Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Region VIII, Denver, Colorado, Social Security Administration, Region VIII, Denver, Colorado, and Social Security Administration, Denver District, Denver, Colorado (Respondents) and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1802, AFL-CIO (Charging Party)



[ v06 p628 ]
06:0628(110)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:


 6 FLRA No. 110
 
 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION
 AND WELFARE, REGION VIII, DENVER, COLORADO,
 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, REGION VIII,
 DENVER, COLORADO, AND SOCIAL SECURITY
 ADMINISTRATION, DENVER DISTRICT,
 DENVER, COLORADO
 Respondents
 
 and
 
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
 EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 1802
 CHARGING PARTY
 
                                            Case No. 7-CA-244
 
                            DECISION AND ORDER
 
    THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ISSUED HIS RECOMMENDED DECISION AND
 ORDER IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PROCEEDING FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS HAD
 NOT ENGAGED IN THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT AND
 RECOMMENDING THAT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED.  THEREAFTER, THE GENERAL
 COUNSEL AND THE CHARGING PARTY FILED EXCEPTIONS TO THE JUDGE'S
 RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER.
 
    PURSUANT TO SECTION 2423.29 OF THE AUTHORITY'S RULES AND REGULATIONS
 (5 CFR 2423.29) AND SECTION 7118 OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS STATUTE (THE STATUTE), THE AUTHORITY HAS REVIEWED THE RULINGS
 OF THE JUDGE MADE AT THE HEARING AND FINDS THAT NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS
 COMMITTED.  THE RULINGS ARE HEREBY AFFIRMED.  UPON CONSIDERATION OF THE
 JUDGE'S RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER, AND THE ENTIRE RECORD IN THE
 CASE, THE AUTHORITY HEREBY ADOPTS THE JUDGE'S FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND
 RECOMMENDATIONS, NOTING PARTICULARLY HIS FINDING THAT THERE IS NO
 EVIDENCE OF ANTI-UNION MOTIVATION.  FURTHER, THE AUTHORITY NOTES THAT
 NOTHING IN THE RECORD OTHERWISE CASTS DOUBT UPON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
 STATED REASONS GIVEN FOR THE TERMINATION OF EMPLOYEE RAYMOND LUCERO AS
 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COUNSELOR.
 
                                   ORDER
 
    IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT THE COMPLAINT IN CASE. NO. 7-CA-244 BE, AND
 IT HEREBY IS, DISMISSED.
 
    ISSUED, WASHINGTON, D.C., SEPTEMBER 21, 1981
 
                       RONALD W. HAUGHTON, CHAIRMAN
                       HENRY B. FRAZIER III, MEMBER
                       LEON B. APPLEWHAITE, MEMBER
                       FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
 
 
 
 
 
 -------------------- ALJ DECISION FOLLOWS --------------------
 
    DANIEL H. GREEN, ESQUIRE
    JOHN J. VERLINDEN
    FOR THE RESPONDENT
 
    GAVIN LODGE, ESQUIRE
    RONALD BROUN, ESQUIRE
    FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL
 
    BEFORE:  FRANCIS E. DOWD
    ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
 
                                 DECISION
 
                           STATEMENT OF THE CASE
 
    THIS IS A PROCEEDING UNDER THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS STATUTE (THE STATUTE), 92 STAT. 1191, 5 U.S.C. 7101 ET SEQ.
 IT WAS INSTITUTED BY THE ISSUANCE OF A COMPLAINT AND NOTICE OF HEARING
 ON MARCH 5, 1980 BASED UPON A CHARGE FILED ON SEPTEMBER 14, 1979 AND
 AMENDED ON FEBRUARY 19, 1980.
 
    THE COMPLAINT ALLEGES THAT RESPONDENT DHEW AND RESPONDENT SSA (ALSO
 REFERRED TO HEREIN AS THE RESPONDENTS) VIOLATED SECTION 7116(A) (1) AND
 (2) OF THE STATUTE BY TERMINATING THE APPOINTMENT OF RAYMOND LUCERO AS
 AN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COUNSELOR BECAUSE HE ALSO HELD THE
 POSITION OF UNION VICE-PRESIDENT.
 
    AT THE HEARING IN DENVER, COLORADO ALL PARTIES WERE AFFORDED FULL
 OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, ADDUCE EVIDENCE, EXAMINE AND CROSS-EXAMINE
 WITNESSES, AND ARGUE ORALLY.  THEREAFTER, COUNSEL FOR GENERAL COUNSEL
 FILED A BRIEF WHICH HAS BEEN DULY CONSIDERED.  /1/ FURTHER, THE GENERAL
 COUNSEL'S MOTION TO CORRECT THE TRANSCRIPT HAS BEEN CAREFULLY REVIEWED
 AND IS HEREBY GRANTED.
 
    UPON CONSIDERATION OF THE ENTIRE RECORD IN THIS CASE, FROM MY
 OBSERVATION OF THE WITNESSES AND THEIR DEMEANOR, AND FROM ALL OF THE
 TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE HEARING, I MAKE THE FOLLOWING
 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER.
 
                           APPLICABLE PRECEDENT
 
    IN GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, A/SLMR NO. 1174, 8 A/SLMR 1386,
 THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR, IN A CASE ARISING UNDER EXECUTIVE
 ORDER 11491, ADOPTED WITHOUT COMMENT AN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S
 RECOMMENDATION THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED SECTION 19(A)(1) BY REQUIRING AN
 EMPLOYEE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN HER PART-TIME JOB AS EEO COUNSELOR, AND HER
 NEWLY ELECTED POSITION OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY-TREASURER-RECORDER OF THE
 UNION.  /2/ IN REACHING HIS DECISION, THE JUDGE REJECTED THE ARGUMENT
 THAT THE HOLDING OF ANY UNION OFFICE, REGARDLESS OF ITS DUTIES, WOULD IN
 ITSELF "RESULT IN A CONFLICT OR APPARENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST OR
 OTHERWISE BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH . . . THE OFFICIAL DUTIES OF "AN EEO
 COUNSELOR WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 1(B) OF THE ORDER.  /3/ HE THUS
 REJECTED THE AGENCY'S CONTENTION THAT ANY UNION OFFICER IS ESSENTIALLY
 AN ADVERSARY OF MANAGEMENT AND AN ADVOCATE FOR EMPLOYEES, AND AS SUCH,
 WOULD LACK THE REQUISITE NEUTRALITY AND OBJECTIVITY ESSENTIAL TO
 FUNCTIONING EFFECTIVELY AS AN EEO COUNSELOR.  INSTEAD, THE JUDGE
 CONCLUDED THAT "THE DUTIES OF THE PARTICULAR UNION OFFICE IN QUESTION
 MUST BE EXAMINED TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANY CONFLICT WOULD ARISE UNDER
 SECTION 1(B) OF THE ORDER IF THE OFFICER SIMULTANEOUSLY SERVED AS AN EEO
 COUNSELOR." THE JUDGE THEN FOUND NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST BECAUSE THE
 EMPLOYEE WAS A MINOR UNION OFFICIAL WHOSE DUTIES INVOLVED ONLY INTERNAL
 MANAGEMENT OF THE UNION AND DID NOT REQUIRE HER TO BE AN ADVERSARY OF
 MANAGEMENT AND AN ADVOCATE FOR EMPLOYEES.
 
                        CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
 
    THE GENERAL COUNSEL CONTENDS THAT THE INSTANT CASE IS GOVERNED BY THE
 GSA DECISION.  THE RESPONDENT DOESN'T AGREE WITH THE GSA DECISION IN THE
 FIRST PLACE BUT, ASSUMING THAT IT IS GOVERNING PRECEDENT, ARGUES THAT
 THE FACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE ARE DISTINGUISHABLE.
 
    THE GENERAL COUNSEL ESSENTIALLY RELIES ON THAT PART OF THE GSA
 DECISION WHERE THE JUDGE CONCLUDED THAT THE DUTIES OF THE PARTICULAR
 UNION OFFICE BE EXAMINED TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANY CONFLICT OF INTEREST
 WOULD ARISE.  IT IS ARGUED THAT HERE THE OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT
 AND THE DUTIES EXERCISED BY FORMER VICE-PRESIDENT VIVIAN RASMUSSEN ARE
 NOT RELEVANT;  RATHER, ATTENTION SHOULD BE DIRECTED EXCLUSIVELY TO THE
 DUTIES OF NEWLY ELECTED VICE-PRESIDENT RAYMOND LUCERO.  AND, SINCE
 LUCERO EXERCISED NO DUTIES AT ALL IN HIS 2 MONTHS IN OFFICE, WE MUST
 RELY ON THE DUTIES WHICH THE NEW PRESIDENT INTENDED TO ASSIGN TO LUCERO.
  IN THIS REGARD, IT IS CONTENDED THAT LUCERO'S ROLE WOULD BE A
 CEREMONIAL OFFICE-HOLDER WITH NO DUTIES WHICH WOULD CONFLICT WITH HIS
 EEO COUNSELOR'S JOB.
 
    RESPONDENTS' POSITION, AS PRESENTED AT THE HEARING, IS AS FOLLOWS:
 
    BUT THE BROAD ISSUE HERE THAT YOU MUST CONSIDER, YOUR HONOR, IS WHAT
 IS THE ROLE OF AN EEO
 
    COUNSELOR?  HOW DOES HE FUNCTION?  WHAT CHARACTERISTICS MUST HE
 POSSESS TO BE EFFECTIVE?  THE
 
    ANSWER IS THAT HE MUST BE A NEUTRAL.  HE MUST HAVE THE TRUST,
 CONFIDENCE, AND RESPECT OF BOTH
 
    EMPLOYEES AND MANAGERS.  HE MUST SERVE AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN AGGRIEVED
 EMPLOYEES AND MANAGEMENT
 
    AND BE ABLE TO FUNCTION WITH BOTH SIDES IN ORDER TO BE EFFECTIVE.
 
    BECAUSE OF THIS MANDATE, THE PERCEPTION OF THE EEO COUNSELOR BY
 MANAGERS AND EMPLOYEES AS A
 
    FAIR AND IMPARTIAL INDIVIDUAL IS JUST AS IMPORTANT AS THAT PERSON'S
 PERSONAL ABILITY IN THAT
 
    REGARD.
 
    INDEED, WITHOUT THE TRUST AND COOPERATION OF MANAGERS, THE EEO
 COUNSELOR COULD NOT DO HIS
 
    JOB AND EVERY MINOR DISPUTE OR MISUNDERSTANDING COULD ESCALATE INTO A
 FORMAL COMPLAINT,
 
    THEREBY SERIOUSLY IMPEDING OPERATIONS.
 
    THE SSA POLICY CONCERNING THE PROHIBITION OF UNION OFFICIALS FROM
 SERVING AS EEO COUNSELORS
 
    WAS FORMULATED WITH THESE FACTORS IN MIND.  CERTAINLY, A
 NEWLY-ELECTED UNION VICE-PRESIDENT IS
 
    IN A TRADITIONALLY ACTIVE OFFICE AND WOULD NOT BE PERCEIVED AS A
 NEUTRAL BY MANAGERS OR
 
    EMPLOYEES, BUT WOULD NECESSARILY BE PERCEIVED AS AN EMPLOYEE ADVOCATE
 AND ENFORCER AND
 
    WATCHDOG OF EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS, AND WOULD THUS BE INEFFECTIVE AS AN
 EEO COUNSELOR.
 
    THUS, YOUR HONOR, RESPONDENT URGES YOU TO NARROWLY CIRCUMSCRIBE THE
 APPLICATION OF THE
 
    ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S CASE NO. 1174 AND TREAT THAT CASE AS AN UNUSUAL
 EXCEPTION,
 
    DISTINGUISHING THE INSTANT CASE FROM IT ON THE BASIS THAT HERE WE'RE
 DEALING WITH A VERY
 
    ACTIVE AND IMPORTANT UNION OFFICE TRADITIONALLY INVOLVED WITH
 REPRESENTATIONAL DUTIES, NOT ONE
 
    EXCLUSIVELY INVOLVED WITH INTERNAL UNION BUSINESS.
 
    IN ADDITION, RESPONDENT CONTENDS THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF EEO
 COUNSELORS IS A DISCRETIONARY MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE WHICH IS TERMINABLE
 AT WILL.
 
                  FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
 
                    A.  THE UNIT INVOLVED IN THIS CASE
 
    1.  THE CHARGING PARTY HEREIN, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
 EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1802, AFL-CIO, IS THE CERTIFIED EXCLUSIVE
 REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL NON-SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES, EXCLUDING
 PROFESSIONALS, OF THE DENVER DISTRICT OFFICE, BUREAU OF DISTRICT OFFICE
 OPERATIONS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
 HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE.  THIS UNIT IS SOMETIMES REFERRED TO IN
 THIS PROCEEDING AS THE "DISTRICT OFFICE" UNIT.
 
    2.  LOCAL 1802 ALSO ADMINISTERS A SEPARATE CONTRACT FOR A UNIT (NOT
 INVOLVED IN THIS CASE) OF EMPLOYEES AT REGION VIII OF DHEW AND REGION
 VIII OF SSA.  THIS IS SOMETIMES REFERRED TO AS THE REGIONAL OFFICE UNIT.
 
              B.  THE ROLE OF AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COUNSELOR
 
    3.  FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL LETTER NO. 713-29, DATED SEPTEMBER 12,
 1974, IS ENTITLED "INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN LABOR RELATIONS AND EQUAL
 EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY PROGRAMS." THE LETTER WAS ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE
 COMMISSION'S RESPONSIBILITY TO REGULATE THE FEDERAL EEO PROGRAMS AND
 ALSO TO FURNISH APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE UNDER
 EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491.  PART II(B)(5)(A)(2) OF FPM LETTER NO. 713-29
 PROVIDES, IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    UNION MEMBERSHIP OR INCLUSION IN AN EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING UNIT ARE NOT
 VALID REASONS FOR
 
    NON-SELECTION (OF EEO COUNSELORS).  SINCE COUNSELORS SERVE ALL
 EMPLOYEES (I.E. REGARDLESS OF
 
    BARGAINING UNIT STATUS) EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO HAVE AS BROAD
 A REPRESENTATION AS
 
    POSSIBLE, WITHOUT LIMITING SELECTIONS TO THE UNIT OF RECOGNITION.
 FURTHERMORE, SINCE A
 
    COUNSELOR SERVES AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE COMPLAINANT AND MANAGEMENT
 IN RESOLUTION OF PROBLEMS,
 
    RATHER THAN AS A CHOSEN OR DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
 EMPLOYEES, AND SINCE A COUNSELOR
 
    MAY NEED ACCESS TO OTHERWISE RESTRICTED INFORMATION IN ORDER TO
 FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY, CARE
 
    SHOULD BE TAKEN TO AVOID CONFLICTS OF INTEREST SUCH AS PROSCRIBED BY
 SECTION 1(B) OF EXECUTIVE
 
    ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED.
 
    4.  THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HAS A POLICY OF PROHIBITING
 EMPLOYEES FROM SERVING AS EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COUNSELORS WHEN THEY ARE
 SUPERVISORS AND/OR HIGH RANKING OFFICIALS OF A LOCAL UNION.
 
    A.  THERE HAVE BEEN INSTANCES IN THE PAST WHERE EEO COUNSELORS LEFT
 THEIR JOB DUE TO THEIR PROMOTION TO SUPERVISORY POSITIONS.
 
    5.  RAYMOND LUCERO HAS BEEN EMPLOYED BY SSA SINCE 1973 AND CURRENTLY
 IS A CLAIMS REPRESENTATIVE.  IN SEPTEMBER 1978 HE WAS APPOINTED AS AN
 EEO COUNSELOR, ON A PART-TIME BASIS.  IN DECEMBER 1978 HE WAS SENT TO
 BALTIMORE FOR TRAINING AND WAS FURNISHED WITH TRAINING MATERIALS WHICH
 INCLUDED INFORMATION CONCERNING SSA'S POLICY WITH RESPECT TO PROHIBITING
 UNION OFFICIALS FROM SERVING AS EEO COUNSELOR.
 
    6.  SOMETIME IN THE SPRING OF 1979, LUCERO WAS ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD
 ACCEPT NOMINATION AS UNION VICE-PRESIDENT FOR THE DISTRICT UNIT.  HE
 AGREED.  ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT CAMPAIGN FOR OFFICE, HE WAS ELECTED AND WAS
 INSTALLED IN MAY 1979.  THIS WAS THE FIRST UNION OFFICE THAT LUCERO HAD
 HELD.  PRIOR TO THE ELECTION HE WAS REMINDED OF SSA'S POLICY BY SUZANNE
 ELDER (EEO OFFICER) BUT HE CHOSE TO DO NOTHING ABOUT IT.  (TR. 78) WHILE
 I CREDIT ELDER OVER LUCERO, I DO NOT REGARD IT AS CRUCIAL THAT HE KNEW
 OF SSA'S POLICY AND CHOSE TO IGNORE IT.  ELDER DID NOT SUGGEST TO LUCERO
 THAT HE REFRAIN FROM RUNNING FOR UNION OFFICE.
 
         C.  THE ROLE OF THE UNION VICE-PRESIDENT AS SET FORTH IN
 
                         THE UNION'S CONSTITUTION
 
    7.  WHEN LOCAL 1802 HAS AN ELECTION FOR UNION OFFICERS, IT ELECTS ONE
 PRESIDENT AND ONE SECRETARY-TREASURER WHO ACT ON BEHALF OF BOTH THE
 DISTRICT AND REGIONAL UNITS.  THE CONSTITUTION CALLS FOR THE ELECTION OF
 A VICE-PRESIDENT FROM EACH UNIT AND SPECIFIES IN ARTICLE IV, SECTION 6,
 THAT IN CASE OF VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, THE THE
 VICE-PRESIDENT WHO WILL MOVE UP TO FILL THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT WILL BE
 FROM THE "OTHER" UNIT.  THUS, IF THE PRESIDENT COMES FROM THE DISTRICT
 UNIT AND SHOULD RESIGN THE PRESIDENCY, HE OR SHE WOULD BE SUCCEEDED BY
 THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE REGIONAL OFFICE UNIT.
 
    A.  OF COURSE, THE NET EFFECT OF THIS IS THAT BOTH VICE-PRESIDENTS
 STAND TO BE ELEVATED TO A HIGHER STATUS SHOULD THE PRESIDENT DIE OR
 RESIGN.
 
    B.  VELMA SLACK TESTIFIED THAT IN HER 4 1/2 YEARS AS ASSISTANT
 DISTRICT MANAGER, THE UNION PRESIDENT HAD ALWAYS BEEN FROM THE REGIONAL
 UNIT PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS DESCRIBED IN THIS PROCEEDING.
 
    8.  ARTICLE IV, SECTION 9 STATES THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF THE
 PRESIDENT, "A" VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL PRESIDE.  THERE IS NO OTHER
 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION SETTING FORTH SPECIFIC DUTIES OF EITHER
 VICE-PRESIDENT.  HOWEVER, ARTICLE V, SECTION 1 STATES THAT ALL OFFICERS
 SHALL CONSTITUTE THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND SHALL MEET AT THE CALL OF
 THE PRESIDENT.
 
        D.  THE ROLE OF THE UNION VICE-PRESIDENT AS SHOWN BY ACTUAL
 
                                EXPERIENCE
 
    9.  VIVIAN RASMUSSEN TESTIFIED AT THE HEARING ON MAY 7, 1980 THAT SHE
 WAS ELECTED TO THE PRESIDENCY IN MAY OF 1979 AND THAT BEFORE THAT SHE
 SERVED AS VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE DISTRICT UNIT FOR "TWO OR THREE YEARS."
 
    A.  AS PRESIDENT, RASMUSSEN EXPECTS TO BE INVOLVED WITH NEGOTIATIONS
 WITH MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONTRACT FOR THE DISTRICT
 UNIT.
 
    B.  AS VICE-PRESIDENT, RASMUSSEN CONCEDED THAT SHE WAS "VERY ACTIVE"
 IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE DISTRICT UNIT AND REPRESENTED THE UNIT IN
 GRIEVANCES, CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS AND OTHER MEETINGS WITH MANAGEMENT.
 
    C.  AS VICE-PRESIDENT, RASMUSSEN ALSO WAS GIVEN OFFICIAL TIME (8
 HOURS PER WEEK) TO REPRESENT AND DO WORK FOR THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE
 SOCIAL SECURITY DISTRICT OFFICE COUNCIL.
 
    D.  IN HIS BRIEF, THE GENERAL COUNSEL CONTENDS THAT "TRADITIONALLY"
 THE VICE-PRESIDENT FROM THE SAME UNIT AS THE PRESIDENT HAS "ALWAYS" BEEN
 A CEREMONIAL OFFICE-HOLDER.  I MUST REJECT THIS CONTENTION AS NOT BEING
 SUPPORTED BY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.  /4/ IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A
 SIMPLE MATTER TO INTRODUCE SOME EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE IDENTITY OF THE
 COUNTERPART VICE-PRESIDENT DURING RASMUSSEN'S TENURE IN OFFICE AND HIS
 OR HER DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS.  INSTEAD WE DO NOT EVEN KNOW THE NAME OF
 SUCH VICE-PRESIDENT FOR THE REGIONAL UNIT.  INDEED, WE DON'T EVEN KNOW
 VERY MUCH ABOUT MILLIE SAMMON, THE PRESIDENT, THE LENGTH OF HER TERM IN
 OFFICE, OR WHETHER SHE DELEGATED ANY DUTIES TO HER VICE-PRESIDENT OR
 NOT.  ALL THAT WE REALLY KNOW IS WHAT RASMUSSEN'S DUTIES IN THE DISTRICT
 UNIT WERE UNTIL HER ELEVATION TO THE PRESIDENCY.
 
        E.  RESPONDENTS' EFFORTS TO ASCERTAIN THE NATURE AND EXTENT
 
                OF LUCERO'S DUTIES AS UNION VICE-PRESIDENT
 
    9.  VELMA SLACK, ASSISTANT DISTRICT MANAGER OF THE DENVER DISTRICT
 OFFICE SPOKE TO LUCERO AFTER THE ELECTION AND EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT
 HIS DUAL ROLE AS EEO COUNSELOR AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE UNION.  LUCERO
 REPLIED THAT HE DIDN'T THINK THERE WAS A CONFLICT AND LATER THAT DAY
 GAVE HER AN EXCERPT FROM A NEWSLETTER (JT. EXH. NO. 10) ABOUT THE GSA
 CASE (TR.  104).
 
    10.  AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME, SLACK CALLED VIVIAN RASMUSSEN AND
 INQUIRED AS TO WHAT WOULD BE THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF THE PRESIDENT AND
 VICE-PRESIDENT (TR. 105).  RASMUSSEN REPLIED THAT SHE HAD NOT MADE ANY
 DECISION YET (TR. 105, 132) BUT THAT SHE DIDN'T THINK THERE WAS A
 CONFLICT BECAUSE UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT "NOW WE CAN WEAR
 BOTH HATS" (TR. 105, 37).
 
    11.  A MONTH LATER, SLACK AGAIN CALLED RASMUSSEN AND ASKED HER TO
 CLARIFY THE ROLES OF THE UNION OFFICIALS BUT RASMUSSEN AGAIN REPLIED
 THAT SHE HADN'T MADE ANY DECISION AS TO WHAT DUTIES SHE WOULD DELEGATE
 TO LUCERO.
 
    12.  IN THE MEANTIME, ON JUNE 1, 1979, E.O. STAFF OFFICER SUZANNE
 ELDER REQUESTED AN OPINION FROM LABOR RELATIONS OFFICER ART GARDNER ON
 THE QUESTION OF LUCERO'S DUAL ROLE (JT. EXH. 10).  HER MEMORANDUM
 RECITES HER UNDERSTANDING WITH RESPECT TO THE DUTIES OF THE
 VICE-PRESIDENT FOR THE DISTRICT OFFICE AND HER OPINION THAT THE GSA CASE
 IS "NOT PARALLEL TO MR. LUCERO'S SITUATION."
 
    A.  AT THIS POINT IN TIME, IT WAS NOT UNREASONABLE FOR MS. ELDER TO
 RELY ON HER KNOWLEDGE OF THE DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS EXERCISED BY VIVIAN
 RASMUSSEN, THE OUTGOING VICE-PRESIDENT, AS THE BASIS FOR HER
 RECOMMENDATION.  CERTAINLY, LUCERO DID NOT KNOW WHAT HIS DUTIES WERE TO
 BE (TR. 18) AND RASMUSSEN OFFERED NO GUIDANCE DESPITE TWO REQUESTS FROM
 SLACK.  IN MY OPINION, IT WAS MORE LOGICAL AND MORE REASONABLE TO ASSUME
 THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN THE FUNCTIONS OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT
 THAN TO ENGAGE IN CONJECTURE AND ASSUME THERE WOULD BE CHANGES.
 
    B.  ACCORDING TO RASMUSSEN, SHE ALSO TALKED TO ART GARDNER ON THE
 TELEPHONE AND HE REQUESTED HER TO SEND HIM A LETTER GIVING HIM A LIST OF
 THE UNION OFFICERS AND THEIR DUTIES (TR. 38).  SHE WAS UNABLE TO FIND A
 COPY OF HER LETTER TO GARDNER.  THE FOREGOING ILLUSTRATES THAT BEFORE
 RESPONDENTS MADE ANY DECISION WITH RESPECT TO LUCERO, GENUINE EFFORTS
 WERE MADE TO ASCERTAIN LUCERO'S DUTIES IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE
 APPLICABILITY OF THE GSA DECISION.
 
    C.  IN REBUTTAL, THE GENERAL COUNSEL RECALLED VIVIAN RASMUSSEN FOR
 THE PURPOSE OF PROVING THAT IN MAY OR JUNE OF 1979, SHE TOLD SLACK HER
 DUTIES HAD NOT CHANGED, JUST HER TITLE HAD CHANGED.  ASSUMING, ARGUENDO,
 THAT RASMUSSEN MADE SUCH A STATEMENT IT DOES NOT RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF
 WHAT LUCERO'S DUTIES WERE TO BE.  IN THE SAME REBUTTAL TESTIMONY,
 RASMUSSEN CORROBORATES SLACK'S MANY EFFORTS TO ASCERTAIN THE PRECISE
 NATURE OF LUCERO'S DUTIES.  RASMUSSEN TESTIFIED IN THIS RESPECT AS
 FOLLOWS:
 
    SHE ALSO WANTED TO KNOW WHAT I WAS GOING TO ASSIGN TO MR.  LUCERO.  I
 HAD NO IDEA WHAT I WAS
 
    GOING TO ASSIGN MR. LUCERO BECAUSE I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT WAS GOING TO
 COME UP IN THE COMING YEAR
 
    THAT I MIGHT WANT TO HAVE HIM LOOK INTO.  (TR. 132)
 
    IN HER EARLIER TESTIMONY, RASMUSSEN TESTIFIED IN A SIMILAR VEIN, AS
 FOLLOWS:
 
    I HADN'T REALLY GIVEN ANY THOUGHT HOW I WOULD USE RAY TOO MUCH.  I
 NEVER KNEW WHAT MIGHT
 
    COME UP.  I REALLY DIDN'T HAVE ANYTHING TO USE RAY FOR AT THE MOMENT.
  (TR. 37)
 
    D.  I FIND AND CONCLUDE, BASED UPON MY EVALUATION OF THE TESTIMONY
 AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES, THAT IN JULY 1979 THE UNION FAILED
 TO MAKE CLEAR TO RESPONDENTS PRECISELY WHAT THE DUTIES OF NEWLY ELECTED
 VICE-PRESIDENT LUCERO WOULD BE.  ALTHOUGH THE UNION PRESIDENT MAY HAVE
 TOLD RESPONDENTS THAT HER OWN DUTIES HAD NOT CHANGED THAT SIGNIFICANTLY
 AS FAR AS THE DISTRICT OFFICE WAS CONCERNED, SHE FAILED TO BE RESPONSIVE
 TO THE INQUIRIES CONCERNING LUCERO'S DUTIES.  I AM NOT PERSUADED BY HER
 TESTIMONY THAT SHE CONVEYED TO RESPONDENTS THE IDEA THAT LUCERO WAS
 ASSUMING A CEREMONIAL OFFICE WITH NO DUTIES.  ON THE CONTRARY, I
 CONCLUDE THAT RASMUSSEN WAS GENUINELY UNDECIDED AS TO WHAT DUTIES SHE
 WOULD GIVE TO LUCERO.  HER INDECISION WAS BASED PARTLY ON THE FACT THAT
 SHE REALLY HADN'T GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT AS TO WHAT FUNCTIONS SHE COULD
 CONTINUE TO PERFORM, TIME PERMITTING, AND WHAT FUNCTIONS SHE COULD
 DELEGATE, CONSIDERING LUCERO'S OWN INEXPERIENCE.  FURTHER, SHE WAS AWARE
 OF LUCERO'S DESIRE TO CONTINUE AS AN EEO COUNSELOR, ON THE ONE HAND, AND
 THE CLEAR LANGUAGE IN THE GSA CASE THAT A CONFLICT OF INTEREST DEPENDED
 UPON WHAT DUTIES WERE PERFORMED BY THE PARTICULAR UNION OFFICIAL.  (TR.
 18) AS A RESULT OF RASMUSSEN'S INDECISION AND UNRESPONSIVENESS,
 RESPONDENTS' REPRESENTATIVES WERE UNABLE TO ASCERTAIN PRECISELY WHAT
 LUCERO'S DUTIES WOULD BE.
 
    E.  FROM THE DATE OF HIS INSTALLATION AS VICE-PRESIDENT IN MAY 1979
 UNTIL JULY 18, 1979 LUCERO APPARENTLY HAD NO ASSIGNED DUTIES OTHER THAN
 WHAT WAS SPECIFIED IN THE UNION CONSTITUTION TO PRESIDE IN THE ABSENCE
 OF THE PRESIDENT.  AGAIN, THE REASON FOR HIS NOT HAVING ANY ASSIGNED
 DUTIES WAS NOT BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN ELECTED TO A "CEREMONIAL OFFICE" BUT
 RATHER BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT DECIDED WHAT DUTIES TO ASSIGN HIM.
 
                   F.  THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
 
    13.  IN A LETTER DATED JULY 18, 1989, ACTING SSA REGIONAL
 COMMISSIONER PATRICIA J. LIVERS TERMINATED RAYMOND LUCERO AN AN EEO
 COUNSELOR.  THE REASONS GIVEN BY LIVERS FOR THE TERMINATION ARE THE
 OPINION OF DHEW THAT LUCERO'S SERVING BOTH AS A UNION VICE-PRESIDENT AND
 AN EEO COUNSELOR CREATED A CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND CONFLICTED WITH AN
 SSA POLICY PROHIBITING SUCH CONCURRENT OFFICE-HOLDING.
 
    A.  I REJECT THE GENERAL COUNSEL'S CONTENTION THAT LUCERO WAS FORCED
 TO CHOOSE WHICH POSITION HE WOULD RETAIN.  I CONCLUDE THAT RESPONDENTS,
 AFTER UNSUCCESSFULLY ATTEMPTING TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE DUTIES TO BE
 ASSIGNED TO LUCERO WOULD BE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE EXERCISED BY RASMUSSEN,
 DECIDED TO APPLY THEIR RULE PRECLUDING HIGH UNION OFFICIALS FROM
 SIMULTANEOUSLY SERVING AS EEO COUNSELORS.  IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
 CASE, I FIND IT UNNECESSARY TO DECIDE WHETHER SUCH ACTION BY RESPONDENTS
 WAS A MANAGEMENT RIGHT UNDER SECTION 7106(A)(2)(A) OF THE STATUTE.  I
 NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE GSA CASE THE UNION OFFICIAL WAS "FORCED TO
 CHOOSE" BETWEEN HER EEO POSITION AND THE UNION POSITION.  SHE CHOSE TO
 RESIGN HER UNION POSITION.  HERE, RESPONDENTS TERMINATED LUCERO FROM HIS
 EEO POSITION AND DID NOT REQUIRE HIM TO RESIGN HIS UNION POSITION.
 
    B.  IN MY OPINION, THERE WAS A REASONABLE BASIS FOR RESPONDENTS'
 DECISION AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT IT WAS BASED ON AN ANTI-UNION
 MOTIVATION.
 
    FIRSTLY, I AGREE WITH RESPONDENTS THAT THE OFFICE OF VICE-PRESIDENT
 IS A HIGH UNION OFFICE AND IS GENERALLY PERCEIVED AS SUCH BY EMPLOYEES
 AND MEMBERS.  THUS, IT IS THE VICE-PRESIDENT WHO AUTOMATICALLY SUCCEEDS
 TO A HIGHER STATUS SHOULD THE PRESIDENT DIE OR RESIGN.  IN THIS CASE,
 THE REGIONAL VICE-PRESIDENT WOULD BECOME PRESIDENT AND THE DISTRICT
 VICE-PRESIDENT WOULD BECOME THE PRINCIPAL SPOKESMAN AND REPRESENTATIVE
 OF THE DISTRICT UNIT.  I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION
 THAT A VICE-PRESIDENT SOMEHOW CAN BE A LOWER OFFICAL THAN THE CHIEF
 STEWARD, SOLELY DEPENDING UPON THE WHIM OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE KIND OF
 DUTIES HE OR SHE DECIDES TO ASSIGN TO THE VICE-PRESIDENT.  SECONDLY,
 THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN THIS CASE WHERE THE VICE-PRESIDENT'S ROLE
 IN THE PAST HAS BEEN AN EXTREMELY ACTIVE ONE AND RESPONDENT HAD NO BASIS
 FOR ASSUMING THAT LUCERO'S ROLE WOULD BE DIFFERENT FROM RASMUSSEN'S.
 INDEED, THE INCREASED RESPONSIBILITY OF RASMUSSEN AS PRESIDENT PLUS HER
 EX OFFICO DUTIES AS A MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL NECESSARILY WOULD REQUIRE,
 IT SEEMS TO ME, SOME DELEGATION OF RESPONSIBILITY TO THE VICE-PRESIDENT.
  THIRDLY, I CONCLUDE THAT REGARDLESS OF THE DUTIES ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO
 LUCERO, THE DUAL ROLE OF EEO COUNSELOR AND UNION VICE-PRESIDENT PRESENTS
 AT LEAST AN APPARENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST BECAUSE THE OFFICE OF
 VICE-PRESIDENT IS TRADITIONALLY REGARDED AS A MAJOR UNION OFFICE AND THE
 INCUMBENT OFFICER IS AN HEIR APPARENT OR POSSIBLE CANDIDATE FOR THE
 PRESIDENCY.  THUS, THIS CASE IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE GSA CASE WHICH
 INVOLVED, ACCORDING TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE, A MINOR UNION
 OFFICIAL WHOSE DUTIES WERE CONFINED TO THE INTERNAL MANAGEMENT OF THE
 UNION.  THE GSA CASE IS ALSO DISTINGUISHABLE ON THE GROUND THAT AT THE
 TIME OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE THE MINOR UNION OFFICIAL ACTUALLY HAD
 NO REPRESENTATIONAL OR ADVERSARIAL DUTIES.  HERE, AT THE TIME OF THE
 ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE, RESPONDENTS HAD NO GENUINE BASIS FOR
 CONCLUDING THAT LUCERO'S ROLE AS VICE-PRESIDENT WOULD NOT IN SOME WAY
 INVOLVE REPRESENTATIONAL OR ADVERSARIAL DUTIES IN VIEW OF PAST
 EXPERIENCE.  RESPONDENTS' EFFORTS OVER A PERIOD OF TWO MONTHS TO
 ASCERTAIN THE PRECISE NATURE OF LUCERO'S COUNSELOR'S JOB IS COMMENDABLE.
  ITS EFFORTS TO FIRST TRY TO COMPLY WITH THE HOLDING OF THE GSA CASE,
 RATHER THAN TAKING PRECIPITOUS ACTION BASED SOLELY ON THE ELECTION, IS
 ALSO COMMENDABLE.
 
    IN DETERMINING WHETHER RESPONDENTS HAVE VIOLATED THE STATUTE, ITS
 CONDUCT MUST BE JUDGED BY THE REASONABLENESS OF ITS ACTIONS IN ALL THE
 CIRCUMSTANCES.  IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I RECOMMEND DISMISSAL OF THE
 COMPLAINT ALLEGING A VIOLATION OF SECTION 7116(A)(1) AND (2) OF THE
 STATUTE.
 
            G.  EVENTS OCCURRING AFTER THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR
 
                                 PRACTICE
 
    12.  ON JULY 27, 1979, LUCERO WROTE TO LIVERS REQUESTING
 REINSTATEMENT AS AN EEO COUNSELOR AND STATING THAT IF HIS REQUEST WERE
 GRANTED, THEN HE WOULD RESIGN HIS POSITION OF UNION VICE-PRESIDENT.  HIS
 REQUEST WAS GRANTED.
 
    13.  ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1979, LUCERO SENT A LETTER OF RESIGNATION TO
 VIVIAN RASMUSSEN, PRESIDENT OF AFGE LOCAL 1802, RESIGNING AS A
 VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE UNION TO OBTAIN REINSTATEMENT AS EEO COUNSELOR.
 
    14.  ON SEPTEMBER 14, 1979, RASMUSSEN NOTIFIED LUCERO BY LETTER THAT
 SHE WAS RELIEVING HIM OF HIS UNION VICE-PRESIDENCY PENDING RESOLUTION OF
 THE ISSUE OF HIS HOLDING UNION OFFICE WHILE SERVING AS AN EEO COUNSELOR.
  RASMUSSEN ALSO SENT A LETTER TO SSA DISTRICT MANAGER ROBERT DAVIS
 NOTIFYING DAVIS OF HER ACTION.
 
    17.  TO FILL LUCERO'S JOB AS VICE-PRESIDENT, RASMUSSEN APPOINTED WADE
 MAYER AS ACTING VICE-PRESIDENT.  THIS APPARENTLY OCCURRED IN SEPTEMBER.
 IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY ITS POSITION THAT THE DISTRICT VICE-PRESIDENT HAD
 REPRESENTATIONAL AND ADVERSARIAL DUTIES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE GSA
 CASE, RESPONDENT OFFERED EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT WADE MAYER EXERCISED SUCH
 DUTIES.  THE GENERAL COUNSEL ARGUED THAT EVENTS OCCURRING AFTER THE
 ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE WERE NOT RELEVANT.  IN EFFECT, THE GENERAL
 COUNSEL IS CONTENDING THAT GREATER WEIGHT BE GIVEN TO RASMUSSEN'S
 TESTIMONY A YEAR AFTER THE ALLEGED VIOLATION AS TO WHAT SHE INTENDED TO
 ASSIGN TO LUCERO, THAN TO EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE KIND OF FUNCTIONS
 ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO LUCERO'S SUCCESSOR.
 
    I AGREE WITH RESPONDENTS THAT WE ARE CONCERNED IN THIS CASE, NOT ONLY
 WITH THE DUTIES OF RAYMOND LUCERO AS VICE-PRESIDENT, BUT ALSO WITH THE
 OFFICE OF VICE-PRESIDENT.  TO THE EXTENT THAT SUBSEQUENT EVENTS SHED
 LIGHT ON THIS QUESTION, I REGARD THE EVIDENCE AS RELEVANT AND ADHERE TO
 MY RULING AT THE HEARING.
 
              H.  DUTIES OF ACTING VICE-PRESIDENT WADE MAYER
 
    18.  BY LETTER DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 1979, PRESIDENT RASMUSSEN NOTIFIED
 RESPONDENTS THAT BECAUSE SHE WAS INVOLVED IN OTHER PRESSING UNION
 BUSINESS SHE WAS DESIGNATING ACTING DISTRICT OFFICE VICE-PRESIDENT WADE
 MAYER "TO BE THE MAIN SPOKESMAN FOR LOCAL 1802 AND HANDLE THE DETAILS OF
 THE MEETING FOR THIS QUARTER."
 
    A.  AT RESPONDENTS' REQUEST ONE OF THE AGENDA ITEMS AT THIS QUARTERLY
 CONSULTATION MEETING WAS "LIST OF OFFICERS AND CLARIFICATION OF ROLES."
 MS. SLACK TESTIFIED THAT SHE WAS STILL TRYING TO ASCERTAIN THE
 VICE-PRESIDENT'S DUTIES.
 
    19.  IN NOVEMBER 1979, ACCORDING TO AURORA BRANCH MANAGER MARY ANN
 TOWNSEND, A NEW OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE WAS PRESENTED TO WADE MAYER, WHO
 REVIEWED IT, DISCUSSED IT WITH EMPLOYEES, AND MET WITH MANAGEMENT TO
 POINT OUT HIS VIEWS AND CONCERNS.
 
    20.  ON JANUARY 21, 1980, WADE MAYER CALLED TO SCHEDULE A GRIEVANCE
 MEETING WHICH WAS HELD ON JANUARY 24.  HE ATTENDED THE MEETING WITH
 CHIEF STEWARD ART FORD AND KENNETH BULL, AFGE NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE.
 ALTHOUGH BULL WAS THE SPOKESMAN, MAYER NEVERTHELESS WAS THERE AS A UNION
 REPRESENTATIVE (TR. 47).
 
    21.  ON JANUARY 24, 1980, MAYER MET WITH MANAGEMENT FOR TWO HOURS TO
 DISCUSS THE SNOW LEAVE GRIEVANCE AND ON THE SAME DATE MET FOR 45 MINUTES
 WITH MANAGEMENT TO DISCUSS HOW THE WORK FLOW OR LAYOUT OF THE OFFICE
 COULD BE CHANGED TO ACCOMODATE THE PAPER SHREDDER (RESP. EXH. NO. 11,
 TR. 123).
 
    22.  MS. TOWNSEND ALSO CREDIBLY TESTIFIED THAT WADE MAYER REPRESENTED
 AN EMPLOYEE WHO OBJECTED TO A PERFORMANCE DISCUSSION BEING PLACED IN HER
 PERSONNEL EXTENSION FILE.  IT'S NOT CLEAR WHETHER THIS INCIDENT WAS A
 FORMAL GRIEVANCE BUT CLEARLY IT WAS HANDLED BY MAYER (TR. 124-126).
 
    23.  MS. TOWNSEND ALSO CREDIBLY TESTIFIED THAT SHE HAS DEALT WITH
 MAYER'S SUCCESSOR (BRUCE MONTOYA) IN TWO SEPARATE INCIDENTS WHERE HE
 REPRESENTED EMPLOYEES IN WHAT APPEAR TO BE INFORMAL GRIEVANCES.
 
    24.  ON REBUTTAL, THE GENERAL COUNSEL ASKED RASMUSSEN TO EXPLAIN WHY
 MAYER WAS GIVEN DUTIES WHICH SHE WOULD NOT HAVE ASSIGNED LUCERO HAD HE
 BEEN THE VICE-PRESIDENT.
 
    Q.  THERE HAS BEEN SOME TESTIMONY BY YOU AND BY SOME OTHERS THAT YOU
 ASSIGNED CERTAIN
 
    DUTIES TO WADE MAYER.
 
    A.  YES, I DID.
 
    Q.  WOULD YOU HAVE ASSIGNED THOSE SAME DUTIES TO MR. LUCERO?
 
    A.  NO.
 
    Q.  WOULD YOU EXPLAIN WHY NOT?
 
    A.  WADE WAS TRAINED;  HE KNEW THE ROPES.  I KNEW WADE WOULD NOT BACK
 DOWN WITH
 
    MANAGEMENT.  RAY WAS GREEN AS FAR AS UNION MATTERS WERE CONCERNED.
 RAY HAD NO TRAINING AS A
 
    STEWARD;  HE HAD NO TRAINING AS AN OFFICER, EVEN THOUGH HE WAS A
 MEMBER.
 
    I DON'T KNOW HOW FAMILIAR RAY WAS WITH THE CONTRACT WITHOUT ANY
 TRAINING OR
 
    BACKGROUND.  THERE'S THING (SIC) I COULD USE WADE IN THAT I COULD NOT
 HAVE USED RAY.
 
    25.  ON CROSS-EXAMINATION, RASMUSSEN STATED THAT, WITHOUT TRAINING,
 SHE WOULD NOT PERMIT LUCERO TO REPRESENT A GRIEVANT BUT IF HE ASKED TO
 RECEIVE SUCH TRAINING, SHE COULD APPROVE HIS REQUEST.  RESPONDENTS'
 COUNSEL THEN QUESTIONED HER FURTHER (TR. 136).
 
    Q.  IF HE HAD THE TRAINING, WOULD YOU HAVE THEN PERMITTED HIM TO BE
 ENGAGED IN
 
    REPRESENTATION LIKE A GRIEVANCE?
 
    A.  IT WOULD HAVE DEPENDED ON THE GRIEVANCE.
 
    26.  THE FOREGOING EXCERPTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF UNION PRESIDENT
 RASMUS