TIDEWATER VIRGINIA FEDERAL EMPLOYEES METAL TRADES COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 734 and STEPHEN SQUIRES
TIDEWATER VIRGINIA FEDERAL EMPLOYEES METAL TRADES COUNCIL,
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 734
Case No. WA-CO-50307
Michelle Ledina, Esquire For the General Counsel
Mr. Samuel Williams For the Respondent
Before: WILLIAM B. DEVANEY Administrative Law Judge
This proceeding, under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, Chapter 71 of Title 5 of the United States Code, 5 U.S.C. § 7101, et seq. (1), and the Rules and Regulations issued thereunder, 5 C.F.R. § 2423.1, et seq., concerns whether Respondent violated the Statute when the members of Local 734 voted to deny Stephen F. Squires member-ship for reasons other than the failure to meet reasonable occupational standards uniformly required or the failure to tender dues uniformly required. For reasons set forth hereinafter, I find that Local 734 violated the Statute as charged in the Complaint.
This case was initiated by a charge filed on March 13, 1995, (G.C. Exh. 1(a)); the Complaint and Notice of Hearing issued on May 16, 1996; and set the hearing for August 22, 1996, pursuant to which a hearing was duly held on August 22, 1996, in Norfolk, Virginia, before the undersigned. All parties were represented at the hearing, were afforded full opportunity to be heard and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues involved. At the conclusion of the testimony, I stated that, inasmuch as there was no dispute as to any material fact, I intended to grant General Counsel's Motion For Summary Judgment (Tr. 24), unless Respondent persuaded me to the contrary and Respondent was invited to file a post-hearing Brief in opposition to the Motion For Summary Judgment (Tr. 24-25); directed General Counsel to submit proposed findings and conclusions of law; and fixed September 4, 1996, as the date for mailing proposed findings and conclusions of law and any post-hearing Brief by Respondent (Tr. 26). General Counsel failed to file proposed findings and conclusions of law, as directed, but did timely file on September 4, 1996, a Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment. Respondent did not timely file a response; however, the Metal Trades Department on September 10, 1996, mailed, ". . . opposition to the General Counsel's Memorandum in Support for Summary Judgment. . . ." This opposition was received on September 19, 1996. Because the opposition was untimely it is rejected and has not been considered for any purpose.
The Tidewater Virginia Federal Employees Metal Trades Council is the exclusive representative of certain employees of the Norfolk Naval Shipyard (hereinafter, "Council"). The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 734 ("Local 734"), is a constituent of the Council (Tr. 14) and an agent of the Council for the purpose of representing employees of the electrical craft at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard. General Counsel made clear at the hearing that the Council is not charged with any violation (Tr. 14-15); however, Respondent, Tidewater Virginia Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 734, is charged with violating the Statute.
Mr. Stephen F. Squires, Junior, has been employed by the Norfolk Naval Shipyard as an electrician for 14 years and is in the bargaining unit represented by Local 734 (Tr. 10). Mr. Squires had been a member of Local 734 and served as a steward (Tr. 11, 16); however, in late 1989, Mr. Squires terminated his membership in Local 734 (G.C. Exh. 2; Tr. 11). In 1993 or 1994 (Tr. 18, 19), the United Association of Federal Employees (UAFE) challenged the Council as exclusive representative and Mr. Squires was an alternate observer for UAFE at the election (G.C. Exh. 1(c); Enclosure 2; Tr. 12, 19); but did not campaign for UAFE (Tr. 16-17); did not attend any organizational meetings of UAFE (Tr. 17); and was not "in line" to be an officer or representative of UAFE (Tr. 17).
On October 18, 1994, Mr. Squires signed a Standard Form 1187, "Request For Payroll Deductions For Labor Organization Dues" (G.C. Exh. 3) and an IBEW "Obligation of I.B.E.W." [application for membership] (G.C. Exh. 4; Tr. 12, 13); but his membership application was rejected (Tr. 14, 15). Mr. Samuel L. Williams, President of Local 734, in a letter dated June 10, 1996, represented that Mr. Squires' application had been rejected on January 4, 1995, by the membership because Mr. Squires, ". . . during the challenge election between the Tidewater Virginia Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, and the U.A.F.E., . . . worked as a U.A.F.E. supporter and a listed observer for the election process . . . The membership considered that . . . [Mr. Squires'] 'good character' within our Constitution has not been advanced by same. . . ." (G.C. Exh. 1(c); Tr. 9, 19).
§ 16(c) of the Statute provides,
"(c) For the purpose of this chapter it shall be an unfair labor practice for an exclusive representative to
deny membership to any employee in the appropriate unit represented by such exclusive representative
except for failure--
"(1) to meet reasonable occupational standards uniformly required for admission, or
"(2) to tender dues uniformly required as a condition of acquiring and retaining membership." (5
U.S.C. § 7116(c)).
The Authority consistently has held that § 16(c) means precisely what it says and that a labor organization violates §§ 16(b)(1) and (8) of the Statute, if it denies membership for any reason except failure to meet reasonable occupational standards or failure to tender dues, as set forth in § 16(c). American Federation of Government Employees, Local 987, Warner Robins, Georgia and Nedra T. Bradley, 46 FLRA 1048 (1992), enf'd. No. 93-8222 (11th Cir. Jan. 28, 1994); American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2344, AFL-CIO and Carol Ramey, 45 FLRA 1004 (1992), enf'd. No. 92-1560 D.C. Cir. Jan. 31, 1994).
Mr. Squires tendered dues uniformly required as a condition of acquiring and retaining membership by submitting a Form 1187 and he met all occupational standards uniformly required for admission. Further, Mr. Squires submitted the required application for membership, i.e. the signed, "Obligation of I.B.E.W.". Local 734 by denying him membership for a reason other than the failure to meet reasonable occupational standards or the failure to tender dues, as set forth in § 16(c) of the Statute, violated §§ 16(b)(1) and (8) of the Statute. I fully agree with General Counsel that, "There is no merit to the Respondent's contention that its constitution provides an acceptable basis for denying membership . . . . The record shows that the Charging Party was not a m