

## NOTICES

## OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

The Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986; Uniform Freedom of Information Act Fee Schedule and Guidelines

Friday, March 27, 1987

AGENCY: Office of Management and Budget.

ACTION: Final publication of Fee Schedule and Guidelines implementing certain provisions of the Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986 (Pub. L. 99-570).

SUMMARY: These Guidelines implement certain provisions of the Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986 which require the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to promulgate guidelines containing a uniform schedule of FOIA fees applicable to all agencies that are subject to the FOIA.

EFFECTIVE DATE: April 27, 1987. Agencies are required to promulgate regulations pursuant to notice and comment implementing the provisions of this schedule and guidelines by April 25, 1987. They should develop and publish proposed rules as soon as possible after publication of this OMB Fee Schedule and Guidelines. Agencies will have met the statutory deadline if they promulgate final versions of such implementing regulations in the Federal Register on or before that date, even though their regulations will not be effective until 30 days after the date of publication.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert N. Veeder, Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Information Policy Branch, Telephone (202) 395-4814.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986 (Pub. L. 99-570) amended the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) by modifying the terms of exemption 7 and by supplying new provisions relating to the charging and waiving of fees. The Reform Act specifically required the Office of Management and Budget to develop and issue a schedule of fees and guidelines, pursuant to notice and comment.

On January 16, 1987, OMB published a proposed fee schedule and guidelines explaining how to implement the schedule. The notice invited public comment especially on the definitions of "commercial," "representative of the news media," "educational institution," "non-commercial scientific institution," "search," and "review."

At the end of the comment period, February 17, 1987, OMB had received 80 comments from 6 identifiable categories of commentator:

- The Congress (1)
- The Federal Agencies (11)
- Publishers of Newsletters (41)

- Public interest groups affiliated with the news media (11)
- Other public interest groups (12)
- Individual members of the public (4)

Although many of the commentators focused exclusively on OMB's proposed definition of "representative of the news media," a significant number provided substantive comments on other aspects of the guidelines and schedule. These comments are discussed in the sectional analysis that follows.

Several commentators urged OMB to publish a revised schedule and guidance for a second round of public comment, while acknowledging the problems presented by the statutory deadline requiring agencies to promulgate their own fee regulations by April 25, 1987. OMB has carefully considered this suggestion, but declines to adopt it. Since agencies' regulations must be published not only pursuant to (and thus following) OMB's issuance and also for notice and comment, a second round of comment would make it impossible for agencies to meet the statutory deadline. It should be noted, however, that OMB intends to follow agencies' implementation of the schedule and guidelines closely and will issue clarifications when needed.

#### Section-by-Section Analysis

##### *Section 1. Purpose.*

Many commentators suggested that OMB's emphasis on collecting FOIA fees was contrary to the intent of the FOIA amendment which they insisted was to make information more widely and cheaply available, and they urged that we emphasize this intention. While it is true that many of the provisions of the FOIA amendments will have this effect, OMB's role in this process is limited to that of providing guidance on charging fees under the FOIA. Moreover, given OMB's budgetary responsibilities, it is quite appropriate for it to require agencies to develop and diligently carry out programs that charge, collect and deposit fees for FOIA services where such activities are clearly permitted by statute. Accordingly, no changes were made to this section.

##### *Section 5. Authorities.*

One commentator objected to the citation of statutory authorities other than the Freedom of Information Reform Act: specifically, the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 and the Budget and Accounting Act and Budget and Accounting Procedures Act. It was not OMB's intention to enlarge the scope of its authority or responsibilities in developing FOIA fee guidance by citing these Acts. Nevertheless, these Acts do provide a framework for the development and issuance of OMB policies relating to information access and dissemination policies and the collecting and disposition of fees. The Paperwork Reduction Act, for example, makes the Director of OMB responsible for developing and implementing "Federal information policies, principles, standards, and guidelines" (44 U.S.C. 3504(a)). Among these responsibilities are those for issuing guidance on the Privacy Act of 1974. These FOIA fee guidelines rely on that authority to remind agencies that the fee schedule provided herein does not apply to individuals seeking access to their own records which are filed in Privacy Act systems of records. Similarly, the budgetary authorities cited mandate that funds agencies receive for providing FOIA services are to be deposited in the general revenues of the United States rather than individual agency accounts. OMB has made one change to this section and that is to add a reference to the Privacy Act of 1974.

##### *Section 6. Definitions:*

*Section 6b. "Statute Specifically Providing for Setting the level of fees for particular types of records."*

A few commentators addressed this definition and suggested that it was too broad and general and could permit agencies, on a discretionary basis, to “circumvent the general FOIA policy of minimal fees for statutory access to agency records.” The commentators urged that we include in the definition that a qualifying statute would have to specifically establish a level of fees and specifically identify a particular type of records for which the fees could be charged.

It was not OMB's intention to have this provision read broadly, since the legislative history relating to this provision is unambiguous in stating that it is not intended to change existing law. We have therefore revised the section to meet the concerns of the commentators. We would note only, however, that a number of commentators misquoted the plain wording of the provision by insisting that a qualifying statute must set a specific level of fees rather than specifically providing for the setting of fees by an agency. Our guidance makes it clear that a qualifying statute must require, not merely permit, an agency to establish fees for particular documents.

The commentators also objected to the first subparagraph in the definition which refers to statutes that “serve both the general public and private sector organizations by conveniently making available government information . . .,” and urged its elimination on the basis that it is “so vague and meaningless that it could probably be applied to any statute allowing disclosure of information.” The objectionable paragraph is taken from the legislation establishing the National Technical Information Service (albeit somewhat condensed) and we have left it unchanged, but note that it is to be read in conjunction with the other subparagraphs in providing a generic description of such fee statutes.

*Section 6c. “Direct Costs.”*

Two categories of commentators addressed the issue of charging a percentage of an employee's salary to cover benefits. Non-federal commentators thought that such charges were improper because they represented agency overhead costs rather than direct costs. Federal agency commentators, on the other hand, pointed out that the 16 percent rate the guidance attributed to benefits was inconsistent with OMB's own guidance in Circular No. A-76 which uses a much higher percentage.

As to the first point, the Freedom of Information Act permits agencies to charge only for allowable reasonable direct costs of providing certain FOIA services. Employee salaries are clearly a direct cost of providing FOIA services. The cost to the agency of conducting, for example, a search for a document is the salary that must be paid to the employee performing the search multiplied by the time he or she spends searching.

The elements used to calculate an employee's total salary are the pay grade of the employee and any fringe benefits. Because the agency is permitted to charge only “reasonable” direct costs, the inclusion of some kinds of fringe benefits would be clearly unreasonable. For example, an agency that maintains recreational facilities for employees and their families could not count the cost of operating the facility as a reasonable direct cost for FOIA fee purposes. But, an employer's contribution to a retirement system and to health and life insurance programs are concrete identifiable costs directly associated with the salary of the employee and should be counted as part of the direct costs of providing FOIA services.

As to the second point, the figure cited in OMB Circular No. A-76 was developed for a different purpose and on a different basis. The circular uses a figure, for example, of 27.9 percent as a cost factor in determining agency costs for employee retirement. The figure includes not only the direct 7 percent agency contribution, but other governmental sources of funds for the Civil Service Retirement System. While 27.9 percent may be an appropriate figure for purposes of Circular No. A-76, the “direct reasonable cost” restriction of the Freedom of Information Act precludes using more than the 7 percent agency contribution. OMB arrived at the 16 percent figure in consultation with the Office of Personnel Management, and it is retained in the final version of our guidance.

Some readers noted that the 16 percent figure was rendered 16.1 in Section 7a of the guidelines. That was a typographical error.

*Section 6d. "Search."*

Several commentators objected to the inclusion of line-by-line searches as an example of search. It is not often that an agency would need to read a document line-by-line to locate records responsive to a request, and agencies should not artificially raise search costs by unnecessarily spending time reading a document for responsive records when it would be cheaper and faster simply to reproduce the entire document. Our intention was to provide guidance on the scope of what constitutes FOIA search and we were careful to distinguish line-by-line search from review. We have accordingly modified the section to make it clear that agencies should not conduct line-by-line searches when whole document reproduction would be cheaper and faster.

*Section 6f. "Review."*

Several Federal agency commentators suggested that we provide greater detail on what constitutes review of documents for which agencies may charge commercial use requesters. We have therefore expanded the explanation.

*Section 6g. "Commercial Use Request."*

Although the legislative history is in conflict on the precise meaning of this provision, it seems clear that the Congress intended to distinguish between requesters whose use of the information was for a use that furthered their business interests, as opposed to a use that in some way benefited the public. The amendment shifts some of the burden of paying for the FOIA to the former group and lessens it for the latter.

As opposed to the other fee categories created by the amendment, inclusion in this one is determined not by the identity of the requester, but the use to which he or she will put the information obtained. Because "use" is the exclusive determining criterion, it is possible to envision a commercial enterprise making a request that is not for a commercial use. It is also possible that a non-profit organization could make a request that is for a commercial use. Moreover, because "use," not identity, controls, agencies will have to spend more time than they do now in determining what the requester intends to do with the records sought.

Both the legislative history and the comments on OMB's proposed fee guidance contain suggestions that agencies can look to the identities of requesters and automatically assign them to or exclude them from this category. Indeed, the original OMB proposal instructed agencies that a request, without further explanation, submitted on corporate letterhead could be presumed to be for a commercial use. Commentators urged that we also include a presumption that requests submitted on the letterhead of a non-profit organization be for a non-commercial purpose. We no longer think either presumption should be made automatically since both would be based upon the identity of the requester as opposed to the use to which he or she intended to put the records sought. We have therefore revised the definition to eliminate the example.

Many commentators were troubled by the breadth of OMB's proposed definition of "commercial use," arguing that by defining such a use as one which is "related to" commerce, OMB was providing too tenuous a connection to be meaningful. OMB has revised the definition to attempt to provide a more meaningful linkage. "Commercial use" is therefore defined as a use that "furthers the commercial, trade or profit interests of the requester or person on whose behalf the request is made."

*Section 6h. "Educational Institution."*

Many commentators were concerned about our definition of "educational institution." One Federal agency, for ex-

ample, pointed out that it would exclude high schools from this category of FOIA requesters. The legislative history is unhelpful on this point, nowhere defining the term. One commentator recommended the definition found in Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language (2nd. ed. 1968) in which the word "education" means providing instruction or information; an "educational institutional" is an entity organized to provide instruction or information. The problem with this suggestion is that it is not sufficiently discriminating. There are very few \*10014 organizations that do not in some way "provide information" and who would not qualify as "an entity organized to provide information."

Other commentators recommended the definition of educational institution used by the Internal Revenue Service in its regulations implementing Section 501(c)(3) of the Tax Code. Institutions meeting this definition qualify for tax exempt treatment. The commentators pointed out that since the task the FOIA Reform Act set OMB was to develop a uniform fee schedule, looking to an existing definition would be consistent with the statutory intent. After some consideration, OMB agrees that while it would be appropriate to incorporate an existing and well understood definition, neither the Tax Code nor the IRS regulations implementing the Code serve that purpose well. The statute merely provides that "Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for . . . educational purposes . . .," qualify for exemption from taxation. The IRS regulations interpreting this somewhat vague statutory provision are themselves too general to be useful to the agencies in determining an institution's eligibility under the FOIA fee schedule. Moreover, OMB does not think it is appropriate to tie eligibility for inclusion in the "educational institution" fee category to an IRS interpretation of the institution's eligibility for tax exempt status.

Rather than using the IRS definition, OMB thinks it more appropriate to look to the Department of Education definition found in 20 U.S.C. 1681(c). Accordingly, the terms of that statutory definition have been adapted for use in a revised definition, but it is intended that they be given their plain meaning in the FOIA context. Moreover, these terms must be applied in conjunction with the FOIA's "scholarly research" requirement. Thus, the definition has been revised to read " 'educational institution' refers to a preschool, a public or private elementary or secondary school, an institution of graduate higher education, an institution of undergraduate higher education, an institution of professional education and an institution of vocational education, which operates a program or programs of scholarly research."

As a practical matter, it is unlikely that a preschool or elementary or secondary school would be able to qualify for treatment as an "educational" institution since few preschools, for example, could be said to conduct programs of scholarly research. But, agencies should be prepared to evaluate requests on an individual basis when requesters can demonstrate that the request is from an institution that is within the category, that the institution has a program of scholarly research, and that the documents sought are in furtherance of the institution's program of scholarly research and not for a commercial use.

Agencies should ensure that it is apparent from the nature of the request that it serves a scholarly research goal of the institution, rather than an individual goal. Thus, for example, a request from a professor of geology at a State university for records relating to soil erosion, written on letterhead of the Department of Geology, could be presumed to be from an educational institution. A request from the same person for drug information from the Food and Drug Administration in furtherance of a murder mystery he is writing would not be presumed to be an institutional request, regardless of whether it was written on institutional stationary. Indeed, such a request could reasonably be construed to be a request that is for a commercial use.

The institutional versus individual test would apply to student requests as well. A student who makes a request in furtherance of the completion of a course of instruction is carrying out an individual research goal and the request would not qualify, although the student in this case would certainly have the opportunity to apply to the agency for a reduction or waiver of fees.

One commentator suggested that OMB should read the phrase "scholarly or scientific research" conjunctively in association with the term "educational institution" so that a request from an educational institution in furtherance of either scholarly or scientific research would qualify. OMB rejected this suggestion; the statute and the legislative

history recite the formula “educational or scientific institution/scholarly or scientific research,” and it seems clear that the phrase was meant to be read disjunctively so that scholarly applies to educational institution and scientific applies to non-commercial scientific institution.

*Section 6i. “Non-Commercial Scientific Institution.”*

A number of Federal agencies commented on this definition. Several suggested that qualifying institutions be limited to those conducting research in the natural sciences. OMB rejected this suggestion; there is no support in either the statute, the legislative history, or the plain meaning of the term to permit such a narrow reading.

Other agency commentators suggested that the word “non-commercial” be more fully defined so that an institution whose purpose was to further a specific product or industry would be excluded from this category. OMB has accepted this suggestion and modified the definition accordingly.

OMB has also revised the definition to ensure consistency with the definition of “commercial” in Section 6g.

*Section 6j. “Representative of the News Media.”*

This definition drew the most comments of any section. Commentators generally fell into two classes. The first consisted of newsletter publishers and their representatives who were concerned that the guidelines could be read to exclude them from qualifying as “representatives of the news media.” The second class had broader concerns about the definition, and were especially concerned about its perceived narrowness.

Many of the newsletter commentators pointed to their accreditation to the House and Senate press galleries as evidence of their membership in the new media category. It was not OMB's intention to exclude the publishers of newsletters from this category. The examples provided in the definition were not intended to be all-inclusive. Certainly newsletters, if they meet all of the other criteria, would qualify as “representatives of the news media” for purposes of this definition. To avoid implying any such limitation, OMB has replaced the references to “newspaper” and “magazine” in the definition with the word “periodical.”

The other class of commentators criticized the narrowness of OMB's proposed definition, pointing to the words of Senator Leahy in the legislative history that “[i]t is critical that the phrase ‘representative of the news media’ be broadly interpreted if the Act is to work as expected.” Cong. Rec. S.14298 (daily ed. September 30, 1986). They asserted that including the words “established,” “general circulation,” “working for,” and “regularly,” all served to unnecessarily limit what they perceived to be the breadth of the definition's coverage.

OMB has carefully considered these comments. Our intention in this section was to provide the agencies and the public with a workable definition. We used the word “established” not to limit eligibility only to those organizations in being at the time of the issuance of the guidance, but simply to indicate that a qualifying organization must be able to show some evidence of its identity beyond the mere assertion that it is a member of the news media. Press accreditation, guild membership, a history of continuing publication, business registration, Federal Communications Commission licensing, for example, would suffice. The word “regularly” which the legislative history shows Senator Leahy using in precisely this context, was meant to indicate that a qualifying organization would have to show that it was a continuing venture that was publishing or broadcasting news to the public. Thus, a newly established newspaper would be able to do so by demonstrating that it had held itself out for subscription and had in fact enrolled subscribers.

The phrase “general circulation” was misinterpreted by many commentators: members of the public and Federal agencies as well. OMB intended the phrase to refer to a newsworthy product that was broadcast or published in a manner that made it available to the general public, not that it had to have an exclusively general content or that it had to be circulated exclusively to a general audience.

In any case, OMB has sought to address these concerns by redrafting the section so that “news media” is defined generically as “an entity that is organized and operated to publish or broadcast news to the public.” The American Heritage Dictionary (Second College Edition, 1982) defines the word “news” as “. . . Recent events and happenings, esp. those that are unusual or notable. . . . Information about recent events of general interest, esp. as reported by newspapers, periodicals, radio or television . . . A presentation or broadcast of such information: newscast. . . . Newsworthy material.”

Thus, “news media” is further limited to purveyors of information that is current or would be of current interest. The Congress could easily have drafted the section to read “representative of the media” rather than “news media,” but it did not; therefore, OMB thinks it is reasonable to give some weight to the term “news” when constructing a definition. The examples given cite the traditional models—radio and television stations as well as publishers of periodicals that disseminate “news,”—but also look to evolving non-traditional distributors, such as videotext. While these examples are not meant to be all-inclusive, they are meant to be limiting, and to give meaning to the phrase “publish or broadcast news” so that it implies something more than merely “make information available.” The news media perform an active rather than passive role in dissemination. Thus, they can be distinguished, for example, from an entity such as a library which stores information and makes it available on demand.

The provision for freelancer eligibility, especially the term “solid basis for expecting publication” also drew comments. OMB’s aim was to incorporate legitimate freelance representatives of the news media into the categorical definition without opening the door to anyone merely calling himself or herself a freelance journalist. Many commentators noted that while it was quite reasonable to require freelancers to show some evidence that they could expect their work to be published before granting them access to this category of requester, they were troubled by the use of the phrase “solid basis.” OMB has attempted to address these concerns by adding to this section examples amplifying what solid basis means, e.g., a publication contract would be the clearest basis, but freelancer’s past publication history could also be considered. In any case, freelancers who do not qualify for inclusion in the “representatives of the news media” category because they cannot demonstrate a solid basis for expecting publication could be eligible to seek a reduction or waiver of fees if they meet the statutory waiver criteria.

#### *Section 7. “Fees to be Charged.”*

A number of commentators expressed frustration that OMB was not issuing a unitary schedule of fees which would establish one government-wide charge for each FOIA service performed. OMB is sympathetic to this position, but does not believe that the FOIA Reform Act gives it the authority to do so. Because the FOIA Reform Act requires each agency’s fees to be based upon its direct reasonable operating costs of providing FOIA services, OMB is precluded from establishing a government-wide fee schedule.

Commentators urged OMB to emphasize in this section that the effect of the FOIA amendment was to minimize costs by creating categorical limitations on what fees could be charged. They asserted that OMB’s direction to the agencies to “charge fees that recoup the full direct costs they incur . . .,” was at the least misleading, given the statutory limitations. OMB agrees and has revised the sentence to read “full allowable direct costs” to make it clear that agencies must look to the categorical limitations in the statute and charge fees accordingly.

Commentators pointed out that OMB’s encouragement of agencies to use private sector services to locate, reproduce and disseminate records in response to FOIA requests, while consistent with the policy articulated in OMB Circular No. A-130, needed some limitations. Commentator specifically wanted OMB to make it clear that the ultimate costs for requesters serviced by private sector contractors should be no different than if serviced by an agency. They also suggested that OMB clarify that there are some services that agencies may not contract out: e.g., records for the application of an exemption or the waiving of a fee. OMB has accordingly redrafted the section to accommodate these concerns.

*Section 7b. "Computer Searches for Records."*

At the suggestion of a Federal agency commentator, OMB has added a provision permitting agencies to establish agency-wide average computer processing unit operating costs and operator/programmer salaries for purposes of determining fees for computer searches where they can reasonably do so because these costs are relatively uniform across the agency. This provision is meant to encourage agencies to minimize FOIA costs by reducing the administrative steps necessary to establish a fee for a particular search. It is not meant to allow agencies to raise the prices of such searches by including in the average expensive but seldom-used equipment.

OMB has also revised this section to make it clear that agencies may only charge search costs for that portion of the operation of the central processing unit (CPU) and operator salary that is directly attributable to the FOIA search.

*Section 7c. "Review of Records."*

Several Federal agency commentators requested additional clarification of when review costs could be charged, i.e., at what point in the processing of a request were review charges permitted and could charges be made for subsequent review of materials. OMB has revised this section to address these concerns and clarify that charges may only be assessed the first time an agency reviews a record for the application of an exemption and not at the administrative appeal level of an exemption already applied.

At the suggestion of a Federal agency commentator, OMB has added a provision permitting agencies to establish an agency-wide average cost for review when review is performed by a single class of employee. The intent is to minimize agency administrative costs.

*\*10016 Section 7d. "Duplication of Records."*

One commentator objected to the salary of the employee operating the duplicating machinery being included as a reasonable direct cost of duplication. Since the operation of a duplicating machine is necessary to produce a copy of a document, OMB considers this a reasonable direct cost and has not changed the section.

*Section 7e. "Other Charges."*

Several commentators objected to the inclusion of fees for normal packaging and mailing of records in this section, arguing that mailing records was a reasonable interpretation of the FOIA requirement that agencies "make . . . records promptly available . . ." They argued that an agency requiring a requester to come from Alaska to Washington, D.C. to obtain records responsive to his request could hardly be said to be making records available. Upon reflection, OMB concurs and has deleted charges for ordinary packaging and mailing as examples of allowable other charges.

*Section 7f. "Restrictions on Assessing Fees."*

OMB has revised this section to provide greater detail on how agencies should develop costs relating to the 100 free pages of reproduction and two hours of free search time the FOIA Reform Act permits certain classes of requesters. The revision also reminds agencies of the consequences of these restrictions for the use of contractors to perform search and duplication services: specifically, that contracts must incorporate free search and reproduction services when appropriate.

OMB also added an explanation of how agencies should determine what constitutes two hours of free computer search time. Since most computer searches are accomplished in seconds and fractions of seconds, it would be unreasonable to

interpret the statutory free search time to mean that an individual would be entitled to require an agency to operate a computer for two hours. The cost and the disruption of an agency's normal ADP activities would be prohibitively expensive. OMB has therefore developed a formula based upon the concept of manual search, i.e., search done by an agency employee who examines records to find those that are responsive to a request. The employee performing the computer search who is most nearly like the clerical searcher is the operator. The guidance, therefore, tells agencies that a requester is entitled to two hours of operator salary translated into computer search costs (computer search consists of operator salary plus CPU operating time cost for the duration of the search).

*Section 7g. "Waiving or Reducing Fees."*

OMB has dropped this section. A number of commentators pointed out that OMB's role is limited by the plain wording of the statute to developing guidelines and a fee schedule. In looking carefully at this requirement, OMB has determined that developing a schedule providing for the charging of fees and issuing guidance on when fees should be reduced or waived are separate issues and that OMB's role does not involve the latter consideration. In developing a fee schedule and guidance on its implementation that the statute clearly contemplates, it was necessary for OMB to carefully define the categories or classes of requester and explain to the agencies what fees to charge them. Thus, for example, OMB discussed the exclusion of search fees for educational/scientific institutional requesters and representatives of the news media. This discussion was about the establishment and limitation of fees for a particular category of requester. It was not about waiving search fees since the statute gives agencies no discretion about what search fees to charge this class of requester. OMB considers the development of such definitions as required by the statute and thus squarely within its proper responsibilities.

*Section 8. "Fees to be Charged."*

OMB has added the phrase "requesters must reasonably describe the records sought" to all categories of requesters to accommodate some commentators' concerns that OMB was creating a new requirement for a particular class of requester by applying this requirement to educational/scientific institutional requesters and representatives of the news media alone.

*Section 8d. "All Other Requesters."*

OMB has revised this section to explain that the requests of record subjects asking for copies of records about themselves filed in agencies' systems of records must be processed under the Privacy Act's fee schedule.

*Section 8a. "Commercial Use Requesters."*

OMB has removed the reference to fee waivers, based upon the discussion in Section 7g. above.

*Section 9a. "Charging Interest."*

OMB has revised this section to specify that interest will accrue from the date the bill was mailed if fees are not paid by the 30th day following the billing date. To ensure that agencies do not bill interest because of defects in their own administrative procedures, the section has been revised to provide that agencies should ensure their accounting procedures are adequate to properly credit a requester who has remitted the fee within the time period. To guard against inadequate processing procedures, the guidelines require that receipt of a fee by the agency, whether processed or not, will stay the accrual of interest.

*Section 9b. "Charges for Unsuccessful Search."*

Many requesters urged OMB to delete this section. Some argued that it could be used by an agency to surprise and unwary requester with an unexpected and potentially ruinous bill. OMB thinks that an agency should be entitled to charge for unsuccessful search, but agrees that it should be done with the knowledge and consent of the requester. Thus the section has been revised to require agencies to notify requesters who have not agreed to pay fees as high as those anticipated when charges are likely to exceed \$25.

*Section 9c. "Aggregating Requests."*

Requesters generally agreed that agencies should not permit a requester to make multiple requests merely to avoid paying fees. There was disagreement about what standard to use in such cases and many requesters urged that OMB adopt a 30-day limit.

The 30-day limit, while providing certainty for both the requester and the agency, does not achieve the goal of allowing an agency to identify requesters who are attempting to circumvent the fee provisions of the statute and charge accordingly. Therefore, OMB has declined to change its original proposal, a "reasonable belief" standard, but has provided examples to help agencies understand what "reasonable" means in this context. Thus, agencies could presume that multiple requests for documents that could reasonably have been the subject of a single request and which occur within a 30-day period are made to avoid paying fees. Agencies may make that presumption for requests occurring over a longer period, but should have a solid basis for doing so.

Commentators also suggested that agencies should not be able to aggregate requests from a single requester for records on unrelated subjects nor from different requesters for records about the same subject. As to the first, OMB agrees and has revised this section to reflect this concern. As to the second, OMB does not agree that agencies should in no circumstances be able to aggregate requests from multiple users. However, such aggregation should occur rarely and only when the agency has solid evidence that multiple requesters are colluding to avoid paying FOIA fees. OMB has included cautions to this effect in the section.

*Section 9d. "Advance Payments."*

The Amendments clearly permit agencies to charge and collect advance payments in two specific circumstances: (1) When fees will exceed \$250; or when a requester has previously failed to pay fees in a timely fashion. Non-federal commentators generally argued that this provision should be read as a limitation rather than an authorization: i.e., "agencies may only charge advance fees when. . ." OMB has accordingly revised this section to incorporate the limitation concept and also to ensure that agencies use this provision fairly. Thus, when agencies determine the estimated fee is likely to exceed \$250, they should seek satisfactory assurances of payment if the requester has a record of prompt payment. If the requester has no history of payment, they may ask for an advance payment of an amount up to the estimated cost. For requesters who have failed to pay in a timely fashion in the past, however, or who are currently delinquent, agencies are encouraged to require full prepayment of the estimated amount.

Uniform Freedom of Information Act Fee Schedule and Guidelines

To the Heads of Executive Departments and Establishments

1. Purpose—This Fee Schedule and Guidelines implement certain provisions of the Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-570) which require the Office of Management and Budget to promulgate guidelines containing a uniform schedule of FOIA fees applicable to all agencies that are subject to the FOIA.

Data from agencies' annual FOIA reports to the Congress as well as studies by the General Accounting Office and others indicate that inconsistent application of the Act's fee provisions has sometimes resulted in inequitable treatment of users of the Act as well as substantial loss of revenues to the Treasury. While the legislative history of the 1974

amendments to the Freedom of Information Act shows that the Congress did not intend that fees be erected as barriers to citizen access, it is quite clear that the Congress did intend that agencies recover of their costs. The 1986 Amendments to the Act clarify that congressional intention further by creating specific categories of requesters and prescribing fees for each category. Therefore, these Guidelines provide a schedule of fees and related administrative procedures in order to establish a consistent government-wide framework for assessing and collecting FOIA fees.

2. Scope—This Fee Schedule and Guidelines apply to all agencies subject to the Freedom of Information Act (see 5 U.S.C. 552(f)).

3. Effective Date—This Fee Schedule and Guidelines are effective upon issuance—April 27, 1987.

4. Inquires—Inquiries should be directed to Robert N. Veeder at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. Telephone: (202) 395-4814.

5. Authorities—The Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552), as amended; the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 35); the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a); the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (31 U.S.C. 1 et. seq.); the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act (31 U.S.C. 67 et seq.).

6. Definitions—For the purpose of these Guidelines:

a. All the terms defined in the Freedom of Information Act apply.

b. A “statute specifically providing for setting the level of fees for particular types of records” (5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(A)(vi)) means any statute that specifically requires a government agency, such as the Government Printing Office (GPO) or the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), to set the level of fees for particular types of records, in order to:

(1) Serve both the general public and private sector organizations by conveniently making available government information;

(2) Ensure that groups and individuals pay the cost of publications and other services which are for their special use so that these costs are not borne by the general taxpaying public;

(3) Operate an information dissemination activity on a self-sustaining basis to the maximum extent possible; or

(4) Return revenue to the Treasury for defraying, wholly or in part, appropriated funds used to pay the cost of disseminating government information.

Statutes, such as the User Fee Statute, which only provide a general discussion of fees without explicitly requiring that an agency set and collect fees for particular documents do not supersede the Freedom of Information Act under section (a)(4)(A)(vi) of that statute.

c. The term “direct costs” means those expenditures which an agency actually incurs in searching for and duplicating (and in the case of commercial requesters, reviewing) documents to respond to a FOIA request. Direct costs include, for example, the salary of the employee performing work (the basic rate of pay for the employee plus 16 percent of that rate to cover benefits) and the cost of operating duplicating machinery. Not included in direct costs are overhead expenses such as costs of space, and heating or lighting the facility in which the records are stored.

d. The term “search” includes all time spent looking for material that is responsive to a request, including

page-by-page or line-by-line identification of material within documents. Agencies should ensure that searching for material is done in the most efficient and least expensive manner so as to minimize costs for both the agency and the requester. For example, agencies should not engage in line-by-line search when merely duplicating an entire document would prove the less expensive and quicker method of complying with a request. "Search" should be distinguished, moreover, from "review" of material in order to determine whether the material is exempt from disclosure (see subparagraph 6f below). Searches may be done manually or by computer using existing programming.

e. The term "duplication" refers to the process of making a copy of a document necessary to respond to an FOIA request. Such copies can take the form of paper copy, microform, audio-visual materials, or machine readable documentation (e.g., magnetic tape or disk), among others. The copy provided must be in a form that is reasonably usable by requesters.

f. The term "review" refers to the process of examining documents located in response to a request that is for a commercial use (see subparagraph 6g below) to determine whether any portion of any document located is permitted to be withheld. It also includes processing any documents for disclosure, e.g., doing all that is necessary to excise them and otherwise prepare them for release. Review does not include time spent resolving general legal or policy issues regarding the application of exemptions.

g. The term " 'commercial use' request" refers to a request from or on behalf of one who seeks information for a use or purpose that furthers the commercial, trade, or profit interests of the requester or the person on whose behalf the request is made. In determining whether a requester properly belongs in this category, agencies must determine the use to which a requester will put the documents requested. Moreover, where an agency has reasonable cause to doubt the use to which a requester will put the records sought, or where that use is not clear from the request itself, agencies should seek additional clarification before assigning the request to a specific category.

h. The term "educational institution" refers to a preschool, a public or private elementary or secondary school, an institution of graduate higher education, an institution of undergraduate higher education, an institution of professional education, and an institution of vocational education, which operates a program or programs of scholarly research.

i. The term "non-commercial scientific institution" refers to an institution that is not operated on a "commercial" basis as that term is referenced in 6g above, and which is operated solely for the purpose of conducting scientific research the results of which are not intended to promote any particular product or industry.

j. The term "representative of the news media" refers to any person actively gathering news for an entity that is organized and operated to publish or broadcast news to the public. The term "news" means information that is about current events or that would be of current interest to the public. Examples of news media entities include television or radio stations broadcasting to the public at large, and publishers of periodicals (but only in those instances when they can qualify as disseminators of "news") who make their products available for purchase or subscription by the general public. These examples are not intended to be all-inclusive. Moreover, as traditional methods of news delivery evolve (e.g., electronic dissemination of newspapers through telecommunications services), such alternative media would be included in this category. In the case of "freelance" journalists, they may be regarded as working for a news organization if they can demonstrate a solid basis for expecting publication through that organization, even though not actually employed by it. A publication contract would be the clearest proof, but agencies may also look to the past publication record of a requester in making this determination.

7. Fees To Be Charged—General. Agencies should charge fees that recoup the full allowable direct costs they incur. Moreover, they shall use the most efficient and least costly methods to comply with requests for documents made under the FOIA.

Agencies are encouraged to contract with private sector services to locate, reproduce and disseminate records in

response to FOIA requests when that is the most efficient and least costly method. When doing so, however, agencies should ensure that the ultimate cost to the requester is no greater than it would be if the agency itself had performed these tasks. In no case may an agency contract out responsibilities which the FOIA provides that it alone may discharge, such as determining the applicability of an exemption, or determining whether to waive or reduce fees.

In addition, agencies should ensure that when documents that would be responsive to a request are maintained for distribution by agencies operating statutory-based fee schedule programs (see definition in paragraph 6b above), such as the NTIS, they inform requesters of the steps necessary to obtain records from those sources.

a. Manual Searches for Records—Whenever feasible, agencies should charge at the salary rate(s) (i.e. basic pay plus 16 percent) of the employee(s) making the search. However, where a homogeneous class of personnel is used exclusively (e.g., all administrative/clerical, or all professional/executive), agencies may establish an average rate for the range of grades typically involved.

b. Computer Searches for Records—Agencies should charge at the actual direct cost of providing the service. This will include the cost of operating the central processing unit (CPU) for that portion of operating time that is directly attributable to searching for records responsive to a FOIA request and operator/programmer salary apportionable to the search. When agencies can establish a reasonable agency-wide average rate for CPU operating costs and operator/programmer salaries involved in FOIA searches, they may do so and charge accordingly.

c. Review of Records—Only requesters who are seeking documents for commercial use may be charged for time agencies spend reviewing records to determine whether they are exempt from mandatory disclosure. It should be noted that charges may be assessed only for the initial review; i.e., the review undertaken the first time an agency analyzes the applicability of a specific exemption to a particular record or portion of a record. Agencies may not charge for review at the administrative appeal level of an exemption already applied. However, records or portions of records withheld in full under an exemption which is subsequently determined not to apply may be reviewed again to determine the applicability of other exemptions not previously considered. The costs for such a subsequent review would be properly assessable. Where a single class of reviewers is typically involved in the review process, agencies may establish a reasonable agency-wide average and charge accordingly.

d. Duplication of Records—Agencies shall establish an average agency-wide, per-page charge for paper copy reproduction of documents. This charge shall represent the reasonable direct costs of making such copies, taking into account the salary of the operators as well the cost of the reproduction machinery. For copies prepared by computer, such as tapes or printouts, agencies shall charge the actual cost, including operator time, of production of the tape or printout. For other methods of reproduction or duplication, agencies should charge the actual direct costs of producing the document(s). In practice, if the agency estimates that duplication charges are likely to exceed \$25, it shall notify the requester of the estimated amount of fees, unless the requester has indicated in advance his willingness to pay fees as high as those anticipated. Such a notice shall offer a requester the opportunity to confer with agency personnel with the object of reformulating the request to meet his or her needs at a lower cost.

e. Other Charges—It should be noted that complying with requests for special services such as those listed below is entirely at the discretion of the agency. Neither the FOIA nor its fee structure cover these kinds of services. Agencies should recover the full costs of providing services such as those enumerated below to the extent that they elect to provide them:

- (1) Certifying that records are true copies;
- (2) Sending records by special methods such as express mail, etc.

f. Restrictions on Assessing Fees—With the exception of requesters seeking documents for a commercial use, Section

(4)(A)(iv) of the Freedom of Information Act, as amended, requires agencies to provide the first 100 pages of duplication and the first two hours of search time without charge. Moreover, this section prohibits agencies from charging fees to any requester, including commercial use requesters, if the cost of collecting a fee would be equal to or greater than the fee itself. These provisions work together, so that except for commercial use requesters, agencies would not begin to assess fees until after they had provided the free search and reproduction. For example, for a request that involved two hours and ten minutes of search time and resulted in 105 pages of documents, an agency would determine the cost of only 10 minutes of search time and only five pages of reproduction. If this cost was equal to or less than the cost to the agency of billing the requester and processing the fee collected, no charges would result.

The elements to be considered in determining the “cost of collecting a fee,” are the administrative costs to the agency of receiving and recording a requester's remittance, and processing the fee for deposit in the Treasury Department's special account (or the agency's account if the agency is permitted to retain the fee). The per-transaction cost to the Treasury to handle such remittances is negligible and should not be considered in the agency's determination.

For purposes of these restrictions on assessment of fees, the word “pages” refers to paper copies of a standard agency size which will normally be “8 1/2 x 11” or “11 by 14.” Thus, requesters would not be entitled to 100 microfiche or 100 computer disks, for example. A microfiche containing the equivalent of 100 pages or 100 pages of computer printout, however, might meet the terms of the restriction.

Similarly, the term “search time” in this context has as its basis, manual search. To apply this term to searches made by computer, agencies should determine the hourly cost of operating the central processing unit and the operator's hourly salary plus 16 percent. When the cost of the search (including the operator time and the cost of operating the computer to process a request) equals the equivalent dollar amount of two hours of the salary of the person performing the search, i.e., the operator, agencies should begin assessing charges for computer search.

8. Fees to be Charged—Categories of Requesters. There are four categories of FOIA requesters: commercial use requesters; educational and non-commercial scientific institutions; representatives of the news media; and all other requesters. The Act prescribes specific levels of fees for each of these categories:

a. Commercial use requesters—When agencies receive a request for documents for commercial use, they should assess charges which recover the full direct costs of searching for, reviewing for release, and duplicating the records sought. Requesters must reasonably describe the records sought. Commercial use requesters are not entitled to two hours of free search time nor 100 free pages of reproduction of documents. Agencies are reminded that they may recover the cost of searching for and reviewing records even if there is ultimately no disclosure of records (see section 9b below).

b. Educational and Non-commercial Scientific Institution Requesters—Agencies shall provide documents to requesters in this category for the cost of reproduction alone, excluding charges for the first 100 pages. To be eligible for inclusion in this category, requesters must show that the request is being made as authorized by and under the auspices of a qualifying institution and that the records are not sought for a commercial use, but are sought in furtherance of scholarly (if the request is from an educational institution) or scientific (if the request is from a non-commercial scientific institution) research. Requesters must reasonably describe the records sought.

c. Requesters who are Representatives of the News Media—Agencies shall provide documents to requesters in this category for the cost of reproduction alone, excluding charges for the first 100 pages. To be eligible for inclusion in this category, a requester must meet the criteria in Section 6j above, and his or her request must not be made for a commercial use. In reference to this class of requester, a request for records supporting the news dissemination function of the requester shall not be considered to be a request that is for a commercial use. Thus, for example, a document request to the Department of Justice by a newspaper for records relating to the investigation of a defendant in a current criminal trial of public interest could be presumed to be request from an entity eligible for inclusion in this category.

and entitled to records for the cost of reproduction alone. Requesters must reasonably describe the records sought.

d. All Other Requesters—Agencies shall charge requesters who do not fit into any of the categories above fees which recover the full reasonable direct cost of searching for and reproducing records that are responsive to the request, except that the first 100 pages of reproduction and the first two hours of search time shall be furnished without charge. Moreover, requests from record subjects for records about themselves filed in agencies' systems of records will continue to be treated under the fee provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 which permit fees only for reproduction. Requesters must reasonably describe the records sought.

9. Administrative Actions to Improve Assessment and Collection of Fees—Agencies shall ensure that procedures for assessing and collecting fees are applied consistently and uniformly by all components. To do so, agencies should amend their agency-wide FOIA regulations to conform to the provisions of this Fee Schedule and Guidelines, especially including the following elements:

a. Charging Interest—Notice and Rate. Agencies may begin assessing interest charges on an unpaid bill starting on the 31st day following the day on which the billing was sent. Agencies should ensure that their accounting procedures are adequate to properly credit a requester who has remitted the full amount within the time period. The fact that the fee has been received by the agency, even if not processed, will suffice to stay the accrual of interest. Interest will be at the rate prescribed in Section 3717 of Title 31 U.S.C. and will accrue from the date of the billing.

b. Charges for Unsuccessful Search. Agencies should give notice in their regulations that they may assess charges for time spent searching, even if the agency fails to locate the records or if records located are determined to be exempt from disclosure. In practice, if the agency estimates that search charges are likely to exceed \$25, it shall notify the requester of the estimated amount of fees, unless the requester has indicated in advance his willingness to pay fees as high as those anticipated. Such a notice shall offer the requester the opportunity to confer with agency personnel with the object of reformulating the request to meet his or her needs at a lower cost.

c. Aggregating Requests. Except for requests that are for a commercial use, an agency may not charge for the first two hours of search time or for the first 100 pages of reproduction. However, a requester may not file multiple requests at the same time, each seeking portions of a document or documents, solely in order to avoid payment of fees. When an agency reasonably believes that a requester or, on rare occasions, a group of requesters acting in concert, is attempting to break a request down into a series of requests for the purpose of evading the assessment of fees, the agency may aggregate any such requests and charge accordingly. One element to be considered in determining whether a belief would be reasonable is the time period in which the requests have occurred. For example, it would be reasonable to presume that multiple requests of this type made within a 30-day period had been made to avoid fees. For requests made over a longer period, however, such a presumption becomes harder to sustain and agencies should have a solid basis for determining that aggregation is warranted in such cases. Agencies are cautioned that before aggregating requests from more than one requester, they must have a concrete basis on which to conclude that the requesters are acting in concert and are acting specifically to avoid payment of fees. In no case may agencies aggregate multiple requests on unrelated subjects from one requester.

d. Advance Payments. Agencies may not require a requester to make an advance payment, i.e., payment before work is commenced or continued on a request, unless:

(1) The agency estimates or determines that allowable charges that a requester may be required to pay are likely to exceed \$250. Then, the agency should notify the requester of the likely cost and obtain satisfactory assurance of full payment where the requester has a history of prompt payment of FOIA fees, or require an advance payment of an amount up to the full estimated charges in the case of requesters with no history of payment; or

(2) A requester has previously failed to pay a fee charged in a timely fashion (i.e., within 30 days of the date of the

billing), the agency may require the requester to pay the full amount owed plus any applicable interest as provided above or demonstrate that he has, in fact, paid the fee, and to make an advance payment of the full amount of the estimated fee before the agency begins to process a new request or a pending request from that requester.

When an agency acts under subparagraphs (1) or (2) above, the administrative time limits prescribed in subsection (a)(6) of the FOIA (i.e., 10 working days from receipt of initial requests and 20 working days from receipt of appeals from initial denial, plus permissible extensions of these time limits) will begin only after the agency has received fee payments described above.

e. Effect of the Debt Collection Act of 1982 (Pub. L. 97-365). Agencies' FOIA regulations should contain procedures for using the authorities of the Debt Collection Act, including disclosure to consumer reporting agencies and use of collection agencies, where appropriate, to encourage repayment.

10. Agencies' Required Implementing Actions—Section 1804(b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Reform Act requires agencies to promulgate final regulations in conformance with OMB's schedule and guidelines no later than the 180th day following enactment: April 25, 1987.

James C. Miller III,

Director.

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