Consumer Product Safety Commission (Respondent) and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 3705, AFL-CIO (Charging Party) 



[ v04 p803 ]
04:0803(105)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:


 4 FLRA No. 105
 
 CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
 EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 3705, AFL-CIO
 Charging Party
 
                                            Case Nos. 3-CA-12 
                                                      3-CA-34 
                                                      3-CA-35 
                                                      3-CA-36 
                                                      3-CA-220 
                                                      3-CA-221
 
                            DECISION AND ORDER
 
    THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ISSUED HIS RECOMMENDED DECISION AND
 ORDER IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PROCEEDING, FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD
 ENGAGED IN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS
 AMENDED, AND RECOMMENDING THAT IT CEASE AND DESIST THEREFROM AND TAKE
 CERTAIN AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS SET FORTH IN THE ATTACHED ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
 JUDGE'S RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER.  THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
 FURTHER FOUND THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD NOT ENGAGED IN OTHER UNFAIR LABOR
 PRACTICES ALLEGED UNDER BOTH THE EXECUTIVE ORDER AND THE FEDERAL SERVICE
 LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE (5 U.S.C. 7101-7135) AND RECOMMENDED
 DISMISSAL OF THOSE COMPLAINTS.  EXCEPTIONS TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
 JUDGE'S RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER WERE FILED BY THE RESPONDENT, THE
 CHARGING PARTY, AND THE GENERAL COUNSEL.  /1/
 
    THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR FOR
 LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED,
 WERE TRANSFERRED TO THE AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 304 OF REORGANIZATION
 PLAN NO. 2 OF 1978 (43 F.R. 36040), WHICH TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS IS
 IMPLEMENTED BY SECTION 2400.2 OF THE AUTHORITY'S RULES AND REGULATIONS
 (5 CFR 2400.2).  THE AUTHORITY CONTINUES TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
 PERFORMANCE OF THESE FUNCTIONS AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 7135(B) OF THE
 STATUTE.
 
    THEREFORE, PURSUANT TO SECTION 2400.2 AND 2423.29 OF THE AUTHORITY'S
 RULES AND REGULATIONS AND SECTIONS 7118 AND 7135(B) OF THE STATUTE, THE
 AUTHORITY HAS REVIEWED THE RULINGS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE MADE
 AT THE HEARING AND FINDS THAT NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED.  THE
 RULINGS ARE HEREBY AFFIRMED.  UPON CONSIDERATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
 LAW JUDGE'S RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER, AND THE ENTIRE RECORD IN THE
 SUBJECT CASES, INCLUDING THE EXCEPTIONS FILED BY THE RESPONDENT, THE
 CHARGING PARTY AND THE GENERAL COUNSEL, THE AUTHORITY HEREBY ADOPTS THE
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
 /2/
 
    IN CASE NO. 3-CA-220, THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE FOUND THAT THE
 FILING OF A CIVIL LIBEL SUIT BY AN OFFICIAL OF THE RESPONDENT, ACTING
 THROUGH HIS PERSONAL ATTORNEY AND IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, AGAINST
 ONE OF THE RESPONDENT'S EMPLOYEES DID NOT VIOLATE SECTION 7116(A)(1) OR
 (4) OF THE STATUTE.  IN AGREEMENT WITH THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE, AND
 FOR THE REASONS MORE FULLY SET FORTH IN HIS RECOMMENDED DECISION AND
 ORDER, THE AUTHORITY CONCLUDES THAT SUCH CONDUCT DID NOT VIOLATE THE
 STATUTE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
 
                                 ORDER /3/
 
    PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 2400.2 AND 2423.29 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS
 OF THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND SECTIONS 7118 AND 7135 OF
 THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE, THE AUTHORITY
 HEREBY ORDERS THAT THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION SHALL:
 
    1.  CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
 
    (A) DETAILING OR ASSIGNING RAYMOND LABONSKI, OR ANY OTHER OFFICIAL OF
 LOCAL 3705, AMERICAN
 
    FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, OUT OF THE PHILADELPHIA
 AREA OFFICE, OR FROM A
 
    NORMAL DUTY STATION, AS PUNISHMENT FOR, OR IN RETALIATION FOR,
 ENGAGING IN ACTIVITY PROTECTED
 
    BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED.
 
    (B) DISAPPROVING, WITHHOLDING, OR DELAYING APPROVAL OF ANNUAL LEAVE
 AND/OR SICK LEAVE FOR
 
    MARIA JAURIGUE, OR FOR AND OTHER EMPLOYEE, AS PUNISHMENT FOR, OR IN
 RETALIATION FOR, ENGAGING
 
    IN PROTECTED ACTIVITY UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED,
 INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
 
    THE FILING OF A COMPLAINT OR THE GIVING OF TESTIMONY UNDER THE ORDER.
 
    (C) IN ANY LIKE OR RELATED MANNER INTERFERING WITH, RESTRAINING, OR
 COERCING ITS EMPLOYEES
 
    IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS ASSURED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS
 AMENDED, AND BY THE
 
    FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE;  ENCOURAGING OR
 DISCOURAGING MEMBERSHIP IN
 
    A LABOR ORGANIZATION BY DISCRIMINATION IN REGARD TO HIRING, TENURE,
 PROMOTION, OR OTHER
 
    CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT;  OR DISCIPLINING OR OTHERWISE
 DISCRIMINATING AGAINST AN EMPLOYEE
 
    BECAUSE THE EMPLOYEE HAS FILED A COMPLAINT OR GIVEN TESTIMONY UNDER
 EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS
 
    AMENDED, OR BECAUSE THE EMPLOYEE HAS FILED A COMPLAINT, AFFIDAVIT, OR
 PETITION, OR HAS GIVEN
 
    ANY INFORMATION OR TESTIMONY UNDER THE FEDERAL SERVICE
 LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE.
 
    2.  TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS:
 
    (A) ADVISE MARIA JAURIGUE, IN WRITING, AS SHE IS NO LONGER LOCATED IN
 ITS PHILADELPHIA AREA
 
    OFFICE, THAT IT WILL NOT DISAPPROVE, WITHHOLD, OR DELAY APPROVAL OF
 ANNUAL LEAVE AND/OR SICK
 
    LEAVE TO WHICH SHE MAY BE ENTITLED, AS PUNISHMENT FOR, OR IN
 RETALIATION FOR, ANY PROTECTED
 
    ACTIVITY ENGAGED IN BY HER, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE FILING
 OF A COMPLAINT OR THE
 
    GIVING OF TESTIMONY UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED OR
 BECAUSE SHE HAS FILED A
 
    COMPLAINT, AFFIDAVIT, OR PETITION, OR HAS GIVEN ANY INFORMATION OR
 TESTIMONY UNDER THE FEDERAL
 
    SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE.
 
    (B) POST AT EACH FACILITY OF ITS PHILADELPHIA AREA OFFICE, INCLUDING
 ALL RESIDENT OFFICES,
 
    COPIES OF THE ATTACHED NOTICE MARKED "APPENDIX" ON FORMS TO BE
 FURNISHED BY THE
 
    AUTHORITY.  UPON RECEIPT OF SUCH FORMS, THEY SHALL BE SIGNED BY THE
 DIRECTOR OF THE
 
    PHILADELPHIA AREA OFFICE, CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION, AND
 SHALL BE POSTED AND
 
    MAINTAINED BY HIM FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS THEREAFTER IN CONSPICUOUS
 PLACES, INCLUDING ALL
 
    BULLETIN BOARDS AND OTHER PLACES WHERE NOTICES TO EMPLOYEES ARE
 CUSTOMARILY POSTED.  THE
 
    DIRECTOR SHALL TAKE REASONABLE STEPS TO INSURE THAT SUCH NOTICES ARE
 NOT ALTERED, DEFACED, OR
 
    COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL.
 
    (C) NOTIFY THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, IN WRITING, WITHIN
 30 DAYS FROM THE DATE
 
    OF THIS ORDER AS TO WHAT STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO COMPLY HEREWITH.
 
    IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE COMPLAINTS IN CASE NOS.
 3-CA-35, 3-CA-36, 3-CA-220 AND 3-CA-221 BE, AND THEY HEREBY ARE,
 DISMISSED.
 
    ISSUED, WASHINGTON, D.C., DECEMBER 31, 1980
 
                       RONALD W. HAUGHTON, CHAIRMAN
                       HENRY B. FRAZIER III, MEMBER
                       LEON B. APPLEWHAITE, MEMBER
                       FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 APPENDIX
 
        NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF
 
           THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO
 
          EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF CHAPTER 71 OF TITLE 5 OF THE
 
            UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 
                                 RELATIONS
 
                   WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
 
    WE WILL NOT DETAIL OR ASSIGN RAYMOND LABONSKI, OR ANY OTHER OFFICIAL
 OF LOCAL 3705, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, OUT
 OF THE PHILADELPHIA AREA OFFICE, OR FROM A NORMAL DUTY STATION, AS
 PUNISHMENT FOR, OR IN RETALIATION FOR, ENGAGING IN ACTIVITIES PROTECTED
 BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED.
 
    WE WILL NOT DISAPPROVE, WITHHOLD, OR DELAY APPROVAL OF ANNUAL LEAVE
 AND/OR SICK LEAVE FOR MARIA JAURIGUE, OR FOR ANY OTHER EMPLOYEE, AS
 PUNISHMENT FOR, OR IN RETALIATION FOR, ENGAGING IN PROTECTED ACTIVITY,
 AND WE WILL ADVISE MARIA JAURIGUE, IN WRITING, AS SHE IS NO LONGER
 LOCATED IN THE PHILADELPHIA AREA OFFICE, THAT WE WILL NOT DISAPPROVE,
 WITHHOLD, OR DELAY APPROVAL OF ANNUAL LEAVE AND/OR SICK LEAVE TO WHICH
 SHE MAY BE ENTITLED AS PUNISHMENT FOR, OR IN RETALIATION FOR, ANY
 PROTECTED ACTIVITY ENGAGED IN BY HER, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 FILING OF A COMPLAINT OR THE GIVING OF TESTIMONY UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER
 11491, AS AMENDED, OR BECAUSE SHE HAS FILED A COMPLAINT, AFFIDAVIT, OR
 PETITION, OR HAS GIVEN ANY INFORMATION OR TESTIMONY UNDER THE FEDERAL
 SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE.
 
    WE WILL NOT IN ANY LIKE OR RELATED MANNER INTERFERE WITH, RESTRAIN,
 OR COERCE OUR EMPLOYEES IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS UNDER EXECUTIVE
 ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED, OR UNDER THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS STATUTE;  ENCOURAGE OR DISCOURAGE MEMBERSHIP IN A LABOR
 ORGANIZATION BY DISCRIMINATION IN REGARD TO HIRING, TENURE, PROMOTION,
 OR OTHER CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT, OR DISCIPLINE OR OTHERWISE
 DISCRIMINATE AGAINST ANY EMPLOYEE BECAUSE THE EMPLOYEE HAS FILED A
 COMPLAINT OR HAS GIVEN TESTIMONY UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS
 AMENDED, OR BECAUSE THE EMPLOYEE HAS FILED A COMPLAINT, AFFIDAVIT, OR
 PETITION OR HAS GIVEN ANY INFORMATION OR TESTIMONY UNDER THE FEDERAL
 SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE.
 
                           (AGENCY OR ACTIVITY)
 
    DATED:  . . .  BY:  . . .
 
                                 DIRECTOR
 
                         PHILADELPHIA AREA OFFICE
 
    THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE
 OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER
 MATERIAL.
 
    IF EMPLOYEES HAVE ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE
 WITH ANY OF ITS PROVISIONS, THEY MAY COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH THE
 REGIONAL DIRECTOR, FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, WHOSE ADDRESS IS:
 ROOM 300, 1133 15TH STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005, AND WHOSE
 TELEPHONE NUMBER IS (202) 653-8452.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -------------------- ALJ$ DECISION FOLLOWS --------------------
 
    PETER B. ROBB, ESQUIRE
    LEE MINGLEDORFF, ESQUIRE
    ATTORNEYS
    FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
    REGION 3
    SUITE 401
    1730 K STREET, N.W.
    WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
                          FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL
 
    MILTON R. COHEN, ESQUIRE
    AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
    EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO
    SUITE 201
    4847 NORTH BROAD STREET
    PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19141
                          FOR THE CHARGING PARTY
 
    RONALD E. DEUTSCH, ESQUIRE
    ATTORNEY
    OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
    CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION
    1111 18TH STREET, N.W.
    WASHINGTON, D.C. 20207
 
    ON BRIEF:
 
    ANDREW S. KRULWICH, ESQUIRE
         GENERAL COUNSEL
    RICHARD W. ALLEN, ESQUIRE
         GENERAL COUNSEL
 
                            FOR THE RESPONDENT
 
    BEFORE:  WILLIAM B. DEVANEY
    ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
 
                            DECISION AND ORDER
 
                           STATEMENT OF THE CASE
 
    THIS IS A PROCEEDING UNDER THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS STATUTE, CHAPTER 71 OF TITLE 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE, 5
 U.S.C. SECTION 7101, ET SEQ., AND THE RULES AND REGULATIONS ISSUED
 THEREUNDER.  5 U.F.R. CHAPTER XIV, PART 2400, ET SEQ., /4/ HOWEVER, CASE
 NOS. 3-CA-12, 3-CA-34, AND 3-CA-35 INVOLVE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF
 EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED (HEREINAFTER ALSO REFERRED TO AS THE
 "ORDER") AND CASE NOS. 3-CA-36, 3-CA-220, AND 3-CA-221, INVOLVE ALLEGED
 VIOLATIONS OF THE STATUTE.
 
    THE CHARGE IN CASE NO. 3-CA-12 (FILED ON THE COMPLAINT FORM OF THE
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY UNDER THE ORDER) WAS FILED ON JANUARY 15, 1979 (G.C.
 EXH. 1B) AND A COMPLAINT AND NOTICE OF HEARING ISSUED ON AUGUST 17, 1979
 (G.C. EXH. 1P), /5/ FOR A HEARING ON OCTOBER 16, 1979.  THE CHARGE IN
 CASE NO. 3-CA-34 (FILED ON THE COMPLAINT FORM OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
 UNDER THE ORDER) WAS FILED ON FEBRUARY 21, 1979 (G.C. EXH. 1C) AND A
 COMPLAINT AND NOTICE OF HEARING ISSUED ON AUGUST 17, 1979 (G.C. EXH 1Q)
 FOR A HEARING ON OCTOBER 16, 1979.  THE CHARGE IN CASE NO. 3-CA-35
 (FILED ON THE COMPLAINT FORM OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY UNDER THE ORDER)
 WAS FILED ON FEBRUARY 21, 1979 (G.C. EXH. 1D) AND A COMPLAINT AND NOTICE
 OF HEARING ISSUED ON AUGUST 17, 1979 (G.C. EXH. 1-R) FOR A HEARING ON
 OCTOBER 16, 1979.  THE CHARGE IN CASE NO. 3-CA-36 (FILED ON THE
 COMPLAINT FORM OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY) ALLEGING VIOLATIONS OF THE
 ORDER WAS FILED ON FEBRUARY 21, 1979 (G.C. EXH. 1E), AN AMENDED CHARGE
 ALLEGING VIOLATIONS OF THE STATUTE WAS FILED ON AUGUST 14, 1979 (G.C.
 EXH. 1F), AND A COMPLAINT AND NOTICE OF HEARING ISSUED ON AUGUST 17,
 1979 (G.C.  EXH. 1S), FOR A HEARING ON OCTOBER 16, 1979.  THE CHARGES IN
 CASE NOS. 3-CA-220 (G.C. EXH. 1G) AND 3-CA-221 (G.C. EXH. 1H) UNDER THE
 STATUTE WERE FILED ON MAY 15, 1979, AND COMPLAINTS AND NOTICES OF
 HEARING IN EACH CASE ISSUED ON AUGUST 30, 1979 (G.C. EXH. 1T, NO. 220;
 G.C. EXH. 1U, NO.  221) FOR A HEARING ON OCTOBER 16, 1979.  RESPONDENT
 TIMELY ANSWERED EACH COMPLAINT (G.C. EXHS. 1BB, 1CC, 1DD, 1EE, 1FF, AND
 1GG);  ON AUGUST 31, 1979, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR ISSUED ON ORDER
 CONSOLIDATING CASES (G.C. EXH. 1HH);  ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1979, RESPONDENT
 FILED A MOTION FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS (G.C. EXH. 1II), A MOTION TO
 TAKE DEPOSITIONS (G.C. EXH. 1JJ), AND A MOTION TO SEVER (G.C. EXH. 1KK),
 EACH OF WHICH WAS DENIED BY THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1979
 (G.C. EXHS. 111, 1MM, AND 1NN).  ON OCTOBER 12, 1979, RESPONDENT FILED A
 MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE AND FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN THIS OFFICE, ON OCTOBER
 12, 1979, ENTERED AN ORDER RESCHEDULING HEARING FOR OCTOBER 30, 1979
 (G.C. EXH. 1QQ).  ON OCTOBER 5, HARRY L. GASTLEY, ESQUIRE, FILED A
 MOTION TO INTERVENE ON BEHALF OF MR. LACY B. WARD, AREA DIRECTOR OF
 RESPONDENT (G.C. EXH. 1RR), WHICH WAS REFERRED TO THIS OFFICE BY THE
 REGIONAL DIRECTOR BY ORDER DATED OCTOBER 11, 1979 (G.C. EXH. 1SS) AND
 AMENDED ORDER DATED OCTOBER 15, 1979 (G.C. EXH. 1UU), AND SAID MOTION TO
 INTERVENE WAS DENIED BY THE UNDERSIGNED ON OCTOBER 18, 1979 (G.C. EXH.
 1WW).
 
    PURSUANT TO THE ORDER RESCHEDULING HEARING, A HEARING WAS DULY HELD
 BEFORE THE UNDERSIGNED IN PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, ON OCTOBER 30, 31
 AND NOVEMBER 1, 1979.  THE CHARGING PARTY APPEARED BY COUNSEL AND WAS
 PERMITTED TO PARTICIPATE AS A PARTY;  HOWEVER THE CHARGING PARTY'S
 PARTICIPATION WAS GRANTED UNDER SECTION 2423.14 OF THE INTERIM
 REGULATIONS (2423.15 OF THE FINAL REGULATIONS) AS AN INTERVENOR.
 CLEARLY, THIS WAS IN ERROR AND THE CHARGING PARTY SHOULD HAVE BEEN
 PERMITTED TO PARTICIPATE AS A PARTY UNDER SECTION 2423.15 OF THE INTERIM
 REGULATIONS (2423.16 OF THE FINAL REGULATIONS).  /6/ ACCORDINGLY, THE
 DESIGNATION OF THE STATUS OF THE CHARGING PARTY IS HEREBY CORRECTED,
 I.E., THE DESIGNATION OF THE CHARGING PARTY AS INTERVENOR IS HEREBY
 DELETED.  NEVERTHELESS, THE PARTICIPATION OF A PARTY, PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 2423.15 OF THE INTERIM RULES (SECTION 2423.16 OF THE FINAL
 RULES), "SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE EXTENT PRESCRIBED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE
 LAW JUDGE" AND, ACCORDINGLY, THE LIMITATIONS PRESCRIBED ON THE
 PARTICIPATION OF THE CHARGING PARTY WAS PROPER AND FULLY IN ACCORDANCE
 WITH THE RULES AND REGULATIONS.  /7/
 
    ALL PARTIES WERE REPRESENTED BY ABLE COUNSEL, WERE AFFORDED FULL
 OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, TO EXAMINE AND CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES (COUNSEL
 FOR CHARGING PARTY CROSS-EXAMINED BUT DID NOT CALL ANY WITNESSES), AND
 TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE BEARING ON THE ISSUES INVOLVED HEREIN;  AND THE
 PARTIES WERE AFFORDED FULL OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ORAL ARGUMENT AT THE
 CONCLUSION OF THE TESTIMONY.  AT THE CLOSE OF THE HEARING, DECEMBER 3,
 1979, WAS FIXED AS THE DATE FOR MAILING POST-HEARING BRIEFS.  COUNSEL
 FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL FILED ON NOVEMBER 27, 1979, A REQUEST FOR AN
 EXTENSION OF TIME FOR THE FILING OF POST-HEARING BRIEFS, FROM DECEMBER
 3, 1979, TO JANUARY 7, 1980, AND STATED THAT COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT
 JOINED IN THE REQUEST BUT THAT COUNSEL FOR THE CHARGING PARTY HAD NOT
 BEEN REACHED AS HE WAS OUT OF THE OFFICE TRAVELING UNTIL NOVEMBER 28.
 ON NOVEMBER 29, 1979, FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, THE REQUEST OF THE GENERAL
 COUNSEL WAS ORALLY GRANTED AND COUNSEL FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL WAS TO
 NOTIFY COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT AND FOR THE CHARGING PARTY.  LATER IN THE
 DAY ON NOVEMBER 29, THIS OFFICE RECEIVED THE BRIEF OF THE CHARGING
 PARTY.  ON DECEMBER 3, 1979, THE UNDERSIGNED ISSUED AN ORDER EXTENDING
 THE TIME FOR FILING BRIEFS BY THE GENERAL COUNSEL AND RESPONDENT TO
 JANUARY 7, 1980, AND GRANTED LEAVE FOR THE CHARGING PARTY TO FILE A
 REPLY BRIEF ON, OR BEFORE, JANUARY 18, 1980.  GENERAL COUNSEL AND
 RESPONDENT TIMELY FILED BRIEFS ON JANUARY 7, 1980, AND CHARGING PARTY
 TIMELY FILED A REPLY BRIEF ON JANUARY 18, 1980.  ALL BRIEFS HAVE BEEN
 CAREFULLY CONSIDERED.  ON NOVEMBER 28, 1979, THIS OFFICE RECEIVED
 RESPONDENT'S MOTION ENTITLED "MOTION TO SEAL RECORD" WHICH, AS SET FORTH
 IN PARAGRAPHS III AND IV THEREOF, DESPITE THE MORE EXPANSIVE TITLE OF
 THE MOTION, CONCERNS ONLY THE NAME OF A FORMER EMPLOYEE OF RESPONDENT.
 WHILE NOT UNSYMPATHETIC WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF RESPONDENT, THE RELIEF
 REQUESTED CAN NOT BE GRANTED.  THE IDENTITY OF THIS FORMER EMPLOYEE WAS
 DISCLOSED IN BOTH TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS WITHOUT OBJECTION;  THIS OFFICE
 RECEIVED THE TRANSCRIPTS AND EXHIBITS ON NOVEMBER 23, 1979, AND THE
 TRANSCRIPT REPORT SHOWS THAT COPIES WERE FORWARDED TO THE REGIONAL
 DIRECTOR ON THE SAME DATE;  AND RESPONDENT HAS NOT SET FORTH THE PAGES
 OF THE TESTIMONY ON WHICH SUCH REFERENCES APPEAR OR THE EXHIBITS WHICH
 RELATE THERETO.  THE MOTION IS, THEREFORE, DENIED;  HOWEVER, INASMUCH AS
 THE NAME OF THIS FORMER EMPLOYEE IS NOT NECESSARY TO DECISION OF ANY
 ISSUE INVOLVED, I SHALL NOT IDENTIFY SUCH FORMER EMPLOYEE IN THIS
 DECISION.
 
    UPON THE BASIS OF THE ENTIRE RECORD, INCLUDING MY OBSERVATION OF THE
 WITNESSES AND THEIR DEMEANOR, I MAKE THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS
 AND ORDER:
 
                                THE ISSUES
 
    1.  DID RESPONDENT VIOLATE SECTIONS 19(A)(1), (2) AND (4) OF THE
 ORDER BY ITS DETAIL OF THE LOCAL UNION PRESIDENT TO PITTSBURGH FOR THE
 PERIOD OF JULY 17, 1978 TO AUGUST 11, 1978?  (CASE NO. 3-CA-12)
 
    2.  DID RESPONDENT ON NOVEMBER 20, 1978 VIOLATE SECTIONS 19(A)(1) AND
 (4) OF THE ORDER BY REFUSING TO GRANT ANNUAL LEAVE AND/OR SICK LEAVE TO
 MARIA JAURIGUE?  (CASE NO. 3-CA-34)
 
    3.  DID RESPONDENT ON JANUARY 9, 1979, VIOLATE SECTIONS 19(A)(1) AND
 (4) OF THE ORDER BY REQUIRING MS. JAURIGUE TO PRESENT A PHYSICIAN'S
 STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF SUCH LEAVE?  (CASE NO. 3-CA-35)
 
    4.  DID RESPONDENT ON JANUARY 22, 1979, VIOLATE SECTIONS 7116(A)(1)
 AND (4) OF THE STATUTE BY IMPOSING ON MS. JAURIGUE A MORE STRINGENT
 REQUIREMENT IN ACCOUNTING FOR SICK LEAVE THAN REQUIRED OF OTHER
 EMPLOYEES?  (CASE NO. 3-CA-36)
 
    5.  DID RESPONDENT VIOLATE SECTIONS 7116(A)(1) AND (4) OF THE STATUTE
 BY VIRTUE OF THE CIVIL LIBEL ACTION FILED IN STATE COURT BY MR. LACY
 WARD AGAINST MS.  JAURIGUE?  (CASE NO. 3-CA-220)
 
    6.  DID RESPONDENT VIOLATE SECTIONS 7116(A)(1) AND (4) OF THE STATUTE
 BY VIRTURE OF THE SUBPOENA DECES TECUM SERVED ON THE LOCAL UNION
 PRESIDENT IN CONNECTION WITH MR.  WARD'S SUIT FOR LIBEL?  (CASE NO.
 3-CA-221)
 
    FOR REASONS MORE FULLY SET FORTH HEREINAFTER, I HAVE FOUND A
 VIOLATION AS TO ISSUES 1 AND 2;  AND HAVE FOUND NO VIOLATION AS TO
 ISSUES 3, 4, 5 AND 6.
 
                                 FINDINGS
 
                              A.  BACKGROUND
 
    RESPONDENT WAS ESTABLISHED IN 1973 TO ENFORCE VARIOUS LAWS DEALING
 WITH CONSUMER PRODUCTS, SUCH AS THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT, THE
 HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES ACT, THE POISON PREVENTION ACT, AND THE INFLAMMABLE
 FABRICS ACT.  RESPONDENT OPERATES THROUGH AREA OFFICES, ONE OF WHICH IS
 LOCATED IN PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA.  IN 1978, THE BASIC SUPERVISORY
 STRUCTURE OF THE PHILADELPHIA AREA OFFICE, WHICH IS THE ONLY AREA OFFICE
 INVOLVED IN THIS PROCEEDING, WAS AS FOLLOWS:  MR. LACY B. WARD WAS AREA
 DIRECTOR AND GENERALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPERVISING ALL ASPECTS OF THE
 OFFICE;  THE COMMUNITY SERVICES DIVISION WHICH HANDLED PUBLIC RELATIONS,
 WAS HEADED BY MS.  MARIA JAURIGUE AND SHE REPORTED DIRECTLY TO MR. WARD;
  THE ADMINISTRATION AND COMPLIANCE BRANCHES ALSO REPORTED DIRECTLY TO
 MR. WARD;  MR. RAYMOND BENSON WAS DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS AND SUPERVISED
 INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE OFFICE.  OPERATIONS WAS FURTHER DIVIDED
 INTO TWO TEAMS OF SIX OR SEVEN INVESTIGATORS WITH EACH TEAM BEING UNDER
 A SUPERVISOR, MR. FRANK KRIVDA OR MR. WILLIAM ROBINSON.  IN ADDITION,
 THERE WERE THREE RESIDENT POSTS:  PITTSBURGH, SUPERVISED BY MR.
 ROBINSON;  AND RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, AND BALTIMORE, MARYLAND, BOTH
 SUPERVISED BY MR. KRIVDA.
 
    IN JANUARY, 1977, THE CHARGING PARTY (HEREINAFTER ALSO REFERRED TO AS
 THE "UNION") WAS GRANTED EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION FOR CERTAIN OF
 RESPONDENT'S EMPLOYEES AT ITS PHILADELPHIA AREA OFFICE.  THE FOLLOWING
 INDIVIDUALS SERVED AS UNION OFFICERS DURING 1978:  MR.  RAYMOND
 LABONSKI, PRESIDENT;  MR. GARY ARMBRUST, VICE PRESIDENT;  AND MR. BEN
 FINK, SECRETARY/TREASURER.
 
         B.  MR. LABONSKI'S UNION ACTIVITY THROUGH JULY 10, 1978.
 
    DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1978, MR. LABONSKI WAS ENGAGED IN A SERIES
 OF ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF OF THE UNION.  IN FEBRUARY, MR. LABONSKI FILED
 AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGE CONCERNING A MEMORANDUM FROM MR. WARD
 REQUIRING SECRETARIES TO REPORT THEIR TIME IN 15 MINUTE INCREMENTS WHICH
 WAS ASSERTED TO HAVE BEEN A UNILATERAL CHANGE IN WORKING CONDITIONS
 WITHOUT NEGOTIATION WITH THE UNION.  IN MARCH, AN EMPLOYEE WAS INFORMED
 THAT SHE WAS ABOUT TO BE DISCHARGED AND WENT TO MR. LABONSKI FOR
 ASSISTANCE.  AFTER AN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH
 MR. WARD, MR. LABONSKI FILED THREE CHARGES OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
 OVER THE MATTER (G.C. EXHS. 2, 3 AND 4).  ON MARCH 10, MR. LABONSKI
 ACCOMPANIED THE EMPLOYEE TO A MEETING WITH MR. WARD AND, WHEN MR.
 LABONSKI SOUGHT TO SPEAK, HE WAS TOLD TO LEAVE.  THEREAFTER, MR.
 LABONSKI FILED A SUIT IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT (G.C. EXH. 5)
 AND TESTIFIED AT A HEARING IN THE MATTER.  AFTER MR. LABONSKI'S
 TESTIMONY, THE HEARING WAS ADJOURNED, AND, AFTER A MEETING IN CHAMBERS,
 THE PARTIES SIGNED A CONSENT DECREE (G.C. EXH. 6) WHICH PROVIDED, IN
 PART, THAT THE DISCHARGE BE RESCINDED AND THE EMPLOYEE BE ALLOWED TO
 RESIGN.  SHORTLY THEREAFTER, SUPERVISOR KRIVDA IN A CONVERSATION WITH
 MR. LABONSKI REFERRED TO THIS MATTER AS A "BLOOD LETTING" AND TOLD MR.
 LABONSKI HE SHOULD WATCH HIS STEP (TR. 71)
 
    IN MAY, MR. LABONSKI SERVED AS CHIEF NEGOTIATOR FOR THE UNION, WITH
 MR. GARY ARMBRUST A MEMBER OF THE UNION'S NEGOTIATING TEAM, AND, AS AN
 ALTERNATE, EITHER MR.  BENEDICT FINK OR MR. JAMES FERRAR.  MS. CATHERINE
 DAVIS WAS CHIEF NEGOTIATOR FOR RESPONDENT, MR.  RAYMOND BENSON SERVED AS
 A MEMBER OF RESPONDENT'S NEGOTIATING TEAM AS DID MR. WARD ON OCCASION.
 A CONTRACT WAS COMPLETED IN MID-MAY, 1978.  ON JUNE 7, 1978, RESPONDENT
 ISSUED A MEMORANDUM CONCERNING A "NO SMOKING POLICY" AND ON JUNE 8,
 1978, MR. LABONSKI FILED AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGE (G.C. EXH. 7),
 ALLEGING THAT RESPONDENT HAD MADE NO EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE IMPACT OR
 IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH A POLICY PRIOR TO ITS ISSUANCE.  ON JUNE 21,
 1978, MR. BENSON MET WITH MESSRS. LABONSKI AND FINK AND ON JUNE 27,
 1978, MR. WARD ADVISED MR. LABONSKI THAT HE WAS IMPLEMENTING THE POLICY
 EFFECTIVE JUNE 28, 1978, BECAUSE:  A) THE MEETING WITH MR. BENSON HAD
 GIVEN "AMPLE OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCUSSION" AND B) "I DO NOT BELIEVE ANY
 ACTION TAKEN BY THIS OFFICE . . . HAS HAD ANY IMPACT ON THE EMPLOYEES OF
 THE BARGAINING UNIT" (G.C. EXH. 8). ON JUNE 30, 1978, MR. LABONSKI FILED
 A COMPLAINT (G.C. EXH. 9).  ON JULY 10, AT A WEEKLY STAFF MEETING, MR.
 WARD ANNOUNCED THAT THERE WOULD BE A NO SMOKING POLICY IN THE CONFERENCE
 ROOM AND MR. LABONSKI PROMPTLY STOOD UP AND STATED THAT THE UNION HAD
 FILED FORMAL CHARGES ABOUT THE POLICY.
 
                         C.  THE PITTSBURGH DETAIL
 
    ON JULY 10, 1978, MR. WARD ASKED SUPERVISOR ROBINSON FOR THE
 ITINERARIES OF JANE HANLON AND GARY ARMBRUST.  MR. ROBINSON SUPPLIED THE
 ITINERARIES AND TESTIFIED THAT HE DID NOT RECALL ANY PRIOR OCCASION WHEN
 MR. WARD HAD ASKED FOR THE ITINERARIES OF INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES.  MR.
 ARMBRUST'S ITINERARY SHOWED THAT FOR MOST OF THE NEXT TWO WEEKS HE WAS
 SCHEDULED FOR HOSPITAL VISITS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE NEISS REDESIGN
 PROGRAM.
 
    THE PITTSBURGH RESIDENT POST WAS TO BECOME OPEN AT THE END OF THE
 WEEK, JULY 14, 1978, AS THE RESIDENT OFFICER HAD RESIGNED AND WAS
 LEAVING AT THAT TIME.  THE PITTSBURGH RESIDENT POST HAD, SINCE ITS
 INCEPTION, BEEN FILLED BY A GS-9 INVESTIGATOR.  DURING JULY, 1978, IN
 MR. BENSON'S ABSENCE, MR. KRIVDA WAS ACTING DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS AND
 MR. LABONSKI WAS ACTING SUPERVISOR FOR MR. KRIVDA'S GROUP FROM JULY 3
 (G.C. EXH. 10).  MR. KRIVDA TESTIFIED THAT ON JULY 12, 1978, AT ABOUT
 8:00 A.M., MR. WARD HAD ASKED WHAT MR. LABONSKI'S DUTIES WERE AND THAT
 HE HAD TOLD HIM MR. LABONSKI WAS AN ACTING SUPERVISORY INSPECTOR.  LATER
 IN THE DAY, ON JULY 12, MR.  KRIVDA PLACED THE TIME AS ABOUT 10:00 A.M.
 AND MR. WARD AS ABOUT 1:30 P.M., MR. WARD ASKED MR. KRIVDA WHAT HIS
 PLANS WERE FOR FILLING THE PITTSBURGH RESIDENT POST.  MR. KRIVDA REPLIED
 THAT HE INTENDED TO SEND MS. JOYCE ALLEN, A GS-7 INVESTIGATOR, AND MR.
 FINK, THEN A GS-9 INVESTIGATOR, FOR ABOUT A WEEK EACH.  THIS HAD ALSO
 BEEN SHOWN ON THE WORK PLANS MEMORANDUM DATED JULY 3, 1978 (G.C. EXH.
 10) AND MR. FINK WAS AWARE THAT HE WAS SCHEDULED TO GO TO PITTSBURGH FOR
 THE WEEK OF JULY 17 THROUGH 21.
 
    MR. WARD TOLD MR. KRIVDA THAT HE WANTED A SENIOR INVESTIGATOR, (I.E.
 A GS-11 INVESTIGATOR) IN THE PITTSBURGH POST FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL
 MONTHS.  THE PHILADELPHIA AREA OFFICE HAD ONLY TWO GS-11 INVESTIGATORS,
 EXCLUSIVE OF THE RESIDENT OFFICERS IN BALTIMORE, MARYLAND, AND RICHMOND,
 VIRGINIA, NAMELY LABONSKI AND ARMBRUST.  /8/ MR. WARD TESTIFIED, IN
 PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "I TOLD MR. KRIVDA THAT I WANTED A SENIOR INVESTIGATOR IN THE
 PITTSBURGH RESIDENT POST FOR
 
    THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS AND THAT I WANT THE PERSON ON DETAIL TO
 REMAIN THERE FOR A MINIMUM OF
 
    A MONTH.
 
    "THE WITNESS:  TWO WEEKS WERE NOT REQUESTED NOR GRANTED.  WE DID NOT
 DISCUSS A TWO WEEK
 
    DETAIL AT THIS TIME." (TR. 555)
 
    MR. KRIVDA TESTIFIED ON DIRECT EXAMINATION, IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "Q.  DID MR. WARD GIVE YOU ANY INSTRUCTIONS WITH REGARD TO HOW HE
 WISHED THE PITTSBURGH
 
    RESIDENT POST TO BE FILLED?
 
    "A.  HE WANTED A SENIOR INVESTIGATOR OR A GS-11 INVESTIGATOR ASSIGNED
 TO THE PITTSBURGH
 
    RESIDENT POST.  (TR. 271)
 
    AFTER HIS RECOLLECTION WAS REFRESHED BY HIS EXAMINATION OF A PRIOR
 STATEMENT, MR. KRIVDA FURTHER TESTIFIED:
 
    " . . . I TOLD MR. WARD THAT LABONSKI WAS AN ACTING SUPERVISOR FOR ME
 AND THAT GARY
 
    ARMBRUST WAS AWAY DOING A NEISS TRAINING THING IN A TRAINING HOSPITAL
 IN ELKTON, MARYLAND, AT
 
    THE TIME.
 
    "TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, I REMEMBER SAYING THAT SOMETHING TO THE
 EFFECT THAT LABONSKI
 
    IS THE ONLY ONE OR SOMETHING.
 
    "I CAN'T REALLY RECALL THE TOTAL--
 
    "Q.  JUST RECALL IT AS BEST AS YOU CAN. DO YOU REMEMBER GENERALLY
 TELLING MR. WARD, THAT
 
    LABONSKI WAS THE ONLY PERSON AVAILABLE TO BE SENT AT THAT TIME?
 
    "A.  YES." (TR. 276-277).
 
    AFTER THE MEETING WITH MR. WARD, MR. KRIVDA CALLED MR. LABONSKI TO
 HIS OFFICE AND TOLD HIM HE WAS BEING DETAILED TO PITTSBURGH FOR ONE
 MONTH.  /9/ MR. LABONSKI WAS DISMAYED AND TOLD MR. KRIVDA IT WOULD
 IMPOSE A HARDSHIP FOR HIM BECAUSE HIS WIFE WAS IN ADVANCED PREGNANCY AND
 WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY.  TO APPRECIATE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM TO
 MR.  LABONSKI, HIS WIFE HAD HAD FIVE PRIOR MISCARRIAGES AND HER PRESENT
 PREGNANCY, WHICH HAD BEGUN IN DECEMBER 1977, WAS BEING CONTINUED BY THE
 USE OF DAILY MEDICATION WHICH CAUSED APPRECIABLE PHYSICAL PAIN.  MR.
 WARD WAS AWARE OF MRS. LABONSKI'S PREGNANCY AND FROM HIS ACTION AT A
 STAFF MEETING I DRAW THE INFERENCE THAT MR. WARD WAS AWARE THAT HER
 PREGNANCY WAS NOTABLE.  IN MAY, 1978, MR. LABONSKI HAD SPOKEN TO MR.
 BENSON /10/ ABOUT HIS WIFE'S PREGNANCY AND HAD ASKED TO DOUBLE-UP ON
 SOME ROAD TRIPS IN ORDER THAT HE MIGHT BE SPARED GOING OUT OF TOWN IN
 LATE AUGUST OR EARLY SEPTEMBER AND THAT MR. BENSON SAID, " . . . I
 SHOULD NOT WORRY.  I WOULD NOT BE TRAVELING AT THAT TIME." (TR. 135,
 SEE, ALSO, TR. 83, 137).
 
    WHEN MR. KRIVDA TOLD HIM, "HE (MR. WARD) WANTS YOU OUT THERE AND IT
 HAS TO BE A MONTH" (TR. 81), MR. LABONSKI, AFTER TELLING MR. KRIVDA THAT
 HE (LABONSKI) COULDN'T DO IT, TOLD MR. KRIVDA,
 
    " . . . THAT I WOULD CALL MR. LACY WARD AND PERSONALLY EXPRESS MY
 DIFFICULTY WITH THE
 
    ASSIGNMENT. MR. FRANK KRIVDA TOLD ME, 'GO AHEAD. GIVE IT A TRY.'"
 (TR. 81).
 
    MR. LABONSKI WENT TO HIS OFFICE AND CALLED MR. WARD.  MR. LABONSKI
 TESTIFIED THAT THE FOLLOWING CONVERSATION ENSUED.
 
    " . . . LACY, FRANK TELLS ME I'M TO GO TO PITTSBURGH FOR A MONTH AND
 I'M HAVING A GREAT
 
    DEAL OF DIFFICULTY WITH THIS, MY WIFE IS EIGHT MONTHS PREGNANT.
 
    "LACY IMMEDIATELY SAID THAT, 'IF YOU HAVE A PROBLEM WITH ONE OF YOUR
 ASSIGNMENTS, SEE YOUR
 
    SUPERVISOR.  HE'S THE ONE THAT MAKES UP YOUR ASSIGNMENTS,' AND HE
 HUNG UP THE
 
    PHONE." (TR. 83-84).
 
    MR. WARD TESTIFIED AS TO THE SAME TELEPHONE CONVERSATION AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "HE CALLED (LABONSKI) AND HE SAID, 'LACY, FRANK TELLS ME I'VE GOT TO
 GO TO PITTSBURGH FOR A
 
    MONTH AND I'M HAVING SOME DIFFICULTY WITH IT.
 
    "Q.  HE HAD SOME DIFFICULTY WITH IT?
 
    "A.  YES.
 
    Q.  DID HE TELL YOU HE WAS HAVING A PROBLEM WITH IT?
 
    "A.  PROBLEM, DIFFICULTY;  I RECALL DIFFICULTY.
 
    "Q.  YOU TOLD HIM TO GO TALK TO THE SUPERVISOR. IS THAT CORRECT?
 
    "A.  I DID.
 
    "Q.  WHY DID YOU TELL HIM TO DO THAT?
 
    "A.  WELL, PRIMARILY BECAUSE THAT IS THE WAY I MANAGE.  I DO NOT,
 ONCE I GIVE A SUPERVISOR
 
    AN ASSIGNMENT I EXPECT THE SUPERVISOR TO COME BACK TO ME AND
 COMMUNICATE IF THERE ARE ANY
 
    DIFFICULTIES IN CARRYING OUT THAT ASSIGNMENT.
 
    "I FIND THAT IT DOES CREATE PROBLEMS FOR ME TO INTERCEDE ONCE THE
 SUPERVISOR HAS GIVEN AN
 
    ASSIGNMENT TO AN EMPLOYEE.
 
    "THAT'S MY GENERAL RULE OF MANAGEMENT.
 
    "Q.  DO YOU EXPECT THE SUPERVISOR TO COME BACK TO YOU WITH EVERY
 PROBLEM EVERY EMPLOYEE
 
    RAISES?
 
    "A.  WELL, IF IT IS A PROBLEM THAT THEY CONSIDER THAT THEY CANNOT
 TAKE CARE OF, OR IF IT IS
 
    A PROBLEM THAT THEY FEEL WARRANTS MY BEING INFORMED. YES, I WOULD
 EXPECT THAT THEY--
 
    "Q.  LET ME ASK YOU THE QUESTION AGAIN.  DO YOU EXPECT THEM TO COME
 TO YOU WITH EVERY
 
    PROBLEM THAT IS PRESENTED?
 
    "A.  I DO NOT.
 
    "Q.  SO YOU DO GIVE YOUR SUPERVISORS SOME DISCRETION TO HANDLE
 PROBLEMS.  IS THAT CORRECT?
 
    "A.  I GIVE THEM SOME DISCRETION, YES." (TR. 570-572).
 
    IMMEDIATELY AFTER MR. LABONSKI CALLED MR. WARD, MR. WARD CALLED MR.
 KRIVDA.  MR. WARD TESTIFIED THAT THE FOLLOWING TRANSPIRED:
 
    "A.  I CALLED HIM (KRIVDA) AND I SAID, 'FRANK, RAY LABONSKI JUST
 CALLED ME ABOUT THE DETAIL
 
    TO THE PITTSBURGH RESIDENT POST, AND I TOLD HIM TO DISCUSS ANY
 PROBLEMS THAT HE MIGHT HAVE
 
    WITH YOU.'
 
    "SO THAT HE WOULD BE ALERTED THAT I HAD NOT ENTERED ANY DISCUSSION OR
 TAKEN ANY ACTION.  AT
 
    THAT TIME I SAID, 'YOU'RE THE SUPERVISOR, YOUR'RE IN CHARGE, SO TAKE
 CARE OF THE ASSIGNMENT.'
 
    "HE SAID, 'SO DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU WANT A GS-11 IN PITTSBURGH.' I
 SAID, 'I THOUGHT THAT
 
    WAS WHAT MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE AT FIRST.'
 
    "THAT CONCLUDED THE CONVERSATION AND HE SAID, 'OKAY.'" (TR.  556).
 
    MR. KRIVDA TESTIFIED AS TO HIS CONVERSATION WITH MR. WARD AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "A.  MR. WARD SAID, 'FRANK, IF YOU CAN'T HANDLE THAT JOB OUT THERE ON
 THE FLOOR,' OR
 
    SOMETHING TO THAT EFFECT, I'M GOING TO GET SOMEONE ELSE TO DO IT.'
 
    "Q.  DID HE SAY ANYTHING ABOUT MR. LABONSKI WAS TO GO TO PITTSBURGH
 FOR A MONTH?
 
    "A.  NO.  I THEN RESPONDED THAT, 'DO I UNDERSTAND CORRECTLY, MR.
 WARD, WANT A GS-11 OR
 
    SENIOR INVESTIGATOR ASSIGNED TO THE PITTSBURGH RESIDENT POST?'
 
    "HE SAID, 'YES.' HE SAID, 'YOU ARE THE SUPERVISOR OUT THERE,' OR 'YOU
 ARE THE
 
    MANAGER,' SOMETHING TO THAT EFFECT, 'YOU DO WHAT YOU WANT.'" (TR.
 280) (SEE, ALSO,
 
    TR. 311-312).
 
    AS SOON AS MR. KRIVDA WAS OFF THE TELEPHONE, MR. LABONSKI RETURNED TO
 MR. KRIVDA'S OFFICE AND HE AGAIN DISCUSSED THE HARDSHIP OF HIS GOING TO
 PITTSBURGH BECAUSE OF HIS WIFE'S PREGNANCY.  MR. LABONSKI SAID THAT
 PERHAPS MR. ARMBRUST COULD GO;  BUT MR. KRIVDA REPLIED THAT MR. ARMBRUST
 COULD NOT GO NOW;  THAT THE EARLIEST MR. ARMBRUST COULD GO WOULD BE IN
 TWO WEEKS.  MR. KRIVDA AND MR. LABONSKI AGREED THAT MR. LABONSKI WOULD
 GO TO PITTSBURGH FOR TWO WEEKS TO BE FOLLOWED BY MR. ARMBRUST.  MR.
 KRIVDA TOLD MR. ROBINSON THAT HE HAD DETAILED MR. LABONSKI TO PITTSBURGH
 FOR TWO WEEKS (JULY 17-21 AND 24-28);  MR. LABONSKI TOLD MR.  ARMBRUST
 ON JULY 12 THAT HE WAS APPREHENSIVE ABOUT GOING TO PITTSBURGH BECAUSE OF
 HIS WIFE'S PREGNANCY AND MR. ARMBRUST TOLD MR. LABONSKI,
 
    "I WOULD BE HAPPY TO-- AFTER HE RETURNED FROM HIS TWO WEEK DETAIL--
 GO THERE FOR WHATEVER
 
    LENGTH OF TIME WAS NECESSARY UNTIL HIS WIFE WAS OUT OF DANGER AND THE
 BABY HAD BEEN BORN, ET
 
    CETRA." (TR. 404).  MR. ARMBRUST FURTHER TESTIFIED THAT ON THE 24TH
 OF JULY, HE TALKED ABOUT THE MATTER WITH HIS IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR, MR.
 ROBINSON, AND WITH MR. BENSON;  AND THAT MR.  ROBINSON HAD TOLD HIM HE
 WOULD BE GOING TO PITTSBURGH FOR IN EXCESS OF A MONTH.  "I BELIEVE IT
 WAS ORIGINALLY AGREED UPON TO BE A MONTH AND A HALF." (TR. 404).
 
              D.  MR. LABONSKI'S SECOND DETAIL TO PITTSBURGH
 
    MR. LABONSKI WAS BACK FROM THE TWO WEEK DETAIL AND IN THE OFFICE ON
 MONDAY, JULY 31 AND WAS PRESENT FOR THE WEEKLY STAFF MEETING.  MR.
 ARMBRUST WAS ALSO AT THE OFFICE BUT HAD HIS BAG PACKED, HAD ASSEMBLED
 MATERIALS FOR THE TRIP TO PITTSBURGH AND WAS IN THE OFFICE WAITING TO
 LEAVE.  BEYOND ADMITTING THAT HE SAW MR. LABONSKI IN THE OFFICE ON JULY
 31, 1978 (TR.  560), MR. WARD WAS NOT QUESTIONED ABOUT THE EVENTS OF
 JULY 31;  HOWEVER, MR. WARD'S ACTIONS ON JULY 31, 1978, ARE FULLY
 DETAILED IN THE TESTIMONY OF OTHER WITNESSES AND WHOLLY UNDENIED BY
 RESPONDENT.  MR. KRIVDA TESTIFIED THAT, AFTER THE STAFF MEETING, MR.
 WARD CALLED A SENIOR STAFF MEETING AT WHICH MR. WARD ASKED MR. BENSON
 WHAT MR. LABONSKI WAS DOING BACK FROM PITTSBURGH;  THAT MR. BENSON WAS A
 LITTLE UNCERTAIN AND THAT HE, KRIVDA, RESPONDED AND SAID,
 
    " . . . I ASSIGNED RAY LABONSKI UP FOR TWO WEEKS AND HE IS BACK FROM
 HIS TWO-WEEK DETAIL.
 
   .          .          .          .
 
 
    "Q.  WHAT DID MR. WARD DO AND SAY?
 
    "A.  MR. WARD, AGAIN, HE REQUESTED FROM MR. BENSON WHAT RAY LABONSKI
 WAS DOING BACK IN THE
 
    AREA OFFICE.  I RESPONDED AND SAID THAT I ASSIGNED MR. LABONSKI FOR A
 TWO-WEEK DETAIL IN THE
 
    PITTSBURGH RESIDENT POST." (TR. 294-295).  THE STAFF MEETING AND
 SENIOR STAFF MEETING HAD BEEN HELD EARLY IN THE MORNING.  MR. KRIVDA
 TESTIFIED THAT AT ABOUT LUNCH TIME, MR. WARD CAME TO HIM, KRIVDA, AND
 ASKED WHY I DID NOT SEND RAY LABONSKI OUT TO PITTSBURGH FOR A MONTH AND:
 
    "I EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT I WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT I, TO THE
 BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE,
 
    THAT I SENT HIM OUT FOR TWO WEEKS BASED ON MY UNDERSTANDING OF (SIC)
 THE ORDER
 
    WAS." (TR. 296).  AT SOME TIME ON THE MORNING OF JULY 31, 1978, MR.
 KRIVDA TESTIFIED THAT MR. WARD TOLD HIM TO STOP MR. ARMBRUST FROM GOING
 TO PITTSBURGH (TR. 322).  MR. ARMBRUST TESTIFIED THAT AT ABOUT NOON MR.
 KRIVDA TOLD HIM HIS DETAIL TO PITTSBURGH HAD BEEN CANCELLED (TR.  406).
 
    MR. ROBINSON TESTIFIED THAT, AFTER THE GENERAL STAFF MEETING, MR.
 WARD CALLED HIM TO HIS OFFICE AND THAT THE FOLLOWING CONVERSATION TOOK
 PLACE:
 
    " . . . HE (MR. WARD) ASKED ME WHY WAS RAY LABONSKI PRESENT AT THE
 PHILADELPHIA AREA
 
    OFFICE, AT THE OFFICE.
 
    "I RESPONDED TO MR. WARD THAT I HAD-- IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING HIS
 DETAIL WAS OVER AT THE
 
    PITTSBURGH RESIDENT POST AND, THEREFORE, HE WAS BACK IN THE OFFICE AT
 HIS NORMAL DUTY STATION,
 
    I GUESS YOU WOULD SAY.
 
    "I DON'T RECALL OF ANY FURTHER REMARKS THAT MR. WARD MADE AT THAT
 TIME." (TR. 374).
 
    MR. ROBINSON FURTHER TESTIFIED THAT SHORTLY AFTER LUNCH ON JULY 31,
 MR. BENSON CAME TO HIS OFFICE AND THE FOLLOWING CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE:
 
    "RAY BENSON . . . TOLD ME THAT HE WANTED RAY LABONSKI TO BE-- HE
 WANTED ME TO ASSIGN RAY
 
    LABONSKI BACK TO THE PITTSBURGH RESIDENT POST EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY,
 OR EFFECTIVE, MEANING
 
    LIKE THE NEXT DAY FOR A PERIOD OF TWO WEEKS.
 
    "I ASKED RAY-- I TOLD RAY BENSON THAT RAY LABONSKI HAD INDICATED HE
 HAD SOME-- HIS WIFE HAD
 
    SOME PROBLEMS.  SHE WAS EXPECTING AND HAD SOME PREVIOUS PROBLEM.
 
    "THERE WAS A HARDSHIP TYPE SITUATION HERE AND THAT HE HAD ASKED, I
 BELIEVE IT WAS FRANK
 
    PREVIOUSLY, WHEN HE WAS INITIALLY ASSIGNED TO PITTSBURGH, THAT HE NOT
 BE PERMITTED-- THAT HE
 
    NOT GO, THAT SOMEONE ELSE WOULD GO IN HIS PLACE.
 
    "AND RAY SAID THAT HE WAS DIRECTING ME TO TELL RAY LABONSKI, IN OTHER
 WORDS, AN ORDER TO
 
    TELL RAY LABONSKI, TO GO BACK TO THE PITTSBURGH RESIDENT POST FOR A
 PERIOD OF TWO WEEKS
 
    EFFECTIVELY IMMEDIATELY.
 
    "I SAID, 'WELL, RAY, WHAT IF, 'THIS IS RAY BENSON, 'WHAT IF RAY
 LABONSKI REFUSED TO GO TO
 
    THE PITTSBURGH RESIDENT POST?'
 
    "AND HE SAID THIS WOULD BE INSUBORDINATION AND I WANT YOU TO CHARGE
 HIM WITH SAME IF HE
 
    FAILS TO COMPLY.  AND I ASKED RAY, 'WELL, IS THIS DIRECTIVE COMING
 FROM YOU OR DOES THIS COME
 
    FROM MR. WARD?'
 
    "HE SAID, 'IT COMES FROM MR. WARD BUT . . . IF YOU ASK ME IF HE SAID
 THAT, I'LL SAY, NO
 
    . . . .
 
    "Q.  HE WOULD DENY THAT THE ORDER CAME FROM MR. WARD?
 
    "A.  THAT'S CORRECT, YES." (TR. 374-375).
 
    IMMEDIATELY AFTER MR. BENSON LEFT, MR. ROBINSON CALLED MR. LABONSKI
 TO HIS OFFICE AND TOLD HIM HE WAS ASSIGNING HIM BACK TO PITTSBURGH FOR
 TWO WEEKS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.  MR. ROBINSON TESTIFIED THAT THE
 FOLLOWING CONVERSATION ENSUED:
 
    "AND HE ASKED ME, 'WELL, MY WIFE IS HAVING PROBLEMS. THIS IS A
 HARDSHIP FOR ME.  ISN'T
 
    THERE SOMEONE ELSE THAT CAN GO?'
 
    "AND I INDICATED, 'NO.  THERE IS NO ONE ELSE.'
 
    "AND HE INDICATED, RAY LABONSKI INDICATED TO ME, 'WELL, WHAT IF I
 REFUSE TO GO?'
 
    "I SAID, 'WELL, YOU WOULD BE CHARGED WITH INSUBORDINATION.'
 
    "AND RAY ASKED ME, 'WELL, IS THIS COMING FROM RAY BENSON OR DOES IT
 COME FROM MR. WARD?'
 
    "I SAID OR INDICATED BY A NOD OF THE HEAD POINTING UP TO THE OFFICE
 UP FROM THAT IT CAME
 
    FROM MR. WARD.  I SAID, 'IT'S BEYOND MY CONTROL.'" (TR. 376) (SEE,
 ALSO, MR. LABONSKI'S
 
    TESTIMONY, TR. 89-90).  MR. LABONSKI WENT TO PITTSBURGH THE FOLLOWING
 DAY, AUGUST 1, 1978, AND REMAINED THERE UNTIL AUGUST 11, 1978.  /11/ IN
 THE AFTERNOON OF JULY 31, 1978, MR. BENSON CAME TO MR. KRIVDA AND TOLD
 HIM HE HAD TO GIVE HIM AN ORAL REPRIMAND FOR NOT SENDING MR. LABONSKI TO
 PITTSBURGH FOR A MONTH;  THAT HE HAD HAD A DISCUSSION WITH MR. WARD AND
 MR. WARD DIRECTED HIM TO DO THIS.  (TR. 324-325).
 
                   E.  MR. LABONSKI DETAILED TO RICHMOND
 
    ON OCTOBER 16, 1978, MR. LABONSKI WAS DETAILED TO THE RICHMOND,
 VIRGINIA, RESIDENT POST FOR A WEEK. MR. LABONSKI TESTIFIED THAT THERE
 WAS NO WORK TO DO IN RICHMOND;  THAT HE CALLED MR. ROBINSON EACH DAY
 ASKING FOR WORK TO NO AVAIL.  AFTER HE RETURNED TO PHILADELPHIA MR.
 LABONSKI TESTIFIED THAT HE HAD TOLD MR. KRIVDA THAT THE RICHMOND
 ASSIGNMENT HAD BEEN STUPID BECAUSE THERE HAD BEEN NO WORK;  THAT MR.
 KRIVDA TOLD HIM THAT ON OCTOBER 16, MS. RENEE WEBB, AS ACTING DIRECTOR
 OF OPERATIONS, HAD COME TO HIM AND ASKED WHAT HE WAS GOING TO DO WITH
 THE RICHMOND RESIDENT POST AS THE RESIDENT INVESTIGATOR HAD BEEN
 DETAILED TO PHILADELPHIA;  THAT HE HAD SAID "NOTHING." THEY WEREN'T
 GOING TO FILL IT BECAUSE THE WORK HAD BEEN CLEANED UP;  BUT MS. WEBB
 SAID, "SEND LABONSKI."
 
        F.  MARIA JAURIQUE'S ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE TO NOVEMBER 15,
 
                                   1978
 
    ON AUGUST 30, 1978, MS. JAURIGUE FILED AN APPLICATION FOR ANNUAL
 LEAVE FROM DECEMBER 21, 1978, TO JANUARY 15, 1979.  THIS LEAVE REQUEST
 WAS APPROVED, IN WRITING, BY MR.  WARD ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1978 (RES. EXH.
 20).  MS. JAURIGUE HAD BEEN IN POOR HEALTH FOR SOME TIME AND ON NOVEMBER
 14, 1978, DR. PONTARELLI INSTRUCTED HER TO UNDERGO AN EXTENSIVE MEDICAL
 SURVEY FOR PERSISTENT AND RECURRING ABDOMINAL PAIN (G.C. EXH. 10).
 BECAUSE OF A HISTORY OF CANCER IN HER FAMILY AND HER CONTINUING PAIN AND
 DISCOMFORT, MS. JAURIGUE FEARED THAT SHE MIGHT HAVE CANCER, WHICH FEAR,
 UNFORTUNATELY, WAS LATER CONFIRMED WHEN SHE UNDERWENT SURGERY IN
 DECEMBER, 1978.  HOWEVER, ON NOVEMBER 14, 1978, MS. JAURIGUE KNEW ONLY
 THAT SHE WAS ILL;  AND THAT DR. PONTARELLI HAD TOLD HER TO UNDERGO
 EXTENSIVE TESTS AND POSSIBLE SURGERY.  SINCE HER FAMILY WAS IN LAS
 CRUCES, NEW MEXICO, MS.  JAURIGUE WANTED TO GO THERE FOR THE MEDICAL
 PROCEDURES.  ON NOVEMBER 15, 1978, MS. JAURIGUE MET WITH MR. WARD, MS.
 RENEE WEBB AND MS. MARJORIE STEWART /12/ AND MS. JAURIGUE TESTIFIED
 WITHOUT CONTRADICTION THAT SHE STATED AT THAT TIME THAT SHE WAS SICK,
 THAT SHE WOULD BE REQUESTING FURTHER ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE;  THAT SHE
 WOULD GIVE MR. WARD THE SPECIFIC DATES WITHIN A DAY OR TWO;  AND THAT
 SHE NEEDED SOME TIME TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS IN PHILADELPHIA BEFORE SHE
 LEFT FOR NEW MEXICO.  MR. WARD SAID "OKAY, GO AHEAD AND SUBMIT YOUR
 REQUEST." (TR. 448.  AT THIS MEETING, THE WORKLOAD WAS DISCUSSED AND MR.
 WARD TOLD MS. JAURIGUE THAT SHE WOULD NOT BE DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION
 ANY MORE.
 
           G.  MARIA JAURIQUE'S STATEMENT TO UNION DISCLOSED TO
 
                      MR. WARD ON NOVEMBER 15, 1978.
 
    ON OCTOBER 24, 1978, MS. JAURIGUE MET WITH MR. LABONSKI AND MR.
 ARMBRUST AND TOLD THEM THAT IN EARLY JULY, 1978, MR. WARD HAD TOLD HER
 THAT HE WAS GOING TO PUNISH MR. LABONSKI FOR HIS UNION ACTIVITY.  MR.
 LABONSKI TOLD MS. JAURIGUE HE WOULD LIKE A WRITTEN STATEMENT FROM HER
 BUT WARNED HER THAT IF SHE GAVE A WRITTEN STATEMENT " . . . IT WOULD
 MOST LIKELY MEAN A GREAT DEAL OF HEAT FROM MR. WARD" (TR. 99).  MS.
 JAURIGUE SAID SHE WOULD THINK IT OVER AND, ON OCTOBER 25, 1978, SHE GAVE
 MR. LABONSKI A HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT (ATTACHMENT TO G.C. EXH. 11).  THE
 WRITTEN STATEMENT RECITED, IN PART, THAT:
 
    " . . . BECAUSE OF UNION ACTIVITY SUCH AS THE 'NO SMOKING SIGN IN THE
 CONFERENCE
 
    ROOM' INCIDENT, HE WAS GOING TO HAVE YOU (LABONSKI) DETAILED TO THE
 PITTSBURGH RESIDENT POST
 
    FOR A WHOLE MONTH.
 
    "MR. WARD WAS AWARE THAT YOUR WIFE WAS DUE TO HAVE YOUR BABY WITHIN A
 COUPLE OF WEEKS.  I
 
    ASKED IF THERE WAS GOING TO BE A PROBLEM FOR YOU.  MR. WARD RESPONDED
 BY SAYING THAT HE WAS
 
    SENT TO KOREA WHEN HIS WIFE WAS PREGNANT SO WHY NOT SEND YOU TO
 PITTSBURGH."
 
    ON OCTOBER 30, 1978, MR. LABONSKI FILED AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
 CHARGE ALLEGING THAT HIS DETAIL TO PITTSBURGH FOR ONE MONTH HAD BEEN TO
 DISCIPLINE HIM FOR ACTIVITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNION (G.C. EXH. 1A).
 ON NOVEMBER 15, 1978, MR. LABONSKI FILED A LETTER WHICH, FOR THE FIRST
 TIME, DISCLOSED MS. JAURIQUE'S STATEMENT (G.C. EXH. 11) AND MR. WARD
 STATED THAT HE FIRST SAW JAURIQUE'S STATEMENT ON NOVEMBER 15, 1978 (TR.
 560).
 
        H.  ACTING DIRECTOR WEBB APPROVED JAURIQUE'S LEAVE REQUESTS
 
                          ON NOVEMBER 17, 1978.
 
    MR. WARD WAS OUT OF THE OFFICE ON NOVEMBER 17, 1978, AND MS. WEBB WAS
 ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE AREA OFFICE.  MS. JAURIGUE PRESENTED THE
 FOLLOWING LEAVE REQUESTS TO MS.  WEBB WHO APPROVED THEM:  ANNUAL LEAVE
 11/20/78 TO 11/24/78;  SICK LEAVE 11/27/78 TO 12/8/78 /13/ MS.  JAURIGUE
 SPENT MOST OF NOVEMBER 17 WITH MS. WEBB, REVIEWING THE WORK OF THE
 COMMUNITY SERVICES DIVISION, AND WITH MS. GLORIA WHITE, BRIEFING HER " .
 . . AS TO WHAT WAS REMAINING AROUND TO BE DONE . . .  .  (TR. 495).
 
        I.  LEAVE APPROVED BY MS. WEBB CANCELLED BY MS. WEBB AFTER
 
                            CALL FROM MR. WARD
 
    MS. WEBB WAS IN JAURIQUE'S OFFICE WHEN MR. WARD CALLED AT ABOUT 4:00
 P.M. TO SPEAK TO MS. WEBB.  MS. WEBB TOOK THE CALL IN HER OWN OFFICE AND
 WHEN SHE RETURNED AT ABOUT 4:25 P.M., SHE ASKED FOR MS. JAURIQUE'S LEAVE
 SLIPS AND SAID THAT THE LEAVE WAS NOW DISAPPROVED (TR. 451).  MS.
 JAURIGUE TOLD HER SHE, JAURIGUE, WAS VERY SICK AT THAT TIME AND REALLY
 NEEDED TO BE OFF ON SICK LEAVE;  BUT MS. WEBB TOLD MS. JAURIGUE THAT IF
 SHE DIDN'T SHOW UP FOR WORK ON MONDAY, NOVEMBER 20, SHE WOULD BE PLACED
 ON AWOL, OR LEAVE WITHOUT PAY.  MS.  JAURIGUE FILED A FURTHER
 APPLICATION FOR ANNUAL LEAVE FROM 11/21/78 TO 11/24/78, I.E. THE
 APPLICATION FILED EARLIER IN THE DAY AND APPROVED BY MS. WEBB HAD BEEN
 FOR LEAVE FROM 11/20/78 TO 11/24/78, BUT MS. WEBB, AFTER TAKING BACK THE
 APPROVED LEAVE SLIPS AND CANCELLING THE LEAVE, HAD ORDERED MS. JAURIGUE
 TO REPORT FOR WORK ON NOVEMBER 20, 1978.
 
         J.  MR. WARD, ON NOVEMBER 20, 1978, CANCELLED THE ANNUAL
 
                  LEAVE HE HAD APPROVED ON SEPTEMBER 6.
 
    ON MONDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1978, MR. WARD MET WITH MS. JAURIGUE AND TOLD
 HER THE ANNUAL LEAVE HE HAD PREVIOUSLY APPROVED ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1978,
 WAS NOW DISAPPROVED AND HE PICKED UP WHAT PURPORTED TO BE THAT LEAVE
 SLIP AND TORE IT IN HALF.  THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT PRODUCED THAT LEAVE
 SLIP INTACT (RES. EXH. 20) DOES NOT REFUTE MS. JAURIQUE'S WHOLLY
 CREDIBLE TESTIMONY THAT MR. WARD DID, IN FACT, PERFORM THE THEATRICAL
 ACT OF TEARING IN HALF A LEAVE SLIP WHICH MS.  JAURIGUE BELIEVED, AS MR.
 WARD OBVIOUSLY INTENDED SHE SHOULD BELIEVE, WAS HER APPROVED LEAVE SLIP.
  MR. WARD STATED THAT HE COULD NOT GRANT HER ANY ANNUAL LEAVE BECAUSE OF
 THE WORKLOAD.  MS. JAURIGUE TOLD MR. WARD SHE WAS SICK;  THAT SHE WAS IN
 PAIN AND RUNNING A TEMPERATURE;  AND THAT SHE PLANNED TO USE HER ANNUAL
 LEAVE AS SICK LEAVE.  MR. WARD SAID HE COULDN'T APPROVE ANY LEAVE FOR
 HER THAT WEEK.  MR. WARD SAID HE WOULD GIVE HER A LETTER LATER IN THE
 DAY SO THERE WOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING.
 
    MR. WARD GAVE MS. JAURIGUE A LETTER LATER IN THE DAY (RES. EXH. 8)
 WHICH ALTERED, SOMEWHAT, HIS EARLIER STATEMENTS TO MS. JAURIGUE AND
 WHICH CONTAINED ONE OBVIOUSLY FALSE STATEMENT AND OTHER SELF-SERVING
 INFERENCES WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND, INDEED, CONTRARY TO THE
 RECORD.  MR. WARD'S STATEMENT THAT "I VERBALLY INDICATED A FAVORABLE
 RESPONSE TO THAT APPLICATION ON 9-6-78" IS FALSE.  MR. WARD APPROVED THE
 APPLICATION, IN WRITING, ON 9/6/78 AS RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 20 PLAINLY
 SHOWS.  MR. WARD'S STATEMENT THAT "THIS RELUCTANT APPROVAL WAS BASED ON
 YOUR ASSURANCE THAT THE WORKLOAD IN THE PHILADELPHIA OFFICE WOULD NOT BE
 ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THAT EXTENDED LEAVE PERIOD" (12/21/78-1/15/79) IS
 WITHOUT SUPPORT IN THE RECORD.  THE RECORD SHOWS:  A) THE APPLICATION
 FOR LEAVE WAS SUBMITTED AUGUST 30, 1978, AND APPROVED BY MR. WARD
 SEPTEMBER 6, 1978;  B) MS. JAURIGUE TESTIFIED CREDIBLY AND WHOLLY
 WITHOUT CONTRADICTION THAT ON NOVEMBER 15, 1978, WHEN SHE TOLD MR. WARD,
 IN THE PRESENCE OF MS. WEBB AND MS. STEWART, THAT SHE WOULD BE
 REQUESTING FURTHER ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE, MR. WARD SAID "OKAY, GO AHEAD
 AND SUBMIT YOUR REQUEST";  THAT WORKLOAD HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AND MR. WARD
 HAD SAID THAT SHE WOULD NOT BE DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION ANY MORE;  C)
 THAT ON NOVEMBER 17, 1978, MS. WEBB, ACTING DIRECTOR, HAD APPROVED MS.
 JAURIQUE'S TWO ADDITIONAL LEAVE REQUESTS (11/20-12/8;  SEE N. 10,
 SUPRA);  THAT MS. JAURIGUE HAD SPENT MOST OF THE DAY, NOVEMBER 17, GOING
 OVER PENDING AND ANTICIPATED WORK WITH MS. WEBB AND WITH MS.  WHITE, AND
 THAT AT NO POINT PRIOR TO MR. WARD'S CALL AT 4:00 P.M. HAD MS. WEBB
 EXPRESSED ANY PROBLEM OR RESERVATION ABOUT MS. JAURIQUE'S ABSENCE.
 INDEED, HER ACTION WHOLLY NEGATED ANY PROBLEM.  ACCORDINGLY, I GIVE NO
 PROBATIVE WEIGHT TO MR. WARD'S UNSUPPORTED STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN HIS
 LETTER OF NOVEMBER 20, 1978.
 
    IN HIS LETTER OF NOVEMBER 20, 1978, MR. WARD AFFIRMED HIS ORAL
 DISAPPROVAL OF ANNUAL LEAVE FOR 11/20-11/24;  BUT, CONTRARY TO HIS PRIOR
 OUTRIGHT DISAPPROVAL STATED THAT HE WOULD GIVE FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION
 TO A REQUEST FOR LEAVE FOR FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 24;  GAVE TENTATIVE APPROVAL
 FOR SICK LEAVE FROM 11/27-12/8/78, UPON SUBMISSION OF A PHYSICIAN'S
 STATEMENT /14/ ;  AND STATED THAT HE HAD RECONSIDERED "THE 8-30-78
 APPLICATION FOR 128 HOURS OF ANNUAL LEAVE AND WAS "PLACING THIS REQUEST
 IN ABEYANCE PENDING THE OUTCOME OF YOUR ANTICIPATED EXAMINATION AND
 TREATMENT, IF INDICATED.  YOU SHOULD NOT CONSIDER YOUR APPLICATION . . .
 APPROVED AT THIS TIME."
 
           K.  MR. LABONSKI FILED SUIT IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT ON
 
                            NOVEMBER 20, 1978.
 
    ON NOVEMBER 20, 1978, MR. LABONSKI FILED CIVIL ACTION NO. 78-3900
 AGAINST LACY B. WARD, DIRECTOR, SEEKING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER TO
 PREVENT THE WITHHOLDING OF SICK LEAVE FROM MS. JAURIGUE (G.C. EXH. 12).
 A HEARING WAS HELD IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ON NOVEMBER 21,
 1978, AND, AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING, A STIPULATION WAS ENTERED
 INTO BY THE PARTIES, APPROVED BY JUDGE BECKER ON DECEMBER 4, AND FILED
 ON DECEMBER 5, 1978, WHICH PROVIDED, IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "IT IS HEREBY AGREED . . . THAT MARIA R. JAURIGUE . . . SHALL GO ON
 AN APPROVED SICK LEAVE
 
    STATUS AS OF 8:00 A.M. ON NOVEMBER 22, 1978 AND SHALL REMAIN IN SAID
 STATUS UNTIL 4:30 P.M. ON
 
    DECEMBER 6, 1978.  IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED THAT MS. JAURIGUE WILL
 BRING A SIGNED STATEMENT
 
    FROM A DOCTOR WHICH WILL INDICATE THAT MEDICAL SERVICES HAVE BEEN
 RENDERED TO HER DURING SAID
 
    SICK LEAVE PERIOD AND/OR THAT HER ABSENCE FROM WORK WAS MEDICALLY
 NECESSARY.  IN THE ABSENCE
 
    OF THE AFORESAID DOCUMENTATION, THE C.P.S.C. MAY VIEW THE TIME TAKEN
 BY MS. JAURIGUE AS OTHER
 
    THAN AN APPROVED SICK LEAVE PERIOD.
 
    "IF HER MEDICAL CONDITION IS SUCH THAT SHE CAN RETURN EARLIER . . .
 SHE SHALL DO SO.
 
    "IF HER MEDICAL CONDITION IS SUCH THAT SHE MUST, FOR MEDICAL REASONS,
 EXTEND HER SICK LEAVE
 
    PERIOD SHE MAY DO SO AS IS NECESSARY INSOFAR AS SAID EXTENSION
 CONFORMS TO RELEVANT LAW AND
 
    REGULATION.
 
    . . . " (G.C. EXH. 13)
 
    PURSUANT TO THE ABOVE STIPULATION, ON JANUARY 9, 1979, MS. JAURIGUE
 REQUESTED SICK LEAVE FOR 11/22/78 THROUGH 1/8/79 (RES. EXH. 12).
 
        L.  MS. JAURIGUE REQUIRED TO SUBMIT PHYSICIAN'S STATEMENTS
 
                             IN JANUARY, 1979
 
    MS. JAURIGUE RETURNED TO PHILADELPHIA ON JANUARY 7, 1979;  BUT THE
 TRIP PROVED TAXING AND SHE CALLED MR. WARD ON JANUARY 8 AND ASKED FOR
 SICK LEAVE THAT DAY WHICH HE GRANTED.  ON JANUARY 8, 1979, MR. WARD
 WROTE A MEMORANDUM TO MR. BENSON, ACTING DIRECTOR JANUARY 9-12 WHILE MR.
 WARD ATTENDED A COURSE AT TEMPLE UNIVERSITY, IN WHICH HE STATED, IN
 PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    " . . . YOU'RE PROBABLY AWARE THAT MS. JAURIGUE HAS BEEN ON LEAVE
 SINCE NOVEMBER 22,
 
    1978.  THE STATUS OF THIS LEAVE HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED AND THEREFORE
 YOU SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT
 
    TO APPROVE THIS OR ANY OTHER LEAVE FOR MS. JAURIGUE DURING MY
 ABSENCE.
 
    . . . (G.C. EXH. 23)
 
    ON JANUARY 9, 1979, MS. JAURIGUE SUBMITTED THE APPLICATION FOR SICK
 LEAVE, REFERRED TO ABOVE, FOR THE PERIOD 11/22/78 THROUGH 1/8/79 (RES.
 EXH. 12), AND MR. BENSON GAVE HER A MEMORANDUM WHICH PROVIDED AS
 FOLLOWS:
 
    "ANY SICK LEAVE TAKEN BY YOU WILL BE APPROVED ONLY UPON PRESENTATION
 OF A BONA FIDE
 
    PHYSICIAN'S STATEMENT.  THIS STATEMENT MUST BE PRESENTED IMMEDIATELY
 UPON YOUR RETURN TO DUTY.
 
    "ANY FAILURE TO PRESENT A PHYSICIAN'S STATEMENT MAY RESULT IN YOUR
 BEING CHARGED WITH
 
    'ABSENT WITHOUT LEAVE.'" (G.C. EXH. 22).
 
    MS. JAURIGUE HAD SUBMITTED WITH HER SICK LEAVE REQUEST (RES. EXH.
 12) A COPY OF DR. PUCELIK'S STATEMENT (RES. EXH. 9) WHICH SHOWED
 HOSPITALIZATION IN LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXICO FROM DECEMBER 3, 1978, TO
 DECEMBER 13, 1978, AND OUTPATIENT TREATMENT THROUGH JANUARY 4, 1979.
 
    MS. JAURIGUE HAD AN APPOINTMENT WITH DR. PONTARELLI ON JANUARY 9,
 1979, AND ON JANUARY 9, DR. PONTARELLI GAVE HER A STATEMENT REQUESTING
 THAT SHE BE EXCUSED FROM WORK UNTIL JANUARY 15, 1979 FOR POST OPERATIVE
 CARE (RES. EXH. 15).  OTHER APPLICATIONS FOR SICK LEAVE FOLLOWED (RES.
 EXH. 14, 1/9-12:30 TO 1/12/79;  RES. EXH. 16, 1/16-1/17/79;  RES. EXH.
 18, 1/19/79) AND A FURTHER PHYSICIAN'S STATEMENT FROM HAHNEMANN MEDICAL
 COLLEGE & HOSPITAL, DATED JANUARY 17, 1979 (RES. EXH. 17).
 
    ON JANUARY 22, 1979, MR. WARD MET WITH MS. JAURIGUE, WHO WAS
 ACCOMPANIED BY MR. ARMBRUST, AND PRESENTED HER WITH A LETTER, DATED
 JANUARY 22, 1979 (RES. EXH. 7), WHICH, IN SUMMARY, STATED THAT DR.
 PUCELIK'S STATEMENT COVERED ONLY PART OF THE PERIOD OF HER APPLICATION
 FOR SICK LEAVE AND, PURSUANT TO THE STIPULATION AGREED TO ON NOVEMBER
 21, 1978, THAT APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS PRIOR TO AN AFTER THE PERIOD
 COVERED BY DR. PUCELIK'S STATEMENT MUST BE FURNISHED BY JANUARY 29,
 1979, OR THE LEAVE MAY BE CHARGED TO OTHER THAN SICK LEAVE.  MR.
 ARMBRUST AND MS.  JAURIGUE REQUESTED ADDITIONAL TIME BEYOND JANUARY 29,
 WHICH WAS GRANTED;  AND MR. WARD ASKED FOR THE ORIGINAL OF DR. PUCELIK'S
 STATEMENT AND MS. JAURIGUE AGREED TO SUPPLY THE ORIGINAL.  MR. WARD ALSO
 EMPHASIZED THAT MS. JAURIGUE MUST COMPLY WITH MR. BENSON'S MEMORANDUM OF
 JANUARY 9, 1979, AND THAT SHE MUST PRESENT A PHYSICIAN'S STATEMENT
 IMMEDIATELY UPON RETURN TO DUTY.
 
    MR. WARD INQUIRED IF MS. JAURIQUE'S FURTHER USE OF SICK LEAVE WAS FOR
 THE SAME ILLNESS AND MS. JAURIGUE REPLIED THAT THIS WAS CORRECT.
 
    MR. WARD APPROVES SICK LEAVE FOR THE PERIOD 11/22/78 TO 1/8/79 AND
 FROM 12:30 PM.M 1/9/79 THROUGH 1/12/79 AND BY LETTER DATED JANUARY 24,
 1979 (RES. EXH. 22, ATTACHMENT) REQUESTED "CARRY OVER TO EXCESS ANNUAL
 LEAVE" OF 49 HOURS FOR MS. JAURIGUE /15/ WHICH WAS APPROVED FEBRUARY 28,
 1979 (RES. EXH. 22).
 
          M.  ON APRIL 10, 1979, MR. WARD FILED A CIVIL ACTION IN
 
                     STATE COURT AGAINST MS. JAURIGUE
 
    ON APRIL 10, 1979, MR. LACY B. WARD COMMENCED AN ACTION BY SUMMONS IN
 TRESPASS IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
 CITY AND COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA, NO. 1487, AGAINST MARIA R. JAURIGUE
 G.C. EXH. 15).  PLAINTIFF, LACY B. WARD, INSTITUTED THIS ACTION AS AN
 INDIVIDUAL, THROUGH HIS PERSONAL ATTORNEY, FOR THE ASSERTED REASON THAT
 HE HAD "REASON TO BELIEVE THAT HE HAD BEEN LIBELED BY THE DEFENDANT."
 (G.C. EXH. 16, P. 3).  THE PROCEDURE OF INITIATION OF A SUIT BY SUMMONS
 IN ORDER TO PREPARE A COMPLAINT, WHILE NOT FAMILIAR TO ME, APPEARS TO BE
 FULLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (SEE,
 G.C. EXH. 16, P. 3).
 
    ON APRIL 11, 1979, MR. RAYMOND L. LABONSKI WAS SERVED WITH A SUBPOENA
 DECES TECUM FOR THE PURPOSE OF A DEPOSITION ON MAY 3, 1979.  THE
 SUBPOENA WAS SERVED ON MR.  LABONSKI AT WORK.
 
          N.  MS. JAURIQUE'S TESTIMONY WITH REGARD TO MR. WARD'S
 
                    STATEMENTS CONCERNING MR. LABONSKI
 
    MS. JAURIGUE TESTIFIED THAT IN THE EARLY PART OF JULY MR. WARD CALLED
 HER INTO HIS OFFICE AND ASKED HER TO SIT DOWN AND HE STOOD UP AND BEGAN
 TO READ FROM A DOCUMENT WHICH WAS THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGE FILED
 BY MR. LABONSKI REGARDING THE NO SMOKING SIGN IN THE CONFERENCE ROOM;
 THAT MR. WARD READ THE WHOLE DOCUMENT OUT LOUD AND THEN COMMENTED AS
 FOLLOWS:
 
    "MR. WARD SAID THAT SINCE RAY HAD NOTHING ELSE BETTER TO DO THAN THIS
 HE WAS GOING TO
 
    DETAIL HIM TO THE PITTSBURGH RESIDENT POST FOR A MONTH.
 
    "Q.  DID MR. WARD AT THAT TIME SAY HOW HE WAS GOING TO DO THAT?
 
    "A.  HE SAID THAT HE DIDN'T HAVE TO DO IT HIMSELF.  HE WOULD GET A
 SUPERVISOR TO DO IT FOR
 
    HIM.
 
   .          .          .          .
 
 
    "Q.  HAD MR. WARD, OR ANY OTHER SUPERVISOR EVER MENTIONED MR.
 LABONSKI TO YOU BEFORE WITH
 
    RESPECT TO HIS ACTIVITIES?
 
    "A.  YES, HE HAD SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE.
 
    "Q.  WHO HAD?
 
    "A.  MR. WARD.
 
    "Q.  DO YOU RECALL ANY OF THOSE SPECIFIC CONVERSATIONS?
 
    "A.  I REMEMBER A CONVERSATION IN APRIL.  MR. WARD AND I WERE DRIVING
 TO HARRISBURG ON
 
    BUSINESS AND MR. WARD STARTED TELLING ME THAT RAY WAS USUALLY ALWAYS
 HARASSING HIM, AND THAT
 
    RAY WAS DISRUPTIVE AND A TROUBLEMAKER.
 
    "THEN MR. WARD TOLD ME THAT ON ST. PATRICK'S DAY, MR. WARD WAS IN
 COURT AND RAY LABONSKI
 
    WAS REPRESENTING A SECRETARY THAT MR. WARD HAD TERMINATED.
 
    "AND MR. WARD SAID, 'AND I WAS IN COURT ON ST. PATRICK'S DAY ALONG
 WITH ALL THE OTHER
 
    PATTIES AND RAY WAS REALLY SHOWING OFF.'
 
   .          .          .          .
 
 
    "Q.  YOU SAID THERE WAS ANOTHER CONVERSATION IN JULY OF 1978 WITH MR.
 WARD CONCERNING RAY
 
    LABONSKI. COULD YOU TELL THE COURT WHEN THAT WAS?
 
    "A.  IT WAS ON JULY 25TH.  MR. WARD AND I WERE ON THE TRAIN ON OUR
 WAY TO BALTIMORE,
 
    MARYLAND TO DISCUSS A GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE WITH THE STATE PEOPLE.
 
    "Q.  WHAT TOOK PLACE IN THAT CONVERSATION?
 
    "A.  WELL, WE TALKED ABOUT SEVERAL THINGS. MR. WARD ASKED ME IF I
 REMEMBERED THE CASE THAT
 
    MR. LABONSKI HAD REPRESENTED A SECRETARY IN A COURT HEARING AND HE
 TOLD ME THAT RAY LABONSKI
 
    WAS REALLY SHOWING OFF AND ACTING LIKE A MISTER BIG GUY.
 
    "APPARENTLY HE ENJOYED DOING THIS SORT OF THING AS A MEANS TO HARASS
 HIM.  MR. WARD THEN
 
    LATER ON WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WAS PRETTY UPSET WITH SOME OF THE
 PEOPLE IN THE OFFICE.
 
    "BECAUSE THERE HAD BEEN A SWITCH IN DETAILING RAY TO THE PITTSBURGH
 RESIDENT POST FOR A
 
    MONTH AND THAT HE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SUPERVISORS THAT RAY WAS TO GO
 FOR A MONTH TO
 
    PITTSBURGH.
 
    "Q.  NOW, WHAT, IF ANYTHING, DID YOU SAY?
 
    "A.  AT THAT TIME I ASKED MR. WARD IF THIS WAS GOING TO BE A PROBLEM
 FOR RAY, SINCE RAY'S
 
    WIFE WAS PREGNANT AND READY TO DELIVER AT ANY TIME.
 
    "MR. WARD SAID THAT THEY SENT HIM TO KOREA WHEN HIS WIFE WAS
 PREGNANT, SO WHY COULDN'T HE
 
    SEND RAY TO PITTSBURGH?  (TR. 443-445)(SEE, ALSO TR. 517, 522, 523)
 
    I DID NOT FIND MR. WARD TO BE A WHOLLY RELIABLE WITNESS, INDEED, HIS
 CREDIBILITY WAS COMPROMISED IN CERTAIN RESPECTS, FOR EXAMPLE, HIS
 COMMENTS IN HIS LETTER OF NOVEMBER 20, 1978, TO MS. JAURIGUE AND IN HIS
 LETTER OF JANUARY 24, 1970 (RES. EXH. 22 ATTACHMENT);  AND HIS TESTIMONY
 THAT, PRIOR TO HIS CONVERSATION WITH MR. KRIVDA ON JULY 12, 1978, HE DID
 NOT KNOW THAT MR. ARMBRUST WOULD BE UNAVAILABLE FOR DETAIL TO PITTSBURGH
 DURING THIS PERIOD, WAS WHOLLY DISCREDITED BY THE CREDIBLE AND
 UNCONTRADICTED TESTIMONY OF MR. ROBINSON THAT ON JULY 11, MR. WARD HAD
 REQUESTED, AND HE HAD SUPPLIED MR. ARMBRUST'S ITINERARY, /16/ AND MR.
 ROBINSON'S TESTIMONY WAS CORROBORATED BY THE TESTIMONY OF MR. ARMBRUST.
 MR. WARD'S TESTIMONY THAT HE DID NOT KNOW UNTIL JULY 31, 1978, THAT MR.
 LABONSKI HAD BEEN DETAILED TO PITTSBURGH FOR ONLY TWO WEEKS IS
 INHERENTLY UNBELIEVABLE.  FIRST, MR. WARD ADMITTED THAT MR. LABONSKI
 TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD A PROBLEM WITH THE ASSIGNMENT AND THAT HE, WARD,
 TOLD MR. LABONSKI TO DISCUSS ANY PROBLEM WITH HIS SUPERVISOR.  MR. WARD
 ADMITTED THAT HE TOLD MR. KRIVDA THAT HE WANTED A GS-11 IN PITTSBURGH,
 NOT MR. LABONSKI, AND THAT KRIVDA SHOULD TAKE CARE OF THE ASSIGNMENT.
 SECOND, MR. KRIVDA DISCUSSED THE TWO WEEK DETAIL WITH MR. ROBINSON AND
 MR. LABONSKI DISCUSSED IT WITH MR. ARMBRUST ON JULY 12.  THIRD, ON JULY
 24, MR. ARMBRUST DISCUSSED HIS GOING TO PITTSBURGH WITH MR. ROBINSON AND
 WITH MR. BENSON.  TO SAY THE LEAST, IT WOULD STRAIN CREDULITY TO BELIEVE
 THAT MR. WARD DID NOT KNOW OF THE TWO WEEK DETAIL.  I DO NOT CREDIT MR.
 WARD'S TESTIMONY THAT HE DID NOT KNOW OF MR. LABONSKI'S TWO WEEK DETAIL
 UNTIL JULY 31 AND I DO NOT CREDIT MR. WARD'S TESTIMONY IN WHICH HE
 DENIED THAT HE DISCUSSED MR. LABONSKI WITH MS. JAURIGUE DURING THEIR
 AUTOMOBILE TRIP TO HARRISBURG OR THEIR TRIP BY RAIL TO BALTIMORE ON JULY
 25 AND, INSTEAD, FULLY CREDIT THE TESTIMONY OF MS. JAURIGUE WHO I FOUND
 TO BE A WHOLLY CREDIBLE WITNESS.  /17/
 
                  O.  MS. JAURIGUE TRANSFERRED TO DALLAS
 
    IN OCTOBER, 1978, MS. JAURIGUE MADE INQUIRIES ABOUT A TRANSFER TO
 ANOTHER OFFICE OF RESPONDENT AND RECEIVED AN INQUIRY ABOUT HER INTEREST
 IN KANSAS CITY WHICH SHE DECLINED BECAUSE OF HER HEALTH.  ON JANUARY 8,
 1979, SHE ASKED MR. WARD FOR TIME OFF FOR A JOB INTERVIEW ON JANUARY 9
 WHICH HE DID NOT GRANT.  ON JANUARY 9, 1979, SHE HAD A JOB INTERVIEW
 WITH COMMUNITY SERVICES ADMINISTRATION AFTER HER DOCTOR'S APPOINTMENT;
 AND ON JANUARY 9, 1979, SHE ALSO PICKED UP FORMS FROM THE WORLD HEALTH
 ORGANIZATION WHILE IN WASHINGTON, AND IN APRIL, 1978, SHE TRANSFERRED TO
 THE DALLAS OFFICE OF RESPONDENT.
 
                                CONCLUSIONS
 
                           1.  CASE NO. 3-CA-12
 
    THE FACTS, FULLY SET FORTH HEREINABOVE, SHOW BY AN OVERWHELMING
 PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE MOTIVATION, PURPOSE AND INTENT OF
 THE DIRECTOR OF THE PHILADELPHIA AREA OFFICE, MR. LACY WARD, IN
 DETAILING RAYMOND LABONSKI TO THE PITTSBURGH RESIDENT POST WAS TO PUNISH
 HIM FOR HIS ACTIVITIES AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNION.  RESPONDENT THEREBY
 VIOLATED SECTIONS 19(A)(1), (2) AND (4) OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER.
 
    MR. LABONSKI, A GS-11 INVESTIGATOR, WAS AN ACTIVE AND VOCAL UNION
 PRESIDENT WHO USED THE PROCESSES OF THE ORDER TO CHALLENGE ACTIONS OF
 THE AREA OFFICE WHICH MR. LABONSKI FELT WERE EITHER UNFAIR OR WHICH
 VIOLATED UNION OR EMPLOYEE RIGHTS.  IN APRIL, 1978, MR. WARD HAD
 COMMENTED TO MS. JAURIGUE DURING AN AUTOMOBILE TRIP TO HARRISBURG THAT
 MR. LABONSKI WAS ALWAYS HARASSING HIM;  THAT MR. LABONSKI WAS DISRUPTIVE
 AND A TROUBLEMAKER;  AND THAT HE HAD BEEN IN COURT ON ST. PATRICK'S DAY
 WHEN MR. LABONSKI WAS REPRESENTING A SECRETARY THAT HE, WARD, HAD
 TERMINATED AND MR. LABONSKI WAS SHOWING OFF.  A SUPERVISOR HAD TERMED
 THE COURT ACTION, WHICH HAD BEEN BROUGHT BY MR. LABONSKI ON BEHALF OF
 THE EMPLOYEE, A "BLOOD-LETTING" AND WARNED MR. LABONSKI TO WATCH HIS
 STEP.
 
    ON JUNE 30, 1978, MR. LABONSKI FILED AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
 COMPLAINT WHICH CONCERNED AN ASSERTED UNILATERAL ISSUANCE OF A NO
 SMOKING POLICY.  IN EARLY JULY, MR. WARD CALLED MS. JAURIGUE TO HIS
 OFFICE AND READ THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE COMPLAINT ALOUD AND THEN
 STATED THAT SINCE RAY (MR. LABONSKI) HAD NOTHING BETTER TO DO HE WAS
 GOING TO DETAIL HIM TO THE PITTSBURGH RESIDENT POST, WHICH WAS TO BECOME
 VACANT JULY 17, FOR A MONTH.  MR. WARD FURTHER TOLD MS. JAURIGUE THAT HE
 DIDN'T HAVE TO DO IT HIMSELF, HE WOULD GET A SUPERVISOR TO DO IT FOR
 HIM.
 
    THE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, RAYMOND BENSON, WAS ON LEAVE THE FIRST
 THREE WEEKS OF JULY, 1978, AND MR. FRANK KRIVDA, THE SENIOR TEAM
 SUPERVISOR, WAS ACTING DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, WITH MR. LABONSKI,
 NORMALLY A MEMBER OF ROBINSON'S STAFF (MR. ROBINSON WAS THE OTHER TEAM
 SUPERVISOR), WAS ACTING SUPERVISOR OF KRIVDA'S TEAM.  ON JULY 3, 1978,
 THE WORK PLAN HAD BEEN ISSUED WHICH SHOWED THAT BEN FINK, A GS-9
 INVESTIGATOR, AND JOYCE ALLEN, A GS-7 INVESTIGATOR, WOULD COVER THE
 PITTSBURGH RESIDENT POST FROM JULY 17, 1978, THROUGH JULY 28, 1978.  THE
 RECORD SHOWS WITHOUT CONTRADICTION THAT MOST DETAILS HAD BEEN FOR A WEEK
 AND THAT THE MAXIMUM DURATION HAD BEEN TWO WEEKS.  FROM ITS INCEPTION,
 THE PITTSBURGH RESIDENT POST HAD BEEN FILLED BY A GS-9 INVESTIGATOR,
 ALTHOUGH, ON PAPER, IT COULD HAVE BEEN FILED WITH A GS-12.  BOTH PRIOR
 TO CREATION OF THE PITTSBURGH RESIDENT POST AND THEREAFTER, ALL GRADES
 OF INVESTIGATORS, GS-5 THROUGH GS-11, HAD BEEN DETAILED TO PITTSBURGH.
 MR. FINK, AN EXPERIENCED GS-9 INVESTIGATOR, WANTED TO GO TO PITTSBURGH
 AND HAD HAD PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE IN PITTSBURGH, HIS MOST RECENT
 ASSIGNMENT THERE HAVING BEEN IN JUNE, 1978.  THE RECORD SHOWED THAT A
 LARGE CASE BACKLOG HAD EXISTED IN PITTSBURGH (SEE, RES. EXHS. 23, 24);
 HOWEVER, AS THE RESULT OF THE REASSIGNMENT OF CASES AND THE ASSIGNMENT
 OF ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL (SEE, MR. BENSON'S MEMORANDUM TO MR. WARD DATED
 JUNE 12, 1978 (ATTACHMENT TO RES. EXH. 23)) MR. ROBINSON, WHO SUPERVISED
 THE PITTSBURGH RESIDENT POST, TESTIFIED THAT, IN HIS OPINION, AS OF
 JULY, 1978, THERE WERE NOT SUFFICIENT CASES AT THE PITTSBURGH RESIDENT
 OFFICE TO REQUIRE THE PRESENCE OF A GS-11 SENIOR INVESTIGATOR AND THAT,
 IN HIS OPINION, MR. FINK COULD HAVE PERFORMED THE DUTIES OF RESIDENT
 OFFICER IN PITTSBURGH.
 
    ON JULY 11, 1978, IN A MEETING WITH ROBINSON, JAURIGUE AND WEBB, MR.
 WARD MENTIONED, TO GET THE MOST OUT OF THE COST, SENDING SOMEONE TO
 PITTSBURGH "FOR A LONGER PERIOD OF TIME," SOMETHING OF THIS SORT " . . .
 THAT WAS NOT A REQUEST.  IT WAS JUST A SUBJECT THAT CAME UP.  IT WAS,
 SHALL WE SAY, THROWN OUT AT THE MEETING." (TR. 387).  ALSO ON JULY 11,
 1978, MR.  WARD ASKED MR. ROBINSON FOR THE ITINERARIES FOR MR. ARMBRUST,
 THE OTHER GS-11, AND FOR JANE HANLON.  MR. ROBINSON STATED THAT THIS WAS
 THE FIRST TIME MR. WARD HAD EVER REQUESTED AN INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE'S
 ITINERARY.  THE ITINERARIES SHOWED THAT MR. ARMBRUST WOULD NOT BE
 AVAILABLE IF A GS-11 WERE TO BE DETAILED TO PITTSBURGH ON JULY 17 SINCE
 ONLY ARMBRUST AND HANLON DID NEISS REDESIGN TRAINING AND BOTH HAD
 SCHEDULED NEISS ASSIGNMENTS FOR THIS PERIOD.  ON THE MORNING OF JULY 12,
 MR. WARD ASKED MR. KRIVDA WHAT MR. LABONSKI WAS DOING AND MR. KRIVDA
 TOLD HIM HE WAS AN ACTING SUPERVISOR.  LATER THAT MORNING, MR. WARD
 CALLED MR. KRIVDA TO HIS OFFICE AND ASKED MR. KRIVDA WHAT HIS PLANS WERE
 FOR COVERING THE PITTSBURGH POST.  UPON BEING TOLD BY MR. KRIVDA THAT HE
 INTENDED TO SEND MR. FINK AND MS. ALLEN FOR A WEEK EACH, MR. WARD
 INSTRUCTED MR. KRIVDA T SEND A GS-11 FOR A MONTH.  MR.  KRIVDA TOLD MR.
 WARD THAT MR. ARMBRUST WAS NOT AVAILABLE AND THAT MR. LABONSKI WAS THE
 ONLY OTHER GS-11 AND HE WAS AN ACTING SUPERVISOR.  MR. WARD INSISTED
 THAT MR. KRIVDA ASSIGN A GS-11.
 
    MR. WARD KNEW THAT MR. LABONSKI'S WIFE WAS PREGNANT AND WAS AWARE
 THAT THIS WAS NOT A ROUTINE PREGNANCY.  IN MAY, MR. LABONSKI HAD SPOKEN
 TO MR. BENSON ABOUT HIS WIFE'S PREGNANCY AND HAD REQUESTED THAT HE
 DOUBLE UP ON TRAVEL SO THAT HE COULD AVOID OUT-OF-TOWN TRAVEL IN AUGUST
 AND MR. BENSON HAD TOLD HIM NOT TO WORRY, THAT HE WOULDN'T BE TRAVELING
 THEN.  ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT SHOWN THAT MR. BENSON DISCUSSED THIS MATTER
 WITH MR. WARD, MR. WARD'S KNOWLEDGE MIGHT REASONABLY BE INFERRED;
 HOWEVER, SINCE MR. LABONSKI TOLD MR. WARD ON JULY 12 THAT HE WAS HAVING
 A GREAT DEAL OF DIFFICULTY WITH THE ASSIGNMENT TO PITTSBURGH FOR A MONTH
 BECAUSE HIS WIFE WAS EIGHT MONTHS PREGNANT AND MR. WARD MADE THE COMMENT
 TO MS. JAURIGUE THAT THEY HAD SENT HIM TO KOREA WHEN HIS WIFE WAS
 PREGNANT SO WHY COULDN'T HE SEND RAY (LABONSKI) TO PITTSBURGH, THE
 DIRECT TESTIMONY OF MR. LABONSKI AND MS. JAURIGUE, WHICH I CREDIT, SHOWS
 THAT MR. WARD ACTED WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE DETAIL OF MR. LABONSKI
 TO PITTSBURGH WAS A PERSONAL HARDSHIP TO MR. LABONSKI.
 
    WHEN MR. KRIVDA TOLD MR. LABONSKI HE WAS BEING DETAILED TO PITTSBURGH
 FOR A MONTH, MR. LABONSKI TOLD MR. KRIVDA THAT HE (LABONSKI) COULDN'T DO
 IT AND TOLD MR. KRIVDA THAT HE WOULD CALL MR. WARD AND PERSONALLY
 EXPRESS HIS DIFFICULTY WITH THE ASSIGNMENT AND MR.  KRIVDA SAID "GO
 AHEAD.  GIVE IT A TRY", WHEREUPON MR. LABONSKI CALLED MR. WARD AND MR.
 WARD TESTIFIED THAT HE TOLD MR. LABONSKI "TO DISCUSS ANY PROBLEMS THAT
 HE MIGHT HAVE WITH" MR. KRIVDA AND THAT HE TOLD MR. KRIVDA TO "TAKE CARE
 OF THE ASSIGNMENT";  AND WHEN MR. KRIVDA SAID "SO DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU
 WANT A GS-11 IN PITTSBURGH" HE, WARD, HAD RESPONDED "I THOUGHT THAT WAS
 WHAT MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE AT FIRST." MR. LABONSKI AGAIN DISCUSSED THE
 HARDSHIP OF HIS GOING TO PITTSBURGH, BECAUSE OF HIS WIFE'S PREGNANCY,
 WITH MR. KRIVDA AND SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS MR. ARMBRUST COULD GO;  BUT
 MR. KRIVDA REPLIED THAT THE EARLIEST MR. ARMBRUST COULD GO WOULD BE IN
 TWO WEEKS.  AS IT APPEARED TO MR. KRIVDA FROM MR. WARD'S COMMENTS THAT
 MR. WARD WAS INTERESTED ONLY IN HAVING A GS-11 IN PITTSBURGH, HE AGREED
 TO SEND MR. LABONSKI FOR TWO WEEKS TO BE FOLLOWED BY MR. ARMBRUST.  MR.
 LABONSKI TALKED TO MR. ARMBRUST ON JULY 12 AND MR. ARMBRUST TOLD MR.
 LABONSKI HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO GO TO PITTSBURGH AFTER LABONSKI'S TWO WEEK
 DETAIL FOR WHATEVER LENGTH OF TIME WAS NECESSARY UNTIL MRS.  LABONSKI
 WAS OUT OF DANGER AND THE BABY HAD BEEN BORN.  ON JULY 24, MR. ARMBRUST
 CONFIRMED HIS GOING TO PITTSBURGH FOR A MONTH AND A HALF WITH MR.
 ROBINSON, HIS IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR, AND WITH MR.  BENSON.
 
    ON JULY 25, 1978, MR. WARD AGAIN MENTIONED TO MS. JAURIGUE HIS
 DISPLEASURE WITH MR. LABONSKI'S UNION ACTIVITIES WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS A
 MEANS TO HARASS HIM (WARD) AND WENT ON TO SAY HE WAS UPSET WITH SOME OF
 THE PEOPLE IN THE OFFICE BECAUSE THERE HAD BEEN A SWITCH IN DETAILING
 LABONSKI TO PITTSBURGH FOR A MONTH AND THAT HE "MADE IT CLEAR TO THE
 SUPERVISORS THAT RAY WAS TO GO FOR A MONTH TO PITTSBURGH." HOWEVER,
 PRETENDING IGNORANCE OF THE "SWITCH IN DETAILING", MR. WARD DID NOTHING
 UNTIL JULY 31 WHEN MR. LABONSKI WAS BACK IN THE OFFICE.  WITH FULL
 KNOWLEDGE THAT MR. ARMBRUST WAS READY TO GO TO PITTSBURGH, MR. WARD
 ORDERED MR. KRIVDA TO STOP MR.  ARMBRUST FROM GOING TO PITTSBURGH AND
 MR. WARD ORDERED MR. BENSON TO ORDER MR. ROBINSON TO SEND MR.  LABONSKI
 BACK TO PITTSBURGH FOR ANOTHER TWO WEEKS.  MR. BENSON TOLD MR. ROBINSON
 THAT IF MR. LABONSKI REFUSED TO GO HE, ROBINSON, WAS TO CHARGE LABONSKI
 WITH INSUBORDINATION.  IN A MOST REVEALING COMMENT, MR. ROBINSON
 TESTIFIED THAT WHEN HE ASKED MR. BENSON IF THIS DIRECTION WAS FROM HIM,
 BENSON, OR FROM MR. WARD, MR. BENSON SAID "IT COMES FROM MR. WARD BUT .
 . . IF YOU ASK ME IF HE SAID THAT, I'LL SAY NO . . . "
 
    THE RECORD SHOWS THAT MR. WARD WAS BESET WITH TWO OBSESSIONS:  FIRST,
 TO PUNISH MR. LABONSKI FOR HIS UNION ACTIVITY, WHICH MR. WARD CONSIDERED
 PERSONAL HARASSMENT, AND PERHAPS, ALSO JUST TO GET MR. LABONSKI "OUT OF
 HIS HAIR" FOR A MONTH.  SECOND, TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT HE, WARD, WAS
 BLAMELESS (SEE, ALSO, RES. EXH. 6).  ON JULY 11, HE SUGGESTED SENDING
 SOMEONE TO PITTSBURGH "FOR A LONGER PERIOD OF TIME" AND OBTAINED THE
 ITINERARY FOR MR. ARMBRUST, ONE OF THE TWO GS-11'S IN THE OFFICE, MR.
 LABONSKI BEING THE OTHER.  ON JULY 12, HE TOLD MR. KRIVDA TO SEND A
 GS-11 TO PITTSBURGH FOR A MONTH;  WHEN MR. LABONSKI TOLD MR. WARD HE HAD
 A PROBLEM WITH THE ASSIGNMENT BECAUSE OF HIS WIFE'S PREGNANCY, MR. WARD
 TOLD HIM TO DISCUSS ANY PROBLEM HE HAS WITH THE ASSIGNMENT WITH MR.
 KRIVDA AND HE TOLD MR. KRIVDA THAT HE WANTED A GS-11 IN PITTSBURGH BUT
 CAREFULLY REFRAINED FROM ANY STATEMENT TO MR. KRIVDA THAT MR. LABONSKI
 WAS TO BE DETAILED TO PITTSBURGH FOR A MONTH.  MR. KRIVDA, NOT BEING
 PRIVY TO MR. WARD'S TRUE PURPOSE, NAMELY TO SUBJECT MR. LABONSKI TO A
 DETAIL OUT OF TOWN FOR A MONTH, WHICH MR. WARD KNEW WAS A PERSONAL
 HARDSHIP TO MR. LABONSKI, IN RETALIATION FOR MR. LABONSKI'S UNION
 ACTIVITIES, REASONABLY BELIEVED FROM MR. WARD'S COMMENTS THAT MR. WARD
 SIMPLY WANTED A GS-11 IN PITTSBURGH WHICH, IN VIEW OF MR. LABONSKI'S
 PERSONAL PROBLEM, HE ACHIEVED BY THE DETAIL OF MR. LABONSKI FOR TWO
 WEEKS, TO BE FOLLOWED THEREAFTER BY MR.  ARMBRUST.
 
    THE RECORD STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT MR. WARD'S DECISION TO SEND ANY
 GS-11 INVESTIGATOR TO PITTSBURGH WAS OF DOUBTFUL WISDOM, AND, IN
 REALITY, WAS SIMPLY A RUSE TO REACH MR. LABONSKI /18/ ;  BUT UNDER
 SECTION 11(B) OF THE ORDER, AGENCY MANAGEMENT HAS THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE
 " . . . GRADES OF POSITIONS OR EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO AN ORGANIZATIONAL
 UNIT, WORK PROJECT OR TOUR OF DUTY . . . ", ENCOMPASSING THE WISE AS
 WELL AS THE ILL CONCEIVED, (BUT SEE, SOUTHEAST EXCHANGE REGION OF THE
 ARMY AND AIR FORCE EXCHANGE SERVICE, ROSEWOOD WAREHOUSE, COLUMBIA, SOUTH
 CAROLINA, A/SLMR NO. 656, 6 A/SLMR 237(1976)).  WHILE RESPONDENT COULD
 PROPERLY DECIDE THAT THE PITTSBURGH RESIDENT POST SHOULD BE MANNED BY A
 SENIOR, GS-11, INVESTIGATOR, EXERCISE OF OTHERWISE LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY
 TO "INTERFERE WITH, RESTRAIN, OR COERCE AN EMPLOYEE IN THE EXERCISE OF
 THE RIGHTS ASSURED BY THE ORDER" (SECTION 19(A)(1)), BY "DISCRIMINATION
 IN REGARD TO . .  . CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT" TO ENCOURAGE, OR
 DISCOURAGE MEMBERSHIP IN A LABOR ORGANIZATION (SECTION 19(A)(2)), OR TO
 "DISCIPLINE OR OTHERWISE DISCRIMINATE AGAINST AN EMPLOYEE BECAUSE HE HAS
 FILED A COMPLAINT OR GIVEN TESTIMONY UNDER THE ORDER" (SECTION
 19(A)(4)), IS AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE.  I FIND THAT MR. WARD'S ORDER TO
 ASSIGN A GS-11 INVESTIGATOR TO PITTSBURGH ON JULY 17, 1978,WITH
 KNOWLEDGE THAT MR. LABONSKI WAS THE ONLY GS-11 INVESTIGATOR THEN
 AVAILABLE, AND WITH INTENT AND DESIGN TO PUNISH MR. LABONSKI FOR HIS
 UNION ACTIVITY, INCLUDING THE FILING OF AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
 COMPLAINT UNDER THE ORDER, VIOLATED SECTIONS 19(A)(1), (2) AND (4) OF
 THE ORDER.
 
    I AM AWARE THAT IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT:  A) RESPONDENT HAD THE RIGHT
 TO DECIDE THAT A GS-11 INVESTIGATOR BE ASSIGNED TO THE PITTSBURGH
 RESIDENT POST;  B) MR. WARD DID NOT SPECIFY THAT ANY PARTICULAR GS-11
 INVESTIGATOR BE DETAILED TO PITTSBURGH;  AND C) SINCE MR. LABONSKI WAS
 THE ONLY GS-11 INVESTIGATOR THEN AVAILABLE, HIS SELECTION, WHATEVER MR.
 WARD'S INTENT, WAS NOT FOR AN IMPROPER PURPOSE.  INDEED, IT COULD BE
 FURTHER ARGUED THAT BECAUSE OF MR. KRIVDA, IN RECOGNITION OF MR.
 LABONSKI'S PERSONAL PROBLEM, DETAILED HIM TO PITTSBURGH, WITH HIS
 ASSENT, FOR TWO WEEKS, THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF THE ORDER IN THE
 INITIAL SELECTION OF MR. LABONSKI FOR DETAIL TO PITTSBURGH OR IN HIS
 DETAIL TO PITTSBURGH FOR TWO WEEKS.  BECAUSE OF MR. WARD'S UNLAWFUL
 PURPOSE AND INTENT, I WOULD FIND ANY DETAIL OF MR. LABONSKI FOR SUCH
 UNLAWFUL PURPOSE VIOLATED SECTIONS 19(A)(1), (2) AND (4) OF THE ORDER.
 BUT EVEN IF THE INITIAL SELECTION AND DETAIL OF MR.  LABONSKI HAD BEEN
 PROPER, MR. WARD'S ACTION ON JULY 31, 1978, IN ORDERING MR. LABONSKI
 BACK TO PITTSBURGH FOR ANOTHER TWO WEEKS WAS THE NAKED AND VINDICTIVE
 PRODUCT OF HIS OBSESSIVE DESIRE TO PUNISH MR. LABONSKI FOR HIS UNION
 ACTIVITY.  MR. LABONSKI HAD FULLY PERFORMED HIS TWO WEEK DETAIL;  MR.
 ARMBRUST WAS PACKED, READY, AVAILABLE AND ENTIRELY WILLING TO GO TO
 PITTSBURGH;  MR. BENSON, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE
 THAT MR. ARMBRUST WAS BEING DETAILED TO PITTSBURGH FOR SIX WEEKS,
 BEGINNING JULY 31, HAD GIVEN HIS TACIT APPROVAL ON JULY 24;  AND IF MR.
 WARD BELIEVED MR.  KRIVDA HAD SOMEHOW NOT FOLLOWED HIS INSTRUCTIONS, HIS
 DISAGREEMENT PROPERLY WAS WITH MR.  KRIVDA, ALONE, NOT WITH MR.
 LABONSKI.  NOT ONLY DO THESE FACTS CLEARLY AND UNMISTAKENLY DISCLOSE MR.
 WARD'S UNLAWFUL PURPOSE BUT MR. WARD'S STATEMENTS TO MS. JAURIGUE SHOW
 THAT MR. WARD CARRIED OUT PRECISELY HIS EXPRESSED INTENTION TO DETAIL
 MR. LABONSKI TO PITTSBURGH FOR A MONTH AS PUNISHMENT FOR MR. LABONSKI'S
 UNION ACTIVITIES.
 
    DISCRIMINATORY ACTION TAKEN AGAINST AN EMPLOYEE BECAUSE OF CONDUCT
 PROTECTED BY SECTION 1(A) OF THE ORDER CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION 19(A)(1)
 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AND INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, SOUTH CAROLINA
 DISTRICT OFFICE, A/SLMR NO. 1081, 8 A/SLMR 778(1978);  UNITED STATES
 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FORT POLK, LOUISIANA, A/SLMR NO. 1100, 8 A/SLMR
 880(1978);  U.S.  DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, MILWAUKEE
 AREA OFFICE, MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN, A/SLMR NO. 925, 7 A/SLMR 948(1977);
 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PERRINE PRIMATE LABORATORY, A/SLMR NO.
 136, 2 A/SLMR 87(1972).  SUCH DISCRIMINATORY ACTION ALSO VIOLATES
 SECTION 19 (A)(2), WHETHER OR NOT ACTUAL DISCOURAGEMENT OF MEMBERSHIP IS
 SHOWN, WHERE THE DISCRIMINATORY ACTION, HERE THE DETAIL OUT-OF-TOWN OF
 THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNION WHEN IT WAS KNOWN THAT SUCH DETAIL IMPOSED A
 PERSONAL HARDSHIP ON THE EMPLOYEE, WAS SUCH DISCRIMINATORY ACTION AS
 WOULD TEND TO DISCOURAGE MEMBERSHIP IN A LABOR ORGANIZATION.
 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PERRINE PRIMATE LABORATORY, SUPRA;
 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, MILWAUKEE AREA OFFICE,
 SUPRA;  DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY
 ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS, REGION II, SAN JUAN,
 PUERTO RICO, A/SLMR NO. 1127, 8 A/SLMR 1092 (1978), SUPPLEMENTAL
 DECISION, A/SLMR NO. 1154, 8 A/SLMR 1266(1978).  FINALLY, THE
 DISCRIMINATORY ACTION VIOLATED SECTION 19(A)(4) SINCE THE MOTIVATION, IN
 PART, WAS TO PUNISH MR. LABONSKI BECAUSE HE HAD FILED UNFAIR LABOR
 PRACTICE COMPLAINTS UNDER THE ORDER.  NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
 REGION 17, AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, A/SLMR NO. 671, 6 A/SLMR
 333(1976);  AIRWAY FACILITIES FIELD OFFICE, FEDERAL AVIATION
 ADMINISTRATION, ST. PETERSBURG, FLORIDA, A/SLMR NO. 776, 6 A/SLMR
 736(1976).
 
                           2.  CASE NO. 3-CA-34
 
    THE FACTS, FULLY SET FORTH HEREINABOVE, SHOW WITHOUT CONTRADICTION
 THAT ON AUGUST 30, 1978, MS. JAURIGUE REQUESTED ANNUAL LEAVE FROM
 DECEMBER 21, 1978, TO JANUARY 15, 1979, WHICH WAS APPROVED, IN WRITING,
 BY MR. WARD ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1978.  MS. JAURIGUE, WHO HAD BEEN IN POOR
 HEALTH FOR SOME TIME, ON NOVEMBER 14, 1978, WAS INSTRUCTED BY HER
 PHYSICIAN IN PHILADELPHIA TO UNDERGO AN EXTENSIVE MEDICAL SURVEY FOR
 PERSISTENT AND RECURRING ABDOMINAL PAIN.  ON NOVEMBER 15, 1978, MS.
 JAURIGUE MET WITH MR. WARD, MS. WEBB AND MS. STEWART AND TOLD THEM SHE
 WAS SICK AND WOULD BE REQUESTING FURTHER ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE;  THAT
 SHE WOULD GIVE SPECIFIC DATES WITHIN A DAY OR TWO;  THAT SHE NEEDED TIME
 TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS BEFORE LEAVING FOR NEW MEXICO;  AND THAT MR. WARD
 SAID "OKAY, GO AHEAD AND SUBMIT YOUR REQUESTS."
 
    ON NOVEMBER 17, 1978, MS. JAURIGUE SUBMITTED TWO ADDITIONAL LEAVE
 REQUESTS TO MS. WEBB, WHO WAS ACTING DIRECTOR IN MR. WARD'S ABSENCE, FOR
 ANNUAL LEAVE FROM NOVEMBER 20, 1978 TO NOVEMBER 24, 1978, AND THE OTHER
 FOR SICK LEAVE FROM NOVEMBER 27, 1978, TO DECEMBER 8, 1978, BOTH OF
 WHICH WERE APPROVED BY MS. WEBB.  MS. JAURIGUE SPENT MOST OF NOVEMBER 17
 WITH MS.  WEBB, REVIEWING THE WORK OF THE DIVISION, AND WITH MS. WHITE,
 BRIEFING HER ON WORK OF THE DIVISION.  AT NO TIME WAS THERE ANY
 INDICATION BY MS. WEBB THAT MS. JAURIQUE'S ABSENCE ON APPROVED LEAVE
 FROM NOVEMBER 20, 1978, TO JANUARY 15, 1979, EXCEPT FOR THE PERIOD OF
 DECEMBER 11-15 AND 18-20, 1978, POSED ANY PROBLEM WHATEVER.
 
    AT ABOUT 4:00 P.M., WHEN MS. WEBB WAS IN MS. JAURIQUE'S OFFICE, MR.
 WARD CALLED MS. WEBB WHO TOOK THE CALL IN HER OFFICE.  WHEN SHE RETURNED
 AT ABOUT 4:25 P.M., SHE ASKED MS. JAURIGUE TO RETURN THE LEAVE SLIPS
 SHE, WEBB, HAD APPROVED AND TOLD HER THE LEAVE WAS NOW DISAPPROVED.  MS.
 JAURIGUE TOLD MS. WEBB SHE WAS VERY SICK AT THAT TIME AND REALLY NEEDED
 TO BE OFF ON SICK LEAVE;  BUT MS. WEBB TOLD MS. JAURIGUE THAT IF SHE
 DIDN'T SHOW UP FOR WORK ON MONDAY, NOVEMBER 20, SHE WOULD BE PLACED ON
 AWOL, OR LEAVE WITHOUT PAY.  MS. JAURIGUE THEN FILED A FURTHER
 APPLICATION FOR ANNUAL LEAVE FROM NOVEMBER 21, 1978, TO NOVEMBER 24,
 1978 (THE EARLIER APPLICATION HAD REQUESTED ANNUAL LEAVE FROM NOVEMBER
 20-24, 1978).
 
    AFTER THE MEETING WITH MS. JAURIGUE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1978, MR. WARD
 AND MR. BENSON HAD MET WITH MR. LABONSKI AND MR. WARD LEARNED, FOR THE
 FIRST TIME, THAT MS.  JAURIGUE HAD GIVEN MR. LABONSKI A STATEMENT
 CONCERNING MR. WARD'S STATEMENTS TO HER ABOUT MR. LABONSKI.
 
    FROM THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS SET FORTH ABOVE, I CONCLUDE:  A) THAT MR.
 WARD ORDERED MS. WEBB TO CANCEL THE LEAVE SHE HAD APPROVED FOR MS.
 JAURIGUE;  B) THAT MR. WARD ORDERED MS. WEBB TO INSTRUCT MS. JAURIGUE TO
 REPORT FOR WORK THE FOLLOWING MONDAY NOVEMBER 20, 1978, ON PAIN OF BEING
 CHARGED AWOL AND DENIED PAY;  AND C) THAT MR. WARD'S ACTION WAS IN
 RETALIATION FOR THE STATEMENT MS. JAURIGUE HAD GIVEN MR. LABONSKI.
 
    ON NOVEMBER 20, 1978, MR. WARD MET WITH MS. JAURIGUE AND TOLD HER THE
 ANNUAL LEAVE HE HAD APPROVED ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1978, WAS NOW DISAPPROVED
 AND, TO EMPHASIZE HIS STATEMENT, PICKED UP WHAT PURPORTED TO BE THAT
 LEAVE SLIP AND TORE IT IN HALF.  MR. WARD FURTHER TOLD MS. JAURIGUE,
 DESPITE HER PLEA THAT SHE WAS SICK, IN PAIN AND RUNNING A TEMPERATURE,
 THAT HE WOULD NOT APPROVE ANY LEAVE FOR HER THAT WEEK.  MR. WARD DID SAY
 THAT HE WOULD GIVE HER A LETTER LATER IN THE DAY.
 
    MR. WARD'S LETTER OF NOVEMBER 20, 1978, AFFIRMED HIS ORAL DISAPPROVAL
 OF ANNUAL LEAVE FOR NOVEMBER 20-24;  HOWEVER, HE STATED IN HIS LETTER
 THAT HE WOULD GIVE FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION TO A REQUEST FOR LEAVE FOR
 FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 24;  AND HE STATED THAT HE GAVE TENATIVE APPROVAL FOR
 SICK LEAVE FROM NOVEMBER 27 TO DECEMBER 8, 1978, UPON SUBMISSION OF A
 PHYSICIAN'S STATEMENT;  BUT THAT THE APPLICATION FOR ANNUAL LEAVE FROM
 DECEMBER 21, 1978, TO JANUARY 15, 1979, SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
 APPROVED.  MR. WARD'S STATEMENT CONCERNING "TENATIVE APPROVAL" OF SICK
 LEAVE WAS, ITSELF, OF UNKNOWN EFFECT SINCE MS. JAURIGUE HAD ALREADY
 SUBMITTED DR. PONTARELLI'S STATEMENT, DATED NOVEMBER 14, 1978, TO MS.
 WEBB.
 
    MS. JAURIGUE INFORMED MR. LABONSKI OF MR. WARD'S ACTION AND ON
 NOVEMBER 20, 1978, MR. LABONSKI FILED CIVIL ACTION NO. 78-3900 IN THE
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.  A HEARING WAS HELD ON NOVEMBER 21, 1978,
 AND, FOLLOWING THE HEARING, THE PARTIES ENTERED INTO A STIPULATION,
 APPROVED BY JUDGE BECKER, WHICH PROVIDED, IN PART, THAT MS. JAURIGUE
 SHOULD GO ON SICK LEAVE AS OF NOVEMBER 22, 1978, AND REMAIN ON SICK
 LEAVE UNTIL DECEMBER 6, 1978, SUBJECT TO EXTENSION FOR SUCH TIME AS
 NECESSARY AS DETERMINED BY HER MEDICAL CONDITION.
 
    MS. WEBB, MS. STEWART AND MS. WHITE DID NOT TESTIFY AT ALL AND MR.
 WARD DID NOT TESTIFY ABOUT MS. JAURIQUE'S LEAVE REQUESTS AND/OR ANY
 ACTION TAKEN WITH REGARD THERETO.  EXCEPT FOR MR. WARD'S SELF-SERVING
 AND WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED STATEMENT TO MS. JAURIGUE ON NOVEMBER 20 ABOUT
 WORK LOAD AND HIS OBTUSE REFERENCE TO WORK LOAD IN HIS LETTER OF
 NOVEMBER 20, WHICH STATEMENTS I HAVE ACCORDED NO PROBATIVE WEIGHT, FOR
 REASONS MORE FULLY SET FORTH HEREINABOVE, BECAUSE SUCH STATEMENTS ARE
 CONTRARY TO THE RECORD, THE RECORD IS DEVOID OF PROPER OR LEGITIMATE
 JUSTIFICATION FOR MS. WEBB'S ACTION ON NOVEMBER 17, WHICH I HAVE FOUND
 WAS AT THE DIRECT ORDER OF MR. WARD, OR FOR MR. WARD'S ACTIONS ON
 NOVEMBER 20, 1978.  TO THE CONTRARY, MR. WARD, ON NOVEMBER 15, 1978,
 WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANNUAL LEAVE HE HAD PERSONALLY APPROVED ON
 SEPTEMBER 6, 1978, WHEN ADVISED BY MS. JAURIGUE OF HER HEALTH PROBLEMS
 AND THAT SHE WOULD BE REQUESTING FURTHER ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE, MADE IT
 CLEAR THAT HE WOULD FAVORABLY RECEIVE HER ADDITIONAL REQUESTS.  THAT
 THIS WAS HIS INTENTION WAS SHOWN BY THE FACT THAT MS. WEBB, WHO HAD
 ATTENDED THE MEETING ON NOVEMBER 15, AS ACTING DIRECTOR, ON NOVEMBER 17,
 1978, APPROVED THE TWO FURTHER LEAVE REQUESTS SUBMITTED BY MS.
 JAURIGUE.  ON NOVEMBER 15, MR. WARD HAD TOLD MS. JAURIGUE SHE WAS NO
 LONGER DIRECTOR OF THE COMMUNITY SERVICES DIVISION (HER SUCCESSOR WAS
 NOT IDENTIFIED ON THE RECORD), AND, ALTHOUGH MS. JAURIGUE SPENT MOST OF
 NOVEMBER 17 GOING OVER OFFICE MATTERS WITH MS. WEBB AND MS. WHITE, THERE
 WAS NO SUGGESTION BY MS. WEBB THAT MS. JAURIQUE'S ABSENCE ON THEN
 APPROVED LEAVE WOULD CAUSE ANY PROBLEM WHATEVER AND, SO FAR AS THE
 RECORD SHOWS, RELATIONS BETWEEN MS. WEBB AND MS. JAURIGUE WERE
 HARMONIOUS AND COOPERATIVE - UNTIL MR. WARD'S CALL AT 4:00 P.M.  WHEN
 MS. WEBB RETURNED AFTER TALKING TO MR. WARD, ALL WAS CHANGED.  THE LEAVE
 SHE HAD APPROVED EARLIER IN THE DAY WAS ABRUPTLY DISAPPROVED AND MS.
 JAURIGUE WAS ORDERED TO REPORT FOR WORK THE FOLLOWING MONDAY, NOVEMBER
 20, 1978, ON PAIN OF BEING CHARGED WITH AWOL AND WITHOUT PAY.  OF
 COURSE, MR. WARD CONFIRMED THIS ACTION ON NOVEMBER 20 AND, FURTHER, TOLD
 MS. JAURIGUE HER ANNUAL LEAVE, WHICH HE HAD APPROVED ON SEPTEMBER 6, WAS
 NOW DISAPPROVED.
 
    THE ONLY THING THAT HAD CHANGED WAS THAT ON NOVEMBER 15, 1978, MR.
 WARD HAD LEARNED, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THAT MS. JAURIGUE HAD GIVEN A
 STATEMENT TO MR. LABONSKI WHICH WAS A MAJOR BASIS FOR THE UNFAIR LABOR
 PRACTICE CHARGE (PRE-COMPLAINT) FILED BY MR. LABONSKI UNDER THE ORDER ON
 OCTOBER 30, 1978, AND DISCLOSED AS AN ATTACHMENT TO A LETTER FILED BY
 MR. LABONSKI IN CONNECTION THEREWITH ON NOVEMBER 15, 1978.  I CONCLUDE
 THAT MR. WARD'S ACTIONS ON NOVEMBER 17 AND 20, 1978, IN DENYING ANNUAL
 AND SICK LEAVE FOR MS. JAURIGUE WAS, AT LEAST IN PART, MOTIVATED BY THE
 FACT THAT MS. JAURIGUE HAD GIVEN A STATEMENT TO MR. LABONSKI WHICH WAS A
 BASIS FOR AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGE, AND THAT MR. WARD'S ACTIONS
 THEREBY VIOLATED SECTION 19(A)(1) AND (2) OF THE ORDER.
 
    WHETHER SUCH CONDUCT ALSO VIOLATED SECTION 19(A)(4) OF THE ORDER MUST
 BE FURTHER CONSIDERED.  SECTION 19(A)(4) PROVIDED AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "SEC. 19.  UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES.  A) AGENCY MANAGEMENT SHALL NOT--
 
   .          .          .          .
 
 
    (4) DISCIPLINE OR OTHERWISE DISCRIMINATE AGAINST AN EMPLOYEE BECAUSE
 HE HAS FILED A
 
    COMPLAINT OR GIVEN TESTIMONY UNDER THIS ORDER;"
 
    SECTION 203.2(A) OF THE REGULATIONS PROVIDED AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "(A) ACTION TO BE TAKEN BEFORE FILING A COMPLAINT. A PARTY DESIRING
 TO FILE A COMPLAINT
 
    ALLEGING AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE UNDER SECTION 19 OF THE ORDER . . .
 MUST TAKE THE FOLLOWING
 
    ACTION FIRST:
 
    (1) A CHARGE IN WRITING ALLEGING THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE MUST BE
 FILED DIRECTLY WITH THE
 
    PARTY OR PARTIES AGAINST WHOM THE CHARGE IS DIRECTED . . . ." SECTION
 203.3 OF THE REGULATIONS PRESCRIBED THE CONTENTS OF THE COMPLAINT AND
 SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION AND SECTION 203.3(B) SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED
 THAT, AMONG OTHER DOCUMENTS TO BE FILED WITH THE COMPLAINT, WAS "THE
 PRE-COMPLAINT CHARGE." ALTHOUGH A CHARGE WAS A NECESSARY PRECONDITION TO
 A COMPLAINT AND GOVERNED THE SCOPE OF THE COMPLAINT, OBVIOUSLY, A CHARGE
 WAS NOT A COMPLAINT.  AT THE TIME OF THE DISCRIMINATORY ACTION AGAINST
 MS. JAURIGUE ONLY THE CHARGE, PURSUANT TO SECTION 203.2(A)(1), HAD BEEN
 FILED (A CHARGE UNDER THE STATUTE, OR THE COMPLAINT FORM OF THE
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY, WAS FILED ON JANUARY 15, 1979, G.C. EXH. 1B), MS.
 JAURIGUE HAD NOT "GIVEN TESTIMONY UNDER THE ORDER" BEYOND HAVING GIVEN
 HER SIGNED STATEMENT, WHICH WAS NOT UNDER OATH, TO MR. LABONSKI,
 PRESIDENT OF THE UNION.  READ LITERALLY, THE DISCRIMINATORY ACTION
 AGAINST MS. JAURIGUE ON NOVEMBER 17 AND 20, 1978, WAS NOT BECAUSE SHE
 HAD FILED A COMPLAINT, AS NO COMPLAINT HAD THEN BEEN FILED, OR BECAUSE
 SHE HAD "GIVEN TESTIMONY", AS SHE HAD NOT "TESTIFIED" IN ANY MANNER BUT
 HAD SIMPLY GIVEN A WRITTEN, SIGNED STATEMENT.
 
    THAT SECTION 19(A)(4) SHOULD NOT BE READ SO LITERALLY AND APPLIED IN
 SO RESTRICTIVE A MANNER, IS, I BELIEVE, APPARENT FROM THE CONSTRUCTION
 AND APPLICATION OF THE ESSENTIALLY LIKE PROVISION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
 RELATIONS ACT WHICH PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "SEC. 8(A) IT SHALL BE AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE FOR AN EMPLOYER--
 
    (4) TO DISCHARGE OR OTHERWISE DISCRIMINATE AGAINST AN EMPLOYEE
 BECAUSE HE HAS FILED CHARGES
 
    OR GIVEN TESTIMONY UNDER THIS ACT;" (29 U.S.C. SECTION 158(A)(4))
 /19/
 
    IN NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. SCRIVENER, D/B/A/ AA ELECTRIC
 COMPANY, 405 U.S. 117(1972), THE SUPREME COURT REVIEWED AT LENGTH THE
 CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 8(A)(4) AND STATED, IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "1.  CONSTRUING SEC. 8(A)(4) TO PROTECT THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE
 INVESTIGATIVE STAGE AS WELL
 
    AS IN CONNECTION WITH THE FILING OF A FORMAL CHARGE OR THE GIVING OF
 FORMAL TESTIMONY COMPORTS
 
    WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF THAT SECTION.  MR. JUSTICE BLACK, IN NO
 UNCERTAIN TERMS, SPELLED OUT THE
 
    CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSE:
 
    '" . . . CONGRESS HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WISHES ALL PERSONS WITH
 INFORMATION ABOUT SUCH
 
    PRACTICES TO BE COMPLETELY FREE FROM COERCION AGAINST REPORTING THEM
 TO THE BOARD . . . .
 
    "2.  THE ACT'S REFERENCE IN SEC. 8(1)(4) TO AN EMPLOYEE WHO 'HAS
 FILED CHARGES OR GIVEN
 
    TESTIMONY,' COULD BE READ STRICTLY AND CONFINED IN ITS REACH TO
 FORMAL CHARGES AND FORMAL
 
    TESTIMONY.  IT CAN ALSO BE READ MORE BROADLY.  ON TEXTUAL ANALYSIS
 ALONE, THE PRESENCE OF THE
 
    PROCEEDING WORKS, 'TO DISCHARGE OR OTHERWISE DISCRIMINATE' REVEALS,
 WE THINK, PARTICULARLY BY
 
    THE WORD 'OTHERWISE,' AN INTENT ON THE PART OF CONGRESS TO AFFORD
 BROAD RATHER THAN NARROW
 
    PROTECTION TO THE EMPLOYEE.  THIS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH SEC.
 8(A)(4)'S PURPOSE AND
 
    OBJECTIVE HEREINABOVE DESCRIBED.
 
   .          .          .          .
 
 
    "3.  THIS BROAD INTERPRETATION OF SEC. 8(A)(4) ACCORDS WITH THE LABOR
 BOARD'S VIEW
 
    ENTERTAINED FOR MORE THAN 35 YEARS.  SECTION 8(A)(4) HAD ITS ORIGIN
 IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL
 
    RECOVERY ACT . . . .
 
    EXECUTIVE ORDER 6711 . . . PROVIDED, 'NO EMPLOYER . . . SHALL DISMISS
 OR TERMINATE ANY
 
    EMPLOYEE FOR MAKING A COMPLAINT OR GIVING EVIDENCE WITH RESPECT TO AN
 ALLEGED VIOLATION
 
    . . . .' THE FIRST LABOR BOARD INTERPRETED THAT PHRASE TO PROTECT THE
 EMPLOYEE NOT ONLY AS TO
 
    FORMAL TESTIMONY BUT ALSO AS TO THE GIVING OF INFORMATION RELATING TO
 VIOLATIONS OF THE NIRA
 
    . . . .  IN SEC. 8(A)(4) THE WORD 'TESTIMONY,' RATHER THAN
 'EVIDENCE,' APPEARS.  BUT THE NEW
 
    LANGUAGE WAS DESCRIBED AS 'MERELY A REITERATION' OF THE EXECUTIVE
 ORDER LANGUAGE AND IT WAS
 
    STATED THE 'NEED FOR THIS PROVISION IS ATTESTED' BY THE ABOVE CITED
 BOARD DECISIONS . . . .
 
    "4.  THIS INTERPRETATION, IN OUR VIEW, ALSO SQUARES WITH THE
 PRACTICALITIES OF APPROPRIATE
 
    AGENCY ACTION . . . .
 
   .          .          .          .
 
 
    "6.  THE APPROACH TO SEC. 8(A)(4) GENERALLY HAS BEEN A LIBERAL ONE IN
 ORDER FULLY TO
 
    EFFECTUATE THE SECTION'S REMEDIAL PURPOSE . . . .
 
    "WE ARE AWARE OF NO SUBSTANTIAL COUNTERVAILING CONSIDERATIONS.  WE
 THEREFORE CONCLUDE THAT
 
    AN EMPLOYER'S DISCHARGE OF AN EMPLOYEE BECAUSE THE EMPLOYEE GAVE A
 WRITTEN SWORN STATEMENT TO
 
    A BOARD FIELD EXAMINER INVESTIGATING AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGE
 . . . CONSTITUTES A
 
    VIOLATION OF SEC. 8(A)(4) . . . ."
 
    WITH FULL RECOGNITION OF THE STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES OF THE ORDER,
 INCLUDING ITS PRECOMPLAINT PHASE WHEREBY THE CHARGE IS FILED WITH THE
 PARTY AGAINST WHOM THE CHARGE IS DIRECTED, AND THE FACTS THAT THE
 STATEMENT GIVEN WAS NOT UNDER OATH AND WAS GIVEN TO THE UNION AND NOT TO
 A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, I CONCLUDE THAT THE PURPOSE
 AND INTENT OF SECTION 19(A)(4) OF THE ORDER WAS TO PROTECT THE EMPLOYEE
 DURING THE PRE-COMPLAINT STAGE AS WELL AS IN CONNECTION WITH THE FILING
 OF A FORMAL COMPLAINT AND, FOR THE REASONS STATED BY THE SUPREME COURT
 AS TO SECTION 8(A)(4) OF THE NLRA, SHOULD BE BROADLY AND LIBERALLY
 CONSTRUED IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE REMEDIAL PURPOSE OF SECTION
 19(A)(4).  ACCORDINGLY, I CONCLUDE THAT THE DISCRIMINATORY ACTIONS SET
 FORTH ABOVE ALSO VIOLATED SECTION 19(A)(4) OF THE ORDER.
 
                     3.  CASE NOS. 3-CA-35 AND 3-CA-36
 
    CASE NO. 3-CA-35 CONCERNS EVENTS WHICH OCCURRED ON JANUARY 9, 1979,
 BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE STATUTE, AND, SPECIFICALLY, A
 MEMORANDUM FROM MR. BENSON TO MS.  JAURIGUE WHICH INFORMED HER THAT ANY
 SICK LEAVE FOR HER WOULD BE APPROVED ONLY UPON PRESENTATION OF A
 PHYSICIAN'S STATEMENT UPON HER RETURN TO DUTY, WHICH, IT IS ALLEGED, WAS
 CONTRARY TO THE PRACTICE OF THE OFFICE AS TO OTHER EMPLOYEES WHICH WAS
 THAT A PHYSICIAN'S STATEMENT WAS REQUIRED ONLY IF THE DURATION OF THE
 LEAVE HAD BEEN FOR THREE OR MORE WORKING DAYS.
 
    CASE NO. 3-CA-36 CONCERNS EVENTS WHICH OCCURRED ON JANUARY 22, 1979,
 AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE STATUTE, AND, SPECIFICALLY, A MEETING
 HELD BY MR. WARD AT WHICH HE GAVE MS. JAURIGUE A LETTER REQUIRING
 ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION FOR SICK LEAVE TAKEN FROM NOVEMBER 22 TO
 JANUARY 9, 1979, AND, IN ADDITION, HE REITERATED THAT MS. JAURIGUE MUST
 COMPLY WITH MR.  BENSON'S MEMORANDUM OF JANUARY 9, 1979.
 
    IN EACH CASE, THE ALLEGED VIOLATION IS BOTTOMED ON THE ASSERTION THAT
 RESPONDENT IMPOSED DISCRIMINATORY AND MORE ARDUOUS CONDITIONS ON MS.
 JAURIGUE WITH RESPECT TO APPROVAL OF SICK LEAVE THAN IMPOSED ON OTHER
 EMPLOYEES.  WHATEVER THE PAST PRACTICE MAY HAVE BEEN GENERALLY, LOCAL
 3705, BY ITS PRESIDENT, MR. LABONSKI, INSTITUTED CIVIL ACTION NO.
 78-3900;  AND PLAINTIFF, LOCAL 3705, BY ITS COUNSEL, MS. JAURIGUE
 INDIVIDUALLY, AND ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GORDON, FOR
 RESPONDENT, ENTERED INTO A STIPULATION ON NOVEMBER 21, 1978 (FILED ON
 DECEMBER 5, 1978, AFTER APPROVAL BY JUDGE BECKER ON DECEMBER 4, 1978,
 G.C. EXH. 13) WHICH, AS TO MS. JAURIGUE, SPELLED OUT BOTH THE
 REQUIREMENT AND PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF SICK LEAVE FOR HER.  THUS, THE
 STIPULATION PROVIDED, IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    " . . . IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED THAT MS. JAURIGUE WILL BRING A
 SIGNED STATEMENT FROM A
 
    DOCTOR WHICH WILL INDICATE THAT MEDICAL SERVICES HAVE BEEN RENDERED
 TO HER DURING SAID SICK
 
    LEAVE PERIOD AND/OR THAT HER ABSENCE FROM WORK WAS MEDICALLY
 NECESSARY. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE
 
    AFORESAID DOCUMENTATION, THE C.P.S.C. MAY VIEW THE TIME TAKEN BY MS.
 JAURIGUE AS OTHER THAN AN
 
    APPROVED SICK LEAVE PERIOD.
 
    "IF HER MEDICAL CONDITION IS SUCH THAT SHE CAN RETURN EARLIER THAN AS
 AFORESTATED SHE SHALL
 
    DO SO.
 
    "IF HER MEDICAL CONDITION IS SUCH THAT SHE MUST, FOR MEDICAL REASONS,
 EXTEND HER SICK LEAVE
 
    PERIOD SHE MAY DO SO AS IS NECESSARY INSOFAR AS SAID EXTENSION
 CONFORMS TO RELEVANT LAW AND
 
    REGULATION.
 
    "THE INSTANT LAW SUIT SHALL BE HELD IN ABEYANCE UNTIL MS.  JAURIQUE'S
 RETURN FROM THE ABOVE
 
    REFERENCED SICK LEAVE, AND IF THE FOREGOING AGREEMENT IS HONORED,
 SAID CASE WILL BE DISMISSED
 
    BY THE PLAINTIFF." (G.C. EXH. 13).  WHETHER THE STIPULATION REFLECTED
 EXISTING POLICY AND PRACTICE OR CONSTITUTES A NOVATION, ALL PARTIES
 AGREED TO ITS TERMS.  MR. BENSON'S MEMORANDUM OF JANUARY 9, 1979 (G.C.
 EXH. 22) DID NO MORE THAN RESTATE THE TERMS OF THE STIPULATION AND
 RESPONDENT DID NOT VIOLATE SECTIONS 19(A)(1) OR (4) OF THE ORDER BY
 INSISTING UPON COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE STIPULATION.  MR. WARD'S
 LETTER OF JANUARY 22, 1979, SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT THE
 ONLY DOCTOR'S STATEMENT FURNISHED COVERED ONLY A PORTION OF THE PERIOD
 OF MS. JAURIQUE'S ABSENCE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IT EXTENDED ONLY THROUGH A
 PERIOD ENDING JANUARY 4, 1979, AND, ACCORDINGLY, MR. WARD REQUESTED
 ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS PRIOR TO AND SUBSEQUENT TO THE PERIOD COVERED BY
 DR. PUCELIK'S STATEMENT.  NEITHER BY REQUESTING SUCH ADDITIONAL
 INFORMATION NOR BY REITERATION OF MR. BENSON'S MEMORANDUM OF JANUARY 9,
 1979, FOR EXTENSION OF SICK LEAVE FOR THE SAME MEDICAL CONDITION, DID
 RESPONDENT VIOLATE SECTIONS 7116(A)(1) OR (4) OF THE STATUTE INASMUCH AS
 RESPONDENT DID NO MORE THAN INSIST UPON COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE
 STIPULATION TO WHICH ALL PARTIES HAD AGREED.
 
    MOREOVER, THE RECORD DOES NOT SHOW THAT, IN ANY EVENT, RESPONDENT
 APPLIED ANY DIFFERENT REQUIREMENT AS TO APPROVAL OF SICK LEAVE, TO MS.
 JAURIGUE THAN IT APPLIED UNDER LIKE CIRCUMSTANCES TO ALL OTHER
 EMPLOYEES.  FIRST, MS. JAURIGUE INFORMED MR. WARD ON JANUARY 22, 1979,
 THAT THE SICK LEAVE, REQUESTED AFTER HER INITIAL RETURN TO WORK ON
 JANUARY 9, WAS FOR THE SAME MEDICAL CONDITION, SO THAT REQUIREMENT OF A
 DOCTOR'S STATEMENT WAS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE PRACTICE OF REQUIRING
 SUCH STATEMENT WHEN THE DURATION EXCEED THREE OR MORE WORKING DAYS.
 OBVIOUSLY, MS. JAURIQUE'S SICK LEAVE HAD GREATLY EXCEEDED 72 HOURS.  NOR
 DID MR. ARMBRUST'S TESTIMONY, WHICH RELATED TO BRIEF OUTPATIENT VISITS
 FOLLOWING SURGERY, REFLECT A COMPARABLE EXTENSION OF SICK LEAVE.
 SECOND, RESPONDENT WAS AWARE OF JOB INTERVIEWS BY MS. JAURIGUE DURING
 PERIODS FOR WHICH SICK LEAVE HAD BEEN REQUESTED.  POSSIBLE ABUSE OF SICK
 LEAVE WOULD HAVE JUSTIFIED A REQUEST FOR A DOCTOR'S STATEMENT WHOLLY
 APART FROM ANY 72 HOUR POLICY.
 
    FOR ALL OF THE FOREGOING REASONS, THE COMPLAINTS IN CASE NOS.
 3-CA-35 AND 3-CA-36 ARE HEREBY DISMISSED.
 
                    4.  CASE NOS. 3-CA-220 AND 3-CA-221
 
    ON APRIL 10, 1979, MR. WARD, BY HIS PERSONAL ATTORNEY, FILED A CIVIL
 LIBEL ACTION AGAINST MS. JAURIGUE IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.  CASE
 NO. 3-CA-220 ALLEGES THAT RESPONDENT THEREBY VIOLATED SECTIONS
 7116(A)(1) AND (4) OF THE STATUTE.  THE RECORD SHOWS THAT MS. JAURIGUE
 MADE CERTAIN STATEMENTS TO MESSRS. LABONSKI AND ARMBRUST IN THE LATTER
 PART OF OCTOBER, 1978 (TR. 446) NOT TO MR. LABONSKI ALONE AS GENERAL
 COUNSEL STATES (GENERAL COUNSEL'S BRIEF, P. 33).  MR. WARD TESTIFIED
 THAT HE CONSULTED PRIVATE COUNSEL FOR PERSONAL REASONS FOR CERTAIN
 INCIDENTS THAT HAD OCCURRED TO HIM AS AN INDIVIDUAL.  WHILE MR. WARD
 WAS, UNDENIABLY, DIRECTOR OF RESPONDENT'S PHILADELPHIA AREA OFFICE, THE
 RECORD IS DEVOID OF EVIDENCE OTHERWISE THAT RESPONDENT AUTHORIZED OR
 KNOWINGLY PERMITTED MR. WARD TO INSTITUTE THIS SUIT.  TO THE CONTRARY,
 THE RECORD SHOWS THAT MR. WARD ACTED IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY THROUGH
 HIS OWN PRIVATE COUNSEL.  HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF MY CONCLUSIONS, I FIND IT
 UNNECESSARY TO DECIDE WHETHER, IF THE FILING OF A CIVIL SUIT BY MR. WARD
 WAS AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE, RESPONDENT WAS GUILTY OF AN UNFAIR LABOR
 PRACTICE.
 
    CASE NO. 3-CA-221 ALLEGES THAT A SUBPOENA SERVED ON MR. LABONSKI
 VIOLATED SECTIONS 7116(A)(1)AND (4) OF THE STATUTE BECAUSE IT WAS SERVED
 ON MR. LABONSKI AT HIS WORK PLACE IN THE PRESENCE OF OTHER EMPLOYEES.
 ONLY ON THE THEORY THAT THE FILING OF THE SUIT WAS UNLAWFUL AND ANYTHING
 DONE IN FURTHERANCE OF AN UNLAWFUL SUIT IS ITSELF UNLAWFUL (GENERAL
 COUNSEL'S BRIEF, P. 35) CAN I PERCEIVE ANY BASIS FOR AN ALLEGATION THAT
 SERVICE OF A SUBPOENA, EVEN AT A PLACE OF WORK, CONSTITUTES AN UNFAIR
 LABOR PRACTICE.  IN ANY EVENT, AS I CONCLUDE, FOR REASONS SET FORTH
 HEREINAFTER, THAT THE FILING OF THE CIVIL ACTION BY MR. WARD DID NOT
 CONSTITUTE AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE, I FURTHER FIND THAT SERVICE OF THE
 SUBPOENA DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE.
 
    I AM AWARE OF NO DECISION UNDER THE ORDER OR THE STATUTE WHICH HAS
 CONSIDERED WHETHER THE FILING OF A CIVIL ACTION MAY CONSTITUTE AN UNFAIR
 LABOR PRACTICE.  SINCE THE PURPOSE AND INTENT OF SECTION 7116(A)(1) OF
 THE STATUTE IS INDISTINGUISHABLE, AS PERTAINS HEREIN, TO SECTION 8(A)(1)
 OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, I HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION
 TO THE DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND CONCLUDE
 THAT, FOR REASONS WELL STATED BY THE BOARD, WITH APPROVAL MOST RECENTLY
 BY THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, THAT UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
 ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE STATUTE SHOULD ALSO ACCOMODATE THE RIGHT OF THE
 PERSONS TO LITIGATE THEIR CLAIMS IN COURT RATHER THAN TO CONDEMN THE
 EXERCISE OF SUCH RIGHT AS AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE.  IN CLYDE TAYLOR
 CO., 127 NLRB 103, 45 LRRM 1514(1960), IT WAS STATED AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "THE CHAIRMAN (LEEDOM) AND MEMBERS RODGERS, BEAN AND JENKINS (JOSEPH
 A.) ARE OF THE OPINION
 
    THAT CARTER (W. T. CARTER, 90 NLRB 2020, 26 LRRM 1427(1950) WAS
 ERRONEOUSLY DECIDED.  THEY
 
    AGREE WITH THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY FORMER CHAIRMAN HERZOG IN HIS
 DISSENTING OPINION IN CARTER
 
    THAT THE BOARD SHOULD ACCOMODATE ITS ENFORCEMENT OF THE ACT TO THE
 RIGHTS OF ALL PERSONS TO
 
    LITIGATE THEIR CLAIMS IN COURT, RATHER THAN CONDEMN THE EXERCISE OF
 SUCH RIGHT AS AN UNFAIR
 
    LABOR PRACTICE. ACCORDINGLY, THE CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS RODGERS, BEAN
 AND JENKINS HEREBY
 
    OVERRULE CARTER . . . ."
 
    (CHAIRMAN HERZOG HAD STATED IN HIS DISSENTING OPINION IN CARTER, AS
 FOLLOWS:  " . . . IT
 
    MAY WELL BE THAT, IN GRANTING SUCH RELIEF, A COURT WOULD BE ACTING
 INCONSISTENTLY WITH
 
    GOVERNING FEDERAL LAW AND, INDEED, THAT THE RESPONDENT'S MOTIVE IN
 SEEKING IT HERE WAS TO
 
    INTERFERE WITH THE EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS. NEVERTHELESS, IT SEEMS TO ME
 THAT THIS BOARD SHOULD
 
    ACCOMODATE ITS ENFORCEMENT OF THE STATUTE TO THE TRADITIONAL RIGHT OF
 ALL TO BRING THEIR
 
    CONTENTIONS TO THE ATTENTION OF A JUDICIAL FORUM, RATHER THAN HOLD IT
 TO BE AN UNFAIR LABOR
 
    PRACTICE FOR THEM TO ATTEMPT TO DO SO." (26 LRRM AT 1432) THAT THE
 REASON FOR THE RULE, ANNOUNCED BY THE BOARD IN CLYDE TAYLOR CO., SUPRA,
 WAS, UNEQUIVOCALLY, TO PROTECT THE TRADITIONAL RIGHT OF ALL TO BRING
 THEIR CONTENTIONS TO THE ATTENTION OF A JUDICIAL FORUM, /20/ AND NOT, AS
 SUGGESTED BY THE GENERAL COUNSEL ONLY WHEN THERE IS "A REASONABLE BASIS
 FOR FILING IT AND THE TRUE PURPOSE IN FILING THE SUITE (SIC) -
 DEMONSTRATED BY THE EVIDENCE - IS LEGITIMATE AND LAWFUL, I.E., NOT FOR
 THE PURPOSE OF INTERFERING WITH OR COERCING EMPLOYEES IN THE EXERCISE OF
 THEIR STATUTORY RIGHTS" (GENERAL COUNSEL'S BRIEF, P. 31), HAS BEEN MADE
 CLEAR IN BOARD DECISIONS SUBSEQUENT TO CLYDE TAYLOR CO., SUPRA, IF IT
 WERE NOT CLEARLY IMPLICIT IN THE CLYDE TAYLOR DECISION ITSELF.  ONE SUCH
 DECISION, WHICH IS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST SINCE, EXCEPT THAT IT INVOLVED
 AN ACTION FOR SLANDER RATHER THAN LIBEL, IT IS INDISTINGUISHABLE IN
 PRINCIPLE FROM THE INSTANT CASE, IS S.E. NICHOLS MARCY CORP., 229 NLRB
 75, 95 LRRM 1110(1977), IN WHICH THE BOARD STATED AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE SUPERVISOR INVOLVED HEREIN, ASSISTANT
 STORE MANAGER LAWRENCE
 
    BARTON, TOLD EMPLOYEE SHAFFER THAT IF THE RUMOR THAT SHE WAS IN THE
 UNION EVER BECAME KNOWN TO
 
    MANAGER KAREZ IT WOULD MEAN HER JOB.  SHAFFER REPEATED THIS STATEMENT
 AT TWO EMPLOYEE MEETINGS
 
    HELD BY RESPONDENT.  THE CREDITED TESTIMONY INDICATES THAT THE
 RESPONDENT'S PRESIDENT, DURING
 
    THE COURSE OF THE SECOND OF THE ABOVE MEETINGS, TOLD SHAFFER TO 'SHUT
 HER MOUTH' . . . .
 
    " . . . THE EVIDENCE IS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE RESPONDENT
 ACTUALLY PARTICIPATED IN
 
    THE FILING OF THE SUIT IN WHICH ONLY BARTON AND SHAFFER ARE NAMED
 PARTIES. WE NEED NOT RESOLVE
 
    THIS ISSUE SINCE THERE IS LONGSTANDING BOARD PRECEDENT CONSISTENTLY
 FOLLOWED THAT THE FILING
 
    OF A CIVIL SUIT . . . DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE.
 
    "CONSISTENT WITH THIS LONGSTANDING BOARD PRECEDENT, WE THEREFORE HAVE
 DECIDED TO REVERSE
 
    THAT PORTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S DECISION WHICH FINDS
 THAT THE RESPONDENT
 
    VIOLATED SECTION 8(A)(1) OF THE ACT BY INSTITUTING THE SLANDER
 LAWSUIT AGAINST SHAFFER
 
    . . . ." (95 LLRM AT 1110-1111).
 
    IN POWER SYSTEMS, INC. V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 601 F.2D
 936 (7TH CIR. 1979) THE COURT STATES, IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "IN ITS DECISION, THE BOARD DID NOT REJECT THE PRINCIPLE ANNOUNCED IN
 CLYDE TAYLOR, SUPRA,
 
    127 NLRB AT 109, AND FOLLOWED IN MANY SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS THAT THE
 FILING OF A CIVIL
 
    COMPLAINT BY AN EMPLOYER OR LABOR ORGANIZATION AGAINST AN EMPLOYEE OR
 MEMBER DOES NOT VIOLATE
 
    THE ACT."
 
    I HAVE REVIEWED POWER SYSTEMS, INC., 239 NLRB NO. 56, 99 LRRM
 1652(1978), ENFORCEMENT DENIED, 601 F.2D 936(7TH CIR. 1979) AND FIND
 THAT DECISION WHOLLY INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE.  THE GRAVAMEN OF
 THE COMPLAINT, AND THE BOARD'S FINDING OF A VIOLATION, IN POWER SYSTEMS,
 INC., SUPRA, WAS, QUITE SIMPLY THAT THE CIVIL ACTION HAD AS ITS
 OBJECTIVE PENALIZING A FORMER EMPLOYEE FOR FILING CHARGES WITH THE
 BOARD, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE INDIVIDUAL APPEARED TO HAVE GROSSLY
 ABUSED HIS RIGHT TO FILE CHARGES TO THE POINT, AS THE COURT OF APPEALS,
 IN EFFECT, CLEARLY CONCLUDED, THAT IT AMOUNTED TO AN ABUSE OF PROCESS.
 SUCH EXCEPTION BY THE BOARD IS NOT ONLY UNDERSTANDABLE BUT WOULD APPEAR
 MANDATED BY SECTION 8(A)(4) OF THE NLRA, AS WELL AS BY 7116(A)(4) OF THE
 STATUTE.
 
    THE CIVIL ACTION HERE WAS NOT BECAUSE MS. JAURIGUE HAD,
 
    " . . . FILED A COMPLAINT, AFFIDAVIT, OR PETITION, OR HAS GIVEN ANY
 INFORMATION OR
 
    TESTIMONY UNDER THIS CHAPTER" (7116(A)(4)) BUT, RATHER, BECAUSE MR.
 WARD ASSERTED THAT MS. JAURIGUE HAD LIBELED HIM.  OF COURSE, AN IN S.E.
 NICHOLS MARCY CORP., SUPRA, THERE IS A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
 MATTERS ASSERTED IN THE LIBEL ACTION AND THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE,
 INDEED;  FOR REASONS SET FORTH HEREINABOVE, I FOUND THAT RESPONDENT
 VIOLATED SECTION 19(A)(4) OF THE ORDER BY DENIAL OF ANNUAL AND SICK
 LEAVE BECAUSE MS. JAURIGUE HAD GIVEN A STATEMENT TO MR. LABONSKI.
 NEVERTHELESS, THE BALANCE WHICH THE BOARD HAS STRUCK AND WHICH, FOR THE
 REASONS WELL AND FULLY STATED BY THE BOARD, I BELIEVE SHOULD BE STRUCK
 UNDER THE STATUTE, IS THAT THE FILING OF A CIVIL SUIT FOR LIBEL, AS
 DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, DOES NOT VIOLATE
 SECTION 7116(A)(1) OR (4) OF THE STATUTE.
 
    ACCORDINGLY, FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, THE COMPLAINTS IN CASE NOS.
 3-CA-220 AND 3-CA-221 ARE HEREBY DISMISSED.
 
                                5.  REMEDY
 
    GENERAL COUNSEL HAS REQUESTED THAT ANY ORDER,
 
    " . . . SHOULD INCLUDE, AT A MINIMUM, A REQUIREMENT THAT THE CHIEF
 OFFICIAL OF THE
 
    RESPONDENT AGENCY DIRECT PERIODIC HEADQUARTERS REVIEW OF PERSONNEL
 ACTIONS TAKEN BY
 
    RESPONDENT'S AREA DIRECTOR WITH REGARD TO LOCAL UNION OFFICIALS TO
 INSURE THAT NO FUTURE
 
    UNLAWFUL TREATMENT IS ACCORDED THOSE OFFICIALS BECAUSE OF THEIR
 PROTECTED UNION
 
    ACTIVITIES.  FINALLY, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT AN APPROPRIATE NOTICE TO
 EMPLOYEES BE POSTED
 
    NATIONWIDE IN ALL OF THE RESPONDENT'S OFFICES." (GENERAL COUNSELS
 BRIEF, P. 36).
 
    THE RECORD CONTAINS NO BASIS WHATEVER FOR ANY SUGGESTION THAT AN
 ORDER OF THE AUTHORITY WILL NOT, IN GOOD FAITH, BE COMPLIED WITH BY
 RESPONDENT'S AREA DIRECTOR.  INDEED, IN THE ABSENCE OF A HISTORY TO
 JUSTIFY HEADQUARTERS REVIEW OF PERSONNEL ACTION TAKEN BY RESPONDENT'S
 AREA DIRECTOR, I DEEM SUCH PROPOSED ORDER, IF WITHIN MY POWER TO GRANT,
 INAPPROPRIATE.  WITH REGARD TO NATIONWIDE POSTING, NOT ONLY IS THE
 RECORD DEVOID OF ANY JUSTIFICATION FOR SUCH ACTION, BUT THE RECORD
 AFFIRMATIVELY DISCLAIMS SUCH ACTION.  THUS, RESPONDENT, AS EARLY AS
 OCTOBER, 1978, WAS ENTIRELY COOPERATIVE WITH THE DESIRE OF MS. JAURIGUE
 TO TRANSFER TO ANOTHER OFFICE AND SHE IS NOW LOCATED IN RESPONDENT'S
 DALLAS OFFICE.  THE RECORD SHOWS CERTAIN CONDUCT IN VIOLATION OF THE
 ORDER AT PHILADELPHIA, AS TO WHICH AN APPROPRIATE ORDER, INCLUDING A
 BROAD ORDER IN THE SENSE THAT IT WILL APPLY TO ANY LIKE OR RELATED
 CONDUCT, WILL ISSUE;  BUT NOT OTHERWISE.
 
    RECOGNIZING THAT MS. JAURIGUE, WHILE STILL EMPLOYED BY RESPONDENT, IS
 NO LONGER LOCATED AT RESPONDENT'S PHILADELPHIA AREA OFFICE, I HAVE
 PROVIDED IN THE ATTACHED ORDER THAT MS. JAURIGUE BE NOTIFIED, IN
 WRITING, BY RESPONDENT THAT SHE WILL NOT BE DENIED LEAVE BECAUSE SHE HAS
 EXERCISED PROTECTED RIGHTS UNDER THE ORDER AND/OR UNDER THE STATUTE.  IN
 ADDITION, THE ORDER EXPRESSLY COVERS ANY LIKE OR RELATED ACTIVITY UNDER
 THE STATUTE, AS WELL AS THE EXECUTIVE ORDER, SINCE SUCH PORTION OF THE
 ORDER OPERATES IN FUTURO AND, OF COURSE, FROM JANUARY 11, 1979, THE
 STATUTE HAS SUPPLANTED THE EXECUTIVE ORDER.
 
    COUNSEL FOR THE CHARGING PARTY REQUESTS A VARIETY OF ACTIONS, WHICH
 ARE, TO SAY THE LEAST, INNOVATIVE;  BUT WHICH:  A) I DEEM BEYOND MY
 AUTHORITY TO GRANT, SUCH AS TERMINATION OF MR. WARD OR HIS REDUCTION IN
 GRADE AND SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY, A FINE, PUNITIVE AND COMPENSATORY
 DAMAGES ETC.; AND B) I DEEM INAPPROPRIATE EVEN IF IT WERE ASSUMED THAT,
 IN A PROPER CASE, COULD BE ENTERTAINED.  IN ADDITION, A REASONABLE
 ATTORNEY'S FEE HAS BEEN REQUESTED;  HOWEVER I DO NOT FIND THAT A PROPER
 BASIS HAS BEEN SHOWN FOR THE AWARD OF A REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEE PURSUANT
 TO SECTION 702 OF P.L. 95-454, WHICH AMENDED SECTION 5596(B) OF TITLE 5,
 UNITED STATES CODE, AND THEREFORE, THE REQUEST FOR AN ATTORNEY'S FEE IS
 DENIED.
 
    HAVING FOUND THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED SECTIONS 19(A)(1), (2), AND (4)
 OF THE ORDER IN CASE NO. 3-CA-12 AS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT, AN
 APPROPRIATE ORDER DESIGNED TO REMEDY THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE FOUND
 THEREIN IS SET FORTH HEREINAFTER;  AND HAVING FOUND THAT RESPONDENT
 VIOLATED SECTIONS 19(A)(1), (2), AND (4) OF THE ORDER IN CASE NO.
 3-CA-34 AS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT, AN APPROPRIATE ORDER DESIGNED TO
 REMEDY THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE FOUND THEREIN IS ALSO SET FORTH
 HEREINAFTER.
 
    HAVING FOUND THAT RESPONDENT DID NOT VIOLATE THE ORDER AS ALLEGED IN
 CASE NO. 3-CA-35, OR OF THE STATUTE AS ALLEGED IN CASE NOS. 3-CA-36,
 3-CA-220 AND 3-CA-221, THE COMPLAINT IN EACH OF THOSE CASES, I.E.,
 3-CA-35, 3-CA-36, 3-CA-221 AND 3-CA-221, IS HEREBY DISMISSED.
 
                                   ORDER
 
    PURSUANT TO SECTION 6(B) OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED, AND
 SECTION 203.26(B) OF THE REGULATIONS THEREUNDER, 29 C.F.R. SECTION
 203.26(B);  AND SECTION 2400.2 OF THE FINAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, 5
 C.F.R. CHAPTER XIV, SUBCHAPTER A, FED. REG., VOL. 45, NO. 12, JANUARY
 17, 1980, THE AUTHORITY HEREBY ORDERS THAT THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
 COMMISSION SHALL:
 
    1.  CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
 
    (A) DETAILING OR ASSIGNING RAYMOND LABONSKI, OR ANY OTHER OFFICIAL OF
 LOCAL 3705, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, OUT OF
 THE PHILADELPHIA AREA OFFICE, OR FROM A NORMAL DUTY STATION, AS
 PUNISHMENT FOR, OR IN RETALIATION FOR, ENGAGEMENT IN ACTIVITIES ON
 BEHALF OF LOCAL 3705.
 
    (B) DISAPPROVING, WITHHOLDING, OR DELAYING APPROVAL OF ANNUAL LEAVE
 AND/OR SICK LEAVE FOR MARIA JAURIGUE, OR FOR ANY OTHER EMPLOYEE, AS
 PUNISHMENT FOR, OR IN RETALIATION FOR, ENGAGING IN PROTECTED ACTIVITY
 UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
 THE FILING OF A COMPLAINT OR THE GIVING OF TESTIMONY UNDER THE ORDER.
 
    (C) IN ANY LIKE OR RELATED MANNER INTERFERING WITH, RESTRAINING, OR
 COERCING ITS EMPLOYEES IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS ASSURED BY
 EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED;  AND BY THE FEDERAL SERVICE
 LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE ENCOURAGING OR DISCOURAGING
 MEMBERSHIP IN A LABOR ORGANIZATION BY DISCRIMINATION IN REGARD TO
 HIRING, TENURE, PROMOTION, OR OTHER CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT;  OR
 DISCIPLINING OR OTHERWISE DISCRIMINATING AGAINST AN EMPLOYEE BECAUSE THE
 EMPLOYEE HAS FILED A COMPLAINT OR GIVEN TESTIMONY UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER
 11491, AS AMENDED, OR BECAUSE THE EMPLOYEE HAS FILED A COMPLAINT,
 AFFIDAVIT, OR PETITION, OR HAS GIVEN ANY INFORMATION OR TESTIMONY UNDER
 THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE.
 
    2.  TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE
 PURPOSES AND POLICIES OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED:
 
    (A) ADVISE MARIA JAURIGUE, IN WRITING, AS SHE IS NO LONGER LOCATED IN
 ITS PHILADELPHIA AREA OFFICE, THAT IT WILL NOT DISAPPROVE, WITHHOLD, OR
 DELAY APPROVAL OF ANNUAL LEAVE AND/OR SICK LEAVE TO WHICH SHE MAY BE
 ENTITLED, AS PUNISHMENT FOR, OR IN RETALIATION FOR, ANY PROTECTED
 ACTIVITY ENGAGED IN BY HER, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE FILING OF
 A COMPLAINT OR THE GIVING OF TESTIMONY UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS
 AMENDED, OR BECAUSE SHE HAS FILED A COMPLAINT, AFFIDAVIT, OR PETITION,
 OR HAS GIVEN ANY INFORMATION OR TESTIMONY UNDER THE FEDERAL SERVICE
 LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE.
 
    (B) POST AT EACH FACILITY OF ITS PHILADELPHIA AREA OFFICE, INCLUDING
 ALL RESIDENT OFFICES, COPIES OF THE ATTACHED NOTICE MARKED "APPENDIX" ON
 FORMS TO BE FURNISHED BY THE AUTHORITY.  UPON RECEIPT OF SUCH FORMS,
 THEY SHALL BE SIGNED BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE PHILADELPHIA AREA OFFICE,
 CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION, AND SHALL BE POSTED AND MAINTAINED
 BY HIM FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS THEREAFTER IN CONSPICUOUS PLACES,
 INCLUDING ALL BULLETIN BOARDS AND OTHER PLACES WHERE NOTICES TO
 EMPLOYEES ARE CUSTOMARILY POSTED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SUCH
 BULLETIN BOARDS AND OTHER PLACES IN THE PHILADELPHIA AREA OFFICE AND IN
 EACH RESIDENT OFFICE.  THE DIRECTOR SHALL TAKE REASONABLE STEPS TO
 INSURE THAT SAID NOTICES ARE NOT ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY
 OTHER MATERIAL.
 
    (C) PURSUANT TO SECTION 203.27 OF THE REGULATIONS, NOTIFY THE
 AUTHORITY, IN WRITING, WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS ORDER AS TO
 WHAT STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO COMPLY HEREWITH.
 
                            WILLIAM B. DEVANEY
                         ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
 
    DATED:  MARCH 5, 1980
    WASHINGTON, D.C.
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 APPENDIX
 
        NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF
 
           THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO
 
           EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS
 
                                  AMENDED
 
                   WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
 
    WE WILL NOT DETAIL OR ASSIGN RAYMOND LABONSKI, OR ANY OTHER OFFICIAL
 OF LOCAL 3705, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, OUT
 OF THE PHILADELPHIA AREA OFFICE, OR FROM A NORMAL DUTY STATION, AS
 PUNISHMENT FOR, OR IN RETALIATION FOR, ENGAGEMENT IN ACTIVITIES ON
 BEHALF OF LOCAL 3705.
 
    WE WILL NOT DISAPPROVE, WITHHOLD, OR DELAY APPROVAL OF ANNUAL LEAVE
 AND/OR SICK LEAVE FOR MARIA JAURIGUE, OR FOR ANY OTHER EMPLOYEE, AS
 PUNISHMENT FOR, OR IN RETALIATION FOR, ENGAGING IN PROTECTED ACTIVITY,
 AND WE WILL ADVISE MARIA JAURIGUE, IN WRITING, AS SHE IS NO LONGER
 LOCATED IN THE PHILADELPHIA AREA OFFICE, THAT WE WILL NOT DISAPPROVE,
 WITHHOLD, OR DELAY APPROVAL OF ANNUAL LEAVE AND/OR SICK LEAVE TO WHICH
 SHE MAY BE ENTITLED AS PUNISHMENT FOR, OR IN RETALIATION FOR, ANY
 PROTECTED ACTIVITY ENGAGED IN BY HER, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 FILING OF A COMPLAINT OR THE GIVING OF TESTIMONY UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER
 11491, AS AMENDED, OR BECAUSE SHE HAS FILED A COMPLAINT, AFFIDAVIT, OR
 PETITION, OR HAS GIVEN ANY INFORMATION OR TESTIMONY UNDER THE FEDERAL
 SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE.
 
    WE WILL NOT IN ANY LIKE OR RELATED MANNER INTERFERE WITH, RESTRAIN,
 OR COERCE OUR EMPLOYEES IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS UNDER EXECUTIVE
 ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED, OR UNDER THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS STATUTE;  ENCOURAGE OR DISCOURAGE MEMBERSHIP IN A LABOR
 ORGANIZATION BY DISCRIMINATION IN REGARD TO HIRING, TENURE, PROMOTION,
 OR OTHER CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT, OR DISCIPLINE OR OTHERWISE
 DISCRIMINATE AGAINST ANY EMPLOYEE BECAUSE THE EMPLOYEE HAS FILED A
 COMPLAINT OR HAS GIVEN TESTIMONY UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS
 AMENDED, OR BECAUSE THE EMPLOYEE HAS FILED A COMPLAINT, AFFIDAVIT, OR
 PETITION, OR HAS GIVEN ANY INFORMATION OR TESTIMONY UNDER THE FEDERAL
 SERVICES LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE.
 
                           (AGENCY OR ACTIVITY)
 
    DATED:  . . .  BY:  . . .
 
                                 DIRECTOR
 
                         PHILADELPHIA AREA OFFICE
 
    THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM DATE OF
 POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER
 MATERIAL.
 
    IF EMPLOYEES HAVE ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE, OR COMPLIANCE
 WITH ANY OF ITS PROVISIONS, THEY MAY COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH THE
 REGIONAL DIRECTOR, FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, REGION 3, WHOSE
 ADDRESS IS:  1730 K STREET, N.W., ROOM 401, WASHINGTON, D.C.  20006.
 
 
 
 
 
 --------------- FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
 
 
    /1/ EXCEPTIONS WERE ALSO FILED BY RESPONDENT'S AREA DIRECTOR, THE
 INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE TAKEN VARIOUS ACTIONS WHICH FORMED
 THE BASES OF THE COMPLAINTS HEREIN.  THE RECORD INDICATES THAT, WITH
 RESPECT TO THE VIOLATIONS FOUND BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE, THIS
 INDIVIDUAL WAS ACTING SOLELY AS AN AGENT OF THE RESPONDENT AND THAT THE
 RESPONDENT DID NOT EXCEPT TO SUCH FINDINGS.  UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES,
 THE AUTHORITY CONCLUDES THAT THE RESPONDENT'S AREA DIRECTOR IS NOT A
 SEPARATE PARTY TO THE PROCEEDINGS AND THEREFORE LACKS STANDING TO FILE
 EXCEPTIONS TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S RECOMMENDED DECISION AND
 ORDER.  SUCH EXCEPTIONS THEREFORE HAVE NOT BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE
 AUTHORITY IN REACHING THE DISPOSITION HEREIN.
 
    /2/ THE AUTHORITY DOES NOT, HOWEVER, ADOPT THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
 JUDGE'S FINDING OF A 19(A)(2) VIOLATION IN CASE NO. 3-CA-34 INASMUCH AS
 NO SUCH ALLEGATION WAS CONTAINED IN THE COMPLAINT NOR WAS IT MADE AN
 AMENDMENT TO THE COMPLAINT.
 
    /3/ THE RESPONDENT'S SOLE EXCEPTION, WHICH SEEKS AN EXEMPTION FROM
 THE REQUIREMENT OF POSTING A REMEDIAL NOTICE, IS BASED UPON ACTIONS
 TAKEN BY THE CHARGING PARTY SUBSEQUENT TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER.
 NOTWITHSTANDING THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE CHARGING PARTY, SUCH AS ITS
 POSTING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S RECOMMENDED DECISION AND
 ORDER, THE AUTHORITY FINDS THAT THE POSITING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
 JUDGE'S RECOMMENDED ORDER BY THE CHARGING PARTY IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO
 REMEDY THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE FOUND HEREIN.  RATHER, THE NOTICE THAT
 IS POSTED SHOULD BE ONE WHICH IS ISSUED BY THE AUTHORITY, SIGNED BY THE
 RESPONDENT, AND POSTED AT SUCH LOCATIONS AS THE AUTHORITY DIRECTS.  FOR
 THESE REASONS, THE AUTHORITY SHALL ORDER THAT THE RESPONDENT COMPLY WITH
 THE AUTHORITY'S POSTING REQUIREMENTS.
 
    /4/ TRANSITION RULES AND REGULATIONS, EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 1979,
 FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL. 44, NO. 1, JANUARY 2, 1979, 5 C.F.R. CHAPTER XIV,
 PART 2400;  INTERIM RULES AND REGULATIONS, EFFECTIVE JULY 30, 1979,
 FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL. 44, NO. 147, JULY 30, 1979, 5 C.F.R. CHAPTER XIV,
 PART 2400, ET SEQ., AND FINAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, EFFECTIVE JANUARY
 28, 1980, FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL. 45, NO. 12, JANUARY 17, 1980, 5 C.F.R.
 CHAPTER XIV, PART 2400, ET SEQ..
 
    /5/ SECTION 7135(B) OF THE STATUTE SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES, IN PART,
 THAT "POLICIES, REGULATIONS, AND PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED UNDER EXECUTIVE
 ORDER 11491 . . . IN EFFECT ON THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS CHAPTER, SHALL
 REMAIN IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT . . . ." SECTION 2423.1 OF THE
 REGULATIONS PROVIDE THAT PART 2423 " . . . IS APPLICABLE TO ANY CHARGE
 OF ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES FILED . . . ON OR AFTER JANUARY 11,
 1979";  AND, PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 7104(F) AND 7134 OF THE STATUTE, ALL
 CHARGES OF ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UNDER THE ORDER FILED ON OR
 AFTER JANUARY 11, 1979 WILL BE PROCESSED BY THE GENERAL COUNSEL AND THE
 AUTHORITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARTS 2423 AND 2429 OF THE REGULATIONS.
 
    /6/ SECTION 2421.11 OF THE REGULATIONS DEFINES "PARTY" AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "'PARTY' MEANS (A) ANY PERSON:  (1) FILING A CHARGE, PETITION, OR
 REQUEST;  (2) NAMED IN A
 
    CHARGE, COMPLAINT, PETITION, OR REQUEST;  (3) WHOSE INTERVENTION IN A
 PROCEEDING HAS BEEN
 
    PERMITTED OR DIRECTED BY THE AUTHORITY . . . ."
 
    THE RULES AND REGULATIONS PRESCRIBE "RIGHTS OF PARTIES" (SECTION
 2423.15 OF THE INTERIM RULES, SECTION 2423.16 OF THE FINAL RULES) AS
 FOLLOWS:
 
    "A PARTY SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAR AT ANY HEARING IN PERSON, BY
 COUNSEL, OR BY OTHER
 
    REPRESENTATIVE, AND TO EXAMINE AND CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES, AND TO
 INTRODUCE . . . EVIDENCE
 
    . . . EXCEPT THAT THE PARTICIPATION OF ANY PARTY SHALL BE LIMITED TO
 THE EXTENT PRESCRIBED BY
 
    ITS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE . . ."
 
    /7/ AS STATED,
 
    "THE GENERAL COUNSEL HAS THE SOLE BURDEN AND IS THE SOLE CONTROL OF
 THIS CASE.  ANY OTHER
 
    PERSON, INCLUDING THE CHARGING PARTY, THAT APPEARS WILL BE STRICTLY
 SUPPLEMENTAL TO THE CASE
 
    OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL.
 
    "THE GENERAL COUNSEL WILL CONTINUE TO CONTROL THIS PROCEEDING.  THE
 RIGHT OF THE CHARGING
 
    PARTY . . . WILL BE LIMITED TO SUPPLEMENTATION TO THE EXTENT IT
 APPEARS APPROPRIATE TO THE
 
    COURT." (TR. 17)
 
    /8/ MR. FINK BECAME A GS-11 IN MARCH, 1979.
 
    /9/ I AM AWARE THAT MR. KRIVDA ON CROSS-EXAMINATION TESTIFIED THAT
 MR. WARD TOLD HIM TO SEND A GS-11 FOR " . . . TWO WEEKS TO A MONTH."
 (TR. 306, 307) AND THAT MR.  KRIVDA HAD TOLD MR. ROBINSON THAT MR. WARD
 HAD TOLD HIM THE DETAIL WAS TO BE FROM TWO FOR FOUR WEEKS (TR. 373).  IN
 VIEW OF THE ACTION TAKEN BY MR. KRIVDA AS WELL AS THE TESTIMONY OF MR.
 LABONSKI, I DO NOT CREDIT MR. KRIVDA'S TESTIMONY THAT MR. WARD TOLD HIM
 THAT THE DETAIL WAS TO BE TWO WEEKS TO A MONTH AND CREDIT MR. WARD'S
 TESTIMONY THAT HE TOLD MR. KRIVDA THAT THE DETAIL WAS TO BE FOR A
 MINIMUM OF ONE MONTH.  HOWEVER, FROM SUBSEQUENT EVENTS, I FIND THAT MR.
 KRIVDA REASONABLY CONCLUDED THAT MR. WARD AUTHORIZED HIS MODIFICATION OF
 MR. LABONSKI'S DETAIL BY HIS DIRECTION THAT HE, KRIVDA, HANDLE MR.
 LABONSKI'S PROBLEM.
 
    /10/ MR. BENSON WAS CALLED AS A WITNESS BUT EXAMINED ONLY AS TO
 GENERAL COUNSEL'S EXHIBIT NO. 23, A MEMORANDUM FROM MR. WARD TO MR.
 BENSON, ACTING DIRECTOR, WITH REGARD TO "LEAVE APPROVAL - MARIA R.
 JAURIGUE" DATED JANUARY 8, 1979.  ACCORDINGLY, TESTIMONY OF ALL
 WITNESSES CONCERNING THEIR STATEMENTS TO MR. BENSON OR HIS STATEMENTS TO
 THEM, IS FULLY CREDITED IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY DENIAL BY MR. BENSON.
 
    /11/ THE BABY WAS BORN AUGUST 31, 1978.
 
    /12/ NEITHER MS. WEBB NOR MS. STEWART TESTIFIED AND MR. WARD WAS NOT
 EXAMINED CONCERNING EITHER THE MEETING OR NOVEMBER 15, 1978, OR ANY
 OTHER MEETING, DISCUSSION OR CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH MS. JAURIGUE
 CONCERNING HER SICK LEAVE OR ANNUAL LEAVE REQUESTS.
 
    /13/ ANNUAL LEAVE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN REQUESTED (8/30/78) AND
 APPROVED BY MR. WARD (9/6/78) FOR 12/21/78 TO 1/15/79.  MS. JAURIGUE HAD
 RECEIVED APPROVED LEAVE AS FOLLOWS:
 
                       ANNUAL - 11/20/78 - 11/24/78
 
                         SICK - 11/27/78 - 12/8/78
 
                        ANNUAL - 12/21/78 - 1/15/79
 
 THIS MEANT THAT MS. JAURIGUE HAD REQUESTED AND HAD RECEIVED APPROVAL OF
 LEAVE FROM NOVEMBER 20, 1978, TO JANUARY 15, 1979, EXCEPT FOR THE PERIOD
 OF DECEMBER 11-15 AND DECEMBER 18-20, 1978.  CONTRARY TO RESPONDENT'S
 ASSERTION, THERE WAS NOTHING CONFUSING ABOUT THE PERIODS COVERED AND NO
 OVERLAP OF LEAVE DATES.  MS. JAURIGUE WAS IN A USE OR LOSE STATUS AS TO
 ANNUAL LEAVE AND HAD MORE THAN 550 HOURS OF ACCRUED SICK LEAVE.
 
    IN ADDITION TO THE 128 HOURS OF ANNUAL LEAVE REQUESTED IN AUGUST AND
 APPROVED IN SEPTEMBER, SHE HAD REQUESTED, AND MS. WEBB HAD APPROVED, AN
 ADDITIONAL THREE WEEKS LEAVE (120) HOURS ON NOVEMBER 17, 1978, THE
 REASONS FOR WHICH MS. JAURIGUE HAD FULLY DETAILED IN THE MEETING ON
 NOVEMBER 15, 1978.
 
    /14/ MS. JAURIGUE WAS NOT CERTAIN THAT SHE HAD SHOWN DR.
 PONTARELLI'S STATEMENT TO MR. WARD ON NOVEMBER 15, ALTHOUGH THE RECORD
 IS CLEAR THAT SHE HAD TOLD MR. WARD THAT HER DOCTOR HAD TOLD HER TO
 UNDERGO EXTENSIVE TESTS;  HOWEVER, SHE HAD SUBMITTED THE STATEMENT TO
 MS. WEBB ON NOVEMBER 17, 1978 (TR. 492).
 
    /15/ MR. WARD IS ENTITLED TO NO COMMENDATION FOR HIS REQUEST OF
 JANUARY 24, 1979, SINCE, OBVIOUSLY, HIS ACTION HAD PREVENTED THE USE OF
 ANNUAL LEAVE AS REQUESTED AND APPROVED ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1978.  INDEED,
 HIS STATEMENT THAT "DUE TO . . . ILLNESS . . . SHE WAS NOT ABLE TO TAKE
 THAT LEAVE" IS NOT TRUE.  MS. JAURIGUE HAD, IN FACT, SOUGHT TO USE HER
 ANNUAL LEAVE AS SICK LEAVE.
 
    /16/ MR. ARMBRUST'S ASSIGNMENT, BUT NOT HIS ITINERARY, WAS SHOWN ON
 THE "WORK PLANS - JULY 1978" (G.C. EXH. 10);  HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT SHOWN
 THAT MR. WARD ACTUALLY RECEIVED THIS DOCUMENT.
 
    /17/ ONLY ON ONE MATTER WAS ANY DOUBT CAST ON HER TESTIMONY AND THIS
 CONCERNED HER LETTER TO DR. VELIMIROVIC, DATED JANUARY 15, 1979.  HER
 LETTER SPEAKS OF "WONDERFUL HOSPITALITY . . . DURING MY VISIT . . . THE
 FIRST WEEK OF JANUARY." SHE TESTIFIED SHE MERELY PICKED UP FORMS ON
 JANUARY 9 (ACTUAL VISIT TO WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION IN WASHINGTON, D.C.
 ON JANUARY 23, 24 OR 25).  RESPONDENT DID NOT PURSUE THE MATTER AND I
 FULLY ACCEPT HER EXPLANATION.
 
    /18/ FOR EXAMPLE, MR. BENSON'S MEMORANDUM OF JUNE 4, 1978, SHOWS
 ACTION TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THE PITTSBURGH BACKLOG;  MR. WARD TESTIFIED
 THAT HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE CASE LOAD IN PITTSBURGH AS OF JULY,
 1978;  YET HE MADE NO INQUIRY BEFORE MAKING HIS DECISION;  AND MR.
 ROBINSON TESTIFI