National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 6 (Labor Organization) and Internal Revenue Service, New Orleans District (Activity) 



[ v03 p748 ]
03:0748(118)NG
The decision of the Authority follows:


 3 FLRA No. 118
 
 NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES
 UNION, CHAPTER 6
 (Labor Organization)
 
 and
 
 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
 NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT
 (Activity)
 
                                            Case No. 0-NG-11
 
                      DECISION ON NEGOTIABILITY ISSUE
 
    THIS CASE COMES BEFORE THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY (THE
 AUTHORITY) PURSUANT TO SECTION 7105(A)(2)(E) OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE
 LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE (THE STATUTE) (5 U.S.C. 7101 ET
 SEQ.).
 
                            UNION PROPOSAL /1/
 
    PRE-PAID PARKING SPACES FOR BARGAINING UNIT EMPLOYEES' PRIVATE
 VEHICLES, AT THE NEW
 
    ORLEANS, BATON ROUGE, SHREVEPORT, LAKE CHARLES, AND HOUMA POSTS OF
 DUTY, WILL NOT BE RELEASED
 
    TO THE GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION.
 
                    QUESTIONS HERE BEFORE THE AUTHORITY
 
    THE QUESTIONS ARE, FIRST OF ALL, WHETHER THE UNION'S PROPOSAL IS
 INCONSISTENT WITH APPLICABLE GOVERNMENT-WIDE REGULATIONS UNDER SECTION
 7117(A) OF THE STATUTE;  OR, SECONDLY, WHETHER THE UNION'S PROPOSAL
 CONCERNS A MATTER WHICH IS NEGOTIABLE AT THE ELECTION OF THE AGENCY
 UNDER SECTION 7106(B)(1) OF THE STATUTE;  OR, FINALLY, WHETHER THE
 UNION'S PROPOSAL VIOLATES SECTION 7106(A)(1) OF THE STATUTE.
 
                                  OPINION
 
    CONCLUSION:  THE UNION'S PROPOSAL, INSOFAR AS IT REQUIRES THE AGENCY
 TO RETAIN THE DISPUTED PARKING SPACES, IS CONSISTENT WITH APPLICABLE
 GOVERNMENT-WIDE REGULATIONS UNDER SECTION 7117(A) OF THE STATUTE, DOES
 NOT CONCERN A MATTER WHICH MAY BE NEGOTIATED AT THE ELECTION OF THE
 AGENCY WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 7106(B)(1) OF THE STATUTE, AND DOES
 NOT VIOLATE THE AGENCY'S RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 7106(A)(1) OF THE STATUTE.
  HOWEVER, TO THE EXTENT THAT THE PROPOSAL IMPLICITLY REQUIRES THE AGENCY
 TO PROVIDE THE PARKING SPACES SO RETAINED FREE OF CHARGE TO EMPLOYEES,
 IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH APPLICABLE GOVERNMENT-WIDE REGULATIONS UNDER
 SECTION 7117(A) OF THE STATUTE.  ACCORDINGLY, PURSUANT TO SECTION
 2424.10 OF THE AUTHORITY'S RULES AND REGULATIONS (45 FED. REG. 3513
 (1980)), THE AGENCY'S ALLEGATION THAT THE DISPUTED PROPOSAL IS NOT
 WITHIN THE DUTY TO BARGAIN IS SUSTAINED IN PART AND SET ASIDE IN PART.
 /2/
 
    REASONS:  UNDER THE STATUTE, THE DUTY OF AN AGENCY TO NEGOTIATE WITH
 AN EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE EXTENDS TO THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT
 AFFECTING EMPLOYEES IN AN APPROPRIATE UNIT EXCEPT AS PROVIDED OTHERWISE
 BY FEDERAL LAW AND REGULATION, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-WIDE REGULATION.
 /3/ THAT IS, UNDER THE STATUTE, IF A PROPOSED MATTER RELATES TO THE
 CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT OF AN APPROPRIATE UNIT OF EMPLOYEES IN AN
 AGENCY AND IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH LAW OR REGULATION-- I.E., IS WITHIN
 THE DISCRETION OF AN AGENCY-- IT IS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF BARGAINING WHICH
 IS REQUIRED OF THAT AGENCY.  IN THIS CASE, THE AGENCY ALLEGES, FIRST OF
 ALL, THAT THE UNION'S PROPOSAL IS NOT WITHIN THE DUTY TO BARGAIN BECAUSE
 IT IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE GOVERNMENT-WIDE REGULATIONS.  SPECIFICALLY,
 THE AGENCY ALLEGES THAT RETENTION OF THE EMPLOYEE PARKING SPACES WHICH
 ARE THE SUBJECT OF THE INSTANT DISPUTE CONFLICTS WITH PROVISIONS OF THE
 FEDERAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS (FPMR).  /4/
 
    THE INITIAL QUESTION IS WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF THE FPMR (41 C.F.R.
 SUBCHAPTER D) AT ISSUE HEREIN CONSTITUTE A "GOVERNMENT-WIDE RULE OR
 REGULATION" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE STATUTE.  THE PHRASE
 "GOVERNMENT-WIDE RULE OR REGULATION" IS USED IN TWO DIFFERENT
 SUBSECTIONS OF SECTION 7117 OF THE STATUTE.  FIRST OF ALL, AS HERE IN
 ISSUE, IT IS USED IN SECTION 7117(A) TO STATE A LIMITATION ON THE SCOPE
 OF BARGAINING;  I.E., MATTERS WHICH ARE INCONSISTENT WITH
 GOVERNMENT-WIDE RULE OR REGULATION ARE NOT WITHIN THE DUTY TO BARGAIN.
 /5/ SECONDLY, IT IS USED IN SECTION 7117(D) TO STATE THE RIGHT OF AN
 EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE, IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, TO CONSULT WITH
 RESPECT TO THE ISSUANCE OF SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS EFFECTING ANY
 SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE IN ANY CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT.  /6/ IN NEITHER OF
 THESE CONTEXTS DOES THE STATUTE PRECISELY DEFINE WHAT CONSTITUTES A
 "GOVERNMENT-WIDE RULE OR REGULATION" WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 7117.
  THE COMMITTEE REPORT ACCOMPANYING THE BILL REPORTED OUT OF THE HOUSE
 COMMITTEE (H.R. 11280) STATED, AS TO THE MEANING OF THE TERM
 "GOVERNMENT-WIDE" AS FOLLOWS:  /1/
 
    THE TERM "GOVERNMENT-WIDE" SHALL BE CONSTRUED LITERALLY;  ONLY THOSE
 REGULATIONS WHICH
 
    AFFECT THE FEDERAL CIVILIAN WORK FORCE AS A WHOLE ARE
 "GOVERNMENT-WIDE" REGULATIONS
 
    . . . TYPICALLY, IT IS ANTICIPATED, THE ISSUING AGENCY WILL BE THE
 OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
 
    MANAGEMENT OR THE GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION.
 
    THE BILL AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE ("THE UDALL SUBSTITUTE") DIFFERS FROM
 THE BILL REPORTED BY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE AS TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH
 GOVERNMENT-WIDE RULES AND REGULATIONS CONSTITUTE A LIMITATION ON THE
 SCOPE OF THE DUTY TO BARGAIN.  NEVERTHELESS, AS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE
 HEREIN, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY INDICATES THAT THE DEFINITION OF THE
 TERM "GOVERNMENT-WIDE" IN "THE UDALL SUBSTITUTE" WAS INTENDED TO BE THE
 SAME AS THAT IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE BILL REFERRED TO ABOVE.  /8/
 
    ON THE OTHER HAND, THE BILL AS PASSED BY THE SENATE (S.2640) PROVIDES
 THAT "REGULATIONS OF APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES, INCLUDING POLICIES WHICH
 ARE SET FORTH IN THE FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL," SHALL GOVERN THE
 ADMINISTRATION OF ALL MATTERS COVERED BY A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
 AGREEMENT.  /9/ THE HOUSE-SENATE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, HOWEVER, ADOPTED
 THE PROVISIONS OF THE HOUSE BILL, RATHER THAN THOSE OF THE SENATE.  IN
 DOING SO, THE CONFEREES PROVIDED NO FURTHER DEFINITION OF THE TERM
 "GOVERNMENT-WIDE," BUT STATED AS FOLLOWS CONCERNING THE INTENDED
 DEFINITION OF THE PHRASE "RULES AND REGULATIONS":  /10/
 
    THE CONFEREES SPECIFICALLY INTEND, HOWEVER, THAT THE TERM "RULES OR
 REGULATIONS" BE
 
    INTERPRETED AS INCLUDING OFFICIAL DECLARATIONS OF POLICY OF AN AGENCY
 WHICH ARE BINDING ON
 
    OFFICIALS AND AGENCIES TO WHICH THEY APPLY.  THE RIGHT OF LABOR
 ORGANIZATIONS TO ENJOY
 
    NATIONAL CONSULTATION RIGHTS WILL ALSO INCLUDE SUCH OFFICIAL
 DECLARATIONS OF POLICY WHICH ARE
 
    BINDING ON OFFICIALS OR AGENCIES.
 
    THUS, CONGRESS INTENDED THE TERM "GOVERNMENT-WIDE REGULATION" TO
 INCLUDE THOSE REGULATIONS AND OFFICIAL DECLARATIONS OF POLICY WHICH
 APPLY TO THE FEDERAL CIVILIAN WORK FORCE AS A WHOLE AND ARE BINDING ON
 THE FEDERAL AGENCIES AND OFFICIALS TO WHICH THEY APPLY.
 
    HOWEVER, WHILE THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TERM "GOVERNMENT-WIDE"
 INDICATES CONGRESS INTENDED THAT REGULATIONS WHICH ONLY APPLY TO A
 LIMITED SEGMENT OF THE FEDERAL CIVILIAN WORK FORCE NOT SERVE TO LIMIT
 THE DUTY TO BARGAIN, /11/ IT DOES NOT PRECISELY DEFINE THE OUTER LIMITS
 OF THE REACH REQUIRED OF A REGULATION IN ORDER FOR THAT REGULATION TO BE
 A "GOVERNMENT-WIDE" REGULATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 7117. THAT
 IS, IT IS UNCLEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, WHETHER CONGRESS INTENDED THAT A
 REGULATION MUST APPLY TO ALL EMPLOYEES IN THE FEDERAL CIVILIAN WORK
 FORCE IN ORDER TO CONSTITUTE A "GOVERNMENT-WIDE" REGULATION.  IN THIS
 REGARD, IT IS A BASIC RULE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION THAT LEGISLATIVE
 ENACTMENTS ARE TO BE CONSTRUED SO AS TO GIVE THEM MEANING.  /12/ A
 REQUIREMENT THAT A REGULATION APPLY TO ALL FEDERAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES IN
 ORDER TO CONSTITUTE A "GOVERNMENT-WIDE" REGULATION UNDER SECTION 7117
 WOULD RENDER THAT PROVISION MEANINGLESS, SINCE IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT
 THERE IS ANY REGULATION WHICH LITERALLY AFFECTS EVERY CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE
 OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.  FURTHERMORE, SUCH A LITERAL DEFINITION OF
 THE TERM WOULD ALSO RENDER MEANINGLESS THE CONCOMITANT RIGHT OF A LABOR
 ORGANIZATION UNDER SECTION 7117(D) OF THE STATUTE IN APPROPRIATE
 CIRCUMSTANCES TO CONSULT WITH THE ISSUING AGENCY ON GOVERNMENT-WIDE
 RULES OR REGULATIONS EFFECTING SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES IN ANY CONDITIONS OF
 EMPLOYMENT.  IN THIS REGARD, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE STATUTE
 INDICATES THAT CONGRESS INTENDED THE CONSULTATION RIGHTS PROVIDED IN
 SECTION 7117(D) TO BE SUBSTANTIAL UNION RIGHTS.  ONE OF THE PROPONENTS
 OF "THE UDALL SUBSTITUTE" STATED ON THE HOUSE FLOOR DURING DEBATE ON
 THAT BILL AS FOLLOWS:  /13/
 
    IN SECTION 7117, THE UDALL SUBSTITUTE REMOVES MANY GOVERNMENT-WIDE
 REGULATIONS FROM
 
    COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.  WE HAVE AGREED TO THIS CHANGE WITH THE
 UNDERSTANDING THAT THE
 
    CONSULTATION RIGHTS ACCORDED EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVES ARE TO BE
 RIGIDLY ENFORCED.
 
    THAT CONGRESS INTENDED CONSULTATION RIGHTS TO BE "RIGIDLY ENFORCED"
 SUPPORTS THE VIEW THAT CONGRESS UNDERSTOOD "GOVERNMENT-WIDE
 REGULATIONS"
 TO CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT LIMITATION ON THE SCOPE OF BARGAINING, I.E.,
 THAT CONGRESS INTENDED THE TERM TO INCLUDE MORE THAN THE INCONSEQUENTIAL
 NUMBER OF REGULATIONS THAT WOULD FALL WITHIN A LITERAL DEFINITION.
 
    THE REGULATIONS AT ISSUE HEREIN ARE CODIFIED AT TITLE 41 OF THE CODE
 OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AS PROPERTY MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS PUBLISHED BY
 THE GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (GSA).  BY THEIR TERMS, THESE
 REGULATIONS ARE BINDING ON MOST, BUT NOT ALL, SEGMENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE,
 LEGISLATIVE, AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.  /14/ AS
 SUCH, THESE REGULATIONS ARE GENERALLY APPLICABLE THROUGHOUT THE FEDERAL
 GOVERNMENT, I.E., APPLY TO THE FEDERAL CIVILIAN WORK FORCE AS A WHOLE,
 THOUGH NOT, OF COURSE, TO EVERY FEDERAL EMPLOYEE.  IT IS REASONABLE TO
 CONCLUDE, THEREFORE, THAT THESE REGULATIONS ARE "GOVERNMENT-WIDE
 REGULATIONS" WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 7117(A).  MOREOVER, THE
 REFERENCE TO GSA IN THE PORTION OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE REPORT CITED
 ABOVE (SEE NOTE 7, SUPRA) SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION THAT THE FPMR,
 PROMULGATED PURSUANT TO GSJ'S STATUTORY PROPERTY MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY,
 WERE CONSIDERED BY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE TO BE OF THE TYPE OF REGULATION
 DEFINES AS "GOVERNMENT-WIDE." THIS DOES NOT MEAN, HOWEVER, THAT A
 REGULATION MUST REACH AS FAR AS THE FPMR IN ORDER TO SATISFY THE
 REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 7117, BUT ONLY THAT WHATEVER ELSE MAY BE, THE
 GENERAL APPLICABILITY OF THE REGULATIONS AT ISSUE HEREIN CLEARLY IS
 SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE DETERMINATION THAT THEY ARE "GOVERNMENT-WIDE
 REGULATIONS" UNDER THE STATUTE.  THUS, WITHOUT DECIDING WHETHER
 REGULATIONS LESS GENERALLY APPLICABLE THROUGHOUT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
 THAN THOSE AT ISSUE HEREIN WOULD CONSTITUTE "GOVERNMENT-WIDE RULES AND
 REGULATIONS," THE AUTHORITY FINDS THAT THE SUBJECT PROVISIONS OF THE
 FPMR ARE "GOVERNMENT-WIDE RULES AND REGULATIONS" WHICH WILL BAR
 NEGOTIATION ON CONFLICTING UNION PROPOSALS UNDER SECTION 7117(A) OF THE
 STATUTE.
 
    THE ISSUE THEN BECOMES WHETHER THE UNION PROPOSAL IN DISPUTE HEREIN
 IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE FPMR CITED BY THE AGENCY.  IN
 THIS REGARD, SINCE GSA HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ISSUANCE AND
 INTERPRETATION OF THESE REGULATIONS, THE AUTHORITY REQUESTED AN ADVISORY
 OPINION FROM GSA REGARDING WHETHER ANY PART OF CURRENT FPMR WOULD
 PREVENT AN AGENCY FROM PROVIDING FREE PARKING SPACES FOR EMPLOYEE
 PERSONALLY OWNED VEHICLES WHICH ARE NOT USED FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS.  GSA
 RESPONDED TO THE AUTHORITY'S REQUEST AS FOLLOWS:
 
    IN CONNECTION WITH THE PENDING CASE OF NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES
 UNION, CHAPTER 6 AND INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT,
 FLRA NO. O-NG-11, YOU SOLICITED AN ADVISORY OPINION FROM THE GENERAL
 SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (GSA) INTERPRETING PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
 PROPERTY MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS (THE F.P.M.R.S).  YOUR REQUEST STATED,
 AT ITS OUTSET, THAT THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THE UNION'S PROPOSAL IN THIS
 CASE REQUIRING THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (IRS) TO PROVIDE FREE
 PARKING SPACES FOR EMPLOYEE-OWNED VEHICLES NOT USED FOR OFFICIAL
 BUSINESS IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE F.P.M.R.S, PARTICULARLY 41 C.F.R.
 101-20.111-2(A) AND 41 C.F.R. 101-20.117, WHICH ESTABLISH PRIORITIES FOR
 THE ALLOTMENT AND ASSIGNMENT OF PARKING SPACES.  LATER IN YOUR LETTER
 YOU STATED THAT YOU WERE REQUESTING OUR OPINION SPECIFICALLY ON THE
 ISSUE OF "WHETHER ANY PART OF CURRENT REGULATIONS" WOULD PREVENT AN
 AGENCY LIKE THE IRS FROM PROVIDING SUCH PARKING SPACES FREE TO ITS
 EMPLOYEES.  I FIND IT NECESSARY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE TWO
 FORMULATIONS IN WHICH THIS QUESTION WAS PRESENTED TO ME, SINCE CURRENT
 REGULATIONS DO EXIST WHICH WOULD PREVENT THE IRS IN THIS CASE FROM
 PROVIDING ITS EMPLOYEES WITH THE SPACES IN QUESTION, BUT THE REGULATIONS
 ARE NOT THOSE AT 41 C.F.R. 101-20.111-2(A), GOVERNING PARKING SPACE
 ASSIGNMENT PRIORITIES, OR 41 C.F.R. 101-20.117, GOVERNING CARPOOLING.
 
    THE FPMR PROVISIONS THAT ARE DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO YOUR QUESTION ARE
 FOUND IN 41 C.F.R. SUBPART 101-17.2, UTILIZATION OF SPACE.
 
    ALTHOUGH THE DUTIES UNDER THESE REGULATIONS BELONG TO "AGENCIES" (THE
 TERMS "FEDERAL AGENCY" AND "EXECUTIVE AGENCY" ARE DEFINED IN 41 C.F.R.
 101-17.003-23 AND 41 C.F.R. 101-17.003-24), AN ACTIVITY THAT IS
 SUBORDINATE TO SUCH AN AGENCY, AS IS THE IRS WITHIN THE TREASURY
 DEPARTMENT, IS NOT ABLE TO EVADE THESE OBLIGATIONS.
 
    A STATEMENT OF THE RESPONSIBILITY OF AGENCIES IN SPACE UTILIZATION
 APPEARS AT 41 C.F.R. 101-17.202:
 
    "IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AGENCIES TO ASSIST AND COOPERATE
 WITH GSA IN THE
 
    ASSIGNMENT AND UTILIZATION OF SPACE, INCLUDING THE FURNISHING OF
 DATA, RELEVANT TO THE USE OF
 
    THE SPACE OCCUPIED . . .  IT IS THE FURTHER RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
 AGENCIES CONTINUOUSLY TO
 
    STUDY AND SURVEY SPACE OCCUPIED UNDER ASSIGNMENT BY GSA AND OTHER
 SPACE WHICH IS CONTROLLED BY
 
    THE AGENCIES, TO INSURE EFFICIENT AND ECONOMICAL SPACE UTILIZATION."
 
    MOREOVER, IT IS MANDATORY THAT AGENCIES RELINQUISH SPACE DEEMED TO BE
 UNDERUTILIZED.  41 C.F.R. 101-17.203 PROVIDES THAT:
 
    "THE SPACE UTILIZATION PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO EFFECT MAXIMUM
 EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF
 
    GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED SPACE.  SPACE FOR WHICH THERE IS NO CURRENT
 FORESEEABLE NEED WILL BE
 
    RELINQUISHED."
 
    WHEN SPACE IS DEEMED TO BE UNDERUTILIZED, NOTICE OF RELINQUISHMENT IS
 GIVEN TO GSA IN ACCORDANCE WITH 41 C.F.R. 101-17.204.  THE AGENCY
 ASSIGNED THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED SPACE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING THE
 DETERMINATION THAT THE SPACE IS NO LONGER NEEDED.  EVIDENCE OF THIS IS
 FOUND IN 41 C.F.R. 101-17.204(B) WHICH PROVIDES, IN PART, THAT:
 
    "WHEN AN AGENCY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, AND
 PROTECTION OF
 
    GOVERNMENT-OWNED SPACE TO WHICH IT HAS BEEN ASSIGNED BY GSA, AND THE
 AGENCY DETERMINES THAT
 
    SUCH SPACE, OR A PORTION THEREOF, IS NO LONGER NEEDED, THE AGENCY
 SHALL SO NOTIFY GSA . . . "
 
    BASED ON THE ABOVE IT WAS PROPER FOR THE IRS TO CONCLUDE THAT IT WAS
 UNDERUTILIZING THE SPACE ON WHICH IT WAS PROVIDING FREE PARKING FOR
 EMPLOYEE-OWNED VEHICLES AT ITS SEVERAL LOUISIANA LOCATIONS.  PARKING
 SPACES-- LIKE ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED SPACE-- MAY BE CONSIDERED
 UNDERUTILIZED WHENEVER AN EXECUTIVE AGENCY DETERMINES THAT THEIR
 RETENTION IS NO LONGER ECONOMICAL, THAT THE AGENCY NO LONGER REQUIRES
 THEM, OR THAT IT CAN SPARE SUCH SPACE TEMPORARILY FOR UTILIZATION BY
 OTHER PARTIES.
 
    ACCORDINGLY, THE DECISION CONCERNING WHETHER A PORTION OF AN AGENCY'S
 SPACE IS UNDERUTILIZED IS FOR THAT AGENCY TO MAKE, BASED ON ITS OWN
 OPINION OF ITS NEEDS, AND NOT PURSUANT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
 NEGOTIATIONS.  THE EXECUTIVE AGENCY IS OBLIGATED TO COMMENCE ACTION TO
 RELEASE ANY SPACE THAT IT DETERMINES TO BE UNNEEDED OR UNDERUTILIZED AND
 THE UNION WHICH REPRESENTS THAT AGENCY'S EMPLOYEES MAY NOT INTERFERE
 WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF THAT DUTY, WHICH THE AGENCY OWES TO GSA.  OF
 COURSE, IF AN AGENCY HAS DETERMINED TO RELINQUISH SPACE, AND THAT
 DECISION WILL AFFECT ITS EMPLOYEES' CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT, THE AGENCY
 MAY, INDEED, HAVE AN OBLIGATION THEN, UNDER THE LABOR RELATIONS STATUTE,
 TO NEGOTIATE WITH THAT UNION OVER THE IMPACT OF THAT DECISION AND THE
 PROCEDURES FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION WITHIN THE BARGAINING UNIT.
 
    THE QUESTION OF WHETHER AN AGENCY CAN BE COMPELLED TO PAY GSA FOR
 PARKING SPACE WHICH THE AGENCY HAS DETERMINED THAT IT DOES NOT NEED HAS
 BEEN ADDRESSED BY THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE IN 55 COMP.GEN.
 897(1976).  IN THAT DECISION, THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL ANSWERED THE
 QUESTION IN THE NEGATIVE.  GRANTED THAT THAT CASE INVOLVED THE ISSUE OF
 WHETHER GSA COULD FORCE AN AGENCY TO ACCEPT PARKING SPACES AGAINST THE
 AGENCY'S WISHES, RATHER THAN WHETHER A UNION COULD COMPEL AN AGENCY TO
 DO SO;  YET IF GSA, WITH ITS REGULATORY AUTHORITY IN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
 CANNOT SO OBLIGATE ITS CLIENT AGENCIES, COULD FEDERAL EMPLOYEE LABOR
 UNIONS, WHO HAVE NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, NEVERTHELESS
 NEGOTIATE TO PERSUADE AN AGENCY TO KEEP SPACE THAT IT WISHES TO
 RELINQUISH?  EVIDENTLY THE CLIENT AGENCY, OF ITS OWN VOLITION, IS QUITE
 FREE TO DIVEST ITSELF OF UNNEEDED PARKING SPACES, FOR IT WAS HELD IN 55
 COMP.GEN. 897 (1976) NOTED ABOVE:
 
    "ACCORDINGLY, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT WHERE A GOVERNMENT AGENCY OCCUPIES
 PARKING SPACE
 
    ASSIGNED BY THE GSA FOR WHICH THERE IS NO CURRENT OR FORESEEABLE
 AGENCY NEED, THE AGENCY MAY
 
    RELINQUISH THAT SPACE BY GIVING THE NOTICE REQUIRED."
 
    ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE IRS DID NOT WISH, OR WAS NOT OBLIGATED,
 TO RELINQUISH THE EMPLOYEE PARKING SPACES THAT IT DEEMED UNESSENTIAL,
 ITS EMPLOYEES WOULD FACE A LOSS OF THEIR PRIVILEGE OF PARKING FREE OF
 CHARGE AFTER NOVEMBER 1, 1979 A TEMPORARY REGULATION ON FEDERAL EMPLOYEE
 PARKING TAKES EFFECT ON THAT DATE AND EXPIRES ON AUGUST 15, 1980.  FPMR
 TEMPORARY REGULATION D-65 (TEMP. REG. D-65), 44 FED.REG. 53161(1979), TO
 BE CODIFIED IN 41 C.F.R. 101 SUBCHAPTER D, APPENDIX. TEMP. REG. D-65
 IMPLEMENTS THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (OMB) CIRCULAR A-118,
 AUGUST 13, 1979, ENTITLED "FEDERAL EMPLOYEE PARKING FACILITIES."
 
    THE POLICY OF PRESIDENT CARTER, AS REFLECTED IN THE OMB CIRCULAR AND
 AS INCORPORATED IN TEMP. REG. D-65, CONTAINS THREE PARTS, 1( FEDERAL
 AGENCY PARKING FACILITIES SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF
 SPACES NECESSARY TO AVOID IMPAIRMENT OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 2) SUCH
 PARKING FACILITIES SHALL BE ADMINISTERED IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH
 CARPOOLING REGULATIONS, AND 3) SUBJECT TO CERTAIN EXEMPTIONS, FEDERAL
 EMPLOYEES WHO ARE PROVIDED PARKING IN GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED SPACE SHALL
 BE ASSESSED A CHARGE EQUIVALENT TO THE FAIR MONTHLY RENTAL VALUE FOR THE
 USE OF EQUIVALENT COMMERCIAL SPACE.  OMB CIRCULAR A-118, PARAGRAPH 4;
 TEMP. REG. D-65, PARAGRAPH 6, 44 FED.REG. 53162.
 
    THE CHIEF EXEMPTIONS FROM THE FEE REQUIREMENT INCLUDE HANDICAPPED
 EMPLOYEES, EMPLOYEES PARKING TWO-WHEELED OR GOVERNMENT-OWNED VEHICLES,
 AND EMPLOYEES WHOSE DUTY HOURS CONSTITUTE A SHIFT THAT EITHER STARTS OR
 ENDS OUTSIDE AN AGENCY'S NORMAL WORKING HOURS.  MOREOVER, UNDER THE NEW
 DIRECTIVE ALL EMPLOYEES OF AN AGENCY WOULD BE EXEMPT FROM PARKING FEES
 ON THEIR PRIVATE VEHICLES IF THE COMMERCIAL RATE PER SPACE IN THAT
 AGENCY'S GSA-CONTROLLED PARKING FACILITY IS UNDER $10 PER MONTH.  OMB
 CIRCULAR A-118, PARAGRAPHS 5A, B, G, I AND 9A;  TEMP. REG.  D-65,
 PARAGRAPHS 7A(4), 7B AND 7B(1), AND 11A, 44 FED.REG. 53162-3.
 
    IN LOCALITIES WHERE THE COMMERCIAL RATE PER SPACE EXCEEDS $10 PER
 MONTH, EMPLOYEES PARKING IN GSA-CONTROLLED SPACE ARE TO BE CHARGED,
 STARTING ON NOVEMBER 1, 1979, A MONTHLY RATE OF 50 PERCENT OF THE FULL
 COMMERCIAL RATE.  THE FULL RATE WILL CHARGED BEGINNING ON OCTOBER 1,
 1981.  OMB CIRCULAR A-118, PARAGRAPH 9A;  TEMP. REG. D-65, PARAGRAPH
 11C, 44 FED.REG.  53163.
 
    INCIDENTALLY, THE "OLD" REGULATIONS ON PARKING SPACE ASSIGNMENT
 PRIORITIES AND ON CARPOOLING, AT 41 C.F.R. 101-20.111-2(A) AND
 101-20.117-- ARE EXPRESSLY SUPERSEDED BY THE TEMPORARY REGULATION AS OF
 NOVEMBER 1, 1979.
 
    TEMP. REG. D-65, PARAGRAPH 16, 44 FED.REG. 53163.  AS I NOTED
 EARLIER, HOWEVER, IT IS MY JUDGMENT THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION
 THAT YOU PRESENTED TURNS NOT ON AN INTERPRETATION OF REGULATIONS
 INVOLVING THE METHODS OF ASSIGNING PARKING SPACES, BUT RATHER ON AN
 INTERPRETATION OF THOSE REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE RELINQUISHMENT BY
 SUCH AGENCIES OF UNNEEDED OR UNDERUTILIZED SPACE.  THE FUNDAMENTAL
 QUESTION IS WHETHER THE IRS MUST NEGOTIATE WITH THE N.T.E.U. BEFORE
 RETURNING TO GSA SPACES THAT THE IRS CONSIDERS DISPENSABLE.  THE OMB
 CIRCULAR AND THE TEMPORARY REGULATION DO NOT DISTURB THE CONTINUED
 EFFECTIVENESS OF THOSE PROPERTY REGULATIONS WHICH I CITED EARLIER
 REGARDING THE RELEASE BY CLIENT AGENCIES OF UNNEEDED OR UNDERUTILIZED
 SPACE.  THUS MY ADVISORY OPINION IS NOT ALTERED BY THE LANGUAGE OF
 PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE CIRCULAR, WHICH DEFERS THE APPLICABILITY OF THE TERMS
 OF THE CIRCULAR UNTIL THE EXPIRATION OF EXISTING LABOR AGREEMENTS THAT
 CONTAIN PROVISIONS ON EMPLOYEE PARKING.
 
    I REITERATE, IN CLOSING, THAT UNDER THE FEDERAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
 REGULATIONS FEDERAL AGENCIES INDEED HAVE A DUTY UNDER A SPECIFIED
 CIRCUMSTANCES TO RETURN TO GSA SPACE THAT THE AGENCIES CONSIDER TO BE NO
 LONGER NEEDED.  SUCH A DUTY, IMPOSED PURSUANT TO GOVERNMENT-WIDE
 REGULATIONS, DOES, INDEED, PREVENT AN AGENCY FROM PROVIDING FREE
 EMPLOYEE PARKING SPACES ON PROPERTY THAT THE AGENCY HAS DETERMINED IS
 UNNEEDED, AND PRECLUDES NEGOTIATIONS ON ANY CONTRARY BARGAINING
 PROPOSAL.
 
    IN SUMMARY, GSA INTERPRETS APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE FPMR,
 SPECIFICALLY, 41 C.F.R. 101-17.2, AS IMPOSING UPON AN AGENCY THE
 OBLIGATION TO RELINQUISH SPACE TO GSA, INCLUDING SPACE FOR PARKING,
 AFTER THE AGENCY DETERMINES THAT SUCH SPACE IS NO LONGER NEEDED OR IS
 UNDERUTILIZED.  GSA ALSO STATES THAT THIS DUTY OF AN AGENCY TO
 RELINQUISH SPACE IS CONTINGENT UPON A DETERMINATION BY THE AGENCY THAT
 THE SPACE IS NO LONGER NEEDED OR IS UNDERUTILIZED.  THAT IS, ACCORDING
 TO GSA, UNDER THE FPMR, AN AGENCY HAS DISCRETION TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT
 NEEDS, OR IS ABLE TO UTILIZE, A GIVEN SPACE.  GSA THEN CONCLUDED,
 WITHOUT CITING ANY PROVISION OF THE FPMR IN SUPPORT, THAT THE AGENCY
 COULD NOT MAKE THE REQUISITE DETERMINATION, I.E., EXERCISE ITS
 DISCRETION UNDER THE FPMR, THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS AS PROVIDED BY THE
 UNION'S PROPOSAL.
 
    THE AUTHORITY, FOR PURPOSES OF THIS DECISION, ADOPTS GSA'S CONCLUSION
 THAT AN AGENCY IS OBLIGATED TO RELINQUISH SPACE TO GSA, INCLUDING SPACE
 FOR PARKING, ONCE THE AGENCY DETERMINES IN ITS DISCRETION, THAT SUCH
 SPACE IS NO LONGER NEEDED OR IS UNDERUTILIZED.  HOWEVER, GSA'S FURTHER
 CONCLUSION THAT THE AGENCY COULD NOT EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION IN THIS
 REGARD THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS WITH A UNION IS WITHOUT SUPPORT.  AS STATED
 AT THE OUTSET OF THIS DECISION, CONGRESS, IN ENACTING THE FEDERAL
 SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE, ESTABLISHED A REQUIREMENT
 THAT AN AGENCY NEGOTIATE WITH THE EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE OF AN
 APPROPRIATE UNIT OF ITS EMPLOYEES OVER THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT
 AFFECTING THOSE EMPLOYEES, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT PROVIDED OTHERWISE BY
 LAW OR REGULATION.  THAT IS, TO THE EXTENT THAT AN AGENCY HAS DISCRETION
 WITH RESPECT TO A MATTER AFFECTING THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT OF ITS
 EMPLOYEES, THAT MATTER IS WITHIN THE DUTY TO BARGAIN OF THE AGENCY.
 /15/ GSA CITED NO PROVISION OF THE FPMR WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE THE AGENCY
 FROM AGREEING TO RETAIN THE PARKING SPACES AT ISSUE FOR THE PURPOSES
 STATED IN THE PROPOSAL.  MOREOVER, GSA CITED NO PROVISION OF THE FPMR
 WHICH WOULD REQUIRE AN AGENCY TO RELINQUISH SPACE MERELY BECAUSE IT
 CEASED TO BE UTILIZED FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER
 THE AGENCY HAD DETERMINED THAT THE SPACE COULD BE PUT TO SOME OTHER USE.
  IN SHORT, GSA CITED NO PROVISION OF THE FPMR WHICH BY ITS TERMS WOULD
 SPECIFICALLY PRECLUDE THE RESULT SOUGHT BY THE UNION'S PROPOSAL.
 
    RATHER, AS QUOTED ABOVE. GSA CLEARLY INTERPRETS THE FPMR AS
 PERMITTING AN AGENCY TO MAKE THE DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER IT DESIRES
 TO RETAIN A GIVEN SPACE AND PUT IT TO A PARTICULAR USE.  IN LIGHT OF THE
 STATUTORY OBLIGATION TO BARGAIN OUTLINED ABOVE, GSA'S INTERPRETATION OF
 THE FPMR PROVIDES AN INSUFFICIENT BASIS FOR THE CONCLUSION THAT THE
 UNION'S PROPOSAL IS INCONSISTENT WITH APPLICABLE GOVERNMENT-WIDE
 REGULATIONS WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 7-17 OF THE STATUTE.  THAT IS,
 THE FACT THAT UNDER THE FPMR AN AGENCY HAS DISCRETION TO DECIDE WHETHER
 TO RELINQUISH A GIVEN SPACE OR TO RETAIN IT FOR A PARTICULAR USE DOES
 NOT MEAN THAT THE AGENCY IS THEREBY PRECLUDED FROM EXERCISING ITS
 DISCRETION TO MAKE THAT DECISION THROUGH THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION WITH
 AN EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE.  GSA STATED THAT AN AGENCY'S DISCRETION IN
 THIS REGARD UNDER THE FPMR IS SUBJECT TO THE OBLIGATION WHICH FEDERAL
 AGENCIES OWE TO GSA CONCERNING THE MANAGEMENT OF PROPERTY.  FEDERAL
 AGENCIES ALSO HAVE AN OBLIGATION, HOWEVER, UNDER THE STATUTE TO
 NEGOTIATE WITH EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVES REGARDING CONDITIONS OF
 EMPLOYMENT.  THEREFORE, UNLESS THE TERMS OF AN AGENCY'S OBLIGATION TO
 GSA AS STATED IN THE FPMR SPECIFICALLY PROVIDE OTHERWISE WITH RESPECT TO
 A PARTICULAR MATTER AFFECTING CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT, AN AGENCY IS
 OBLIGATED TO NEGOTIATE WITH RESPECT TO THAT MATTER, SO LONG AS
 NEGOTIATION IS NOT PRECLUDED ON OTHER GROUNDS.
 
    GSA DID NOT ADVERT TO ANY PROVISION OF THE FPMR WHICH BY ITS SPECIFIC
 TERMS WOULD PRECLUDE THE AGENCY FROM EXERCISING ITS DISCRETION REGARDING
 THE PARTICULAR MATTER AT ISSUE HEREIN BY NEGOTIATION.  INSTEAD, THE
 CONCLUSION THAT THE UNION'S PROPOSAL CONFLICTS WITH THE FPMR IS BASED ON
 THE UNSUPPORTED DETERMINATION THAT THE AGENCY'S DECISION WITH RESPECT TO
 THE DISPOSITION OF SPACE MUST BE MADE BY THE AGENCY WITHIN ITS SOLE AND
 EXCLUSIVE DISCRETION, AND THUS, THAT THE DECISION IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE
 OBLIGATION TO BARGAIN.  UNDER SECTION 7105 OF THE STATUTE, HOWEVER, ONLY
 THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY IS EMPOWERED TO RESOLVE ISSUES
 REGARDING WHETHER THE DUTY TO BARGAIN EXTENDS TO A PARTICULAR MATTER.
 /16/ CONTRARY TO THE CONCLUSION REACHED BY GSA, IN THE ABSENCE OF
 SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE FPMR WHICH PROVIDE OTHERWISE, AND INSOFAR AS
 NOT PRECLUDED ON OTHER GROUNDS, THE AGENCY'S DUTY TO BARGAIN UNDER THE
 STATUTE EXTENDS TO THAT ASPECT OF THE UNION'S PROPOSAL HEREIN WHICH
 RELATES TO THE AGENCY'S DECISION TO RELINQUISH THE PARKING SPACES IN
 DISPUTE.
 
    GSA ALSO STATES, HOWEVER, THAT EVEN IF THE AGENCY'S DECISION TO
 RELINQUISH SPACE IS SUBJECT TO THE DUTY TO BARGAIN UNDER THE STATUTE,
 THE AGENCY WOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM AGREEING TO PROVIDE THOSE SPACES FREE
 OF CHARGE BY THE PROVISIONS OF FPMR TEMPORARY REGULATION D-65 (TEMP.
 REG. D-65), 44 FED.REG. 53161(1979).  SPECIFICALLY, UNDER SECTION 11 OF
 THIS REGULATION, FEDERAL EMPLOYEES UTILIZING GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED
 PARKING SPACES SHALL BE ASSESSED A CHARGE AT A RATE WHICH IS THE SAME AS
 THE COMMERCIAL EQUIVALENT VALUE OF THOSE PARKING SPACES.  (BETWEEN
 NOVEMBER 1, 1979, AND SEPTEMBER 30, 1981, HOWEVER, THE CHARGE WILL BE
 ONE-HALF OF THE FULL RATE TO BE CHARGED.) /17/ THIS REGULATION IS
 PRESENTLY IN EFFECT AND APPLIES TO THE PARKING SPACES HERE IN DISPUTE.
 /18/ FURTHER, BASED UPON THE ANALYSIS STATED ABOVE, THIS REGULATION,
 WHICH IS GENERALLY APPLICABLE THROUGHOUT THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, /19/ IS A
 GOVERNMENT-WIDE REGULATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 7117 OF THE
 STATUTE AND PRECLUDES NEGOTIATION ON A CONFLICTING UNION PROPOSAL.
 THUS, SINCE THE UNION PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE THE AGENCY TO PROVIDE THE
 DISPUTED PARKING SPACES FREE OF CHARGE TO EMPLOYEES, IT IS INCONSISTENT
 WITH FPMR TEMPORARY REGULATION D-65 AND, TO THAT EXTENT, IS OUTSIDE THE
 AGENCY'S DUTY TO BARGAIN UNDER THE STATUTE.
 
    THE AGENCY NEXT ALLEGES THAT THE UNION'S PROPOSAL IS OUTSIDE ITS DUTY
 TO BARGAIN BECAUSE THE DECISION TO RELINQUISH THE DISPUTED PARKING
 SPACES CONSTITUTES A DETERMINATION AS TO THE "MEANS OF PERFORMING WORK"
 WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 7106(B)(1) OF THE STATUTE.  /20/ IN
 PARTICULAR, THE AGENCY STATES THAT ITS DECISION TO RELINQUISH THE
 PARKING SPACES IN QUESTION IS A RESULT OF ITS DECISION TO CHANGE FROM
 PRE-PAID PARKING FOR EMPLOYEE'S PERSONAL VEHICLES USED IN CONNECTION
 WITH OFFICIAL BUSINESS TO REIMBURSEMENT OF PARKING EXPENSES BY WAY OF
 TRAVEL VOUCHERS INCIDENT TO OFFICIAL TRAVEL.  THE POSITION OF THE
 AGENCY, IN ESSENCE, IS THAT THIS CHANGE OF POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE
 WAY IN WHICH IT WILL PROVIDE THE PARKING NECESSARY FOR THE PERFORMANCE
 OF ITS OPERATIONS IS A DETERMINATION OF THE "MEANS" OF PERFORMING ITS
 WORK.
 
    HOWEVER, EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE AGENCY POSITION IS CORRECT IN THIS
 REGARD, IT WOULD NOT BE DISPOSITIVE OF THE ISSUE HERE.  THE DECISION TO
 RELINQUISH THE PARKING SPACES IS A SEPARATE MATTER.  THAT IS, THE UNION
 IS NOT HERE SEEKING TO REVERSE THE AGENCY'S POLICY DECISION AND REQUIRE
 IT TO RETAIN THE SPACES FOR EMPLOYEE'S PERSONAL VEHICLES WHICH ARE USED
 IN CONNECTION WITH OFFICIAL BUSINESS.  RATHER, THE UNION PROPOSAL
 ASSUMES THAT THE DECISION TO PROVIDE PARKING BY WAY OF TRAVEL VOUCHER
 HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE.  THE UNION'S PROPOSAL IS AN ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE
 WHAT WILL BE DONE WITH THE PARKING SPACES IN QUESTION NOW THAT THEY ARE
 NO LONGER PROVIDED FOR EMPLOYEE VEHICLES USED IN CONNECTION WITH THE
 AGENCY'S OPERATIONS.  IN PARTICULAR, THE UNION PROPOSES THAT THE SPACES
 BE USED TO PROVIDE PARKING, FREE OF CHARGE, FOR EMPLOYEE VEHICLES WHICH
 ARE NOT USED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS BUT, E.G.,
 PRIMARILY FOR COMMUTING.  /21/ THE BASIC ISSUE, THEREFORE, IS WHETHER
 THE UNION'S PROPOSED DISPOSITION OF THE PARKING SPACES WOULD IMPOSE UPON
 THE AGENCY A PARTICULAR "MEANS" OF PERFORMING ITS WORK.
 
    THE RIGHT OF THE AGENCY UNDER SECTION 7106(B)(1) OF THE STATUTE TO
 ELECT WHETHER OR NOT IT WILL NEGOTIATE OVER "METHODS" AND "MEANS"
 EXTENDS ONLY TO MATTERS WHICH PERTAIN TO THE PERFORMANCE OF THE WORK OF
 THE AGENCY.  /22/ THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE PARKING SPACES IN THIS CASE
 ARE TO BE RETAINED UNDER THE UNION'S PROPOSAL ARE NOT RELATED TO THE
 PERFORMANCE OF THE AGENCY'S WORK.  THAT IS, AS ALREADY INDICATED, THE
 UNION IS NOT PROPOSING THAT THE SPACES BE RETAINED IN ORDER THAT
 EMPLOYEES MAY HAVE THEIR OWN CARS AVAILABLE FOR USE IN PERFORMING THEIR
 OFFICIAL DUTIES, BUT PRIMARILY SO THAT EMPLOYEES WILL HAVE A PLACE TO
 PARK VEHICLES THEY USE TO COMMUTE TO WORK.  THEREFORE, THE UNION'S
 PROPOSAL, FOR THE REASONS STATED, DOES NOT CONCERN SUCH A MATTER.  THUS,
 APART FROM CONSIDERATION OF THE REMAINING GROUND OF NONNEGOTIABILITY
 ALLEGED BY THE AGENCY, THE PROPOSAL, INSOFAR AS IT REQUIRES THE AGENCY
 TO RETAIN THE DISPUTED PARKING SPACES DOES NOT CONCERN A MATTER ABOUT
 WHICH THE AGENCY MAY ELECT TO NEGOTIATE UNDER SECTION 7106(B)(1) AND, IN
 THIS REGARD, IS WITHIN THE AGENCY'S DUTY TO BARGAIN UNDER THE STATUTE.
 
    THE REMAINING AGENCY ALLEGATION IS THAT THE UNION'S PROPOSAL
 CONFLICTS WITH ITS RIGHT TO DETERMINE ITS BUDGET UNDER SECTION
 7106(A)(1) OF THE STATUTE.  /23/ THE AGENCY STATES, IN THIS REGARD, THAT
 THE DECISION TO RELINQUISH THE PARKING SPACES AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE WAS
 BASED ON "BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS," I.E., REIMBURSEMENT OF EMPLOYEE
 PARKING EXPENSES BY TRAVEL VOUCHER WOULD COST THE AGENCY LESS THAN
 PROVIDING PRE-PAID PARKING FOR EMPLOYEE VEHICLES USED IN CONNECTION WITH
 AGENCY BUSINESS.  THUS, THE AGENCY TAKES THE POSITION THAT THE UNION'S
 PROPOSAL CONFLICTS WITH ITS RIGHT UNDER SECTION 7106(A)(1) TO MAKE THIS
 BUDGETARY DETERMINATION BECAUSE THE PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE IT TO ABSORB
 THE ADDITIONAL COSTS OF RETAINING THE SPACES IT HAD PLANNED TO
 RELINQUISH TO GSA.  ASSUMING THE AGENCY AGREED TO RETAIN THE SPACES,
 SUCH ADDITIONAL COSTS, GIVEN THE EFFECT OF FPMR TEMPORARY REGULATION
 D-65 DISCUSSED ABOVE, COULD AMOUNT TO ONE-HALF THE COMMERCIAL EQUIVALENT
 VALUE OF THE PARKING SPACES IN DISPUTE, AT LEAST UNTIL SEPTEMBER 30,
 1981.
 
    THE AUTHORITY, IN WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, /24/ CONSIDERED
 THE ARGUMENT THAT A PROPOSAL WHICH IMPOSED ADDITIONAL COSTS UPON AN
 AGENCY WOULD VIOLATE THE RIGHT OF AN AGENCY TO DETERMINE ITS BUDGET
 UNDER SECTION 7106(A)(1).  THE AUTHORITY REJECTED THE POSITION THAT COST
 ALONE WAS A DECIDING FACTOR IN DETERMINING THE NEGOTIABILITY OF A
 PROPOSAL UNDER SECTION 7106(A)(1).  THE AUTHORITY STATED AS FOLLOWS:
 /25/
 
    . . . THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTION OF THIS POSITION APPEARS TO BE THAT A
 PROPOSAL IS
 
    INCONSISTENT WITH THE AUTHORITY OF THE AGENCY TO DETERMINE ITS BUDGET
 WITHIN THE MEANING OF
 
    SECTION 7106(A)(1) IF IT IMPOSES A COST UPON THE AGENCY WHICH
 REQUIRES THE EXPENDITURE OF
 
    APPROPRIATED AGENCY FUNDS.  SUCH A CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE,
 HOWEVER, COULD PRECLUDE
 
    NEGOTIATION ON VIRTUALLY ALL OTHERWISE NEGOTIABLE PROPOSALS, SINCE,
 TO ONE EXTENT OR ANOTHER,
 
    MOST PROPOSALS WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF IMPOSING COSTS UPON THE
 AGENCY WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE
 
    EXPENDITURE OF APPROPRIATED AGENCY FUNDS.  NOTHING IN THE RELEVANT
 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
 
    INDICATES THAT CONGRESS INTENDED THE RIGHT OF MANAGEMENT TO DETERMINE
 ITS BUDGET TO BE SO
 
    INCLUSIVE AS TO NEGATE IN THIS MANNER THE OBLIGATION TO BARGAIN.
 
    THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT THAT CONGRESS INTENDED THAT ANY PROPOSAL
 WHICH WOULD DIRECTLY
 
    INFRINGE ON THE EXERCISE OF MANAGEMENT RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 7106 OF
 THE STATUTE WOULD BE
 
    BARRED FROM NEGOTIATION.  WHETHER A PROPOSAL DIRECTLY AFFECTS THE
 AGENCY'S DETERMINATION OF
 
    ITS BUDGET DEPENDS UPON THE DEFINITION OF "BUDGET" AS USED IN THE
 STATUTE.  THE STATUTE AND
 
    LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DO NOT CONTAIN SUCH A DEFINITION.  IN THE ABSENCE
 OF A CLEARLY STATED
 
    LEGISLATIVE INTENT, IT IS APPROPRIATE TO GIVE THE TERM ITS COMMON OR
 DICTIONARY
 
    DEFINITION.  AS DEFINED BY THE DICTIONARY, "BUDGET" MEANS A STATEMENT
 OF THE FINANCIAL
 
    POSITION OF A BODY FOR A DEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME BASED ON DETAILED
 ESTIMATES OF PLANNED OR
 
    EXPECTED EXPENDITURES DURING THE PERIOD AND PROPOSALS FOR FINANCING
 THEM.  IN THIS SENSE, THE
 
    AGENCY'S AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE ITS BUDGET EXTENDS TO THE
 DETERMINATION OF THE PROGRAMS AND
 
    OPERATIONS WHICH WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE ESTIMATE OF PROPOSED
 EXPENDITURES AND THE
 
    DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNTS REQUIRED TO FUND THEM.  UNDER THE
 STATUTE, THEREFORE, AN AGENCY
 
    CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO NEGOTIATE THOSE PARTICULAR BUDGETARY
 DETERMINATIONS.  THAT IS, A UNION
 
    PROPOSAL ATTEMPTING TO PRESCRIBE THE PARTICULAR PROGRAMS OR
 OPERATIONS THE AGENCY WOULD
 
    INCLUDE IN ITS BUDGET OR TO PRESCRIBE THE AMOUNT TO BE ALLOCATED IN
 THE BUDGET FOR THEM WOULD
 
    INFRINGE UPON THE AGENCY'S RIGHT TO DETERMINE ITS BUDGET UNDER
 SECTION 7106(A)(1) OF THE
 
    STATUTE.
 
    MOREOVER, WHERE A PROPOSAL WHICH DOES NOT BY ITS TERMS PRESCRIBE THE
 PARTICULAR PROGRAMS OR
 
    AMOUNTS TO BE INCLUDED IN AN AGENCY'S BUDGET, NEVERTHELESS IS ALLEGED
 TO VIOLATE THE AGENCY'S
 
    RIGHT TO DETERMINE ITS BUDGET BECAUSE OF INCREASED COST,
 CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO ALL
 
    THE FACTORS INVOLVED.  THAT IS, RATHER THAN BASING A DETERMINATION AS
 TO THE NEGOTIABILITY OF
 
    THE PROPOSAL ON INCREASED COST ALONE, THAT ONE FACTOR MUST BE WEIGHED
 AGAINST SUCH FACTORS AS
 
    THE POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVED EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE, INCREASED
 PRODUCTIVITY, REDUCED TURNOVER,
 
    FEWER GRIEVANCES, AND THE LIKE.  ONLY WHERE AN AGENCY MAKES A
 SUBSTANTIAL DEMONSTRATION THAT
 
    AN INCREASE IN COSTS IS SIGNIFICANT AND UNAVOIDABLE AND IS NOT OFFSET
 BY COMPENSATING BENEFITS
 
    CAN AN OTHERWISE NEGOTIABLE PROPOSAL BE FOUND TO VIOLATE THE AGENCY'S
 RIGHT TO DETERMINE ITS
 
    BUDGET UNDER SECTION 7106(A) OF THE STATUTE.  (FOOTNOTES OMITTED.)
 
    THE PROPOSAL AT ISSUE HEREIN, HOWEVER, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE AGENCY
 TO RETAIN CERTAIN PARKING SPACES AND COULD THEREBY, UNDER FPMR TEMPORARY
 REGULATION D-65, REQUIRE IT TO ABSORB UP TO ONE-HALF THE COST OF
 EMPLOYEE PARKING, DOES NOT REQUIRE THE AGENCY TO NEGOTIATE ITS BUDGET.
 THAT IS, THE PROPOSAL DOES NOT ON ITS FACE PRESCRIBE THAT THE AGENCY'S
 BUDGET WILL INCLUDE A SPECIFIC PROVISION FOR THOSE PARKING SPACES OR A
 SPECIFIC MONETARY AMOUNT TO FUND THEM.  FURTHERMORE, THE AGENCY HAS NOT
 DEMONSTRATED THAT RETENTION OF THE PARKING SPACES AT ISSUE HEREIN WILL
 RESULT IN A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN COSTS.  IN PARTICULAR, THE AGENCY
 MADE NO ATTEMPT TO REFUTE THE FIGURES, OR THE CALCULATIONS BASED ON
 THOSE FIGURES, BY WHICH THE UNION SHOWED THAT THE COST OF RETAINING THE
 PARKING SPACES REPRESENTED ONLY 1/6 OF 1% TO 1/7 OF 1% OF THE TOTAL
 BUDGET FOR THE NEW ORLEANS REGIONAL OFFICE FOR THE LAST FISCAL YEAR.
 MOREOVER, UNDER FPMR TEMPORARY REGULATION D-65, THE POSSIBLE BUDGETARY
 IMPACT OF RETAINING THOSE SPACES WOULD BE EVEN LESS.  IT IS NOT
 NECESSARY, THEREFORE, TO REACH THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE ALLEGED INCREASE
 IN COSTS IS OUTWEIGHED BY COMPENSATING BENEFITS.  CONSEQUENTLY, THE
 PROPOSAL AT ISSUE HEREIN DOES NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHT OF THE AGENCY TO
 DETERMINE ITS BUDGET UNDER SECTION 7106(A) OF THE STATUTE.
 
    IN SUMMARY, CONSIDERATION OF EACH OF THE GROUNDS FOR NONNEGOTIABILITY
 ALLEGED BY THE AGENCY LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, FOR THE FOREGOING
 REASONS, THE UNION'S PROPOSAL, INSOFAR AS IT WOULD REQUIRE THE AGENCY TO
 RETAIN THE DISPUTED PARKING SPACES FOR EMPLOYEE PARKING IS WITHIN THE
 AGENCY'S DUTY TO BARGAIN UNDER THE STATUTE;  BUT TO THE EXTENT THAT IT
 WOULD REQUIRE THE AGENCY TO PROVIDE THOSE SPACES FREE OF CHARGE TO
 EMPLOYEES, IT CONFLICTS WITH THE CURRENTLY APPLICABLE GOVERNMENT-WIDE
 REGULATION, NAMELY FPMR TEMPORARY REGULATION D-65 44 FED.REG.
 53161(1979), UNDER SECTION 7117(A) OF THE STATUTE, AND THUS, IN THAT
 RESPECT, IS OUTSIDE THE AGENCY'S DUTY TO BARGAIN.
 
    ISSUED, WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 30, 1980
 
                       RONALD W. HAUGHTON, CHAIRMAN
 
                       HENRY B. FRAZIER III, MEMBER
 
                        LEON B. APPLEWHAITE, MEMBER
 
                     FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
 
    /1/ FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, NEW ORLEANS
 DISTRICT OFFICE (THE ACTIVITY) PROVIDED PRE-PAID, I.E., FREE, PARKING
 SPACES FOR EMPLOYEES' PRIVATE VEHICLES AT VARIOUS POSTS OF DUTY IN THE
 DISTRICT.  MANY OF THESE PRIVATE VEHICLES WERE NOT USED FOR OFFICIAL
 BUSINESS.  IN JANUARY 1979, THE AGENCY NOTIFIED NATIONAL TREASURY
 EMPLOYEES UNION, CHAPTER 6 (THE UNION) OF ITS INTENTION TO RELEASE MOST
 OF THE PRE-PAID PARKING SPACES.  THE UNION REQUESTED THE OPPORTUNITY TO
 NEGOTIATE WITH THE AGENCY ABOUT THE "THE SUBSTANCE, IMPACT, AND
 IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DECISION." THE AGENCY INFORMED THE UNION THAT ITS
 DECISION TO RELEASE THE PARKING SPACES WAS NONNEGOTIABLE.  THE UNION IS
 APPEALING THIS AGENCY ALLEGATION TO THE AUTHORITY, URGING THE AUTHORITY
 TO "RULE THAT THE DECISION ITSELF IS NEGOTIABLE." IT APPEARS FROM THE
 RECORD IN THE CASE THAT THE AGENCY HELD IN ABEYANCE IMPLEMENTATION OF
 ITS DECISION PENDING THE DECISION OF THE AUTHORITY ON THE UNION'S
 APPEAL.
 
    /2/ IN SO DECIDING THAT THE PROPOSAL, INSOFAR AS IT WOULD REQUIRE THE
 AGENCY TO RETAIN THE PARKING SPACES IN DISPUTE, IS WITHIN THE DUTY TO
 BARGAIN, THE AUTHORITY MAKES NO JUDGMENT AS TO THE MERITS OF THAT ASPECT
 OF THE PROPOSAL.
 
    /3/ SECTION 7117(A)(1) OF THE STATUTE PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS:
 
    SEC. 7117.  DUTY TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH;  COMPELLING NEED;  DUTY TO
 CONSULT
 
    (A)(1) SUBJECT TO PARAGRAPH (2) OF THIS SUBSECTION, THE DUTY TO
 BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH
 
    SHALL, TO THE EXTENT NOT INCONSISTENT WITH ANY FEDERAL LAW OR ANY
 GOVERNMENT-WIDE RULE OR
 
    REGULATION, EXTEND TO MATTERS WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF ANY RULE OR
 REGULATION ONLY IF THE RULE
 
    OR REGULATION IS NOT A GOVERNMENT-WIDE RULE OR REGULATION.
 
    THE TERM "MATTERS" AS USED IN SECTION 7117(A)(1) IS EXPLAINED BY
 REFERENCE TO THE DEFINITION OF "COLLECTIVE BARGAINING" IN SECTION
 7103(A)(12) AND "CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT" IN SECTION 7103(A)(14) OF THE
 STATUTE:
 
    SEC. 7103.  DEFINITIONS;  APPLICATION
 
   *          *          *          *
 
 
    (12) "COLLECTIVE BARGAINING" MEANS THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MUTUAL
 OBLIGATION OF THE
 
    REPRESENTATIVE OF AN AGENCY AND THE EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE OF
 EMPLOYEES IN AN APPROPRIATE
 
    UNIT IN THE AGENCY TO MEET AT REASONABLE TIMES AND TO CONSULT AND
 BARGAIN IN A GOOD-FAITH
 
    EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE CONDITIONS OF
 EMPLOYMENT AFFECTING SUCH
 
    EMPLOYEES
 
   *          *          *          *
 
 
    (14) "CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT" MEANS PERSONNEL POLICIES, PRACTICES,
 AND MATTERS, WHETHER
 
    ESTABLISHED BY RULE, REGULATION, OR OTHERWISE, AFFECTING WORKING
 CONDITIONS . . .
 
    /4/ THE AGENCY CITES THE FPMR, 41 C.F.R. 101-20.111-2(A) AND SEC.
 101-20.117.  41 C.F.R. 101-20.111-2(A) PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS:
 
    SEC. 101-20.111 VEHICLE PARKING FACILITIES.
 
   *          *          *          *
 
 
    SEC. 101-20.111-2 POLICY.
 
    (A) GSA WILL ESTABLISH, TO THE EXTENT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE THEREFOR,
 VEHICLE PARKING
 
    FACILITIES IN AND AROUND EXISTING GOVERNMENT-OWNED PROPERTIES UNDER
 THE CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF
 
    GSA.  SUCH FACILITIES WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH THE CHARACTER OF OTHER
 PROPERTIES IN THE
 
    NEIGHBORHOOD, WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE USE OR APPEARANCE OF THE
 GOVERNMENT PROPERTY, AND
 
    WILL NOT CONSTITUTE A TRAFFIC HAZARD.  GSA WILL ALLOCATE PARKING
 SPACE AT THE FACILITY IN THE
 
    FOLLOWING ORDER OF PRIORITY:
 
    (1) POSTAL MANEUVERING AREA AND OFFICIAL POSTAL VEHICLE PARKING
 (INCLUDING CONTRACT MAIL
 
    HAULING VEHICLES AND PRIVATE VEHICLES OF RURAL CARRIERS);
 
    (2) GOVERNMENT-OWNED VEHICLES USED FOR CRIMINAL APPREHENSION LAW
 ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES;
 
    (3) PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES OF FEDERAL JUDGES, MEMBERS OF CONGRESS,
 AND HEADS OF OCCUPANT
 
    AGENCIES (PRIORITY IS LIMITED TO THE INDIVIDUALS AND DOES NOT INCLUDE
 MEMBERS OF THEIR
 
    STAFFS);
 
    (4) OFFICIAL PARKING OTHER THAN THAT LISTED IN PARAGRAPHS (A)(1) AND
 (2) OF THIS SECTION:
 
    (I) NET REQUIREMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT-OWNED VEHICLES OTHER THAN THOSE
 LISTED IN PARAGRAPHS
 
    (A)(1) AND (2) OF THIS SECTION INCLUDING MOTOR POOL DISPATCH SERVICE
 VEHICLES AND VEHICLES
 
    ASSIGNED DIRECTLY TO OCCUPANT AGENCIES, SHALL BE AN AMOUNT LESS THAN
 THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
 
    VEHICLES ASSIGNED TO THE POOL, DEPENDING ON THE NATURE OF THE POOL
 OPERATIONS;
 
    (II) AREAS ASSIGNED FOR GOVERNMENT-OWNED VEHICLES, INCLUDING POSTAL
 AND MOTOR POOL AREAS,
 
    SHALL ALSO BE USED DURING OTHER THAN EARLY MORNING OR LATE AFTERNOON
 HOURS FOR VISITORS,
 
    SERVICE VEHICLES, PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES REGULARLY USED FOR
 OFFICIAL BUSINESS, PHYSICALLY
 
    HANDICAPPED EMPLOYEES OF OCCUPANT AGENCIES, AND OCCUPANT AGENCY
 EMPLOYEES NOT OTHERWISE
 
    ACCOMMODATED (WITH PREFERENCE GIVEN TO CARPOOL DRIVERS), IN THE ORDER
 NAMED.  IN CONNECTION
 
    WITH PART-TIME USE OF THESE AREAS, STREET PARKING, MUNICIPAL LOTS,
 AND COMMERCIAL PARKING
 
    FACILITIES MAY BE USED DURING EARLY AND LATE HOURS WHEN
 GOVERNMENT-OWNED VEHICLES ARE
 
    OCCUPYING ASSIGNED SPACES;
 
    (5) VEHICLES OF PATRONS AND VISITORS AND SERVICE VEHICLES NOT
 ACCOMMODATED UNDER PARAGRAPH
 
    (A)(4)(II) OF THIS SECTION;  AND
 
    (6) PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES OF EMPLOYEES OF OCCUPANT AGENCIES NOT
 OTHERWISE ACCOMMODATED.
 
    41 C.F.R. 101-20.117 PROVIDES, IN RELEVANT PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    SEC. 101-20.117 CARPOOL PARKING.  SEC. 101-
 
   *          *          *          *
 
 
    SEC. 101-20.117-2 POLICIES.
 
    AGENCIES SHALL ENCOURAGE THE CONSERVATION OF ENERGY BY TAKING
 POSITIVE ACTION TO INCREASE
 
    CARPOOLING.  THE FOLLOWING POLICIES SHALL BE REFLECTED IN AGENCY
 PLANS:
 
    (A) PARKING.  IN ASSIGNING ALL PARKING SPACES ASSIGNED TO OR
 CONTROLLED BY EACH AGENCY, THE
 
    FOLLOWING POLICIES SHALL BE OBSERVED:
 
    (1) AGENCIES SHALL GIVE FIRST PRIORITY TO OFFICIAL AND VISITOR
 PARKING REQUIREMENTS.
 
    (2) SEVERELY HANDICAPPED GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES FOR WHOM ASSIGNED
 PARKING SPACES ARE
 
    NECESSARY SHALL BE ACCOMMODATED.
 
    (3) A GOAL OF NOT MORE THAN 10 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL SPACES AVAILABLE
 FOR EMPLOYEE PARKING
 
    ON AN AGENCY-WIDE BASIS (EXCLUDING SPACES ASSIGNED TO SEVERELY
 HANDICAPPED) SHALL BE ASSIGNED
 
    TO EXECUTIVE PERSONNEL AND PERSONS WHO ARE ASSIGNED UNUSUAL HOURS.
 
    (4) ALL OTHER SPACES AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYEE PARKING SHALL BE MADE
 AVAILABLE TO CARPOOLS TO
 
    THE EXTENT PRACTICAL.
 
    (5) THOSE PARKING SPACES RESERVED FOR CARPOOLS SHALL BE ASSIGNED
 PRIMARILY ON THE BASIS OF
 
    THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS IN A CARPOOL.
 
    (6) FOR THE PURPOSE OF ALLOCATION OF PARKING SPACES FOR CARPOOLS,
 FULL CREDIT SHALL BE
 
    GIVEN TO ANY REGULAR MEMBER REGARDLESS OF WHERE HE IS EMPLOYED EXCEPT
 THAT AT LEAST ONE MEMBER
 
    OF THE CARPOOL MUST BE A FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE OF THE AGENCY.
 
    /5/ SEE NOTE 3, SUPRA.
 
    /6/ SECTION 7117(D) OF THE STATUTE PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS:
 
    SEC 7117.  DUTY TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH;  COMPELLING NEED;  DUTY TO
 CONSULT
 
   *          *          *          *
 
 
    (D)(1) A LABOR ORGANIZATION WHICH IS THE EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE OF
 A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER
 
    OF EMPLOYEES, DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CRITERIA PRESCRIBED BY
 THE AUTHORITY, SHALL BE
 
    GRANTED CONSULTATION RIGHTS BY ANY AGENCY WITH RESPECT TO ANY
 GOVERNMENT-WIDE RULE OR
 
    REGULATION ISSUED BY THE AGENCY EFFECTING ANY SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE IN
 ANY CONDITION OF
 
    EMPLOYMENT.  SUCH CONSULTATION RIGHTS SHALL TERMINATE WHEN THE LABOR
 ORGANIZATION NO LONGER
 
    MEETS THE CRITERIA PRESCRIBED BY THE AUTHORITY.  ANY ISSUE RELATING
 TO A LABOR ORGANIZATION'S
 
    ELIGIBILITY FOR, OR CONTINUATION OF, SUCH CONSULTATION RIGHTS SHALL
 BE SUBJECT TO
 
    DETERMINATION BY THE AUTHORITY.
 
    (2) A LABOR ORGANIZATION HAVING CONSULTATION RIGHTS UNDER PARAGRAPH
 (1) OF THIS SUBSECTION
 
    SHALL--
 
    (A) BE INFORMED OF ANY SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE IN CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT
 PROPOSED BY THE
 
    AGENCY, AND
 
    (B) SHALL BE PERMITTED REASONABLE TIME TO PRESENT ITS VIEWS AND
 RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING
 
    THE CHANGES.
 
    (3) IF ANY VIEWS OR RECOMMENDATIONS ARE PRESENTED UNDER PARAGRAPH (2)
 OF THIS SUBSECTION TO
 
    AN AGENCY BY ANY LABOR ORGANIZATION--
 
    (A) THE AGENCY SHALL CONSIDER THE VIEWS OR RECOMMENDATIONS BEFORE
 TAKING FINAL ACTION ON
 
    ANY MATTER WITH RESPECT TO WHICH THE VIEWS OR RECOMMENDATIONS ARE
 PRESENTED;  AND
 
    (B) THE AGENCY SHALL PROVIDE THE LABOR ORGANIZATION A WRITTEN
 STATEMENT OF THE REASONS FOR
 
    TAKING THE FINAL ACTION.
 
    /7/ H. REP. NO. 95-1403, 95TH CONG., 2ND SESS. 51-52 (1978).
 
    /8/ SEE THE STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN FORD OF MICHIGAN, A PROPONENT OF
 "THE UDALL SUBSTITUTE," DURING THE DEBATE ON THE HOUSE FLOOR:
 
    SECTION 7117 SETS FORTH THE DUTY TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH, ESPECIALLY
 WITH RESPECT TO
 
    REGULATIONS.  UNDER THE COMPROMISE VERSION, GOVERNMENT-WIDE RULES AND
 REGULATIONS ARE NO
 
    LONGER SUBJECT TO BARGAINING AS THEY WERE UNDER THE COMMITTEE PRINT
 OF TITLE VII (EXCEPT FOR
 
    THOSE SUPPORTED BY A COMPELLING NEED).  IN THIS FASHION,
 GOVERNMENT-WIDE RULES AND REGULATIONS
 
    ARE THUS A MAJOR EXCEPTION TO THE DUTY TO BARGAIN.  IN MAKING THIS
 CHANGE, HOWEVER, THE
 
    COMMITTEE AT NO TIME EXPANDED THE DEFINITION OF "GOVERNMENT-WIDE" AS
 CONTAINED IN THE
 
    COMMITTEE'S REPORT.
 
    124 CONG. REC. H9650 (DAILY ED. SEPT. 13, 1978).
 
    /9/ SECTION 7218 OF THE BILL PASSED BY THE SENATE (S.2640) PROVIDED,
 IN RELEVANT PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    SEC. 7218.  BASIC PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS
 
    (A) EACH AGREEMENT BETWEEN AN AGENCY AND A LABOR ORGANIZATION SHALL
 PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING:
 
    (1) IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF ALL MATTERS COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT,
 OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
 
    SHALL BE GOVERNED BY--
 
    (A) EXISTING OR FUTURE LAWS AND THE REGULATIONS OF APPROPRIATE
 AUTHORITIES, INCLUDING
 
    POLICIES WHICH ARE SET FORTH IN THE FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL . .  .
 
    /10/ H. REP. NO. 95-7117, 95TH CONG., 2ND SESS. 158-159 (1978).
 
    /11/ CF. STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN FORD OF MICHIGAN, 124 CONG. REC.
 H9650 (DAILY ED. SEPT. 13, 1978).
 
    /12/ ROSADO V. WYMAN, 379 U.S. 397, 415(1970).
 
    /13/ 124 CONG.REC. H9638 (DAILY ED. SEPT. 13, 1978)(REMARKS OF REP.
 CLAY).
 
    /14/ SEE GENERALLY 41 C.F.R. 101-17.003 ET SEQ.
 
    /15/ GSA CITES 55 COMP.GEN. 897(1976) IN SUPPORT OF ITS POSITION.
 HOWEVER, THAT DECISION, WHICH HELD THAT GSA COULD NOT COMPEL AN AGENCY
 TO ACCEPT AND PAY FOR AN ALLOCATION OF PARKING SPACES WHICH THE AGENCY
 DETERMINED IT DID NOT NEED, MERELY REINFORCES THE POINT THAT AN AGENCY,
 UNDER THE FPMR, HAS DISCRETION AS TO WHETHER IT WILL RETAIN OR
 RELINQUISH PARKING SPACES ALLOCATED TO IT BY GSA.  BASED ON THIS
 DECISION, GSA MAKES THE FURTHER ARGUMENT THAT SINCE, EVEN WITH ITS
 REGULATORY AUTHORITY OVER FEDERAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, GSA CANNOT
 OBLIGATE AN AGENCY TO RETAIN SPACE, AN EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE, WHICH
 HAS NO AUTHORITY IN THE AREA OF PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, COULD NOT NEGOTIATE
 TO PERSUADE AN AGENCY TO RETAIN SPACE WHICH THE AGENCY WISHED TO
 RELINQUISH.  THE ARGUMENT IS WITHOUT MERIT SINCE IT FAILS TO TAKE INTO
 ACCOUNT THE EFFECT OF AN AGENCY'S STATUTORY OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE OVER
 THOSE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT WHICH ARE WITHIN ITS DISCRETION.
 
    /16/ SECTION 7105(A)(2)(E) OF THE STATUTE PRO