Federal Labor Relations Authority
Office of the Solicitor
Closed Court Litigation
(Current As of 07/31/2008)

D.C. District Court

National Air Traffic Controllers Association, AFL-CIO v. FLRA, No. 1:04CV00138 (D.D.C. Cir. Feb. 22, 2005).

The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia District has dismissed the union's complaint.  The unions sought declaratory and injunctive relief against FSIP, challenging FSIP decisions declining to assert jurisdiction over certain bargaining impasses with the FAA concerning employee compensation. (03 FSIP 144; 149, 150, 151 and 157). 

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Local 3719, AFL- CIO, et al. v. FLRA, No. 1:97CV01042 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 1998)[unpublished decision], reviewing 52 FLRA 1093 (1997).

The district court granted the Authority's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction a complaint seeking review of an Authority decision in a representation case. The Authority had affirmed a Regional Director's determination excluding certain employees from a bargaining unit because they were engaged in security work that directly affected national security. The court agreed with the Authority that the court could not review such actions under 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a), and that the Supreme Court's decision in Leedom v. Kyne did not apply. The court recognized that section 7123(a) authorizes only the courts of appeals to review the Authority's orders, and precludes any court from reviewing an order of the Authority involving a representation matter.

Association of Civilian Technicians, Inc. v. FLRA, No. 99-2562 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2001)[unpublished decision], reviewing 55 FLRA 657 (1999).

The district court granted the Authority's motion to dismiss the complaint in this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The plaintiff sought review of an Authority decision denying the consolidation of various bargaining units of National Guard civilian technicians into a single unit.  First, the court determined that § 7123 precluded judicial review of appropriate unit determinations.  The court also agreed that certain exceptions to the bar raised by section 7123, such as the Supreme Court's decision in Leedom v. Kyne, did not apply. 

Dennis R. Means v. Phyllis N. Segal, Chair, FLRA, No. 1:97CV01301 (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 1998)[unpublished decision].

The district court adopted the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge and granted the Authority's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The complaint sought to compel the FLRA's General Counsel to issue unfair labor practice complaints and to obtain documents withheld by the General Counsel under the Freedom of Information Act. Recognizing that the General Counsel has unreviewable discretion to decline to issue unfair labor practice complaints, the Court dismissed the complaint's unfair labor practice claims because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Court also granted the Authority's motion for summary judgment with regard to the plaintiff's Freedom of Information Act claim. It found that the portions of the attorney notes and the investigative reports withheld from the Plaintiff were protected from disclosure by the deliberative process privilege and the attorney-client and work product privileges. The court also upheld the General Counsel's claim that Freedom of Information Act Exemption 7(C) (protection of privacy interests of third parties) and Freedom of Information Act Exemption 7(D) (protection of identity of confidential sources) protected from disclosure several documents created during the investigation of the Unfair labor practice charges.