans Administration Regional Office, Buffalo, New York, 28 FLRA 260 (1987) (VA Regional Office). See also, Department of Veterans Affairs, Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Fort Lyon, Colorado, 41 FLRA 1091, 1098 (1991) (Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center), petition for review filed sub nom. United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Fort Lyon, Colorado v. FLRA, No. 91-1470 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 26, 1991) (the transcript of an arbitration hearing was necessary within the meaning of section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute for the union "to carry out its representational duties by more effectively representing the unit employee in the arbitration proceeding"). It is also clear that under section 7114(b)(4) a union has a right to information that is necessary for it to determine whether to file a grievance. See U.S. Army Reserve Components, Personnel and Administration Center, St. Louis, Missouri, 26 FLRA 19, 27 (1987).

Here, the parties stipulated that the information requested is normally maintained and does not constitute guidance, advice, counsel, or training provided for management officials or supervisors relating to collective bargaining. Further, we find that the information requested by the Union was necessary for it to fulfill its representational functions under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute. The Union requested a copy of a transcript of an EEOC hearing in which Beck was the complainant. The Union alleged that the transcript contained information documenting violations of procedures that the Respondent used in filling a vacant position. The information was requested by the Union, in connection with a grievance filed on Beck's behalf, to determine whether contractual procedures were followed in filling the vacancy under the Merit Promotion Plan of the parties' negotiated agreement. Information requested by a union is necessary, within the meaning of section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute, if it would be useful to the union in the investigation and/or presentation of a potential grievance. We find that the requested information would have assisted the Union in determining whether the Respondent violated the parties' negotiated agreement. Therefore, we find that the information was necessary within the meaning of section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute. See, for example, VA Regional Office, 28 FLRA at 265.

We reject the Respondent's contention that providing a copy of the hearing transcript to the Union was not necessary because the Union was given a copy by Beck. The Respondent's claim that the Union received a copy of the transcript from Beck was not a matter of fact stipulated to by the parties. The parties agreed that the stipulation "contain[ed] the entire agreement among the parties" and the parties "waive[d] a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, including the presentation of any evidence other than contained in this Stipulation and the Exhibits[.]" Stipulation of Facts, paragraphs 23-24. Therefore, it is not necessary to consider the Respondent's argument that the Union was given a copy of the transcript by Beck. See U.S. Customs Service, Washington, D.C., 39 FLRA 749, 757 (1991).

Moreover, even if the Union had received a copy of the hearing transcript from another source, that fact would not relieve the Agency of its obligation under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute to furnish the requested document. See, for example, National Labor Relations Board, 38 FLRA 506, 517 (1990) (an agency's contention that the union is aware of the information contained in a requested document does not relieve an agency of its obligation to furnish the requested document). Therefore, we find that even if the Union had a copy of the transcript, the Respondent was not relieved of its obligation under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute to furnish information necessary for the Union to fulfill its representational functions.

An agency's contention that a potential grievance is not grievable does not relieve an agency of its obligation to furnish otherwise necessary information. See, for example, U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Border Patrol, El Paso, Texas, 37 FLRA 1310, 1320 (1990), petition for review filed sub nom. U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Border Patrol, El Paso, Texas v. FLRA, No. 90-4960 (5th Cir. Dec. 28, 1990) (Border Patrol) and cases cited therein. Consequently, we reject the Respondent's contention that, because Beck's grievance was nongrievable, the Respondent was not obligated to furnish necessary information pursuant to section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute.

B. The Requested Information Is Reasonably Available

In Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, 36 FLRA 943 (1990), we defined what is meant by the phrase "reasonably available" in section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute. We found that "available" referred to information which is accessible or obtainable, while "reasonable" referred to means that are not extreme or excessive. Id. at 950. Here, as noted above, the transcript requested by the Union is maintained by the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Transportation and can be retrieved at the Respondent's request when needed. There is no showing that the information is not accessible or obtainable or that it could be retrieved only through the use of extreme or excessive methods. Therefore, we conclude that the transcript requested by the Union was reasonably available. See U.S. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Logistics Command, Sacramento Air Logistics Center, McClellan Air Force Base, California, 37 FLRA 987 (1990) (McClellan Air Force Base).

C. Disclosure of the Requested Information Is Not Prohibited by Law

For the reasons set forth below, we find that disclosure of the requested information is not prohibited by law.

The Privacy Act regulates the disclosure of any information contained in an agency "record" within a "system of records" that is retrieved by reference to an individual's name or some other personal identifier. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4), (5) (1982). The Privacy Act defines "record" as "any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency[,]" and defines "system of records" as "a group of any records under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual[.]" 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5). See National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1655 and U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Military Affairs, Springfield, Illinois, 39 FLRA 1087, 1094-96 (1991), petition for review filed sub nom. United States Department of Defense, Department of Military Affairs v. FLRA, No. 91-1216 (D.C. Cir. May 10, 1991) (Department of Military Affairs).

The parties stipulated that the transcript of the EEOC hearing involved in this case "is maintained in the ordinary course of business by the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Transportation in a system of records." Stipulation, paragraph 17(b). The system of records is entitled "Discrimination Complaint Files." Respondent's Brief at 5. The records in the system are "[c]ase files developed in processing complaints of discrimination." Privacy Act Issuances, 1989 Comp., Volume II, p. 553 (Privacy Act Issuances) (published by the Office of the Federal Register). The individuals covered by the system are "FAA employees, and applicants for FAA employment, who are directly or indirectly involved in a discrimination complaint filed with FAA." Id. The "records are retrieved by name." Id.

With certain enumerated exceptions, the Privacy Act precludes an agency from disclosing to any person or agency any record which it maintains as a part of a system of records absent a request by, or the written consent of, the person to whom the record pertains. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). Although the grievance for which the copy of the transcript was requested was filed by the Union on Beck's behalf, nothing in the stipulation demonstrates that Beck requested or specifically consented to the disclosure of the copy of the transcript to the Union.

Section (b)(2) of the Privacy Act provides that the prohibition against disclosure is not applicable if disclosure of the information would be required under the FOIA. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2). Under the FOIA, requested information must be disclosed unless it falls within one of the enumerated exemptions. The exemption pertinent to this case is exemption (b)(6), which provides that information contained in personnel files, in addition to medical and other similar files, may be withheld if disclosure of the information would constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). We find that the Respondent's discrimination complaint files constitute personnel or other similar files within the meaning of exemption (b)(6). Therefore, if the release of a copy of the transcript contained in the Respondent's discrimination complaint files would not constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, disclosure of a copy of the transcript to the Union would not be barred by the Privacy Act.

The question, therefore, is whether disclosure of a copy of the transcript would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. In determining whether disclosure of the requested information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, the employee's right to privacy must be balanced against the public interest in disclosure. See U.S. Department of the Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 37 FLRA 515 (1990) (Portsmouth), application for enforcement denied sub nom. FLRA v. U.S. Department of the Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 941 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1991).

With respect to the alleged privacy interests involved, the Respondent asserts that the "confidentiality of the EEO process must be protected in order to minimize the potential for adverse consequences to the complainant and to any and all witnesses as a result of filing the complaint and also to prevent other employees from being deterred from filing complaints for fear that they might later be disclosed to third parties." Respondent's Exceptions at 3-4.

We first consider the privacy interests of the complainant, Beck. The Union asked for a copy of the transcript in an EEOC hearing in which Beck was the complainant in order to process a grievance that it filed on Beck's behalf. Under these circumstances, we find that Beck has a limited privacy interest in the transcript. We emphasize that this case involves only the issue of the disclosure of a copy of a transcript of an EEOC hearing to a union representing an employee in a grievance where the complainant in the EEOC proceeding is also the person on whose behalf the grievance is filed.

We next consider the Respondent's assertion that witnesses who testified at the EEOC hearing might suffer adverse consequences if a copy of the transcript is furnished to the Union. We construe this assertion as a claim that the witnesses who testified at the hearing have privacy interests that, under the Privacy Act, must be considered before a determination is made whether the requested information may be disclosed to the Union.

Under the Privacy Act, the relevant privacy interests are those of "the individual to whom the record pertains[.]" 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). As noted above, the applicable system of records in this case contains information regarding employees who are "directly or indirectly" involved in a discrimination complaint filed with the Respondent, and the records are retrievable by name. Privacy Act Issuances. In the absence of any indication in the record before us to the contrary, we construe this description of the system of records as encompassing the possibility that transcripts of discrimination hearings maintained by the Respondent may be retrievable by the names of witnesses who testified at such hearings. As such, the witnesses would be individuals to whom the record pertains and any identifiable privacy interests that they have in the record would be a relevant consideration.

However, the Respondent has not asserted, and the record before us does not set forth, any identifiable privacy interests that the witnesses who testified have in the transcript. Therefore, recognizing that there might be other situations in which witnesses who testify in an EEOC hearing might have identifiable privacy interests in a transcript of such a hearing, we find that in this case there are no identifiable privacy interests of the witnesses who testified in Beck's EEOC hearing.

Finally, we consider the Respondent's claim that other employees might be deterred from filing complaints for fear that the complaints might later be disclosed to third parties. To the extent that this claim can be construed as a contention that other employees have interests that must be considered under the Privacy Act, we reject this claim. The claim that other employees might be deterred from filing complaints does not present a basis under the Privacy Act for precluding disclosure of a copy of the transcript to the Union because there is no showing that the transcript pertains to such other employees.

In this connection, we also reject the Respondent's reliance on International Union. In International Union, the union requested copies of all discrimination complaints filed against the employer by union members. In declining to order the employer to give copies of the complaints to the union, the court noted that "[t]he [u]nion seeks copies of complaints from the employer because the complaining union member, presumably, has elected not to involve his union." International Union, 648 F.2d at 27. International Union is inapposite because it did not involve application of the Privacy Act and because, in the instant case, the complainant is also the person on whose behalf the grievance is filed.

Accordingly, in the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we find that, with respect to the relevant privacy interests involved, the Respondent has established only that Beck has a limited privacy interest in the transcript.

On the other hand, as set forth below, we conclude that there is a strong public interest in the disclosure to the Union of a copy of the transcript. In determining what the public interest is in disclosure of the requested information, we look to the public interest embodied in the Statute. Portsmouth, 37 FLRA at 525-35. The "public interest" identified in the Statute is "the facilitation of the collective bargaining process . . . ." Id. at 531. We conclude that there is a strong public interest in the disclosure of the requested information. The release of information which is necessary for a union to perform its statutory representational functions promotes important public interests. Id. at 525-31. In connection with a grievance filed on Beck's behalf, the Union requested a copy of the EEOC transcript to obtain information that allegedly would document violations of merit procedures that the Respondent used in filling a vacant position.

More specifically, the Union requested the information to determine whether the Respondent violated the parties' negotiated agreement by not following the procedures in the parties' Merit Promotion Plan. Disclosure of the information furthers the public interest in promoting the fair and equitable treatment of Federal employees, the absence of illegal discrimination, and the application of merit system principles. The disclosure of information needed to ensure that the Agency complies with its responsibilities in administering the selection process is a matter of public concern. See, for example, Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, Silver Spring, Maryland, 38 FLRA 120, 132 (1990), application for enforcement filed sub nom. FLRA v. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, Silver Spring, MD, No. 91-1175 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 12, 1991) (disclosure of the names and duty stations of unit employees receiving commendable or outstanding performance ratings was found to serve an important public interest).

Accordingly, insofar as the Union sought the information to perform its representational function under the Statute, we find that there are important public interests to be served by disclosure of the information.

Even using only the public interest identified by the Supreme Court in United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989) (Reporters Committee), and taking into account "the nature of the requested document and its relationship to the basic purpose of the FOIA 'to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny,'" Dunkelberger v. Department of Justice, 906 F.2d 779, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1990), quoting Reporters Committee, we find that there is a clear public interest in the disclosure of the information requested by the Union in this case. Disclosing a copy of the transcript would open to public scrutiny the manner in which the Agency administers its selection process and whether the Agency's selection process is administered in a fair and evenhanded manner. See, for example, Department of the Air Force, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, 38 FLRA 410, 419 (1990), petition for review filed sub nom. Department of the Air Force, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois v. FLRA, No. 91-1042 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 24, 1991) (disclosing the nature of a disciplinary action taken against a supervisor for an alleged assault on an employee found to concern the public interest in the agency's compliance "with its responsibilities [for] administering its disciplinary system in a fair and evenhanded manner.").

The information requested pertains to the decisions the Agency makes and the actions the Agency takes in selecting from among candidates for a vacant position. Disclosure of that information would open to "public scrutiny" what the Agency is "up to" in its hiring and promotion practices. See Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 772-73. Disclosure of the information would enable the public to assess, for example, whether the Agency is hiring and promoting candidates for a vacancy consistent with applicable law, regulation, and the collective bargaining agreement.

Accordingly, balancing Beck's limited privacy interest in the transcript against the strong public interest in the disclosure to the Union of a copy of the transcript, we find that disclosure of a copy of the transcript to the Union would not constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and, therefore, disclosure of a copy of the transcript to the Union is not prohibited by the Privacy Act.

Based on our finding that disclosure of a copy of the transcript is not prohibited by the Privacy Act, we find it unnecessary to determine whether disclosure of the information also falls within the "routine use" exception of the Privacy Act. See, for example, National Labor Relations Board, Office of the General Counsel, Washington, D.C. and National Labor Relations Board Union, 37 FLRA 1036, 1046 (1990).

V. Summary

We find that, in the specific circumstances of this case, the Respondent was required under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute to provide the Union with a copy of the transcript of the Beck EEOC hearing. As stated above, this case involves only the issue of the disclosure of a copy of a transcript of an EEOC hearing to a union representing an employee in a grievance where the complainant in the EEOC proceeding is also the person on whose behalf the grievance is filed. The transcript in this case was normally maintained by the Respondent, was reasonably available and necessary for the Union to carry out effectively its representational functions, and did not constitute guidance, advice, counsel, or training provided for management officials or supervisors relating to collective bargaining. Disclosure of the transcript is not prohibited by the Privacy Act. Therefore, we find that the Respondent's refusal to provide the requested transcript constitutes a failure to comply with section 7114(b)(4) in violation of section 7116(a)(1), (5), and (8) of the Statute. Accordingly, we will direct the Respondent to cease and desist from its violation of the Statute and to supply the requested transcript to the Union.

VI. Order

Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations and section 7118 of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, National Aviation Support Facility, Atlantic City Airport, New Jersey shall:

1. Cease and desist from:

(a) Refusing to furnish, upon request by the National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1340, the exclusive representative of a unit of its employees, a copy of the EEOC transcript requested in connection with the representative's processing of a grievance filed on behalf of Eloise Beck challenging the procedures utilized in filling a vacant position under the parties' Merit Promotion Plan.

(b) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights assured them by the Statute.

2. Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Statute:

(a) Upon request, furnish the National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1340, the exclusive representative of a unit of its employees, a copy of the EEOC transcript requested in connection with the representative's processing of a grievance filed on behalf of Eloise Beck challenging the procedures utilized in filling a vacant position under the parties' Merit Promotion Plan.

(b) Post at its facilities at National Aviation Support Facility, Atlantic City Airport, New Jersey, copies of the attached Notice on forms to be furnished by the Federal Labor Relations Authority. Upon receipt of such forms, they shall be signed by the District Director, and shall be posted and maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all bulletin boards and other places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

(c) Pursuant to section 2423.30 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations, notify the Regional Director, Boston Regional Office, Federal Labor Relations Authority, in writing within 30 days from the date of this Order as to what steps have been taken to comply.

NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES

AS ORDERED BY THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY

AND TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE

FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE

WE NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:

WE WILL NOT refuse to furnish, upon request by the National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1340, the exclusive representative of a unit of our employees, a copy of the EEOC transcript requested in connection with the representative's processing of a grievance filed on behalf of Eloise Beck challenging the procedures utilized in filling a vacant position under the parties' Merit Promotion Plan.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights assured by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.

WE WILL, upon request, furnish the National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1340, the exclusive representative of a unit of our employees, a copy of the EEOC transcript requested in connection with the representative's processing of a grievance filed on behalf of Eloise Beck challenging the procedures utilized in filling a vacant position under the parties' Merit Promotion Plan.

_________________________
(Agency)

Dated:_________ By:________________________

(Signature) (Title)

This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting