Department of the Navy, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington (Respondent) and Bremerton Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO (Complainant) 

 



[ v02 p54 ]
02:0054(7)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:



 2 FLRA No. 7
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
 PUGET SOUND NAVAL SHIPYARD,
 BREMERTON, WASHINGTON
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 BREMERTON METAL TRADES COUNCIL,
 AFL-CIO
 Complainant
 
                                            Assistant Secretary
                                            Case Nos. 71-4280(CA) 
                                                      71-4333(CA)
 
 
                            DECISION AND ORDER
 
    ON MARCH 7, 1979, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE THOMAS SCHNEIDER ISSUED
 HIS RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PROCEEDING,
 FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAD ENGAGED IN SOME OF THE UNFAIR LABOR
 PRACTICES ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT AND RECOMMENDING THAT CERTAIN OTHER
 ALLEGED UNFAIR PRACTICES BE DISMISSED.  THEREAFTER, THE RESPONDENT FILED
 TIMELY EXCEPTIONS ONLY TO THAT PORTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S
 RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER PERTAINING TO HIS FINDING THAT THE
 RESPONDENT VIOLATED SECTION 19(A)(1) BY ITS ACTION IN SUSPENDING
 EMPLOYEE JOHN CLEARY.
 
    THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR FOR
 LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED,
 WERE TRANSFERRED TO THE AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 304 OF REORGANIZATION
 PLAN NO. 2 OF 1978 (43 F.R. 36040), WHICH TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS IS
 IMPLEMENTED BY SECTION 2400.2 OF THE AUTHORITY'S RULES AND REGULATIONS
 (44 F.R. 44741, JULY 30, 1979).  THE AUTHORITY CONTINUES TO BE
 RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THESE FUNCTIONS AS PROVIDED IN
 SECTION 7135(B) OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
 STATUTE (92 STAT. 1215).
 
    THEREFORE, PURSUANT TO SECTION 2400.2 OF THE AUTHORITY'S RULES AND
 REGULATIONS AND SECTION 7135(B) OF THE STATUTE, THE AUTHORITY HAS
 REVIEWED THE RULINGS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE MADE AT THE HEARING
 AND FINDS THAT NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED.  THE RULINGS ARE
 HEREBY AFFIRMED.  UPON CONSIDERATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S
 RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER AND THE ENTIRE RECORD IN THE SUBJECT
 CASE, INCLUDING THE RESPONDENT'S EXCEPTIONS AND SUPPORTING BRIEF, THE
 AUTHORITY HEREBY ADOPTS THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S FINDINGS,
 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION AS MODIFIED BELOW.
 
    THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE (ALJ) FOUND AS VIOLATIVE OF SECTION
 19(A)(1) OF THE ORDER THE TWO DAY SUSPENSION OF A UNION STEWARD WHO HAD
 BEEN DISCIPLINED BECAUSE OF HIS REMARKS TO THE GENERAL FOREMAN WHILE
 REPRESENTING ANOTHER EMPLOYEE.  THE ALJ CONCLUDED THAT THE UNION
 STEWARD'S IMPULSIVE LANGUAGE AROSE FROM HIS FRUSTRATION AT TRYING TO
 INTERVIEW AN EMPLOYEE REGARDING A GRIEVANCE, AND, THUS, CAME WITHIN THE
 DEFINITION OF "ROBUST DEBATE," WHICH THE ALJ CONSIDERED TO BE PROTECTED
 ACTIVITY UNDER THE ORDER.  WHILE THE AUTHORITY AGREES WITH THE ALJ THAT
 THE RESPONDENT VIOLATED THE ORDER IN DISCIPLINING THE UNION STEWARD FOR
 HIS IMPULSIVE LANGUAGE, IT REACHES THIS CONCLUSION FOR DIFFERENT
 REASONS.
 
    IN THE AUTHORITY'S VIEW FLAGRANT MISCONDUCT BY AN EMPLOYEE, EVEN
 THOUGH OCCURRING DURING THE COURSE OF PROTECTED ACTIVITY, MAY JUSTIFY
 DISCIPLINARY ACTION BY THE EMPLOYER.  ON THE OTHER HAND, NOT EVERY
 IMPROPRIETY COMMITTED DURING SUCH ACTIVITY IS BEYOND THE AMBIT OF
 PROTECTED ACTIVITY.  THE EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN PROTECTED
 ACTIVITY PERMITS LEEWAY FOR IMPULSIVE BEHAVIOR, WHICH IS BALANCED
 AGAINST THE EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO MAINTAIN ORDER AND RESPECT OF ITS
 SUPERVISORY STAFF ON THE JOB SITE.  THE AUTHORITY NEITHER DEFENDS NOR
 ENDORSES THE USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE IN THE CONDUCT OF LABOR
 MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR.  HOWEVER, UNDER THE
 CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, THE AUTHORITY FINDS THAT THE NATURE OF THE
 STEWARD'S CONDUCT AND LANGUAGE WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY FLAGRANT TO JUSTIFY
 REMOVING IT FROM THE AMBIT OF PROTECTED ACTIVITY.  IN THIS REGARD, THE
 AUTHORITY NOTES THE UNCONTESTED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE ALJ TO
 THE EFFECT THAT FOR A PERIOD OF APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH IMMEDIATELY
 PRECEEDING THE INCIDENT THE RESPONDENT, AND MOST PARTICULARLY THE
 GENERAL FOREMAN, HAD ENGAGED IN A PERVASIVE COURSE OF CONDUCT
 CONSTITUTING, AMONG OTHER THINGS, INTERFERENCE WITH, RESTRAINT AND
 COERCION OF EMPLOYEES AND UNION STEWARDS IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR
 PROTECTED RIGHT TO UTILIZE THE CONTRACTUALLY ESTABLISHED GRIEVANCE
 PROCEDURE.  IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE AUTHORITY CONCLUDES THAT THE
 STEWARD'S CONDUCT WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY FLAGRANT TO REMOVE IT FROM THE
 AMBIT OF PROTECTED ACTIVITY, AND, IN AGREEMENT WITH THE ALJ, FINDS THAT
 THE RESPONDENT VIOLATED SECTION 19(A)(1) OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491,
 AS AMENDED, BY SUSPENDING HIM FOR SUCH CONDUCT.  /1/
 
                                   ORDER
 
    PURSUANT TO SECTION 2400.2 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE
 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND SECTION 7135 OF THE FEDERAL
 SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE, THE AUTHORITY HEREBY ORDERS
 THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, PUGET SOUND NAVAL SHIPYARD, BREMERTON,
 WASHINGTON, SHALL:
 
    1.  CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
 
    (A) INTERFERING WITH, RESTRAINING, OR COERCING ITS EMPLOYEES IN THE
 EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS TO UTILIZE THE CONTRACTUALLY ESTABLISHED
 GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE.
 
    (B) DISCOURAGING EMPLOYEE HESTAND, OR ANY OTHER EMPLOYEE, FROM
 MEMBERSHIP IN A LABOR ORGANIZATION BY EXCESSIVE ASSIGNMENT TO ONEROUS OR
 UNDESIRABLE WORK DUTIES.
 
    (C) SPONSORING, CONTROLLING, OR OTHERWISE ASSISTING A LABOR
 ORGANIZATION, EXCEPT AS PERMITTED BY THE EXECUTIVE ORDER.
 
    (D) IN ANY LIKE OR RELATED MANNER, INTERFERING WITH, RESTRAINING OR
 COERCING ITS EMPLOYEES IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS ASSURED BY THE
 EXECUTIVE ORDER.
 
    2.  TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS TO EFFECTUATE THE PURPOSES
 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED:
 
    (A) MAKE WHOLE, CONSISTENT WITH APPLICABLE LAW AND REGULATIONS, ANY
 LOSS OF INCOME EMPLOYEE JOHN CLEARY MAY HAVE SUFFERED BY REASON OF HIS
 TWO DAY SUSPENSION, ON OR ABOUT JANUARY 12, 1977, FOR ALLEGED
 INSUBORDINATION.
 
    (B) REMOVE OR EXPUNGE ALL REFERENCES TO THE TWO DAY SUSPENSION
 SUFFERED BY EMPLOYEE JOHN CLEARY FROM HIS PERSONNEL FILE AND FROM ANY
 OTHER DOCUMENTS IN THE POSSESSION OR CONTROL OF THE ACTIVITY IN WHICH
 SUCH REFERENCE MAY APPEAR.
 
    (C) POST IN ITS FACILITY AT BREMERTON, WASHINGTON, COPIES OF THE
 ATTACHED NOTICE MARKED "APPENDIX" ON FORMS TO BE FURNISHED BY THE
 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY.  UPON RECEIPT OF SUCH FORMS THEY
 SHALL BE SIGNED BY THE COMMANDER OF THE PUGET SOUND NAVAL SHIPYARD AND
 SHALL BE POSTED AND MAINTAINED BY HIM FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS THEREAFTER
 IN CONSPICUOUS PLACES, INCLUDING ALL PLACES WHERE NOTICES TO EMPLOYEES
 ARE CUSTOMARILY POSTED.  THE COMMANDER SHALL TAKE REASONABLE STEPS TO
 INSURE THAT SUCH NOTICES ARE NOT ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY
 OTHER MATERIAL.
 
    (D) NOTIFY THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, IN WRITING, WITHIN
 30 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS ORDER AS TO WHAT STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO
 COMPLY HEREWITH.
 
    IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT ALL OTHER ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINTS IN
 CASE NOS. 71-4280(CA) AND 71-4333(CA) BE, AND THEY HEREBY ARE,
 DISMISSED.  /2/
 
    ISSUED, WASHINGTON, D.C., NOVEMBER 2, 1979
 
                       RONALD W. HAUGHTON, CHAIRMAN
 
                       HENRY B. FRAZIER III, MEMBER
 
                   FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY /3/
 
        APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND
 
           ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND IN
 
          ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF CHAPTER 71 OF TITLE
 
                5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE
 
              LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR
 
                             EMPLOYEES THAT:
 
    WE WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH, RESTRAIN OR COERCE OUR EMPLOYEES IN THE
 EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS TO UTILIZE THE CONTRACTUALLY ESTABLISHED
 GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE.
 
    WE WILL NOT DISCOURAGE EMPLOYEE HESTAND, OR ANY OTHER EMPLOYEE, FROM
 MEMBERSHIP IN A LABOR ORGANIZATION BY EXCESSIVE ASSIGNMENT TO ONEROUS OR
 UNDESIRABLE WORK DUTIES.
 
    WE WILL NOT SPONSOR, CONTROL OR OTHERWISE ASSIST A LABOR ORGANIZATION
 EXCEPT AS PERMITTED BY THE EXECUTIVE ORDER.
 
    WE WILL NOT, IN ANY LIKE OR RELATED MANNER, INTERFERE WITH, RESTRAIN,
 OR COERCE OUR EMPLOYEES IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS ASSURED BY THE
 EXECUTIVE ORDER.
 
    WE WILL MAKE WHOLE, CONSISTENT WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND REGULATIONS,
 ANY LOSS OF INCOME EMPLOYEE JOHN CLEARY MAY HAVE SUFFERED BY REASON OF
 HIS TWO DAY SUSPENSION, ON OR ABOUT JANUARY 12, 1977, FOR ALLEGED
 INSUBORDINATION.
 
    WE WILL REMOVE OR EXPUNGE ALL REFERENCES TO THE TWO DAY SUSPENSION
 SUFFERED BY EMPLOYEE JOHN CLEARY FROM HIS PERSONNEL FILE AND FROM ANY
 OTHER DOCUMENTS IN OUR PERSONNEL FILE AND FROM ANY OTHER DOCUMENTS IN
 OUR POSSESSION OR CONTROL IN WHICH SUCH REFERENCE MAY APPEAR.
 
                           (AGENCY OR ACTIVITY)
 
    DATED:  . . .  BY:  . . .
 
                                (SIGNATURE)
 
    THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE
 OF POSTING, AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER
 MATERIAL.
 
    IF EMPLOYEES HAVE ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE
 WITH ANY OF ITS PROVISIONS, THEY MAY COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH THE
 REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, WHOSE
 ADDRESS IS:  450 GOLDEN GATE AVENUE, ROOM 11408, P.O. BOX 36016, SAN
 FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102, AND WHOSE TELEPHONE NUMBER IS:  (415)
 556-8105.
 
    W. DON WILSON
 
    LABOR RELATIONS ADVISOR
 
    OFFICE OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
 
    WESTERN FIELD DIVISION
 
    DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
 
    525 MARKET STREET, SUITE 3522
 
    SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94105
 
                            FOR THE RESPONDENT
 
    JON HOWARD ROSEN
 
    ATTORNEY AT LAW
 
    27TH FLOOR, SMITH TOWER BUILDING
 
    506 SECOND AVENUE
 
    SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104
 
                            FOR THE COMPLAINANT
 
    BEFORE:  THOMAS SCHNEIDER
 
                         ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
 
    THIS PROCEEDING WAS INITIATED UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS
 AMENDED;  THE NOTICE OF THE HEARING WAS ISSUED BY A REGIONAL
 ADMINISTRATOR OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, UNITED
 STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR;  AND THE PROCEEDING WAS CONDUCTED BEFORE THE
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS.  THIS DECISION,
 PURSUANT TO TRANSITION RULES AND REGULATIONS, FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL. 44,
 NO. 1, JANUARY 2, 1979, PAGES 7-8, IS ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE
 AUTHORITY AND, IN ACCORDANCE WITH SEC. 2400.2 (5 C.F.R. SEC. 2400.2) OF
 THE TRANSITION RULES AND REGULATIONS, SHALL BE PROCESSED BY THE
 AUTHORITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE ASSISTANT
 SECRETARY FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, TITLE 29, CODE OF FEDERAL
 REGULATIONS, PART 201, ET SEQ., EXCEPT THAT THE WORD "AUTHORITY" SHALL
 BE SUBSTITUTED WHEREVER THE WORDS "ASSISTANT SECRETARY" APPEAR IN THE
 RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY.
 
                            DECISION AND ORDER
 
    THE BREMERTON METAL TRADES COUNCIL ("UNION" OR "COUNCIL") FILED TWO
 COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE PUGET SOUND NAVAL SHIPYARD ("ACTIVITY").  THE
 COMPLAINT IN CASE NUMBER 71-4280(CA) WAS FILED JUNE 6, 1977 AND THE
 COMPLAINT IN CASE NUMBER 71-4333(CA) WAS FILED AUGUST 10, 1977.  THE
 LATTER COMPLAINT ALLEGED THAT THE ACTIVITY VIOLATED SUBSECTIONS (1), (2)
 AND (4) OF SECTION 19(A) OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED ("THE
 ORDER"), BY SUSPENDING JOHN E. CLEARY AND BY TERMINATING THE EMPLOYMENT
 OF JOSEPH E. PITTSON.  THE COMPLAINT IN CASE 71-4280(CA) ALLEGED THAT
 THE ACTIVITY VIOLATED SUBSECTIONS (1), (2), (4), (5) AND (6) OF SECTION
 19(A) OF THE ORDER, IN A SERIES OF INCIDENTS BETWEEN OCTOBER 1, 1976 AND
 FEBRUARY 4, 1977, AS WELL AS BY THE ACTIONS TAKEN AGAINST CLEARY AND
 PITTSON.
 
    ON FEBRUARY 24, 1978, THE REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 SERVICES, AFTER INVESTIGATING, DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT IN CASE
 71-4333(CA) IN ITS ENTIRETY AND DISMISSED A LARGE PORTION OF THE
 COMPLAINT IN CASE 71-4280(CA).
 
    UPON REVIEW ON JUNE 19, 1978, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR AGREED
 WITH THE REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR RESPECTING THE DISCHARGE OF JOSEPH
 PITTSON, AND HELD THAT SUCH DISCHARGE COULD NOT BE HELD VIOLATIVE OF THE
 ORDER SINCE THAT ISSUE COULD PROPERLY BE RAISED UNDER AN APPEALS
 PROCEDURE.  SEC. 19(D).  /4/ HOWEVER, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY HELD THAT
 ALL OTHER ALLEGATIONS OF BOTH COMPLAINTS SHOULD BE RESOLVED ON THE BASIS
 OF EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT A HEARING.
 
    SUCH A HEARING WAS HELD BEFORE ME IN BREMERTON, WASHINGTON, ON
 SEPTEMBER 11, 12, 13, 21 AND 22, 1978.  THE LAST BRIEFS WERE FILED ON
 DECEMBER 11, 1978.
 
                     FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
 
    BACKGROUND
 
    THE ACTIVITY HAS ACCORDED THE UNION EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION, AND HAS
 ENTERED INTO A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT WITH IT, WHICH WAS IN EFFECT AT ALL
 MATERIAL TIMES.
 
    FOR SEVERAL MONTHS PRIOR TO AUGUST 1976, SEVERAL PERSONS IN THE
 WELDING SHOP (SHOP 26 OR 926) AT THE ACTIVITY BELIEVED THEY WERE DOING
 WORK AT A HIGHER LEVEL THAN THEY WERE BEING PAID FOR.  A PERSON AT A
 LOWER CLASSIFICATION CAN GET PROMOTED TO A HIGHER CLASSIFICATION.  BUT
 EVEN WITHOUT BEING PROMOTED, IF A PERSON PERFORMS THE HIGHER
 CLASSIFICATION WORK FOR MORE THAN TWO WEEKS HE IS ENTITLED TO A
 TEMPORARY PROMOTION-- I.E., HIGHER PAY DURING THE TIME HE PERFORMS THE
 WORK AT THE HIGHER LEVEL.  (ART. EIGHTEEN, R-A.) /5/
 
    IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE SUCH COMPLAINTS AND TO ASSIST WITH ANY
 GRIEVANCES SUCH COMPLAINTS MIGHT LEAD TO, THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL
 APPOINTED JOSEPH E. PITTSON TO THE POST OF SHOP STEWARD, AND INFORMED
 THE ACTIVITY OF HIS APPOINTMENT ON SEPTEMBER 24, 1976 (C-1).
 
    THE ISSUES
 
    IN A LETTER ACCOMPANYING THE NOTICE OF HEARING, DATED AUGUST 11,
 1978, THE REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR FOCUSED ON 26 ISSUES CONCERNING WHICH
 HE THOUGHT EVIDENCE SHOULD BE INTRODUCED.  THAT LETTER WAS INTRODUCED AS
 ALJ EXHIBIT #1, AND THE ISSUES NUMBERED CONSECUTIVELY IN THE MARGIN.  I
 FOUND THIS SYSTEM OF IDENTIFYING THE ISSUES USEFUL AT TRIAL AND WILL USE
 IT IN THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION.  FOR CONVENIENCE, I WILL RESTATE THE
 REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR'S STATEMENT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE DISCUSSION OF
 EACH ISSUE.
 
    (1) WERE SECTIONS 19(A)(1) AND (2) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED WHEN FOREMAN
 WELDER NULL PREPARED
 
    AN ALLEGED 'POOR' WORK PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL ON A MERIT PROMOTION
 APPLICATION FILED BY FORMER
 
    SHOP STEWARD PITTSON?
 
    ONE OF THE WORKERS DESIRING A PROMOTION WAS THE SAME JOSEPH E.
 PITTSON, WHO WAS APPOINTED SHOP STEWARD AS MENTIONED ABOVE.  HE WAS A
 WELDER-LIMITED (WG-8) AND FILED FOR JOURNEYMAN (WG-10) IN APRIL 1976.
 ON AUGUST 30 HE WAS FOUND ELIGIBLE FOR WG-10, BUT THE REGISTER WAS
 CLOSED.  IN SEPTEMBER 1976, PITTSON FILED A NEW APPLICATION.  SHORTLY
 THEREAFTER, ON OCTOBER 1, 1976, HE WAS EVALUATED AS "JUST BARELY AN
 AVERAGE WORKER." THE ACTIVITY CONTENDS THAT THIS IS NOT A "POOR"
 APPRAISAL, BUT THAT IN ANY EVENT, IT IS ACCURATE.
 
    THE UNION POINTS OUT THAT IT FOLLOWED SHORTLY AFTER PITTSON WAS
 APPOINTED STEWARD TO DEAL WITH WELDER COMPLAINTS, AND THAT PITTSON HAD
 PREVIOUSLY BEEN FOUND ELIGIBLE FOR WG-10.  THE PAPERS CONCERNING THAT
 ELIGIBILITY WERE DESTROYED.  THE TESTIMONY OF MR.  BLAKEY, HEAD OF THE
 ACTIVITY'S PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION (TR. 843-841), MADE IT CLEAR
 THAT THIS DESTRUCTION WAS NOT ROUTINE.  NEVERTHELESS IT IS NOT CLEAR
 THAT UNION ANIMUS WAS THE MOTIVE BEHIND THE RATING.  THE OBVIOUS REASON
 FOR A NEW EVALUATION SHORTLY AFTER BEING NOTED "ELIGIBLE" WAS THAT
 PITTSON HAD AGAIN APPLIED FOR A PROMOTION (TR. 190).
 
    THERE IS NO NECESSARY INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE "ELIGIBLE" RATING IN
 AUGUST 1976 (C-10) AND THE "BARELY AVERAGE" APPRAISAL (R-C) PITTSON GOT
 IN OCTOBER.  CREDITING MR. MCFALL'S STATEMENT (R-C) THAT PITTSON WAS
 RANKED 15TH AND 16TH OUT OF 16 IN THE LIST OF ELIGIBLES IN MAY AND JULY
 1976, I CONCLUDE THAT THE "BARELY AVERAGE" APPRAISAL WAS, IF NOT
 ACCURATE, AT LEAST CONSISTENT WITH THE PREVIOUS APPRAISALS.  THEREFORE I
 FIND NO VIOLATION OF THE ORDER IN THIS REGARD.
 
    (2) WERE SECTIONS 19(A)(1) AND (2) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED ON OR ABOUT
 OCTOBER 4, 1976, WHEN
 
    PITTSON WAS ISSUED A LETTER OF CAUTION AND REQUIREMENT REGARDING THE
 ABUSE OF SICK LEAVE?
 
    ON OCTOBER 4, 1976, PITTSON RECEIVED A LETTER OF CAUTION AND
 REQUIREMENT TELLING HIM THAT HE WOULD NEED A DOCTOR'S NOTE FOR ANY DAYS
 THAT HE TOOK SICK LEAVE.
 
    PITTSON HIMSELF TESTIFIED THAT HE TOOK A LOT OF SICK LEAVE PRIOR TO
 NOVEMBER 1976, BECAUSE OF A SHOULDER PROBLEM (TR. 255).  THE UNION
 CONTENDS THAT HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADVISED VERBALLY PRIOR TO BEING ISSUED
 A LETTER OF CAUTION AND REQUIREMENT (R-A, ART. TWELVE, SECTION 5).  THE
 EVIDENCE SHOWS HE WAS ADVISED, ALTHOUGH SEVERAL MONTHS PREVIOUSLY (TR.
 430).  WHETHER SUCH WARNING COMPLIES WITH THE NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT IS A
 QUESTION OF "ARGUABLE INTERPRETATION," AND THEREFORE NOT APPROPRIATE FOR
 RESOLUTION BY ME.  SEE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, WATERVLIET ARSENAL AND
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, LOCAL UNION 2352,
 A/SLMR NO. 624(1976);  DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE AND
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1802, AFL-CIO, A/SLMR
 NO. 1168(1978).  BUT EVEN IF IT WERE, I WOULD FIND NO VIOLATION OF THE
 ORDER.  THE REQUIREMENT STATED IN THE LETTER WAS NOT PARTICULARLY
 BURDENSOME-- MERELY TO SUBSTANTIATE SICK LEAVE WITH A DOCTOR'S NOTE.
 SUCH A REQUIREMENT SEEMS REASONABLE IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT PITTSON
 TOOK APPROXIMATELY 15 DAYS OF SICK LEAVE IN THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF
 1976 ON DAYS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING OR FOLLOWING A SATURDAY OR SUNDAY OR
 OTHER SICK LEAVE DAY (R-D).
 
    (3) WAS SECTION 19(A)(1) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED ON OCTOBER 13, 1976,
 WHEN PITTSON WAS DENIED
 
    THE RIGHT TO SEE THEN CHIEF STEWARD JOHN CLEARY REGARDING THE
 CANCELLATION OF HIS ANNUAL
 
    LEAVE?
 
    JOHN CLEARY WAS CHIEF SHOP STEWARD OF THE MACHINISTS LOCAL, AND
 SECRETARY OF THE COUNCIL, AND WAS THE PERSON WHO SUGGESTED THAT PITTSON
 BE MADE A STEWARD.  LATER, IN DECEMBER, CLEARY WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT OF
 THE COUNCIL.
 
    PITTSON HAD APPLIED FOR LEAVE FROM SATURDAY, OCTOBER 16 THROUGH
 SUNDAY, OCTOBER 24, TO GO HUNTING.  THIS HAD APPARENTLY BEEN GRANTED.
 ON WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 13, SAID LEAVE WAS CANCELLED.  AFTER SOME
 DISCUSSION BETWEEN PITTSON, CLEARY, GENERAL FOREMAN MEE, AND PITTSON'S
 FOREMAN, HENSHAW, THE LEAVE WAS RESTORED.
 
    THE EVIDENCE THUS SHOWS THAT PITTSON IN FACT SAW CLEARY ABOUT THIS
 INCIDENT (TR. 203, 691).  THEREFORE THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF THE ORDER.
 
    (4) WERE SECTIONS 19(A)(1), (2) AND (3) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED ON OR
 ABOUT NOVEMBER 5, 1976,
 
    BY THE THREATENING ACTIONS OF GENERAL FOREMAN RUNTE AND, IN A
 SEPARATE INCIDENT, THE ACTIONS
 
    OF WELDER FOREMAN INGRAHAM AND SHOP SUPERINTENDENTS GURLEY, TOWERS,
 AND KIDRICK WHILE PITTSON
 
    WAS REPRESENTING EMPLOYEE HESTAND?  WERE THE ABOVE SECTIONS VIOLATED
 BY THE ALLEGED
 
    THREATENING ACTIONS OF SUPERVISORS ROWLAND, HUGHES, COOPER AND
 HENSHAW LATER ON THAT SAME DAY
 
    AS PITTSON WAS ABOUT TO LEAVE WORK?
 
    IN THE MORNING ON FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1976, AT 0740 HOURS PITTSON
 OBTAINED A SLIP FROM HENSHAW, HIS ACTING FOREMAN, AUTHORIZING PITTSON TO
 GO TO A MEETING AT THE UNION OFFICE AT 1220 HOURS.  AT THAT MEETING
 PITTSON OBTAINED A LIST OF PEOPLE TO SEE IN CONNECTION WITH HIS
 INVESTIGATION.  HE RETURNED AT 1330 HOURS TO ARRANGE TO SEE THE PEOPLE
 INVOLVED.  ACTING FOREMAN HENSHAW WAS NOT THERE, BUT SUPERINTENDENT
 HUGHES WAS.  HUGHES WANTED THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS TO BE SEEN AND
 DECIDED IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR PITTSON TO INTERVIEW THE ONES WHO WERE
 WORKING ON THE CARRIER KITTY HAWK ALL TOGETHER AND DENIED PERMISSION FOR
 PITTSON TO SEE THEM SINGLY AT THAT TIME.  PITTSON WANTED TO SEE AT LEAST
 TWO OTHER INDIVIDUALS:  POTTER, WHO WAS ABOUT TO GO ON LEAVE, AND
 HESTAND, WHO WAS NOT ABOARD THE KITTY HAWK.  THERE WAS SOME CONFLICT IN
 THE TESTIMONY AS TO WHETHER HUGHES GAVE PITTSON PERMISSION TO VISIT THE
 SACRAMENTO WHERE HESTAND WAS, OR ONLY TO CALL.  IN ANY EVENT, PITTSON
 WENT TO THE KITTY HAWK TO SEE POTTER AND THEN TO THE SACRAMENTO /6/ TO
 SEE HESTAND.
 
    WHILE PITTSON WAS ABOARD THE SACRAMENTO, INGRAHAM, HESTAND'S FOREMAN,
 CALLED HUGHES AND ASKED HIM WHETHER HE HAD GIVEN PERMISSION TO PITTSON
 TO BE ABOARD THE SACRAMENTO, LOCATED A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE FROM HIS
 WORKSITE.  HUGHES SAID, "NO." INGRAHAM REPORTED TO HIS GENERAL FOREMAN
 I, RUNTE.  RUNTE CALLED HENSHAW, PITTSON'S ACTING FOREMAN, TO VERIFY
 THAT PITTSON HAD NO PERMISSION TO BE ABOARD THE SACRAMENTO.  THEREUPON
 RUNTE AND INGRAHAM APPROACHED PITTSON AND HESTAND.
 
    THE OSTENSIBLE REASON FOR FOREMAN I, RUNTE TO BE CONCERNED THAT
 PITTSON WAS ON BOARD THE SACRAMENTO WAS THAT IT WAS OUT OF HIS
 TERRITORY.  THE SACRAMENTO WAS MORE THAN HALF A MILE FROM PITTSON'S
 WORKSITE.  THE PREVAILING PRACTICE WAS TO HAVE THOSE STEWARDS HANDLE
 GRIEVANCES WHO WERE LOCATED NEARBY.  HOWEVER, FROM ALL THE EVIDENCE IT
 APPEARS TO ME THAT MR. RUNTE WAS MORE UPSET ABOUT PITTSON'S PRESENCE
 THAN A TECHNICAL VIOLATION OF RULES WOULD WARRANT.  BOTH HESTAND AND
 PITTSON TESTIFIED THAT WHEN RUNTE APPROACHED THEM RUNTE WAS EXCITED AND
 SHAKING HIS FINGER OR FIST AT PITTSON BEFORE THE LATTER HAD SAID
 ANYTHING.
 
    RUNTE ASKED PITTSON WHAT HE WAS DOING ABOARD THE SHIP, TO WHICH
 PITTSON REPLIED THAT HE WAS ON UNION BUSINESS.  RUNTE ORDERED PITTSON TO
 LEAVE THE SHIP.  PITTSON SAID, "YOU ARE NOT MY FOREMAN." RUNTE REPEATED
 HIS ORDER, SHAKING HIS FINGER AT PITTSON.  PITTSON REPEATED THAT HE WAS
 ON UNION BUSINESS.  IT WAS CLOSE TO QUITTING TIME.  RUNTE WAS ANGRY.  HE
 AND INGRAHAM LEFT.  PITTSON WAS ANGRY TOO, AND SHAKEN.
 
    I CONCLUDE THAT IT WAS NOT PITTSON'S DISOBEDIENCE OF A DIRECT ORDER
 THAT FIRST INFURIATED RUNTE, ALTHOUGH IT UNDOUBTEDLY MADE THE SITUATION
 WORSE, BUT PITTSON'S VERY PRESENCE.  FURTHERMORE, I CREDIT PITTSON'S
 TESTIMONY THAT RUNTE SAID, "YOU CAN STICK THE UNION," (TR. 226) WHEN
 PITTSON SOUGHT TO TAKE COVER UNDER THE TERMS OF THE UNION CONTRACT.  I
 CONCLUDE THAT MR. RUNTE'S CONDUCT HAD THE EFFECT OF INTIMIDATING BOTH
 MR. HESTAND AND PITTSON.  IN FACT, HESTAND TESTIFIED THAT IF FILING A
 COMPLAINT RESULTED IN SUCH A HASSLE "IT WASN'T EVEN REALLY WORTH IT"
 (TR. 73).  THEREFORE SECTIONS 19(A)(1) AND (2) WERE VIOLATED.
 
    THERE WAS SOME EVIDENCE CONCERNING "THE ACTIONS OF WELDER FOREMAN
 INGRAHAM, AND SHOP SUPERINTENDENTS GURLEY, TOWERS, AND KIDRICK,"
 DESCRIBED IN THE REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR'S LETTER, BUT THOSE ACTIONS WERE
 OVERSHADOWED BY RUNTE'S CONDUCT AND I FIND NO SEPARATE VIOLATION OF THE
 ORDER.
 
    AFTER THE HEATED EXCHANGE BETWEEN RUNTE AND PITTSON, PITTSON WENT TO
 THE KITTY HAWK TO MUSTER OUT.  THERE HE WAS MET BY ROWLAND WHO WAS
 GENERAL FOREMAN II, AND THUS RUNTE'S AND HUGHES' SUPERVISOR, BY HUGHES,
 WHO WAS ON THAT DAY ACTING GENERAL FOREMAN, AND THUS HENSHAW'S
 SUPERVISOR, AND BY HENSHAW, WHO WAS ACTING FOREMAN AND PITTSON'S
 SUPERVISOR.  THERE WERE OTHER PEOPLE THERE TOO, BUT THEY PLAYED NO PART
 IN THE CONFRONTATION THAT FOLLOWED.  HUGHES TOLD PITTSON HE HAD BEEN OFF
 THE JOB AND MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO DISCIPLINE (TR. 699).  HENSHAW ASKED FOR
 PITTSON'S PASS AND ASKED HOW COME IT WASN'T SIGNED.  PITTSON SAID HE
 DIDN'T HAVE MUCH TIME TO TALK, AND HE DIDN'T NEED THIS JOB.  THEN HE
 SAID, "I'LL TAKE CARE OF THIS (OR YOU) OUTSIDE." HE THEN LEFT ON
 VACATION.  CONSIDERING THAT PITTSON HAD JUST REFUSED TO OBEY THE DIRECT
 ORDER OF A GENERAL FOREMAN, AND THAT HUGHES AND HENSHAW HAD BEEN ALERTED
 OF THIS BY RUNTE, THE SUPERVISORS' CONDUCT AT THE MUSTERING-OUT POINT IS
 UNDERSTANDABLE, AND PROPER.  I AM FORECLOSED FROM DECIDING WHETHER
 PITTSON'S STATEMENT OR THREAT WARRANTED HIS DISMISSAL AS DISCUSSED BELOW
 IN ISSUE NO. 24.
 
    (5) WERE SECTIONS 19(A)(1) AND (5) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED ON OR ABOUT
 NOVEMBER 8, 1976, BY
 
    THE ACTIONS OF SUPERVISORS INGRAHAM AND RUNTE IN REFUSING TO ALLOW
 CLEARY THE RIGHT TO SEE
 
    HESTAND REGARDING A GRIEVANCE?
 
    HESTAND, WHO WAS INTERVIEWED FOR A WHILE BY PITTSON ON BOARD THE
 SACRAMENTO ON NOVEMBER 5, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE, HAD A COMPLAINT FOR WHICH
 HE WAS TRYING TO FILE A GRIEVANCE.  HE WAS A WELDER-HELPER-GENERAL (WG
 5) WHO FELT HE WAS DOING WG-8, OR BETTER, WORK.  ON NOVEMBER 8, HE MET
 WITH CLEARY IN AN OFFICE TO COMPLETE HIS GRIEVANCE.  BEFORE FILING A
 GRIEVANCE, THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ACTIVITY AND THE UNION REQUIRES
 THAT THE MATTER BE DISCUSSED WITH THE GRIEVANT'S IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
 (-R-A, ART. THIRTY, SECTION 5(A)).  IN HESTAND'S CASE THAT WAS HIS
 FOREMAN, INGRAHAM.  INGRAHAM ENTERED THE OFFICE AND CLEARY ASKED HIM TO
 MEET RESPECTING HESTAND'S GRIEVANCE.  INGRAHAM DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO DO,
 AND THEREFORE WENT TO THE PHONE AND CALLED HIS GENERAL FOREMAN I, RUNTE,
 WHO CAME IN SHORTLY THEREAFTER.  IMMEDIATELY AFTER INGRAHAM USED THE
 PHONE CLEARY CALLED THE UNION'S PRESIDENT, HOLT.  THEN CLEARY AND
 INGRAHAM TALKED.  ACCORDING TO CLEARY HE SHOWED INGRAHAM THE
 UNION-ACTIVITY CONTRACT, AND INGRAHAM THREW IT ACROSS THE ROOM, SAYING
 THE UNION WOULD SHUT DOWN THE SHIPYARD.  ACCORDING TO INGRAHAM, HE SAID
 HE WAS POWERLESS TO PROMOTE HESTAND.  I BELIEVE BOTH WITNESSES.  SOON
 THEREAFTER, HOLT CAME IN, IN RESPONSE TO CLEARY'S CALL.  AT THAT POINT
 RUNTE WENT OUT.
 
    THE ACTIVITY URGES THAT THIS ASPECT OF THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED
 BECAUSE IT INVOLVES INTERPRETATION OF THE NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT WHICH
 COULD BE, AND, THE ACTIVITY CLAIMS WAS, RESOLVED BY OTHER PROCEDURES.
 IT DOES NOT SEEM THAT THE INCIDENTS ON NOVEMBER 8 INVOLVED AN
 INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT.  BUT IT ALSO APPEARS THAT CLEARY AND
 HESTAND MET, AND WERE NOT INTERFERED WITH.  CLEARY AND HESTAND SOUGHT TO
 GET INGRAHAM TO JOIN THEM IN AN INFORMAL MEETING, TO ACCOMPLISH THE
 FIRST STEP OF PROCESSING HESTAND'S GRIEVANCE CONCERNING TEMPORARY
 PROMOTION.  THIS MEETING WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL, IN THAT INGRAHAM COULD NOT
 GRANT THE PROMOTION.  BUT I FIND NO VIOLATION OF THE ORDER.
 
    (6) WERE SECTIONS 19(A)(1), (5) AND (6) VIOLATED BY THE SHIPYARD'S
 ALLEGED ADHERENCE TO
 
    DIFFERENT PROCEDURES IN SHOPS 931 AND 926 FOR ARRANGING APPOINTMENTS
 BETWEEN SHOP STEWARDS AND
 
    UNIT EMPLOYEES THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE COMPLAINT?
 
    SHOP 931 IS THE MACHINE SHOP IN WHICH CLEARY WORKS.  SHOP 926 IS THE
 WELDING SHOP.  THE WELDING SHOP HAS ITS PERSONNEL WIDELY DISPERSED OVER
 THE SHIPYARD.  THE MACHINE SHOP IS IN ONE DISCRETE LOCATION.  THE
 PROCEDURE FOR A STEWARD ARRANGING TO SEE A WORKER IN SHOP 926 AT THE
 TIME INVOLVED HERE WAS THAT THE STEWARD WOULD CONTACT HIS SUPERVISOR,
 WHO WOULD ARRANGE FOR A MEETING BY CONTACTING THE WORKER'S SUPERVISOR.
 IN SHOP 931 THE SUPERVISORS WERE NOT INVOLVED IN MAKING APPOINTMENTS.
 STEWARDS MADE THEIR OWN APPOINTMENTS.
 
    THE ACTIVITY EXPLAINED THIS DISPARITY BY THE DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHICAL
 DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE SHOPS.  IN PERTINENT PART, THE NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT
 PROVIDES (ART.  SEVEN, SECTION 2):
 
    WHEN ANY COUNCIL OFFICIAL OR STEWARD IS REQUIRED TO LEAVE HIS
 WORKSITE ON APPROPRIATE
 
    MATTERS RELATED TO HIS REPRESENTATIONAL DUTIES, HE WILL REQUEST
 PERMISSION, ADVISE WHERE HE IS
 
    GOING, AND STATE THE GENERAL NATURE OF HIS BUSINESS.  PERMISSION
 SHALL ALSO BE OBTAINED FROM
 
    THE COGNIZANT IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR OF ANY EMPLOYEE BEING CONT()ACTED.
  THE SUPERVISOR'S
 
    PERMISSION IN THESE INSTANCES WILL NORMALLY BE GRANTED.
 
    TO THE EXTENT THAT THE DIFFERENT PROCEDURES ARE DIFFERENT
 INTERPRETATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY IN THE INTERPRETATION OF
 "PERMISSION" IN THE AGREEMENT, I AM PRECLUDED FROM CONSIDERING THEM HERE
 BY A/SLMR REPORT NO. 49, AND DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, SUPRA, . 5, A/SLMR
 NO. 624, AND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SUPRA, P. 5,
 A/SLMR NO.  1168.  INSOFAR AS MR. CLEARY OR MR. PITTSON IN PARTICULAR
 WAS RESTRAINED IN HIS FUNCTION, I SHALL DEAL WITH SUCH RESTRAINT
 SPECIFICALLY IN THE APPROPRIATE ISSUES.
 
    (7) WAS SECTION 19(A)(3) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER
 8, 1976, WHEN
 
    SUPERVISOR WIXSON CALLED STEWARDS OWENS AND SPRENGER INTO HIS OFFICE
 ALLEGEDLY TO COMPLAIN
 
    ABOUT MACHINISTS REPRESENTING WELDERS?
 
    ON NOVEMBER 8, 1976, THE MONDAY AFTER THE INCIDENTS ON THE SACRAMENTO
 AND THE KITTY HAWK, MAHLON WIXSON, SUPERINTENDENT OF WELDING, SHOP 26,
 HAD WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A "ROUTINE" (TR. 437) MEETING OF CHIEF
 STEWARDS.  THERE WAS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THERE WERE NO "REGULAR" MEETINGS
 (C-8).  IN ANY EVENT, PRESENT WERE:  LEVI OWENS, CHIEF SHOP STEWARD OF
 THE BOILERMAKERS, AND ED SPRENGER, CHIEF SHOP STEWARD OF THE OPERATING
 ENGINEERS.  JOHN CLEARY, CHIEF SHOP STEWARD OF THE MACHINISTS WAS NOT
 THERE.  (INCIDENTALLY, I FIND ON THE BASIS OF MY OBSERVATION OF ALL
 THREE WITNESSES, THAT CLEARY WAS FAR YOUNGER, MORE AGGRESSIVE AND MORE
 ARTICULATE THAN EITHER SPRENGER OR OWENS.) WIXSON TOLD THEM THAT
 PITTSON, A MACHINIST, WAS OPERATING OUTSIDE OF HIS GEOGRAPHICAL AREA
 AMONG THE WELDERS.  THEREUPON SPRENGER WENT TO THE UNION OFFICE, ANGRY
 THAT PITTSON WAS ON HIS "TURF."
 
    THE ACTIVITY CONTENDS THAT SINCE THE COMPLAINT DID NOT ALLEGE A
 VIOLATION OF SECTION 19(A)(3) OF THE ORDER, THIS ISSUE IS NOT BEFORE ME.
  I CONCLUDE THAT SINCE BOTH SIDES INTRODUCED EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS
 CONCERNING THIS INCIDENT, IT IS BEFORE ME.  I FIND THAT ONE PURPOSE MR.
 WIXSON HAD IN CALLING THIS MEETING WAS TO INFORM SPRENGER AND OWENS THAT
 PITTSON WAS A NEW STEWARD FOR THE WELDERS.  SPRENGER'S REACTION WAS TO
 IMMEDIATELY TALK TO CLEARY ABOUT THIS.  CLEARY RESPONDED THAT PRESIDENT
 HOLT HAD APPOINTED PITTSON.  THEREUPON SPRENGER "ASKED MR.  HOLT WHAT HE
 WAS TRYING TO DO BECAUSE I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT WE WERE TRYING TO KEEP . .
 . THE STEWARDS FOR THE WELDERS BETWEEN THE BOILERMAKERS AND LOCAL 48
 (OPERATING ENGINEERS)." (TR. 130-131.) I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WIXSON KNEW
 ENOUGH ABOUT UNION AFFAIRS AND ABOUT ED SPRENGER TO HAVE FORESEEN THIS
 REACTION.  SINCE PITTSON HAD THE RIGHT, UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE ORDER TO
 ASSIST A LABOR ORGANIZATION, AND SINCE WIXSON'S ACTION WAS AN ATTEMPT TO
 INTERFERE WITH THAT RIGHT, A VIOLATION OF SECTION 191(A)(1) IS
 ESTABLISHED.
 
    (8) WAS SECTION 19(A)(1) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER
 8, 1976, WHEN
 
    SUPERVISOR RUNTE PURPORTEDLY REFUSED TO ALLOW CLEARY TO MEET HESTAND?
 
    THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED ON NOVEMBER 9.
 
    HESTAND HAD DISCUSSED HIS GRIEVANCE CONCERNING HIS TEMPORARY
 PROMOTION WITH PITTSON ON THE SACRAMENTO ON NOVEMBER 5, BUT THE
 PAPERWORK HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED.  CLEARY WAS ATTEMPTING TO FOLLOW
 THROUGH, SINCE PITTSON WAS ON VACATION.  A LOGICAL OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO
 AROSE ON NOVEMBER 9, 1976, WHEN HESTAND AND CLEARY BOTH WERE IN
 INGRAHAM'S OFFICE FOR A SCHEDULED MEETING WITH RUNTE.  WHEN RUNTE CAME
 IN HE WAS INFORMED THAT THE MEETING WAS CANCELLED.  AFTER CHECKING WITH
 HIS SUPERIOR, ROWLAND, RUNTE ANNOUNCED THAT THE MEETING WAS OFF, AND
 TOLD CLEARY AND HESTAND TO GO BACK TO WORK.  CLEARY REQUESTED PERMISSION
 TO TALK TO HESTAND RIGHT THEN.  RUNTE REFUSED, SAYING THAT THE PROPER
 WAY TO DO IT WAS FOR CLEARY TO SET UP AN APPOINTMENT THROUGH HESTAND'S
 FOREMAN.  SINCE IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT HESTAND'S FOREMAN ALREADY KNEW THAT
 HESTAND WAS AT A MEETING, AND PRESUMABLY HAD ACCOMMODATED HIS WORK
 SCHEDULE ACCORDINGLY, THE ONLY POSSIBLE EFFECT OF RUNTE'S DECISION WAS
 TO INTERFERE WITH HESTAND'S RIGHT TO PURSUE HIS GRIEVANCE. THIS IS A
 PATENT VIOLATION OF SECTION 19(A)(1) OF THE ORDER.
 
    THE ACTIVITY CONTENDS THAT THIS ISSUE IS RENDERED MOOT BY THE
 NEGOTIATION AND EXECUTION IN APRIL 1977 OF A DOCUMENT ENTITLED "INTENT
 OF SPECIFIC ARTICLES AND SECTIONS." THAT DOCUMENT ADDED INTERPRETATIONS
 TO SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT.  THE CONTENTION IS THAT
 ARGUABLE INTERPRETATIONS OF NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS ARE NOT TO BE RESOLVED
 IN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROCEEDINGS.  IN THE ABSTRACT THAT IS A SOUND
 PROPOSITION.  BUT THIS CONDUCT BY RUNTE WAS NOT A BONA FIDE DISAGREEMENT
 CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF THE NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT.  EVEN IF THE
 AGREEMENT REQUIRED AN APPOINTMENT MADE BY A SUPERVISOR, IN THIS INSTANCE
 THE APPOINTMENT HAD BEEN MADE.  IT IS UNREASONABLE TO CONSTRUE THE
 AGREEMENT TO REQUIRE MAKING A SECOND APPOINTMENT.
 
    (9) WERE SECTIONS 19(A)(1) AND (2) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED ON OR ABOUT
 NOVEMBER 11, 1976,
 
    WHEN SUPERVISOR HUGHES PREPARED AN ALLEGEDLY 'POOR' WORK PERFORMANCE
 APPRAISAL ON PITTSON?
 
    THIS APPRAISAL (R-C) WAS SLIGHTLY BETTER ("AVERAGE" RATHER THAN
 "BARELY AVERAGE") THAN FOREMAN NULL'S APPRAISAL A MONTH EARLIER, WHICH
 IS DISCUSSED ABOVE, IN ISSUE NO. 1.  A FORTIORI, I FIND NO VIOLATION OF
 THE ORDER.
 
    (10) WAS SECTION 91(A)(1) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER
 12, 1976, WHEN CLEARY,
 
    ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE HE WAS DENIED OFFICIAL TIME TO MEET WITH HESTAND,
 HAD TO ARRIVE EARLY TO
 
    WORK TO
 
    HAVE HESTAND SIGN A GRIEVANCE FORM?
 
    SINCE THE ACTIVITY VIOLATED THE ORDER BY REFUSING TO LET CLEARY AND
 HESTAND MEET ON NOVEMBER 9, 1976, AS DISCUSSED IN ISSUE NO. 8, AND SINCE
 OTHER ATTEMPTS BY HESTAND TO SPEAK TO STEWARDS HAD BEEN SURROUNDED BY
 UNPLEASANT INCIDENTS, I.E., THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN RUNTE AND PITTSON
 ON THE SACRAMENTO (ISSUE NO. 4) AND INGRAHAM'S TOSSING THE CONTRACT
 ACROSS THE ROOM ON NOVEMBER 8 (ISSUE NO. 5), IT WAS REASONABLE FOR
 HESTAND AND CLEARY TO MEET ON OFF DUTY HOURS.  THEREFORE IT WAS THE
 FORESEEABLE RESULT OF THE VIOLATION DISCUSSED IN ISSUE NO. 8, AND IS
 PART OF THE SAME VIOLATION.
 
    (11) WERE SECTIONS 19(A)(2) AND (4) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED ON OR ABOUT
 NOVEMBER 15, 1976,
 
    WHEN SUPERVISOR HUGHES INFORMED PITTSON THAT PITTSON WOULD BE CHARGED
 LWOP FOR TWO HOURS FOR
 
    NOVEMBER 5, 1976?
 
    THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT PITTSON HAD FILED A COMPLAINT OR
 GIVEN TESTIMONY UNDER THE ORDER, SO THAT NO VIOLATION OF SECTION
 19(A)(4) IS ESTABLISHED.  THE REASON PITTSON WAS GOING TO BE CHARGED
 LEAVE WITHOUT PAY FOR TWO HOURS FOR NOVEMBER 5, 1976, WAS THAT HUGHES
 DENIED GIVING PITTSON PERMISSION TO TALK TO HESTAND ABOARD THE
 SACRAMENTO.  SINCE I CREDIT HUGHES IN THIS REGARD, CHARGING THE TIME TO
 LWOP SEEMS APPROPRIATE.  SINCE CHARGING THE TIME IS APPROPRIATE, IT WAS
 ALSO APPROPRIATE TO INFORM PITTSON ACCORDINGLY.
 
    (12) WERE SECTIONS 19(A)(1), (2) AND (4) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED ON OR
 ABOUT NOVEMBER 16,
 
    1976, WHEN PITTSON WAS TOLD BY HUGHES THAT PITTSON WOULD BE
 INVESTIGATED FOR HIS ACTIONS OF
 
    NOVEMBER 5, 1976?
 
    SINCE THE INCIDENTS ON NOVEMBER 5, 1976, WERE SIGNIFICANT AND
 UPSETTING FOR ALL PARTIES, THEY REQUIRED INVESTIGATION.  THE NEGOTIATED
 AGREEMENT PERMITTED SUCH INVESTIGATION (R-A, ART. TWENTY-ONE, SECTION 4)
 AND COMMON COURTESY AS WELL AS DUE PROCESS REQUIRED THAT PITTSON BE
 INFORMED OF SUCH AN INVESTIGATION.
 
    (13) WERE SECTIONS 19(A)(1) AND (2) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED ON OR ABOUT
 NOVEMBER 29, 1976,
 
    WHEN HESTAND WAS ASSIGNED TO BE "FIRE WATCH?"
 
    BETWEEN DECEMBER 1, 1976 AND JULY 1977, WHEN HE QUIT, HESTAND WAS
 ASSIGNED TO "FIRE WATCH" APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT OF THE TIME.  FIRE
 WATCH IS AN ESSENTIAL BUT TEDIOUS FUNCTION, WHICH CONSISTS OF WATCHING
 TO INSURE THAT WELDING OPERATIONS DO NOT RESULT IN FIRES.  WELDERS WHO
 WANT TO ADVANCE AND IMPROVE THEIR SKILLS DO NOT LIKE FIRE WATCH DUTY
 BECAUSE IT OFFERS LITTLE OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE IMPROVED WELDING
 SKILLS.
 
    A SINGLE OR AN OCCASIONAL OR A ROTATING ASSIGNMENT TO "FIRE WATCH"
 WOULD NOT BE A VIOLATION OF THE ORDER.  BUT TO BE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT OF
 THE TIME FOR A SIX-MONTH PERIOD IS UNUSUAL.  SINCE HESTAND HAD BEEN ONE
 OF THE PEOPLE TRYING TO PUSH HIS GRIEVANCE WITH PITTSON'S AND CLEARY'S
 HELP AND IN VIEW OF HIS ABOVE AVERAGE PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS (C-5 AND 6)
 I INFER THAT THE EXCESSIVE FIRE WATCH DUTY WAS IN REPRISAL FOR HIS
 PROTECTED ACTIVITIES.  IT WAS DIRECTLY INTENDED TO DISCOURAGE HIS
 MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNION AND IS A VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 19(A)(1) AND (2)
 OF THE ORDER.
 
    (14) WAS SECTION 19(A)(3) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER
 3, 1976, WHEN HESTAND
 
    WAS GIVEN A LIST OF SHOP STEWARDS AND ALLEGEDLY TOLD THAT THESE WERE
 THE ONLY STEWARDS FROM
 
    WHICH HE COULD CHOOSE FOR REPRESENTATION?
 
    THE LIST WAS INTRODUCED AS C-7.  IT PROBABLY WAS GIVEN TO HESTAND
 TOWARD THE END OF NOVEMBER, RATHER THAN ON NOVEMBER 3, 1976 (TR. 105).
 HESTAND TESTIFIED THAT HIS FOREMAN, INGRAHAM, GAVE HIM THE LIST EVEN
 THOUGH HE WANTED CLEARY, AND LIMITED HIM TO THE NAMES ON IT.  INGRAHAM,
 ON THE OTHER HAND, DENIED GIVING HESTAND C-7 (TR. 688).  THE UNION DOES
 NOT ADDRESS THIS ISSUE IN ITS BRIEF.  RESOLVING THE CONFLICTS IN THE
 EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF THE ACTIVITY AS BEING MORE PLAUSIBLE ON THIS POINT
 I FIND NO VIOLATION OF THE ORDER.
 
    (15) WERE SECTIONS 19(A)(1), (2), (3) AND (4) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED
 ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER
 
    24, 1976, WHEN PITTSON WAS ORDERED BY HUGHES TO SEE SUPERINTENDENT
 WIXSON;  PITTSON'S REQUEST
 
    TO HAVE CLEARY REPRESENT HIM WAS NOT HONORED;  WIXSON APPOINTED A
 REPRESENTATIVE FOR
 
    PITTSON;  AND PITTSON WAS HANDED A MEMORANDUM DATED NOVEMBER 23,
 1976, DEALING WITH
 
    DISCIPLINARY ACTION?
 
    ON NOVEMBER 24, PITTSON WAS TOLD BY HIS SUPERVISOR, HUGHES, TO REPORT
 TO SUPERINTENDENT WIXSON'S OFFICE.  PITTSON TOLD HUGHES THAT HE WANTED
 CLEARY TO BE THERE TO REPRESENT HIM.  HUGHES SAID HE'D SEE WHAT HE COULD
 DO.  IN FACT, HUGHES DID NOTHING.  WHEN PITTSON ARRIVED, HE WAS MET BY
 SEVERAL PEOPLE, INCLUDING SUPERINTENDENT WIXSON, OTHER SUPERVISORS, AND
 HENRY CLANCY, A SHOP STEWARD IN THE OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL.  CLANCY
 HAD BEEN CALLED BY MR. MEE (WELDER GENERAL FOREMAN) TO REPRESENT
 PITTSON.  PITTSON REFUSED TO HAVE CLANCY AS A REPRESENTATIVE AND THUS
 THE MEETING LASTED ONLY LONG ENOUGH FOR WIXSON TO HAND PITTSON A LETTER
 (C-14) ADVISING HIM THAT A DETERMINATION IS BEING MADE AS TO WHETHER
 DISCIPLINARY ACTION IS WARRANTED, PRESUMABLY AS A RESULT OF THE NOVEMBER
 5 INCIDENTS.  EVENTUALLY, ON DECEMBER 17 AND DECEMBER 21, PITTSON WAS TO
 GET LETTERS OF PROPOSED REMOVAL, AND ON FEBRUARY 4, 1977, HE WAS FINALLY
 TERMINATED.
 
    THE ACTIVITY CONTENDS THAT THE MEETING ON NOVEMBER 24, 1976, WAS NOT
 A FORMAL MEETING WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 10(E) OF THE ORDER SINCE
 IT DEALT SOLELY WITH THE INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT OF MR. PITTSON.  EVEN IF IT
 BE ASSUMED THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION AROSE EXCLUSIVELY
 BECAUSE OF PITTSON'S CONDUCT AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND NOT AS A UNION STEWARD
 ON UNION BUSINESS, ARTICLE TWENTY-ONE OF THE NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT (R-A)
 PROVIDES THAT AN EMPLOYEE MAY HAVE COUNCIL REPRESENTATION.  APPARENTLY
 MR. WIXSON THOUGHT SO TOO, WHICH IS WHY HE ARRANGED, THROUGH MEE, TO
 HAVE A STEWARD THERE.  IF REPRESENTATION IS TO BE MEANINGFUL IT MUST BE
 BY SOMEONE IN WHOM THE EMPLOYEE HAS CONFIDENCE.  MANAGEMENT, ESPECIALLY
 MR. HUGHES, KNEW THAT PITTSON WANTED CLEARY.  YET HUGHES NEVER
 COMMUNICATED THIS DESIRE TO ANYONE.  THUS, PITTSON WAS DENIED REAL
 REPRESENTATION.  I FIND THAT, BUT FOR PITTSON'S ACTIVITY IN PUSHING THE
 WELDERS' GRIEVANCES, HE WOULD HAVE BEEN ACCORDED THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
 HIS CHOICE.  THUS, MR. MEE TESTIFIED THAT IT IS NORMAL PRACTICE TO GIVE
 AN EMPLOYEE THE STEWARD OF HIS CHOICE, IF REQUESTED (TR. 725).  IN ALL
 THE CIRCUMSTANCES THIS AMOUNTED TO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 19(A)(1) AND
 (3) OF THE ORDER.  THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF SECTION 19(A)(4), BECAUSE
 THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT PITTSON HAD FILED A COMPLAINT OR GIVEN
 TESTIMONY UNDER THE ORDER.
 
    (16) WERE SECTIONS 19(A)(1), (2), (3) AND (5) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED
 ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER
 
    29, 1976, WHEN CLEARY WAS DENIED PERMISSION TO SEE PITTSON EVEN
 THOUGH CLEARY ALLEGEDLY HAD
 
    OBTAINED PERMISSION TO SEE HIM?
 
    ON NOVEMBER 29, CLEARY WANTED TO HAVE A MEETING WITH HUGHES AND
 PITTSON.  IN TRYING TO LOCATE HUGHES AND TO GET PERMISSION TO SEE
 PITTSON, CLEARY ENTERED THE WELDERS' SUPERVISORS' OFFICE.  HE THERE
 ENGAGED IN A DISCUSSION DURING WHICH HE WAS GETTING INCREASINGLY
 FRUSTRATED BY THE DIFFICULTY HE WAS HAVING IN ARRANGING THE MEETING.  AT
 THIS POINT WELDER GENERAL FOREMAN I, LYLE RUNTE, ENTERED THE OFFICE, AND
 CLEARY MADE THE STATEMENTS THAT ARE DISCUSSED BELOW IN ISSUE NO. 25.
 OBVIOUSLY CLEARY WAS UPSET.  BECAUSE OF THIS UPSET, I BELIEVE THE
 TESTIMONY THAT CLEARY "STORMED OUT OF THE OFFICE" (TR. 739) RATHER THAN
 TRYING TO FIND HUGHES TO GET PERMISSION TO TALK TO PITTSON.  I FIND THAT
 HE WAS NOT DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH PITTSON ON THIS OCCASION.
 
    (17) WERE SECTIONS 19(A)(1) AND (5) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED DURING THE
 PERIOD BETWEEN
 
    NOVEMBER 23, 1976, AND DECEMBER 1, 1976, BY THE ACTIONS OF
 SUPERVISORS DROUIN AND MAYTON IN
 
    REFUSING TO ALLOW PITTSON TO SEE CLEARY TO DISCUSS PITTSON'S
 GRIEVANCE?
 
    I CAN FIND NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD CONCERNING THESE SPECIFIC
 INCIDENTS, AND THEREFORE I MAKE NO RULING ON THEM.
 
    (18) WERE SECTIONS 19(A)(1), (2), (3) AND (4) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED
 AT THE END OF NOVEMBER
 
    1976 BY THE ACTIONS OF SUPERVISORS UNGREN AND HUGHES WHEN THEY
 ATTEMPTED TO DETERMINE IF
 
    PITTSON HAD PROMPTED THE FILING OF GRIEVANCES BY OTHER EMPLOYEES
 AGAINST SHOP 926 REGARDING
 
    TEMPORARY PROMOTIONS?
 
    THE EVIDENCE IS UNCONTRADICTED THAT SUPERVISORS UNGREN AND HUGHES
 APPROACHED TWO WORKERS NAMED CHAMP AND DOUGLAS TO ASK THEM WHETHER
 THEY
 HAD GRIEVANCES.  MR. UNGREN DECLINED TO CHARACTERIZE THIS INQUIRY AS AN
 ATTEMPT TO SEE WHETHER PITTSON WAS SOLICITING GRIEVANCES.  BUT BOTH
 DOUGLAS AND CHAMP TESTIFIED THAT THE QUESTION ASKED WAS WHETHER PITTSON
 SOLICITED.  I BELIEVE THAT, IN FACT, THIS IS THE INFORMATION THE
 SUPERVISORS WERE AFTER.  PITTSON'S ACTIVITIES WERE CREATING PROBLEMS
 (WITNESS THE INCIDENT OF NOVEMBER 5, 1976-- SEE ISSUE NO. 4, ABOVE) AND
 IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT MANAGEMENT SOUGHT TO FIND OUT IF PITTSON WAS
 BEHAVING ILLEGALLY.
 
    THE EFFECT OF THIS INQUIRY WAS TO DISCOURAGE CHAMP AND DOUGLAS FROM
 PURSUING THEIR GRIEVANCES ACTIVELY THEREAFTER, ESPECIALLY AFTER THEY
 LEARNED THAT PITTSON WAS BEING FIRED.  THIS IS A VIOLATION OF SECTION
 19(A)(1), BUT NOT OF ANY OTHER SECTION.
 
    THE UNION ALSO CONTENDS THAT CHAMP WAS OFFERED A PROMOTION IF HE
 WOULD DROP HIS GRIEVANCE.  THE ACTIVITY'S WITNESSES DENIED THAT SUCH AN
 OFFER WAS MADE.  CHAMP HIMSELF JUST TESTIFIED THAT "SOME SORT OF
 ARRANGEMENT" WAS MENTIONED (TR. 177) AND APPARENTLY NOTHING FURTHER WAS
 SAID ABOUT IT.  I FIND THIS EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A VIOLATION
 OF THE ORDER IN THIS RESPECT.
 
    (19) WERE SECTION 19(A)(1), (3) AND (5) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED FROM
 NOVEMBER 17, 1976, BY
 
    WIXSON'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT GRIEVANCES FILED BY PITTSON ON BEHALF OF
 UNIT EMPLOYEES?
 
    WIXSON TESTIFIED THAT HE RECEIVED A TOTAL OF SIX GRIEVANCES WHICH HE
 RETURNED BECAUSE THEY LACKED SPECIFICITY (TR. 444-446;  C-4).  HE
 TESTIFIED THAT THIS WAS NOT A REJECTION OF THE GRIEVANCES, BUT MERELY A
 REQUEST FOR FURTHER INFORMATION.
 
    ARTICLE THIRTY, SECTION 5(B)(1) OF THE NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT PROVIDES
 IN PART:
 
    . . . THE GRIEVANCE SHALL BE REDUCED TO WRITING ON THE APPROPRIATE
 FORM AND SHALL SPECIFY,
 
    AS A MINIMUM, THE FOLLOWING DETAILS:  THE NATURE, TIME, AND DATE OF
 THE ACTION OR INCIDENT
 
    GIVING RISE TO THE GRIEVANCE, THE AGREEMENT PROVISION ALLEGED
 VIOLATED, THE DATE OF THE
 
    INFORMAL DISCUSSION AND THE CORRECTIVE ACTION DESIRED.  THE FORM MUST
 BE SUBMITTED TO THE HEAD
 
    OF THE SHOP OR BRANCH WITHIN FIVE (5) WORKING DAYS OF THE IMMEDIATE
 SUPERVISOR'S INFORMAL
 
    DECISION.
 
    GRIEVANCES DEFICIENT IN REQUIRED DETAILS WILL BE RETURNED TO THE
 EMPLOYEE FOR INCLUSION OF
 
    ADDITIONAL NECESSARY INFORMATION.  THE SHOP OR BRANCH HEAD SHALL
 SCHEDULE A MEETING WITH THE
 
    EMPLOYEE AND HIS STEWARD WITHIN FIVE (5) WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT OF
 THE GRIEVANCE TO ATTEMPT
 
    RESOLUTION.
 
    THE EMPHASIS OF THIS OUTLINED PROCEDURE IS SPEED AND ORAL
 COMMUNICATION, WITH WRITING PRIMARILY AS A MEANS OF KEEPING A RECORD.
 C-4 SHOWS THAT THE GRIEVANCE CONTAINED THE MINIMUM DETAILS SPECIFIED:
 NATURE, TIME AND DATE OF THE INCIDENT GIVING RISE TO THE GRIEVANCE, THE
 AGREEMENT PROVISION ALLEGED VIOLATED, THE DATE OF THE INFORMAL
 DISCUSSION AND THE CORRECTIVE ACTION DESIRED.  MR. WIXSON TESTIFIED THAT
 THE STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE GRIEVANCE LACKED SPECIFICITY.  IN
 THIS REGARD THE GRIEVANCE STATES:  "THEY HAVE ASSIGNED ME DUTIES ABOVE
 THE LEVEL OF MY POSITION FOR MORE THAN ONE PAY PERIOD WITHOUT
 TEMPORARILY PROMOTING ME TO THE HIGHER POSITION." ALTHOUGH THIS DOES NOT
 GIVE A DESCRIPTION OF PRECISELY WHAT WORK IS CLAIMED TO BE "ABOVE THE
 LEVEL OF MY POSITION," IT IS ENOUGH TO PUT THE ACTIVITY ON NOTICE OF THE
 GENERAL NATURE OF THE GRIEVANCE.  IF THE THRUST OF THE GRIEVANCE
 PROCEDURE WAS WRITTEN COMMUNICATION, A MORE SPECIFIC WRITING WOULD BE
 DESIRABLE.  BUT THE THRUST IS ORAL, NOT WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS.  A
 MEETING INVOLVING THE BRANCH HEAD, EMPLOYEE AND STEWARD IS REQUIRED TO
 BE HELD WITHIN FIVE DAYS.  IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE ACTIVITY DID NOT
 SCHEDULE SUCH A MEETING WITH ANY OF THE GRIEVANTS.  AT A MEETING THE
 DETAILS COULD EASILY HAVE BEEN SUPPLIED.  IN THIS LIGHT, THE RETURN OF
 THE GRIEVANCES SEEMS MORE LIKE A TACTIC OF DELAY THAN A BONA FIDE
 REQUEST FOR DETAILS.  I CONCLUDE THAT THIS WAS A VIOLATION OF SECTION
 19(A)(1) OF THE ORDER, BUT NOT OF 19(A)(3) OR (5).
 
    (20) WAS SECTION 19(A)(1) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED ON OR ABOUT DECEMBER
 1, 1976, WHEN
 
    SUPERVISOR HUGHES ALLEGEDLY QUESTIONED THE NEED FOR HIS PRESENCE AT A
 GRIEVANCE MEETING?
 
    THE QUESTIONING REFERRED TO WAS BASED ON HUGHES' INEXPERIENCE WITH
 GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE AND RECTIFIED WHEN HE MET WITH CLEARY AND PITTSON.
 THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF THE ORDER IN THIS RESPECT.
 
    (21) WERE SECTIONS 19(A)(1) AND (4) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED WHEN
 HESTAND WAS ISSUED A
 
    MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE NEED FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION BECAUSE OF
 STOLEN TOOLS?
 
    IN PART THIS ISSUE IS ARGUED BY THE PARTIES ON THE POINT WHETHER A
 PROPOSED NOTICE OF DISCIPLINE SHOULD HAVE PRECEDED THE MEMORANDUM.  THE
 CONTRACT IS NOT CLEAR ON THIS POINT (R-A, ARTICLE TWENTY-ONE, SECTIONS
 1, 2 AND 5).  THE ACTIVITY'S DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS TESTIFIED IT
 WAS NOT CUSTOMARY TO ISSUE PROPOSED LETTERS OF REPRIMAND.  I FIND
 INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH TO PREMISE A VIOLATION OF THE ORDER, IN
 THIS RESPECT.  FURTHERMORE, ON THIS ASPECT OF THE ISSUE, I AM PRECLUDED
 FROM CONSIDERING IT BY THE RULE IN DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, SUPRA, P. 5,
 A/SLMR NO. 624, AND DEPARTMENT OF HEW, SUPRA, P. 5, A/SLMR NO. 1168.
 
    ON THE MORE BASIC ISSUE, WHETHER A REPRIMAND WAS JUSTIFIED, OR WAS AN
 INSTANCE OF REPRISAL, AS WAS THE FIRE WATCH DUTY IMPOSED ON HESTAND, I
 ALSO FIND NO VIOLATION OF THE ORDER.  IT APPEARS THAT VALUABLE TOOLS
 WERE MISSING WHILE IN HESTAND'S CUSTODY.  ALTHOUGH HESTAND SUGGESTED
 THAT THE TOOLS WERE TAKEN AS A REPRISAL (TR. 117-118), THERE IS NOTHING
 TO CORROBORATE THIS SPECULATION.
 
    (22) WERE SECTIONS 19(A)(1) AND (5) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED WHEN A. L.
 MCFALL, ON OR ABOUT
 
    DECEMBER 22, 1976, ISSUED A LETTER TO THE BMTC INDICATING THAT A
 GRIEVANCE REGARDING SICK
 
    LEAVE FILED AGAINST SUPERVISOR WIXSON SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE BMTC?
 
    COMPLAINANT DOES NOT ARGUE THIS ISSUE.  ONLY MR. MCFALL TESTIFIED ON
 IT.  I FIND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON WHICH TO PREMISE A VIOLATION OF THE
 ORDER.
 
    (23) WERE SECTIONS 19(A)(1), (2), (3) AND (4) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED
 ON OR ABOUT DECEMBER
 
    22, 1976, WHEN A LETTER PROPOSING A TWO DAY SUSPENSION OF J.  CLEARY
 WAS FORWARDED TO THE BMTC
 
    DESPITE CLEARY'S SPECIFIC INSTRUCTION THAT THE DOCUMENT REMAIN
 PRIVATE?
 
    AS A RESULT OF CLEARY'S DISRESPECT TO RUNTE ON NOVEMBER 29 (SEE ISSUE
 NO. 25, BELOW), CLEARY'S SUPERINTENDENT ISSUED A LETTER OF PROPOSED
 ADVERSE ACTION TO CLEARY, DATED DECEMBER 20, 1976.  ON DECEMBER 21,
 CLEARY REQUESTED IN WRITING THAT THE UNION NOT BE GIVEN A COPY OF THE
 LETTER.  ON DECEMBER 22, THE UNION IN FACT RECEIVED A COPY OF THE
 LETTER.  BASED ON TESTIMONY, WHICH I BELIEVE, THAT THE SHIPYARD
 PERSONNEL OFFICE HAD XEROX COPIERS ONLY, AND THE COPY THAT THE UNION
 RECEIVED WAS A COPY MADE BY ANOTHER PROCESS, I FIND THAT THE ACTIVITY
 DID NOT FURNISH THE UNION A COPY OF THE LETTER OF PROPOSED ADVERSE
 ACTION.
 
    (24) WERE SECTIONS 19(A)(1) AND (4) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED ON DECEMBER
 20, 1976, WHEN
 
    PITTSON RECEIVED AN OFFICIAL LETTER PROPOSING TO TERMINATE HIS
 EMPLOYMENT WITH THE SHIPYARD?
 
    OBVIOUSLY IT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ORDER TO ISSUE A PROPOSED LETTER OF
 ADVERSE ACTION IF THE ADVERSE ACTION ITSELF IS JUSTIFIED.  THE BASIC
 QUESTION IS WHETHER PITTSON'S TERMINATION WAS IN REPRISAL FOR HIS UNION
 ACTIVITY OR WAS A BONA FIDE RESPONSE TO HIS ACTIONS.  I AM FORECLOSED
 FROM CONSIDERING THIS QUESTION BY THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR'S
 DECISION IN HIS LETTER OF JUNE 19, 1978 (ASST. SECY. EXHIBIT 1(E)) AND
 BY SECTION 19(D) OF THE ORDER.
 
    (25) WERE SECTIONS 19(A)(1), (2) AND (4) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED ON
 DECEMBER 20, 1976, WHEN
 
    CLEARY RECEIVED AN OFFICIAL LETTER PROPOSING TO SUSPEND HIM FOR TWO
 DAYS, AND ON DECEMBER 21,
 
    1976, WHEN PITTSON WAS GIVEN A SLIGHTLY REVISED COPY OF THE DECEMBER
 20, 1976, LETTER
 
    PROPOSING TO REMOVE HIM?
 
    RESPECTING PITTSON, THIS ISSUE IS DISPOSED OF BY THE DISCUSSION OF
 ISSUE NO. 24, ABOVE.  RESPECTING CLEARY, THE BASIC ISSUE IS WHETHER THE
 TWO-DAY SUSPENSION WAS IN REPRISAL FOR HIS UNION ACTIVITIES OR WAS
 JUSTIFIED BY HIS ACTIONS.  HIS ACTIONS WERE THAT ON NOVEMBER 29, 1976,
 CLEARY, A CHIEF STEWARD, WANTED TO MEET WITH ONE OF HIS STEWARDS,
 PITTSON.  IN ORDER TO SEE HIM HE HAD TO GET PERMISSION OF PITTSON'S
 FOREMAN, HUGHES.  CLEARY LOOKED FOR HUGHES IN THE WELDERS' SUPERVISORS'
 OFFICE.  HUGHES WAS NOT THERE BUT FOREMAN MAIN WAS.  MAIN'S CONVERSATION
 WITH CLEARY MADE CLEARY MORE AND MORE FRUSTRATED WITH WHAT HE PERCEIVED
 AS OBSTACLES PUT HIS WAY.  CLEARY, WAS, OF COURSE, AWARE OF THE RUN-IN
 PITTSON HAD EARLIER THAT MONTH WITH GENERAL FOREMAN RUNTE (SEE ISSUE NO.
 4);  AND WITH RUNTE'S REFUSAL TO LET HIM MEET WITH HESTAND ON NOVEMBER 9
 (SEE ISSUE NO. 8).  AT THAT POINT RUNTE ENTERED THE OFFICE AND CLEARY
 SAID, "WHAT IS HE DOING HERE?" AND THEN HE SHOOK HIS FIST IN HIS FACE
 AND HE SAID, "I AM GOING TO GET YOUR ASS.  I FILED AN UNFAIR LABOR
 PRACTICE AND IF THE COUNCIL DOESN'T GET YOUR JOB, THEN SOMETHING IS
 WRONG." (TR. 746;  SEE ALSO PP. 755-756.) SHORTLY THEREAFTER CLEARY
 "STORMED OUT OF THE OFFICE." (TR. 739).  THIS WAS THE EXCLUSIVE BASIS
 FOR CLEARY'S TWO-DAY SUSPENSION.  CLEARY HAD HAD NO DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
 AGAINST HIM PREVIOUSLY.  MR. MCFALL, TESTIFIED:  "WE HAVE NO PROBLEM
 WITH MR. CLEARY IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH GENERAL FOREMEN AND SUPERVISORS,
 NOW.  THERE WERE SOME THINGS SAID, AT THAT TIME, WHICH WERE NOT TYPICAL
 OF EVEN HIMSELF." (TR.  405-406.) IN SHORT, CLEARY'S STATEMENT WAS AN
 ISOLATED INCIDENT.  HE WAS CLEARLY ON UNION BUSINESS.  THERE HAD BEEN A
 RECENT HISTORY OF INCIDENTS WHICH VIOLATED THE ORDER.  IN THESE
 CIRCUMSTANCES ALMOST ANY DISCIPLINE WAS IMPROPER, AND A TWO-DAY
 SUSPENSION CERTAINLY SO.
 
    CLEARY'S LANGUAGE COMES WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF "ROBUST DEBATE"
 WHICH THE SUPREME COURT HAS DECLARED PROTECTED, BOTH UNDER THE NLRA AND
 THE ORDER, IN OLD DOMINION BR. NO. 496, NAT. ASSN., LETTER CAR. V
 AUSTIN, 418 U.S. 264, 273(1974).  IN U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,
 CENTRAL OFFICE AND AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL
 2532, AFL-CIO, A/SLMR NO. 631, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY ADOPTED THE
 FOLLOWING STATEMENT BY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GIESEY:
 
    THE BRIEF ENCOUNTER BETWEEN MR. FOSTER AND MR. GRANT DID OCCUR AND
 SOMEWHERE BETWEEN TWO
 
    AND THREE 'DAMNS,' ONE 'ASS' AND ONE 'HELL' WERE SPOKEN BY MR.
 FOSTER.  AS MR. FOSTER
 
    TESTIFIED, 'I WAS REALLY ANGRY.' I BELIEVE HIM, HE APPEARED AT THE
 HEARING TO BE SOMEWHAT
 
    MERCURIAL IN NATURE IN CONTRAST WITH MR. GRANT'S IMPERIOUS AND
 GLACIAL DEMEANOR.
 
    I ADOPT THAT LANGUAGE AS APPLICABLE HERE, SUBSTITUTING CLEARY FOR
 FOSTER AND RUNTE FOR GRANT.  FLAGRANT CONDUCT OF AN EMPLOYEE IN THE
 COURSE OF PROTECTED ACTIVITY JUSTIFIES DISCIPLINARY ACTION BY AN
 EMPLOYER, BUT THERE MUST BE LEEWAY FOR IMPULSIVE BEHAVIOR.  N.L.R.B. V.
 THOR POWER TOOL CO., 351 F.2D 584, 587 (7TH CIR. 1965).  THIS IS AN
 INSTANCE OF SUCH "IMPULSIVE BEHAVIOR." THE DISCIPLINE IMPOSED WAS
 EXCESSIVE;  IT RESULTED FROM UNION ANIMUS.  I FIND THAT SECTION 19(A)(1)
 OF THE ORDER WAS VIOLATED.
 
    (26) WERE SECTIONS 19(A)(1), (2) AND (4) OF THE ORDER VIOLATED ON OR
 ABOUT JANUARY 12,
 
    1977, WHEN THEN CHIEF STEWARD CLEARY WAS SUSPENDED FOR TWO DAYS FOR
 ALLEGED INSUBORDINATION?
 
    THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN DISPOSED OF IN THE DISCUSSION OF ISSUE NO. 25.
 
    RELIEF
 
    FOR RELIEF THE UNION SEEKS THE REINSTATEMENT OF PITTSON WITH BACK
 PAY;  REIMBURSEMENT FOR CLEARY'S LOST WAGES;  PURGING OF REFERENCES TO
 CLEARY'S ALLEGED MISCONDUCT AND THE TWO-DAY SUSPENSION FROM ALL
 GOVERNMENT RECORDS;  ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPENSES OF LITIGATION;  AND
 POSTING OF THE USUAL NOTICE.
 
    DESPITE THE UNION'S CONTENTION, I BELIEVE I AM FORECLOSED FROM
 ORDERING PITTSON'S REINSTATEMENT BY THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR'S
 DECISION IN HIS LETTER OF JUNE 19, 1978 (ASST. SECY. EXHIBIT 1(E)).  I
 DO ORDER THE RELIEF REQUESTED RESPECTING CLEARY.  PRECEDENT FOR SUCH
 ACTION IS FOUND IN PARAGRAPHS 2(A) AND (B) OF THE ORDER ISSUED IN
 VETERAN'S ADMINISTRATION, NORTH CHICAGO VETERANS HOSPITAL AND LOCAL
 2107, AFGE, A/SLMR NO. 1024(1978).
 
    DESPITE MY REQUEST FOR AUTHORITIES FROM COUNSEL (TR. 10) HE HAS
 FURNISHED NONE, AND I HAVE FOUND NONE, THAT WOULD AUTHORIZE THE AWARD OF
 ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS.  THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT OF 1978, P.L.
 95-454, 92 STAT. 1111, SECTION 702, AMENDS 5 U.S.C. 5596(B) TO PROVIDE
 FOR REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES TO "AN EMPLOYEE OF AN AGENCY" IN CERTAIN
 CIRCUMSTANCES.  IN THE INSTANT CASE THE EMPLOYEE INVOLVED, JOHN CLEARY,
 HAD NO ATTORNEY'S FEES.  THE UNION'S COUNSEL REPRESENTED THE UNION, NOT
 MR. CLEARY AS AN INDIVIDUAL.  THEREFORE THAT PROVISION DOES NOT APPLY.
 IN THE ABSENCE OF AUTHORITY AUTHORIZING AWARD OF SUCH FEES AND COSTS I
 DECLINE TO ORDER SUCH RELIEF.
 
                                   ORDER
 
    PURSUANT TO SECTION 6(B) OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED, AND
 SECTION 203.26(B) OF THE REGULATIONS, AND THE TRANSITION RULES AND
 REGULATIONS PUBLISHED IN 44 FED.REG. 7 (JANUARY 2, 1979) ADDING PART
 2400 TO 5 C.F.R., THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY HEREBY ORDERS
 THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, PUGET SOUND NAVAL SHIPYARD, BREMERTON,
 WASHINGTON, SHALL:
 
    1.  CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
 
    (A) INTERFERING WITH, RESTRAINING, OR COERCING ITS EMPLOYEES IN THE
 EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS ASSURED BY THE EXECUTIVE ORDER.
 
    (B) DISCOURAGING MEMBERSHIP IN A LABOR ORGANIZATION BY DISCRIMINATION
 IN REGARD TO ANY CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT.
 
    (C) SPONSORING, CONTROLLING, OR OTHERWISE ASSISTING A LABOR
 ORGANIZATION EXCEPT AS PERMITTED BY THE EXECUTIVE ORDER.
 
    2.  TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE
 PURPOSES OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491 AS AMENDED:
 
    (A) REIMBURSE JOHN CLEARY THE WAGES HE WAS NOT PAID AS A RESULT OF
 THE TWO-DAY SUSPENSION REFERRED TO IN ISSUE 26 ABOVE.
 
    (B) DELETE ALL REFERENCES TO THE TWO DAY SUSPENSION GIVEN TO JOHN
 CLEARY, REFERRED TO IN ISSUE 26 ABOVE, AND DELETE ALL REFERENCES TO THE
 CONDUCT OF JOHN CLEARY IN THE PRESENCE OF LYLE RUNTE ON NOVEMBER 29,
 1976, FROM CLEARY'S PERSONNEL FILE AND FROM ANY OTHER DOCUMENTS IN THE
 ACTIVITY'S POSSESSION OR CONTROL IN WHICH SUCH REFERENCE MAY APPEAR.
 
    (C) POST IN ITS FACILITY AT BREMERTON, WASHINGTON COPIES OF THE
 ATTACHED NOTICE MARKED "APPENDIX" ON FORMS TO BE FURNISHED BY THE
 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY.  UPON RECEIPT OF SUCH FORMS THEY
 SHALL BE SIGNED BY THE COMMANDER OF THE PUGET SOUND NAVAL SHIPYARD AND
 SHALL BE POSTED AND MAINTAINED BY HIM FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS THEREAFTER
 IN CONSPICUOUS PLACES, INCLUDING ALL PLACES WHERE NOTICES TO EMPLOYEES
 ARE CUSTOMARILY POSTED.  THE COMMANDER SHALL TAKE REASONABLE STEPS TO
 INSURE THAT SUCH NOTICES ARE NOT ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY
 OTHER MATERIAL.
 
    (D) PURSUANT TO SECTION 203.27 OF THE REGULATIONS, NOTIFY THE FEDERAL
 LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY IN WRITING WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF
 THIS ORDER AS TO WHAT STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO COMPLY HEREWITH.
 
                             THOMAS SCHNEIDER
 
                         ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
 
    DATED:  MARCH 7, 1979
 
    SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
 
    TS:VAG
 
        APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND
 
           ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND IN
 
            ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF EXECUTIVE ORDER
 
            11491, AS AMENDED LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE
 
           FEDERAL SERVICE WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
 
    WE WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH, RESTRAIN, OR COERCE OUR EMPLOYEES IN THE
 EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS ASSURED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED.
 
    WE WILL NOT DISCOURAGE MEMBERSHIP IN THE BREMERTON METAL TRADES
 COUNCIL, OR ANY LABOR ORGANIZATION, BY DISCRIMINATING IN REGARD TO ANY
 CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT.
 
    WE WILL NOT SPONSOR, CONTROL, OR OTHERWISE ASSIST A LABOR
 ORGANIZATION EXCEPT AS PERMITTED BY THE EXECUTIVE ORDER.
 
    WE WILL REIMBURSE JOHN CLEARY THE WAGES HE WAS NOT PAID AS A RESULT
 OF THE TWO-DAY SUSPENSION HE RECEIVED ON OR ABOUT JANUARY 12, 1977, FOR
 ALLEGED INSUBORDINATION.
 
    WE WILL DELETE ALL REFERENCES TO THE AFORESAID TWO-DAY SUSPENSION AND
 DELETE ALL REFERENCES TO THE CONDUCT OF JOHN CLEARY IN THE PRESENCE OF
 LYLE RUNTE ON NOVEMBER 29, 1976, FROM CLEARY'S PERSONNEL FILE AND FROM
 ANY OTHER DOCUMENTS IN OUR POSSESSION OR CONTROL IN WHICH SUCH
 REFERENCES MAY APPEAR.
 
                           (AGENCY OR ACTIVITY)
 
    DATED:  . . .  BY . . .
 
                                (SIGNATURE)
 
    THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE
 OF POSTING, AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER
 MATERIAL.
 
    IF ANY EMPLOYEES HAVE ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
 COMPLIANCE WITH ANY OF ITS PROVISIONS, THEY MAY COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY
 WITH THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY,
 WHOSE ADDRESS IS:  ROOM 317, 211 MAIN STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
 94105.
 
    /1/ IN VIEW OF THIS FINDING, THE AUTHORITY FINDS IT UNNECESSARY TO
 CONSIDER OR PASS UPON THE ALJ'S FINDING THAT THE DISCIPLINE IMPOSED ON
 THE STEWARD WAS EXCESSIVE.
 
    /2/ IN CONFORMITY WITH SECTION 902(B) OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT
 OF 1978 (92 STAT. 1224), THE PRESENT CASE IS DECIDED SOLELY ON THE BASIS
 OF E.O. 11491, AS AMENDED, AND AS IF THE NEW FEDERAL SERVICE
 LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE (92 STAT. 1191) HAD NOT BEEN ENACTED.
  THE DECISION AND ORDER DOES NOT PREJUDGE IN ANY MANNER EITHER THE
 MEANING OR APPLICATION OF RELATED PROVISIONS IN THE NEW STATUTE OR THE
 RESULT WHICH WOULD BE REACHED BY THE AUTHORITY IF THE CASE HAD ARISEN
 UNDER THE STATUTE RATHER THAN THE EXECUTIVE ORDER.
 
    /3/ MEMBER LEON B. APPLEWHAITE DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE PRESENT
 CASE, WHICH HAD BEEN PROCESSED PRIOR TO HIS CONFIRMATION BY THE UNITED
 STATES SENATE AS A MEMBER OF THE AUTHORITY.
 
    /4/ SECTION REFERENCES ARE TO THE ORDER.
 
    /5/ R-A IS RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT A, THE NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT.
 REFERENCES TO RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS ARE PREFIXED BY R;  REFERENCES TO
 COMPLAINANT'S EXHIBITS ARE PREFIXED BY C.  THE TRANSCRIPT IS REFERRED TO
 BY TR. FOLLOWED BY A PAGE REFERENCE.
 
    /6/ THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THIS WAS THE CAMDEN, BUT THE NAME OF
 THE SHIP IS IRRELEVANT FOR PRESENT PURPOSES.