08:0718(125)CO - AFGE Local 2000 and Wilder M. Mixon -- 1982 FLRAdec CO



[ v08 p718 ]
08:0718(125)CO
The decision of the Authority follows:


 8 FLRA No. 125
 
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
 EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 2000, AFL-CIO
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 WILDER M. MIXON, AN INDIVIDUAL
 Charging Party
 
                                            Case No. 6-CO-17
 
                            DECISION AND ORDER
 
    THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ISSUED THE ATTACHED DECISION AND ORDER
 IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PROCEEDING RECOMMENDING THAT THE COMPLAINT BE
 DISMISSED.  THEREAFTER, THE GENERAL COUNSEL FILED EXCEPTIONS TO THE
 JUDGE'S DECISION AND ORDER.
 
    PURSUANT TO SECTION 2423.29 OF THE AUTHORITY'S RULES AND REGULATIONS
 (5 CFR 2423.29) AND SECTION 7118 OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS STATUTE (THE STATUTE), THE AUTHORITY HAS REVIEWED THE RULINGS
 OF THE JUDGE MADE AT THE HEARING AND FINDS THAT NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS
 COMMITTED.  THE RULINGS ARE HEREBY AFFIRMED.  UPON CONSIDERATION OF THE
 JUDGE'S DECISION AND ORDER AND THE ENTIRE RECORD IN THE SUBJECT CASE,
 THE AUTHORITY HEREBY ADOPTS THE JUDGE'S CONCLUSIONS HEREIN.
 
    IN AGREEMENT WITH THE JUDGE'S CONCLUSIONS, THE AUTHORITY FINDS THAT
 THE ALLEGATION IN THE COMPLAINT MAY NOT BE LITIGATED UNDER SECTION 7116
 OF THE STATUTE.  IN THIS REGARD, THE MATTERS AT ISSUE INVOLVE
 ALLEGATIONS THAT CERTAIN OF THE RESPONDENT'S CONDUCT WAS INCONSISTENT
 WITH AND VIOLATIVE OF ITS CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS, AND THUS ARE MATTERS
 WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR
 PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 7120 OF THE STATUTE.  /1/
 ACCORDINGLY, THE COMPLAINT HEREIN SHALL BE DISMISSED.  /2/
 
                                   ORDER
 
    IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT THE COMPLAINT IN CASE NO. 6-CO-17 BE, AND
 IT HEREBY IS, DISMISSED.
 
    ISSUED, WASHINGTON, D.C., MAY 20, 1982
 
                        RONALD W. HAUGHTON CHAIRMAN
                        HENRY B. FRAZIER III, MEMBER
                        LEON B. APPLEWHAITE, MEMBER
                        FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
 
 
 
 
 
 --------------- FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
 
 
    /1/ SEE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY, 5 FLRA NO. 21(1981).
 
    /2/ CF. NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION AND NATIONAL TREASURY
 EMPLOYEES UNION, CHAPTER 53, 6 FLRA NO. 37(1981), IN WHICH THE AUTHORITY
 FOUND A VIOLATION OF SECTION 7116(B)(1) OF THE STATUTE, AND ORDERED A
 UNION STEWARD REINSTATED TO HIS UNION POSITION, IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE
 IT WAS DETERMINED THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REMOVED EXCEPT FOR HIS
 
 HAVING GIVEN TESTIMONY AT AN AUTHORITY PROCEEDING.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -------------------- ALJ$ DECISION FOLLOWS --------------------
 
    AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
    EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 2000
                                RESPONDENT
 
    AND
 
    WILDER M. MIXON, AN INDIVIDUAL
                              CHARGING PARTY
 
                             CASE NO. 6-CO-17
 
    STEVEN M. ANGEL, ESQUIRE
    FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL
 
    MR. CARL W. HOLT
    FOR THE RESPONDENT
 
    BEFORE:  WILLIAM B. DEVANEY
    ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
 
                                 DECISION
 
                           STATEMENT OF THE CASE
 
    THIS IS A PROCEEDING UNDER THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS STATUTE, 5 U.S.C. CHAPTER 71, /1/ AND THE FINAL RULES AND
 REGULATIONS ISSUED THEREUNDER, FED. REG., VOL- 45, NO. 12, JANUARY 29,
 1980, 5 C.F.R. 2415.1, ET. SEQ.  THE CHARGE HEREIN, FILED ON FEBRUARY
 21, 1980 (G.C. EXH. 1(A)), NAMED AS THE LABOR ORGANIZATION AGAINST WHICH
 THE CHARGE WAS MADE, "AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL
 2000, AFL-CIO;" THE BASIS OF THE CHARGE STATED, INTER ALIA, IN EFFECT,
 THAT THE NAMED LABOR ORGANIZATION, I.E., AFGE LOCAL 2000, BY THE ACTS
 AND CONDUCT OF ITS AGENTS INTERFERRED WITH, RESTRAINED EMPLOYEES IN THE
 EXERCISE OF RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE STATUTE AND DENIED MEMBERSHIP TO
 WILDER M. MIXON FOR REASONS OTHER THAN THE FAILURE TO MEET REASONABLE
 OCCUPATIONAL STANDARDS OR THE FAILURE TO TENDER DUES OR THE ENFORCEMENT
 OF DISCIPLINE OTHER THAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES CONSISTENT WITH
 THE STATUTE.  HOWEVER, IN PARAGRAPH 5, BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE WAS
 NAMED AS THE ACTIVITY INVOLVED.  /2/
 
    THE COMPLAINT AND NOTICE OF HEARING ISSUED ON MARCH 28, 1980.
 PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE COMPLAINT STATED THAT RESPONDENT, AFGE LOCAL 2000,
 HAS BEEN, AND IS NOW, THE EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE OF EMPLOYEES OF THE
 U.S. AIR FORCE, BARKSDALE AFB IN A UNIT OF:
 
    "ALL NON PROFESSIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES PAID FROM
 APPROPRIATED FUNDS OF THE
 
    BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE AND THE ON-BASE TENANT ORGANIZATIONS .  . .
 (G.C. EXH. 1(C)).
 
    PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE COMPLAINT STATED THAT RESPONDENT INTERFERED WITH,
 RESTRAINED AND COERCED EMPLOYEES IN THE EXERCISE OF RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY
 5 U.S.C. 7102 BY DISCIPLINING WILDER M. MIXON.  PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE
 COMPLAINT STATED THAT RESPONDENT DENIED MEMBERSHIP TO WILDER M. MIXON,
 AN EMPLOYEE IN THE APPROPRIATE UNIT SET FORTH ABOVE IN PARAGRAPH 3 FOR
 REASONS OTHER THAN:  (1) FAILURE TO MEET REASONABLE OCCUPATIONAL
 STANDARDS;  (2) FAILURE TO TENDER DUES;  OR (3) ENFORCEMENT OF
 DISCIPLINE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES UNDER ITS CONSTITUTION OR
 BY-LAWS TO THE EXTENT CONSISTENT WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491 AND CHAPTER
 71 OF TITLE 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE.
 
    RESPONDENT'S ANSWER WAS DATED APRIL 19, 1980 (G.C. EXH. 1(G)).
 PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE ANSWER DID NOT DENY THE ALLEGATIONS OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF
 THE COMPLAINT BUT STATED,
 
    "AFGE LOCAL 2000 IS THE EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE OF EMPLOYEES OF THE
 U.S. AIR FORCE,
 
    BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE . . . THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION MEDICAL
 CENTER . . . , THE DEPUTY
 
    MARSHALS UNIT . . . AND THE NON-APPROPRIATED FUND EMPLOYEES,
 BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE,
 
    LOUISIANA." (G.C. 1(G)).
 
    PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE ANSWER STATED,
 
    "DENIED.  MS. MIXON WAS NEVER DISCIPLINED AS PERTAINS TO ANY RIGHTS
 DUE HER AS GUARANTEED
 
    BY 5 U.S.C. 7102." (G.C. EXH. 1(G)).
 
    PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE ANSWER STATED, IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "MS. MIXON WAS RECOMMENDED BY THE AFGE LOCAL 2000 TRIAL COMMITTEE TO
 THE AMERICAN
 
    FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND THE
 LEGAL RIGHTS COMMITTEE,
 
    WASHINGTON, D.C., FOR EXPULSION FROM MEMBERSHIP IN AFGE LOCAL 2000
 FOR VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE
 
    XIV OF THE AFGE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION. . .  THE AFGE NATIONAL
 EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND THE LEGAL
 
    RIGHTS COMMITTEE MADE THE FINAL DECISION TO SUSPEND MS. MIXON FROM
 MEMBERSHIP FOR TWO
 
    YEARS. . . . " (G.C. EXH. 1(G)).
 
    PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE ANSWER STATED, IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "(A) DENIED.  THE AFGE LOCAL 2000 MEMBERSHIP FOLLOWED ALL
 REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW, THE
 
    LABOR DEPARTMENT RULES AND REGULATIONS. . .  AFGE NATIONAL
 CONSTITUTION, THE LOCAL'S
 
    CONSTITUTION AND BY LAWS, AND THE AFGE OFFICER'S MANUAL IN EVERY STEP
 OF THE PROCESS FOR TRIAL
 
    AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE BASIS IN MS. MIXON'S CASE.  MS. MIXON WAS
 GIVEN EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO
 
    PARTICIPATE IN HER TRIAL . . . TO PROVE HERE INNOCENCE OF THE CHARGES
 WHICH WERE MADE AGAINST
 
    HER BY MRS. GEORGIE P. LUCAS . . . ." (G.C. EXH. 1(G)).
 
    THE NOTICE OF HEARING, ISSUED MARCH 28, 1980, SET THE HEARING FOR
 JUNE 24, 1980.  BY TELEGRAM DATED JUNE 13, 1980, AFGE NATIONAL
 REPRESENTATIVE CARL W. HOLT REQUESTED A POSTPONEMENT OF THE HEARING FOR
 THE STATED REASONS THAT:
 
    "1) MISS OPAL ADAMS IS OUT OF TOWN TILL JUNE 30, 1980 DUE TO DEATH IN
 FAMILY.
 
    "2) AFGE HAS VOTED TO PLACE LOCAL 2000 IN TRUSTEESHIP.
 
    "3) I DO NOT HAVE ANY RECORDS PERTAINING TO THIS MATTER AND AM UNABLE
 TO PREPARE FOR THE
 
    SCHEDULED HEARING."
 
    GENERAL COUNSEL OPPOSED THE REQUEST AND THE REQUEST WAS DENIED BY
 TELEGRAPHIC ORDER ISSUED JUNE 20, 1980.  AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE
 HEARING, COUNSEL FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL ANNOUNCED THAT IN REVIEWING THE
 RECORDS OF REGIONAL OFFICE IT HAD BEEN DISCOVERED THAT RESPONDENT HAD,
 INDEED, FILED AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT;  THAT, ACCORDINGLY, THE MOTION
 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS BEING WITHDRAWN.  RESPONDENT RENEWED ITS
 MOTION
 TO POSTPONE THE HEARING FOR THE SAME REASONS PREVIOUSLY ADVANCED IN ITS
 REQUEST OF JUNE 13, 1980.  ASSUMING THE ABSENCE OF MS.  ADAMS, NO
 SHOWING WAS MADE THAT SHE WAS A NECESSARY WITNESS;  NO RECORDS WERE
 SHOWN TO BE UNAVAILABLE, INDEED THE DOCUMENTS IN POSSESSION OF THE
 GENERAL COUNSEL, SUBSEQUENTLY INTRODUCED AS EXHIBITS, APPEAR TO
 CONSTITUTE ALL RECORDS MATERIAL TO THIS PROCEEDING;  AND A VOTE TO PLACE
 LOCAL 2000 IN TRUSTEESHIP CONSTITUTED NO CAUSE FOR POSTPONEMENT OF THE
 HEARING AND RESPONDENT'S RENEWED MOTION WAS DENIED;  HOWEVER, RESPONDENT
 WAS AFFORDED A RECESS TO CALL NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS AND WAS OFFERED
 ADDITIONAL TIME, NOT TO EXCEED TWO HOURS, TO ARRANGE FOR THE APPEARANCE
 OF DEFENSE WITNESSES EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER GENERAL COUNSEL PRESENTED
 HIS CASE.
 
    RESPONDENT ACCEPTED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A RECESS AND CALLED NATIONAL
 HEADQUARTERS AND UPON RETURN MADE TWO FURTHER MOTIONS.  FIRST, THAT A
 TRUSTEE HAD BEEN APPOINTED AND THE COMPLAINT WAS DIRECTED AGAINST THE
 IMPROPER PARTY.  SECOND, THAT MS. MIXON WAS NEVER AN EMPLOYEE OF THE
 U.S. AIR FORCE, BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE;  THAT THEREFORE, THE
 ALLEGATIONS OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE COMPLAINT WERE FALSE AND THAT,
 ACCORDINGLY, THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED.  COUNSEL FOR GENERAL
 COUNSEL MOVED TO AMEND PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE COMPLAINT TO REFLECT THE
 VETERANS ADMINISTRATION HOSPITAL UNIT, ORIGINALLY A SEPARATE EXCLUSIVE
 UNIT (LOCAL 2525), BUT IN DECEMBER, 1977, MERGED WITH LOCAL 2000.  WITH
 FULL RECOGNITION OF RESPONDENT'S ANSWER, DATED APRIL 19, 1980, THE FACT
 THAT THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES BY LOCAL 2000 AGAINST
 WILDER M. MIXON, AND THAT RESPONDENT WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE SPECIFIC
 ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING MS. MIXON TO WHICH IT ASSERTED THAT IT HAD ACTED
 IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS AS PERMITTED BY THE
 STATUTE, OBVIOUSLY, GENERAL COUNSEL'S MOTION DID NOT RAISE A NEW OR
 DIFFERENT UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE;  RESPONDENT CAN NOT ASSERT SURPRISE;
 AND, BEING FULLY APPRISED OF BASIS OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE ALLEGED,
 RESPONDENT HAD AMPLE TIME AND OPPORTUNITY, SINCE ON OR BEFORE APRIL 19,
 1980, TO PREPARE ITS DEFENSE.  THEREFORE, GENERAL COUNSEL'S MOTION TO
 AMEND PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE COMPLAINT WAS GRANTED AND RESPONDENT'S TWO
 ADDITIONAL MOTIONS WERE DENIED.
 
    RESPONDENT ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION NOT TO PARTICIPATE AS A PARTY AND
 MR. HOLT LEFT THE COURTROOM ROOM AFTER GENERAL COUNSEL'S OPENING
 STATEMENT.  THE HEARING PROCEEDED WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF RESPONDENT'S
 REPRESENTATIVE.  THE UNDERSIGNED, ON THE BASIS OF COUNSEL FOR GENERAL
 COUNSEL'S OPENING STATEMENT, QUESTIONED JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER GENERAL
 COUNSEL'S ASSERTION THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED SEC. 16(B)(1) INASMUCH AS:
 A) SEC. 16(C) PROVIDES, IN PART, THAT, "THIS SUBSECTION DOES NOT
 PRECLUDE ANY LABOR ORGANIZATION FROM ENFORCING DISCIPLINE IN ACCORDANCE
 WITH PROCEDURES UNDER ITS CONSTITUTION OR BY LAWS TO THE EXTENT
 CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CHAPTER;" B) THE BASIS FOR THE
 ASSERTED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE IS THAT RESPONDENT'S ENFORCEMENT OF
 DISCIPLINE AGAINST MS. MIXON WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES UNDER
 ITS CONSTITUTION OR BY LAWS;  AND C) SEC. 20 GOVERNS STANDARDS OF
 CONDUCT FOR LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, ENFORCEMENT OF WHICH THE STATUTE HAS
 DELEGATED TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR FOR LABOR MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS.
 
    RESERVING THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION, COUNSEL FOR GENERAL COUNSEL
 PRESENTED EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF THE ASSERTIONS OF THE
 COMPLAINT.  AT THE CLOSE OF THE HEARING, JULY 24 WAS FIXED AS THE DATE
 FOR MAILING BRIEFS AND COUNSEL FOR GENERAL COUNSEL WAS REQUESTED TO
 SERVE NOTICE OF THE DATE FOR FILING BRIEFS ON RESPONDENT.  COUNSEL FOR
 GENERAL COUNSEL HAS FILED A BRIEF AND MS. OPAL B. ADAMS, PRESIDENT OF
 LOCAL 2000, HAS FILED A STATEMENT, IN THE FORM OF A LETTER, WHICH HAVE
 BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED.  UPON THE BASIS OF THE ENTIRE RECORD, I MAKE
 THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:
 
                                 FINDINGS
 
    1.  MS. WILDER M. MIXON, ALSO KNOWN AS SUE MIXON, WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF
 THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION MEDICAL CENTER UNTIL HER RETIREMENT ON
 DECEMBER 15, 1979.  SHE HAD BEEN A MEMBER AND OFFICER OF LOCAL 2525, THE
 SEPARATE UNIT FOR THE VA MEDICAL CENTER, UNTIL ITS MERGER WITH LOCAL
 2000 IN DECEMBER, 1977.  IN JANUARY, 1978, SHE WAS ELECTED
 SECRETARY-TREASURER OF LOCAL 2000 AND SERVED IN SUCH CAPACITY UNTIL
 JANUARY, 1979, WHEN HER TERM EXPIRED.
 
    2.  BY LETTER DATED MARCH 8, 1979, ADDRESSED TO MS. MIXON, MS. OPAL
 B. ADAMS, PRESIDENT OF LOCAL 2000, PURPORTEDLY ADVISED MS. MIXON THAT
 SHE HAD, ON MARCH 8, 1979, APPOINTED A THREE-MEMBER INVESTIGATIVE
 COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE CHARGES MADE BY UNIT MEMBERS AGAINST HER;  THAT
 THE CHARGES CITE PROBABLE VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE XIV, AFGE NATIONAL
 CONSTITUTION;  AND THAT IF SHE WISHED TO REVIEW THE CHARGES, SHE MIGHT
 CONTACT MS. ADAMS UPON RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE (G.C. EXH. 3).  A
 MEMORANDUM, ALSO DATED MARCH 8, 1979, WAS ADDRESSED TO MR. JACK FRANKS,
 INVESTIGATOR, CHAIRMAN;  MR. JOE WATSON, INVESTIGATOR, MEMBER;  AND MR.
 JOE TAYLOR, INVESTIGATOR, MEMBER (G.C. EXH. 3).  THE CHARGES, HOWEVER,
 WERE DATED MARCH 12, 1979, AND, WHILE SIGNED BY MS. GEORGIE P. LUCAS,
 CHIEF STEWARD, VAMC UNIT, MS. LUCAS TESTIFIED THAT THE CHARGES HAD BEEN
 DRAWN UP BY MS. ADAMS (TR. 131).  AS SIGNED BY MS. LUCAS, THERE WERE 42
 CHARGES (NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS AND/OR COUNTS).
 
    3.  MS. MIXON TESTIFIED THAT SHE DID NOT RECEIVE THE LETTER DATED
 MARCH 8, 1979, /3/ OR THE PURPORTED ATTACHMENT, MEMORANDUM ADDRESSED TO
 THE INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE, UNTIL SOMETIME IN JUNE, 1979, WHEN SHE
 RECEIVED MS. ADAMS' LETTER DATED JUNE 8, 1979, WHICH ADVISED HERE, INTER
 ALIA, THAT THE INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE HAD MADE A REPORT OF PROBABLE
 CAUSE FOR A TRIAL UNDER ARTICLE XIV;  THAT THE REPORT HAD BEEN SUBMITTED
 TO THE MEMBERSHIP ON MAY 14, 1979, A REGULAR MEETING WHICH MS. MIXON HAD
 FAILED TO ATTEND;  AND THAT THE MEMBERSHIP HAD VOTED TO HAVE HER TRIED
 BY THE LOCAL 2000 EXECUTIVE BOARD AT 6:00 P.M. ON JUNE 25, 1979.  THE
 LETTERS OF MARCH 8, 1979, WERE ATTACHED, TOGETHER WITH A LIST OF THE
 CHARGES.  THE INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE ON MAY 9, 1979, ASSERTED THAT, IN
 THE COURSE OF THEIR INVESTIGATION OF THE ORIGINAL CHARGES, THE COMMITTEE
 DISCOVERED THAT MS. MIXON HAD FURTHER VIOLATED "#43 OF SEC. 2'A" BY
 "COLLECTING SIGNATURES FROM VA UNIT AND NON-AFGE UNIT EMPLOYEES TO
 SECEDE FROM AFGE AND GO WITH NFFE" FOR WHICH THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED
 EXPULSION.  THIS WAS ADDED, ON JUNE 7, 1979, AS THE 43RD CHARGE.  (G.C.
 EXH. 3).
 
    4.  MS. MIXON TESTIFIED THAT SHE SELECTED MR. MIKE KENNINGTON AS HER
 REPRESENTATIVE.  ABOUT NOON ON JUNE 25, 1979, MS. MIXON STATED THAT MR.
 KENNINGTON CALLED AND TOLD HER HE COULD NOT ATTEND THE TRIAL SCHEDULED
 FOR THAT AFTERNOON AND ADVISED HER TO ATTEND AND REQUEST A POSTPONEMENT
 TO ANY DAY THE FOLLOWING WEEK EXCEPT FRIDAY.  THE JUNE 25 TRIAL BODY
 CONSISTED OF:  LOUIE HERZBERG, CHAIRMAN, MILTON WEEKS, SAM GATLIN,
 MARGUERITE LOFTIN AND MARVIS PRICE.  MS.  LUCAS SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED
 HERZBERG, WEEKS AND LOFTIN AS MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD AND,
 PRESUMABLY, GATLIN AND PRICE WERE ALSO MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD
 (TR. 132, 133).
 
    5.  MS. MIXON ATTENDED THE MEETING ON JUNE 25 AND, DESPITE THE FACT
 THAT ARTICLE XIV OF THE UNION'S CONSTITUTION, SECTION 4 (G.C. EXH. 2)
 PROVIDES THAT THE TRIAL SHALL BE CONDUCTED EITHER BY THE LOCAL'S
 EXECUTIVE BOARD OR BY A TRIAL COMMITTEE ELECTED BY THE MEMBERSHIP,
 OBJECTED TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE TRIAL BODY.  IN ADDITION, SHE:  A)
 REQUESTED A POSTPONEMENT UNTIL THE FOLLOWING WEEK (ANY DAY EXCEPT
 FRIDAY);  AND B) SUBMITTED A REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS (G.C. EXH. 4).  MS.
 MIXON TESTIFIED THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE TRIAL BODY AGREED TO A
 POSTPONEMENT TO JULY 5, 1979;  HOWEVER, MS. ADAMS, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE
 EXECUTIVE BOARD, BY TELEGRAM ON JUNE 28, 1979, ADVISED MS. MIXON, IN
 PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    ". . . BECAUSE YOU PROTESTED THE PRESENCE OF THREE OF THE TRIAL
 COMMITTEE MEMBERS, YOU
 
    RENDERED THEM WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO POSTPONE YOUR TRIAL, AND YOUR CASE
 WAS REMANDED TO THE
 
    CHAIRMAN OF THE LOCAL 2000 EXECUTIVE BOARD FOR ACTION.  YOUR TRIAL
 WILL PROCEED AT 6:00 P.M.,
 
    FRIDAY, 29 JUNE 1979, WITH OR WITHOUT YOUR PRESENCE . . . " (G.C.
 EXH. 5).
 
    6.  BY SEPARATE TELEGRAM ON JUNE 28, 1979, MS. ADAMS, AGAIN AS
 CHAIRMAN OF AFGE LOCAL 2000 EXECUTIVE BOARD, FURTHER ADVISED MS. MIXON,
 IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "THE AFGE LOCAL 2000 TRIAL COMMITTEE, INCLUDING OFFICIALS OF THE
 LOCAL 2000 EXECUTIVE
 
    BOARD, WILL PROCEED WITH YOUR TRIAL AT 6:00 P.M., FRIDAY, JUNE 29,
 1979 . . .  YOUR PRESENCE
 
    IS REQUESTED FOR THIS TRIAL.  IF YOUR DESIRE, YOU MAY HAVE A
 REPRESENTATIVE PRESENT
 
    . . . ." (G.C. EXH. 6).
 
    6.  THE JUNE 29, 1979, TRIAL COMMITTEE CONSISTED OF:  ROBERT YAGEL,
 CHAIRMAN, MILTON WEEKS AND DENNIS HARDIMAN, MEMBERS.  MS. LUCAS
 TESTIFIED THAT MR. WEEKS WAS A MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD BUT THAT
 MESSRS. YAGEL AND HARDIMAN WERE NOT (TR. 136).
 
    8.  MS. MIXON APPEARED ON JUNE 29 AND PRESENTED A PROTEST (G.C.
 EXHS. 7, 8) AND LEFT.  THE TRIAL PROCEEDED IN HER ABSENCE (G.C. EXH. 8);
  THE MEMBERS OF THE TRIAL COMMITTEE UNANIMOUSLY FOUND MS. MIXON GUILTY
 AS CHARGED AND RECOMMENDED TO THE MEMBERSHIP THAT SHE BE EXPELLED FROM
 MEMBERSHIP;  ROBERT YAGEL, CHAIRMAN, TRIAL COMMITTEE, NOTIFIED MS.
 MIXON BY TELEGRAM ON SEPTEMBER 10, 1979, THAT ON SEPTEMBER 10, 1979, THE
 TRIAL COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE PRESENTED TO THE MEMBERSHIP AT
 ITS REGULAR MEETING.  /4/ ALTHOUGH THE TELEGRAM WAS SENT AT 8:25 A.M.,
 BECAUSE SHE DID NOT GO DIRECTLY HOME FROM WORK, MS. MIXON STATED SHE DID
 NOT SEE THE TELEGRAM UNTIL 6:30 P.M., AN HOUR BEFORE THE SCHEDULED
 MEETING, AND DID NOT ATTEND THE MEETING.
 
    9.  BY LETTER DATED SEPTEMBER 28, 1979 (G.C. 12), MS. ADAMS, AS
 PRESIDENT OF LOCAL 2000, ADVISED MS. MIXON THAT THE MEMBERSHIP ON
 SEPTEMBER 10 HAD VOTED FOR HER DISMISSAL AND SET FORTH HER RIGHT TO
 APPEAL.  /5/
 
    10.  BY LETTER, ALSO DATED SEPTEMBER 28, 1979, PRESIDENT ADAMS
 ADVISED MR. L.M. FRAZIER, JR., HOSPITAL DIRECTOR, VA MEDICAL CENTER,
 THAT ON SEPTEMBER 10, 1979, MS.  MIXON WAS EXPELLED FROM MEMBERSHIP AND,
 
    "SINCE MS. MIXON IS NO LONGER A MEMBER IN GOOD STANDING, REQUEST THAT
 YOU INSTRUCT YOUR
 
    CHIEF OF FINANCE . . . TO TERMINATE MS. MIXON'S UNION DUES
 WITHHOLDING . . . THAT I BE
 
    NOTIFIED OF THE AMOUNT OF DUES WITHHELD . . . SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER
 1979.  THE UNION WILL THEN
 
    REIMBURSE MS. MIXON FOR DUES WITHHELD AND PAID . . . SINCE 11
 SEPTEMBER 1979
 
    . . . ." (G.C. EXH. 13).
 
    MS. MIXON'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS WAS NOT, OF COURSE, AFFECTED IN ANY
 MANNER AND SHE CONTINUED HER EMPLOYMENT UNTIL HER VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT
 ON DECEMBER 15, 1979.
 
    11.  CHARGES (NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS AND/OR COUNTS) NOS. 4, 6, 12, AND
 16 /6/ RELATED IN WHOLE, OR IN PART, TO THE LATE MS. SALLIE J. WHITAKER
 AND TO MS. GOLDA I.  MCDONALD.  GENERAL COUNSEL'S POSITION IS THAT THE
 DECISION OF JUDGE OLIVER, IN AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
 EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 2000, CASE NOS. 6-CO-1, 6-CO-2 AND 6-CO-3
 (SALLIE J.  WHITAKER AND G. IRENE MCDONALD CHARGING PARTIES), DATED
 APRIL 29, 1980, WHICH FOUND THAT LOCAL 2000, INTER ALIA, VIOLATED SEC.
 16(B)(1) OF THE STATUTE BY LETTERS THREATENING WHITAKER AND/OR MCDONALD
 WITH UNSPECIFIED CHARGES IF THEY ATTEMPTED TO PAY DUES AND RETAIN
 MEMBERSHIP;  AND VIOLATED SEC. 19(C) OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS
 AMENDED, BY EJECTING WHITAKER FROM A UNION MEETING;  AND VIOLATED SEC.
 16(C) OF THE STATUTE BY DENYING MEMBERSHIP TO WHITAKER AND MCDONALD BY
 ERRONEOUSLY STATING THAT THEY HAD NOT BEEN MEMBERS IN GOOD STANDING
 SINCE MARCH, 1978 AND JULY 1978, RESPECTIVELY, RENDERS CHARGES 4, 6, 12
 AND 16 AGAINST MS. MIXON UNLAWFUL FOR THE REASON THAT THESE CHARGES
 CONCERN THE SAME MATTERS ADDRESSED TO JUDGE OLIVER.  THE FOUR CHARGES IN
 QUESTION READ AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "4.  COLLUSION WITH MS. SALLIE J. WHITAKER AND GOLDA I.  MCDONALD,
 CAUSING DISSENTION AND
 
    TROUBLE FOR THE LOCAL 2000 PRESIDENT AND OTHER OFFICIALS AT THE 13
 NOV 78 MEETING;  GAVING
 
    (SIC) AID AND ABETMENT TO THEM AGAINST THE MEMBERSHIP.
 
    "6.  IGNORING AND REFUSING TO FOLLOW DIRECTIONS OF THE MEMBERSHIP AND
 THE PRESIDENT TO
 
    REFUND DUES ILLEGALLY ACCEPTED BY HER FROM SALLIE WHITAKER AND IRENE
 MCDONALD AND ATTEMPTING
 
    TO COVER UP WHAT SHE HAD DONE.
 
    "12.  INSUBORDINATE TO THE PRESIDENT AT MEETINGS-- REFUSED TO BE
 ACKNOWLEDGED FOR THE
 
    FLOOR-- AND BROUGHT SELECT MEMBERS TO THE MEETING TO DISRUPT AND TAKE
 OVER THE CHAIR WITHOUT
 
    APPROVAL.  (DISSENTERS ENGAGING IN THESE DISRUPTIONS WITH MS.  MIXON
 WERE MIKE KENNINGTON,
 
    ROBERT LANGLEY, ANN KENNINGTON, SALLIE WHITAKER, IRENE MCDONALD).
 
    "16.  FALSIFICATION OF FINANCIAL RECORDS OF MS. SALLIE J.  WHITAKER
 AND MS. GOLDA
 
    I. MCDONALD AS TO WHEN THEIR PAYMENTS OF DUES WERE MADE, AND REFUSAL
 TO REFUND ALL ILLEGAL
 
    DUES PAID TO THE LOCAL SEC-TRES FROM SEPT-13 NOV 78;  INSTEAD
 SCHEMING WITH MS. WHITAKER AND
 
    MS. MCDONALD TO GET THEM ON DUES DEDUCTION WITHOUT BENEFIT OF
 APPROVAL MEMBERSHIP."
 
    12.  COUNSEL FOR GENERAL COUNSEL STATED THAT THE OTHER 38 ORIGINAL
 CHARGES WERE NOT QUESTIONED;  THAT "WE SHOULDN'T GET INTO LITIGATION" OF
 THEM.  NEVERTHELESS, GENERAL COUNSEL'S POSITION WAS STATED, IN EFFECT,
 THAT EVEN ASSUMING 38 VALID REASONS FOR DISCIPLINE, IF THE DISCIPLINE OF
 MS. MIXON RESULTED IN ANY PART FROM IMPROPER MOTIVATION, THE DISCIPLINE
 VIOLATED SEC. 16(B)(1) AND (8).  AS TO THE 43RD CHARGE, IT IS CERTAINLY
 CORRECT THAT IT WAS ADDED TO THE SPECIFICATION OF CHARGES ON JUNE 7,
 1979, AND, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT MS. MIXON'S FIRST WRITTEN NOTIFICATION
 OF THIS CHARGE WAS THE SPECIFICATION OF CHARGES, WHICH CONTAINED IT AS
 CHARGE NO. 43, TRANSMITTED WITH MS. ADAMS' LETTER OF JUNE 8, 1979;
 HOWEVER, THIS ADDITIONAL VIOLATION WAS SET FORTH BY JACK E. FRANKS,
 CHAIRMAN OF THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, ON MAY 9, 1979, AS PART OF THE
 REPORT OF INVESTIGATION SUBMITTED TO THE MEMBERSHIP ON MAY 14, 1979.
 
                                CONCLUSIONS
 
    THE THRESHHOLD ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS ONE OF JURISDICTION, I.E., MAY
 ALLEGED DEPARTURES FROM A UNION'S CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS IN THE
 IMPOSITION OF DISCIPLINE OF A MEMBER BE LITIGATED AS UNFAIR LABOR
 PRACTICES BY THE AUTHORITY OR DOES THE CONCLUDING SENTENCE OF SEC. 16(C)
 AND SEC. 20 REQUIRE THAT SUCH ALLEGED DEPARTURES FROM A UNION'S
 CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS BE LITIGATED BEFORE THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
 PURSUANT TO SEC. 20 OF THE STATUTE AND THE REGULATIONS DULY ISSUED
 PURSUANT THERETO, FED. REG. VOL. 45, NO. 47, MARCH 7, 1980, P. 15156,
 ET. SEQ.; NO. 84, APRIL 29, 1980, P. 28322 (CORRECTIONS TO FINAL
 REGULATIONS PUBLISHED ON MARCH 7, 1980), 29 C.F.R.PARTS 201-209?
 
    THE CONCLUDING SENTENCE OF SEC. 16(C) /7/ IS SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO
 THE PROVISO TO SEC. 8(B)(1)(A) OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, /8/
 INDEED SECTION 9(B)(1) OF H.R. 1589, INTRODUCED BY CONGRESSMAN FORD ON
 JANUARY 10, 1977, REFLECTED THE FORMAT AND FOLLOWED THE LANGUAGE OF
 8(B)(1)(A) AND WHILE OTHER BILLS, AS WELL AS THE LANGUAGE AS ENACTED,
 REMOVED THE PROVISION FORM (B)(1) AND PLACED IT IN 16(C), THE
 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY REFLECTS A CONSCIOUS INTENT TO "TRACK" THE
 SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR PROVISIONS OF THE NLRA.  I CONCLUDE, FULLY IN
 AGREEMENT WITH THE WELL REASONED DECISION OF JUDGE STERNBURG, IN
 NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION AND NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION,
 CHAPTER 53, CASE NO. 2-CO-3 (ALJ JULY 15, 1980), THAT THE CONCLUDING
 SENTENCE OF SEC. 16(C) OF THE STATUTE, AS DOES THE PROVISO TO 8(B)(1)(A)
 OF THE NLRA, "ASSURES A UNION FREEDOM OF SELF REGULATION WHERE INTERNAL
 AFFAIRS ARE CONCERNED" ALTHOUGH SUCH FREEDOM OF REGULATION DOES NOT
 EXTEND TO, OR ENCOMPASS THE IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES "FOR UTILIZING OR
 PARTICIPATING IN THE AUTHORITY'S PROCESSES . . . ." BECAUSE I CONCLUDE,
 FOR REASONS MORE FULLY SET FORTH BELOW, THAT THE DISCIPLINE OF MS. MIXON
 CONCERNED WHOLLY INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A UNION, SUCH DISCIPLINE IS NOT
 COGNIZABLE UNDER THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE;
 AND THE ALLEGED DEPARTURES BY LOCAL 2000 FROM ITS CONSTITUTION AND BY
 LAWS ARE MATTERS DELEGATED BY SEC. 20 OF THE STATUTE TO THE ASSISTANT
 SECRETARY OF LABOR FOR LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS WHOSE JURISDICTION
 OVER STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, INCLUDING SAFEGUARDS AGAINST IMPROPER
 DISCIPLINARY ACTION AND PROCEEDINGS FOR ENFORCING STANDARDS OF CONDUCT,
 /9/ IS EXCLUSIVE EXCEPT WHERE THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT CONCERN AN INTERNAL
 UNION MATTER BUT TOUCHES A PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN COVERED BY THE
 STATUTE.  SEE, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. INDUSTRIAL UNION OF
 MARINE AND SHIPBUILDING WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 391 U.S. 418(1966).
 
    UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
 PURSUANT TO SECTION 6(A)(4), DECIDED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE COMPLAINTS,
 UNDER SECTION 19, AND ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT,
 UNDER SECTION 18, AND, ACCORDINGLY, NO QUESTION OF JURISDICTION OF THE
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY EXISTED SINCE THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY HAD
 JURISDICTION WHETHER THE MATTER AROSE UNDER SECTION 18 OR UNDER SECTION
 19.  THIS IS NO LONGER TRUE.  AS STATED IN S.REP. 95-969
 
    " . . . THE INITIAL JURISDICTION TO DECIDE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE
 STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
 
    FOR LABOR ORGANIZATIONS WILL BE RETAINED BY THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
 WHO ADMINISTERS SIMILAR
 
    STANDARDS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL
 SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 
    RELATIONS STATUTE, TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT OF 1978.
  COMM. PRINT NO. 96-7,
 
    COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
 
    NOVEMBER 19, 1979, P. 760 (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS "LEGISLATIVE
 HISTORY")
 
   *          *          *          *
 
 
    "SUBSECTION (D) REQUIRES THAT COMPLAINTS OF VIOLATIONS OF THIS
 SECTION BE FILED WITH THE
 
    ASSISTANT SECRETARY . . . THE POWER AND DUTY TO DECIDE ALLEGED
 VIOLATIONS OF THE STANDARDS OF
 
    CONDUCT ARE NOT BEING TRANSFERRED TO THE AUTHORITY BECAUSE THE
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY ADMINISTERS
 
    SIMILAR STANDARDS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR . . . ." (LEGISLATIVE
 HISTORY, P. 768)
 
    AS NOTED ABOVE, THE CONCLUDING SENTENCE OF SEC. 16(C), "THIS
 SUBSECTION DOES NOT PRECLUDE ANY LABOR ORGANIZATION FROM ENFORCING
 DISCIPLINE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES UNDER ITS CONSTITUTION OR BY
 LAWS TO THE EXTENT CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CHAPTER," IS
 SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO THE PROVISO OF SECTION 8(B)(1)(A) OF THE NLRA
 AND THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF 8(B)(1)(A) ARE FULLY
 APPLICABLE TO THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THIS PORTION OF
 SEC. 16(C) OF THE STATUTE.  IN NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V.
 ALLIS-CHALMERS MANUFACTURING COMPANY, 388 U.S. 175(1967), FINES WERE
 IMPOSED AGAINST MEMBERS WHO CROSSED UNION'S PICKET LINE AND WORKED
 DURING AN AUTHORIZED STRIKE.  THE COURT HELD THAT NEITHER THE IMPOSITION
 OF THE FINES NOR SUIT FOR COLLECTION OF THE FINES VIOLATED 8(B)(1)(A)
 STATING, IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    " . . . IT IS NO ANSWER THAT THE PROVISO TO SEC. 8(B)(1)(A) PRESERVES
 TO THE UNION THE
 
    POWER TO EXPEL THE OFFENDING MEMBER.  WHERE THE UNION IS STRONG AND
 MEMBERSHIP THEREFORE
 
    VALUABLE, TO REQUIRE EXPULSION OF THE MEMBER VISITS A FAR MORE SEVERE
 PENALTY UPON THE MEMBER
 
    THAN A REASONABLE FINE . . .  (388 U.S.AT 183).
 
   *          *          *          *
 
 
    "WHAT LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS THERE ARE DEALING WITH SEC.  8(B)(1)(A)
 CONTAIN NOT A SINGLE
 
    WORD REFERRING TO THE APPLICATION OF ITS PROHIBITIONS TO TRADITIONAL
 INTERNAL UNION DISCIPLINE
 
    IN GENERAL, OR DISCIPLINARY FINES IN PARTICULAR.  ON THE CONTRARY
 THERE ARE A NUMBER OF
 
    ASSURANCES BY ITS SPONSORS THAT THE SECTION WAS NOT MEANT TO REGULATE
 THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF
 
    UNIONS.  (388 U.S.AT 185-186).
 
   *          *          *          *
 
 
    " . . . AT THE VERY LEAST IT CAN BE SAID THAT THE PROVISO PRESERVES
 THE RIGHTS OF UNIONS TO
 
    IMPOSE FINES, AS A LESSER PENALTY THAN EXPULSION, AND TO IMPOSE FINES
 WHICH CARRY THE EXPLICIT
 
    OR IMPLICIT THREAT OF EXPULSION FOR NONPAYMENT . . .  (388 U.S.AT
 191-192).
 
   *          *          *          *
 
 
    "THE 1959 LANDRUM-GRIFFIN AMENDMENTS . . . ALSO NEGATE THE REACH
 GIVEN SEC. 8(B)(1)(A) BY
 
    THE MAJORITY EN BANC BELOW . . .  IN 1959 CONGRESS DID SEEK TO
 PROTECT UNION MEMBERS IN THEIR
 
    RELATIONSHIP TO THE UNION BY ADOPTING MEASURES TO INSURE THE
 PROVISION OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES
 
    IN THE CONDUCT OF UNION AFFAIRS AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS TO MEMBERS
 SUBJECTED TO DISCIPLINE
 
    . . .  (388 U.S.AT 193-194).
 
   *          *          *          *
 
 
    "THUS THIS HISTORY OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION DOES NOT SUPPORT A
 CONCLUSION THAT THE
 
    TAFT-HARTLEY PROHIBITIONS AGAINST RESTRAINT OR COERCION OF AN
 EMPLOYEE TO REFRAIN FROM
 
    CONCERTED ACTIVITIES INCLUDED A PROHIBITION AGAINST THE IMPOSITION OF
 FINES ON MEMBERS WHO
 
    DECLINE TO HONOR AN AUTHORIZED STRIKE AND ATTEMPTS TO COLLECT SUCH
 FINES.  RATHER, THE
 
    CONTRARY INFERENCE IS MORE JUSTIFIED IN LIGHT OF THE REPEATED REFRAIN
 THROUGHOUT THE DEBATES
 
    ON SEC. 8(B)(1)(A) AND OTHER SECTIONS THAT CONGRESS DID NOT PROPOSE
 ANY LIMITATIONS WITH
 
    RESPECT TO THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UNIONS, ASIDE FROM BARRING
 ENFORCEMENT OF A UNION'S
 
    INTERNAL REGULATION TO AFFECT A MEMBER'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS." (388
 U.S.AT 195).
 
    IN LOCAL 138, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, AFL-CIO AND
 CHARLES S. SKURA, 148 NLRB 679(1964), A MEMBER, SKURA, FILED AN UNFAIR
 LABOR PRACTICE CHARGE AGAINST THE UNION CLAIMING DISCRIMINATION IN
 REFUSING TO REFER HIM TO AVAILABLE EMPLOYMENT;  SKURA WITHDREW THE
 CHARGE WHEN THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE BOARD ADVISED HIM THAT A
 COMPLAINT WOULD NOT ISSUE;  A UNION OFFICIAL FILED A UNION GRIEVANCE
 AGAINST SKURA CHARGING HIM WITH A VIOLATION OF THE UNION'S BY LAWS FOR
 HAVING FILED THE ULP CHARGE BEFORE EXHAUSTING HIS INTERNAL UNION
 REMEDIES;  SKURA WAS FINED $200.00 AND HIS TENDER OF DUES WAS REJECTED
 BECAUSE HE HAD AN UNPAID FINE OUTSTANDING;  SKURA FILED A SECOND CHARGE.
  THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED THAT THE IMPOSITION OF A FINE FOR FILING AN
 UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGE VIOLATED 8(B)(1)(A).  THE UNION CONTENDED
 THAT SKURA WAS NOT FINED FOR FILING CHARGES BUT FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST
 HIS INTERNAL REMEDIES AND THAT ENFORCEMENT OF SUCH RULE BY A FINE WAS A
 REASONABLE EXERCISE OF A UNION'S RIGHT TO ADMINISTER ITS INTERNAL
 AFFAIRS.  THE BOARD REJECTED THE ASSERTION THAT ANY UNION RULE COULD
 IMPAIR THE FREE ACCESS TO ITS PROCESSES AND STATED, IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "IT IS WELL SETTLED THAT AN EMPLOYER WHO DISCRIMINATES AGAINST AN
 EMPLOYEE BECAUSE HE HAS
 
    FILED CHARGES UNDER THE ACT VIOLATES NOT ONLY SECTION 8(A)(4) BUT
 ALSO SECTION 8(A)(1).  NOT
 
    ONLY DOES THE BOARD HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO PROTECT EMPLOYEES WHO
 PARTICIPATE IN THE BOARD'S
 
    PROCESSES, BUT IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT THE BOARD HAS AN AFFIRMATIVE
 DUTY TO EXERCISE THAT
 
    AUTHORITY TO ITS OUTERMOST LIMITS TO PROTECT SUCH EMPLOYEES.
 
    "JUST AS AN EMPLOYER VIOLATES THE ACT BY RESORTING TO RESTRAINT AND
 COERCION TO RESTRICT
 
    THE RIGHT OF AN EMPLOYEE TO FILE A CHARGE, SO TOO, DOES A LABOR
 ORGANIZATION INFRINGE THE
 
    RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES UNDER THIS LAW BY RESORTING TO UNLAWFUL MEANS TO
 PREVENT OR RESTRICT
 
    EMPLOYEES FROM FILING CHARGES.  AS SUCH CONDUCT BY AN EMPLOYER
 VIOLATES SECTION 8(A)(1), SO
 
    DOES A LABOR ORGANIZATION'S USE OF RESTRAINT OR COERCION VIOLATE
 SECTION 8(B)(1)(A)." (148
 
    NLRB AT 681-682).
 
    WITH RESPECT TO SECTION 101(A)(4) OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING
 AND DISCLOSURE ACT (LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT), AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE
 PROVISION THAT ". . .  ANY SUCH MEMBER MAY BE REQUIRED TO EXHAUST
 REASONABLE HEARING PROCEDURES (BUT NOT TO EXCEED A FOUR MONTH LAPSE OF
 TIME) . . . BEFORE INSTITUTING LEGAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
 AGAINST SUCH ORGANIZATION OR ANY OFFICER THEREOF . . . ", THE BOARD
 FURTHER STATED, IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    " . . . THUS, (PROFESSOR) COX CONCLUDES THAT SECTION 101(A)(4) SHOULD
 BE VIEWED AS
 
    OUTLAWING UNION RULES WHICH COUPLE AN EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT WITH A
 PROVISION FOR DISCIPLINE
 
    FOR FAILING TO EXHAUST.  WE ARE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH THESE
 VIEWS.
 
   *          *          *          *
 
 
    "ACCORDINGLY, WE FIND THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED SECTION 8(B)(1)(A) OF
 THE ACT BY FINING
 
    SKURA BECAUSE HE FAILED TO EXHAUST HIS INTERNAL UNION REMEDIES PRIOR
 TO FILING CHARGES WITH
 
    THE BOARD." (148 NLRB AT 684).
 
    IN NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. MARINE AND SHIPBUILDING WORKERS
 OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 391 U.S. 418(1968), THE SUPREME COURT WAS
 CONFRONTED WITH EXPULSION OF A MEMBER FOR FAILING TO EXHAUST INTRA-UNION
 GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES BEFORE FILING A CHARGE WITH THE NLRB AND, IN FULL
 AGREEMENT WITH THE BOARD'S SKURA, SUPRA, DECISION, HELD THAT A UNION CAN
 NOT EXPEL A MEMBER FOR FAILING TO EXHAUST INTRA-UNION GRIEVANCE
 PROCEDURES ON MATTERS THAT TOUCHES AN AREA COVERED BY THE NLRA
 NOTWITHSTANDING SECTION 101(A)(4) OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND
 DISCLOSURE ACT SINCE EXPULSION IS PERMISSIBLE ONLY WHEN DISPUTED
 CONCERNS SOLELY INTERNAL UNION MATTERS, STATING, IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "WE HELD IN NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. ALLIS-CHALMERS MFG.
 CO., 388 U.S. 175 THAT
 
    SEC. 8(B)(1)(A) DOES NOT PREVENT A UNION FROM IMPOSING FINES ON
 MEMBERS WHO CROSS A PICKET
 
    LINE CREATED TO IMPLEMENT AN AUTHORIZED STRIKE.  THE STRIKE, WE SAID,
 'IS THE ULTIMATE WEAPON
 
    IN LABOR'S ARSENAL FOR ACHIEVING AGREEMENT UPON ITS TERMS' AND THE
 POWER TO FINE OR EXPEL A
 
    STRIKE-BREAKER 'IS ESSENTIAL IF THE UNION IS TO BE AN EFFECTIVE
 BARGAINING AGENT.' ID., AT
 
    181.
 
    "THUS SEC. 8(B)(1)(A) ASSURES A UNION FREEDOM OF SELF-REGULATION
 WHERE ITS LEGITIMATE
 
    INTERNAL AFFAIRS ARE CONCERNED.  BUT WHERE A UNION RULE PENALIZES A
 MEMBER FOR FILING AN
 
    UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGE WITH THE BOARD OTHER CONSIDERATIONS OF
 PUBLIC POLICY COME INTO
 
    PLAY.
 
    " . . . A PROCEEDING BY THE BOARD IS NOT TO ADJUDICATE PRIVATE RIGHTS
 BUT IS TO EFFECTUATE
 
    A PUBLIC POLICY.  THE BOARD CANNOT INITIATE ITS OWN PROCEEDINGS;
 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACT IS
 
    DEPENDENT 'UPON THE INITIATIVE OF INDIVIDUAL PERSONS.' NASH V.
 FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
 
    389 U.S. 235.  . . . ANY COERCION USED TO DISCOURAGE, RETARD, OR
 DEFEAT THAT ACCESS IS BEYOND
 
    THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF A LABOR ORGANIZATION.  THAT WAS THE
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE BOARD IN THE
 
    SKURA CASE . . . , AND WE AGREE THAT THE OVERRIDING PUBLIC INTEREST
 MAKES UNIMPEDED ACCESS TO
 
    THE BOARD THE ONLY HEALTHY ALTERNATIVE, EXCEPT AND UNLESS PLAINLY
 INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE
 
    UNION ARE INVOLVED.  (391 U.S.AT 423-425).
 
   *          *          *          *
 
 
    "THE COURT OF APPEALS FOUND SUPPORT FOR ITS CONTRARY POSITION IN SEC.
 101(A)(4) OF THE
 
    LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959.  73 STAT.
 529, 29
 
    U.S.C. 411(A)(4).  WHILE THAT PROVISION PROHIBITS A UNION FROM
 LIMITING THE RIGHT OF A MEMBER
 
    TO INSTITUTE AN ACTION IN ANY COURT OR IN A PROCEEDING BEFORE ANY
 ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, IT
 
    PROVIDES THAT A MEMBER 'MAY BE REQUIRED TO EXHAUST REASONABLE HEARING
 PROCEDURES' 'NOT TO
 
    EXCEED A FOUR-MONTH LAPSE OF TIME'.
 
    "WE CONCLUDE THAT 'MAY BE REQUIRED' IS NOT A GRANT OF AUTHORITY TO
 UNIONS MORE FIRMLY TO
 
    POLICY THEIR MEMBERS BUT A STATEMENT OF POLICY THAT THE PUBLIC
 TRIBUNALS WHOSE AID IS INVOKED
 
    MAY IN THEIR DISCRETION STAY THEIR HANDS FOR FOUR MONTHS, WHILE THE
 AGGRIEVED PERSON SEEKS
 
    RELIEF WITHIN THE UNION.  . . . (391 U.S.AT 425-426).
 
   *          *          *          *
 
 
    "WE CONCLUDE THAT UNIONS WERE AUTHORIZED TO HAVE HEARING PROCEDURES
 FOR PROCESSING
 
    GRIEVANCES OF MEMBERS . . . BUT THAT A COURT OR AGENCY MIGHT . .  .
 ENTERTAIN THE COMPLAINT
 
    EVEN THOUGH THOSE PROCEDURES HAD NOT BEEN EXHAUSTED.  WE ALSO
 CONCLUDE . . . THAT WHERE THE
 
    COMPLAINT OR GRIEVANCE DOES NOT CONCERN AN INTERNAL UNION MATTER, BUT
 TOUCHES A PART OF THE
 
    PUBLIC DOMAIN COVERED BY THE ACT, FAILURE TO RESORT TO ANY
 INTRA-UNION GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE IS
 
    NOT GROUNDS FOR EXPULSION FROM A UNION . . . ." (391 U.S.AT 428).
 
    SCOFIELD V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 394 U.S.AT 423(1969)
 CONCERNED ENFORCEMENT BY REASONABLE FINES OF UNION RULE IMPOSING A
 CEILING ON PIECEWORK PRODUCTION.  IN HOLDING SUCH RULE VALID, AND ITS
 ENFORCEMENT NOT IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 8(B)(1)(A), THE COURT STATED, IN
 PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "SECTION 8(B)(1) MAKES IT AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE TO 'RESTRAIN OR
 COERCE (A) EMPLOYEES IN
 
    THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHTS GUARANTEED IN (SEC. 7);  PROVIDED, THAT
 THIS PARAGRAPH SHALL NOT
 
    IMPAIR THE RIGHT OF A LABOR ORGANIZATION TO PRESCRIBE ITS OWN RULES
 WITH REGARD TO THE
 
    ACQUISITION OR RETENTION OF MEMBERSHIP THEREIN . . . '
 
    "BASED ON THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECTION, INCLUDING ITS
 PROVISO, THE COURT IN NLRB
 
    V. ALLIS-CHALMERS MFG. CO. . . . DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN INTERNAL AND
 EXTERNAL ENFORCEMENT OF
 
    UNION RULES AND HELD THAT 'CONGRESS DID NOT PROPOSE ANY LIMITATIONS
 WITH RESPECT TO THE
 
    INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UNIONS, ASIDE FROM BARRING ENFORCEMENT OF A
 UNION'S INTERNAL REGULATIONS
 
    TO AFFECT A MEMBER'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS.' . . .
 
    "THIS INTERPRETATION OF SEC. 8(B)(1) . . . WAS REINFORCED BY THE
 LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT OF
 
    1959 WHICH, ALTHOUGH IT DEALT WITH THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UNIONS,
 INCLUDING THE PROCEDURES
 
    FOR IMPOSING FINES OR EXPULSION, DID NOT PURPORT TO OVERTURN OR
 MODIFY THE BOARD'S
 
    INTERPRETATION OF SEC. 8(B)(1) . . .
 
    "ALTHOUGH THE BOARD'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE SECTION EMPHASIZES THE
 SANCTION IMPOSED, RATHER
 
    THAN THE RULE ITSELF, AND DOES NOT INVOLVE THE BOARD IN JUDGING THE
 FAIRNESS OR WISDOM OF
 
    PARTICULAR UNION RULES, IT HAS BECOME CLEAR THAT IF THE RULE INVADES
 OR FRUSTRATES AN
 
    OVERRIDING POLICY OF THE LABOR LAWS THE RULE MAY NOT BE ENFORCED,
 EVEN BY FINE OR EXPULSION,
 
    WITHOUT VIOLATING SEC. 8(B)(1) . . .  (394 U.S.AT 428-430).
 
   *          *          *          *
 
 
    " . . . SEC. 8(B)(1) LEAVES A UNION FREE TO ENFORCE A PROPERLY
 ADOPTED RULE WHICH REFLECTS
 
    A LEGITIMATE UNION INTEREST, IMPAIRS NO POLICY CONGRESS HAS IMBEDDED
 IN THE LABOR LAWS, AND IS
 
    REASONABLY ENFORCED AGAINST UNION MEMBERS WHO ARE FREE TO LEAVE THE
 UNION AND ESCAPE THE RULE
 
    . . .  (394 U.S.AT 430).
 
   *          *          *          *
 
 
    "WE AFFIRM, HOLDING THAT THE UNION RULE IS VALID AND THAT ITS
 ENFORCEMENT BY REASONABLE
 
    FINES DOES NOT CONSTITUTE THE RESTRAINT OR COERCION PROSCRIBED BY
 SEC. 8(B)(1)(A)." (494
 
    U.S.AT 436).
 
    SECTION 16(C) OF THE STATUTE /10/ PROVIDES, IN RELEVANT PART, AS
 FOLLOWS:
 
    "(C) FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER IT SHALL BE AN UNFAIR LABOR
 PRACTICE FOR AN EXCLUSIVE
 
    REPRESENTATIVE TO DENY MEMBERSHIP TO ANY EMPLOYEE IN THE APPROPRIATE
 UNIT REPRESENTED BY SUCH
 
    EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE EXCEPT FOR FAILURE --
 
   *          *          *          *
 
 
    (2) TO TENDER DUES UNIFORMALY REQUIRED AS A CONDITION OF ACQUIRING
 AND RETAINING
 
    MEMBERSHIP.
 
    THIS SUBSECTION DOES NOT PRECLUDE ANY LABOR ORGANIZATION FROM
 ENFORCING DISCIPLINE IN
 
    ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES UNDER ITS CONSTITUTION OR BY-LAWS TO THE
 EXTENT CONSISTENT WITH THE
 
    PROVISIONS OF THIS CHAPTER." (5 U.S.C. 7116(C)).
 
    AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 2000,
 CASE NOS. 6-CO-1;  6-CO-2;  6-CO-3, SUPRA, CONCERNED WHOLLY THE ALLEGED
 DENIAL OF MEMBERSHIP FOR REASONS OTHER THAN THE FAILURE TO TENDER DUES,
 WHICH IS AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE UNDER THE STATUTE.  ASSERTION OF
 JURISDICTION UNDER SEC. 16 WAS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE MANDATE OF THE
 STATUTE.
 
    BY STARK CONTRAST, THE CHARGES AGAINST MS. MIXON ON THEIR FACE
 CONCERNED LEGITIMATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF LOCAL 2000.  FOR EXAMPLE,
 "DISRUPTIVE ACTIONS AT UNION MEETINGS;" "FAILURE TO PERFORM DUTIES OF
 SECRETARY-TREASURER;" "DROPPED 329 MEMBERS DURING 1978 WITHOUT THE
 KNOWLEDGE AND APPROVAL OF THE MEMBERSHIP;" "REFUSED TO MERGE BOOKS OF
 LOCAL 3727 IN JUNE 1978, ALTHOUGH DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT TO DO SO;"
 "FAILURE TO PERFORM DUTIES, MAKE REPORTS TO IRS AND LABOR DEPT.;"
 "REFUSED TO TURN OVER ALL RECORDS AND PROPERTY OF UNION UPON GOING OUT
 OF OFFICE;" "REFUSED TO PROCESS 1187S FOR SEVERED MEMBERS;" "FAILURE TO
 FOLLOW &THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE LOCAL MEMBERSHIP TO BILL NON
 DUES-DEDUCTION MEMBERS;" "REFUSED TO MERGE FINANCES OF LOCAL 2525 WITH
 2000." GENERAL COUNSEL DOES NOT QUESTION THE FACT THAT, EXCEPT AS TO
 FOUR CHARGES WHICH ARE DISCUSSED HEREINAFTER, THE CHARGES AGAINST MS.
 MIXON CONCERNED LEGITIMATE INTERNAL UNION AFFAIRS;  BUT ASSERTS THAT
 DISCIPLINE OF MS. MIXON WAS, NEVERTHELESS, IMPROPER BECAUSE OF ASSERTED
 DEPARTURES BY LOCAL 2000 FROM ITS CONSTITUTION.  THAT LOCAL 2000
 PURPORTED TO HAVE ACTED IN STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH ITS CONSTITUTION WITH
 REGARD TO MS. MIXON IS NOT QUESTIONED.  THUS, FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE
 CONSTITUTION THERE WERE WRITTEN CHARGES;  THE WRITTEN CHARGES WERE
 PURPORTEDLY SERVED ON MS.  MIXON AT THE TIME OF THEIR REFERRAL TO A
 THREE-MEMBER INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE;  THE COMMITTEE MADE AN
 INVESTIGATION OF THE CHARGES AND RECOMMENDED TO THE MEMBERSHIP THAT MS.
 MIXON BE TRIED ON THE CHARGES;  A TRIAL COMMITTEE WAS DESIGNATED;  A
 TRIAL WAS HELD;  THE TRIAL COMMITTEE FOUND MS. MIXON GUILTY AND
 RECOMMENDED EXPULSION;  THE REPORT OF THE TRIAL COMMITTEE WAS SUBMITTED
 TO THE MEMBERSHIP AND APPROVED THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COMMITTEE AND
 VOTED TO EXPEL MS. MIXON;  AND THE AFGE NATIONAL BODY APPROVED
 DISCIPLINE OF MS. MIXON BUT MODIFIED THE PENALTY TO A TWO YEAR
 SUSPENSION.  GENERAL COUNSEL ASSERTS, INTER ALIA, THAT, CONTRARY TO THE
 REPRESENTATIONS OF LOCAL 2000, THE WRITTEN CHARGES WERE NOT SERVED ON
 MS. MIXON UNTIL AFTER THE INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE HAD MADE ITS REPORT TO
 THE MEMBERSHIP;  THAT THE 43RD CHARGE /11/ WAS NOT TIMELY SERVED ON MS.
 MIXON;  THAT MS. MIXON WAS NOT GIVEN REASONABLE TIME TO PREPARE HER
 DEFENSE;  THAT THE TRIAL COMMITTEE WAS NOT CONSTITUTED IN ACCORDANCE
 WITH ITS CONSTITUTION IN THAT IT WAS NEITHER THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF THE
 LOCAL NOR ELECTED BY THE MEMBERSHIP;  AND THAT MS. MIXON WAS NOT
 AFFORDED A FULL AND FAIR HEARING.  WITHOUT DOUBT, SUCH ASSERTIONS RAISE
 SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF RESPONDENT'S COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
 AS SET FORTH IN SEC. 20.  NECESSARILY, ENFORCEMENT OF DISCIPLINE FOR
 INTERNAL UNION MATTERS UNDER SEC. 16(C) "TO THE EXTENT CONSISTENT WITH
 THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CHAPTER" MEANS COMPLIANCE WITH SEC. 20;  BUT
 "COMPLAINTS OF VIOLATIONS" OF SEC. 20 "SHALL BE FILED WITH THE ASSISTANT
 SECRETARY" (SEC. 20(D)).
 
    GENERAL COUNSEL FURTHER ASSERTS, OF COURSE, THAT CHARGES 4, 6, 12 AND
 16 CONCERNED CHARGES AGAINST MS. MIXON WITH REGARD TO CONDUCT INVOLVING
 MS. WHITAKER AND MS. MCDONALD WHICH, AS TO MEMBERS WHITAKER AND
 MCDONALD, WAS LITIGATED IN AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,
 AFL-CIO, LOCAL 2000, SUPRA.  RECOGNIZING THAT IT WAS DETERMINED IN THAT
 DECISION THAT:
 
    A.  LOCAL 2000 VIOLATED SEC. 19(C) OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS
 AMENDED, ON NOVEMBER 13,
 
    1978, BY EJECTING SALLIE WHITAKER FROM A UNION MEETING, THERE BEING
 NO EVIDENCE THAT HER
 
    EJECTION WAS FOR DISCIPLINARY REASONS PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE ORDER;
 THAT WHITAKER HAD NOT BEEN
 
    CHARGED FOR ANY ALLEGED MISCONDUCT;  AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT
 THE EJECTION WAS DISCIPLINE
 
    IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES UNDER RESPONDENT'S CONSTITUTION OR
 BY-LAWS.  /12/
 
    B.  RESPONDENT'S FEBRUARY 6, 1979, LETTER TO WHITAKER AND MCDONALD
 VIOLATED SEC. 16(C) OF
 
    THE STATUTE BY DENYING MEMBERSHIP BY ERRONEOUSLY STATING THAT THEY
 HAD NOT BEEN MEMBERS IN
 
    GOOD STANDING SINCE MARCH 1978 AND JULY 1978, RESPECTIVELY;  AND BY
 STATING THAT IF THEY WANTED
 
    TO BECOME MEMBERS THEY WOULD HAVE TO REAPPLY AND BE VOTED ON BY THE
 MEMBERSHIP, A REQUIREMENT
 
    WHICH WAS NOT UNIFORMLY REQUIRED OF DIRECT DUES PAYING MEMBERS WITH
 DUES IN ARREARS.
 
    C.  RESPONDENT VIOLATED 16(B)(1) OF THE STATUTE BY THREAT OF
 UNSPECIFIED CHARGES IF
 
    WHITAKER AND/OR MCDONALD ATTEMPTED TO PAY DUES AND RETAIN MEMBERSHIP
 OR REAPPLY FOR
 
    MEMBERSHIP.
 
    NEVERTHELESS, I DO NOT FIND THAT CHARGES 4, 6, 12 OR 16 AGAINST MS.
 MIXON WERE THEREBY RENDERED IMPROPER.  CHARGE 6 ALLEGED THAT MS. MIXON
 IGNORED AND REFUSED TO FOLLOW DIRECTIONS OF THE MEMBERSHIP AND THE
 PRESIDENT TO REFUND DUES ILLEGALLY ACCEPTED BY HER FROM WHITAKER AND
 MCDONALD AND ATTEMPTING TO COVER UP WHICH SHE HAD DONE.  WHOLLY APART
 FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNION ACTION, IT IS A LEGITIMATE INTERNAL UNION
 CONCERN AS TO WHETHER AN OFFICER HAS FOLLOWED THE DIRECTION OF THE
 MEMBERSHIP AND THE PRESIDENT AND/OR WHETHER THE OFFICER HAS ATTEMPTED TO
 COVER UP THE FAILURE TO DO SO.
 
    CHARGE 12 ALLEGED THAT MS. MIXON WAS INSUBORDINATE AT MEETINGS.
 AGAIN, THIS IS AN INTERNAL UNION MATTER.
 
    CHARGE 16 ALLEGED FALSIFICATION OF FINANCIAL RECORDS OF WHITAKER AND
 MCDONALD AS TO WHEN DUES PAYMENTS HAD BEEN MADE, REFUSAL TO REFUND DUES
 ILLEGALLY PAID AND SCHEMING TO GET MCDONALD AND WHITAKER ON DUES
 DEDUCTION WITHOUT APPROVAL OF MEMBERSHIP.  AGAIN, THESE ALLEGATIONS
 CONCERNED MATTERS OF LEGITIMATE INTERNAL UNION AFFAIRS.  A UNION
 CERTAINLY HAS THE RIGHT TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS THAT AN OFFICER HAS
 FALSIFIED UNION FINANCIAL RECORDS AND WHETHER AN OFFICER HAS COMPLIED
 WITH ITS RULES AND REGULATIONS.  THE FACT THAT LOCAL 2000 WAS HELD TO
 HAVE VIOLATED SEC. 16(C) AS TO WHITAKER AND MCDONALD DOES NOT AFFECT THE
 UNION'S RIGHT TO INQUIRE AS TO AN OFFICER'S PERFORMANCE OF DUTY AS AN
 OFFICER NOR DOES THE VIOLATION FOUND AS TO MEMBERS WHITAKER AND MCDONALD
 RENDER THE INQUIRY INTO MS. MIXON'S CONDUCT AS AN OFFICER, PURSUANT TO
 CHARGE 16, UNLAWFUL.
 
    CHARGE 4 ALLEGED COLLUSION WITH WHITAKER AND MCDONALD CAUSING
 DISSENTION AND TROUBLE FOR THE LOCAL 2000 PRESIDENT AND OTHER OFFICIALS
 AT THE NOVEMBER 13, 1978, MEETING AND GIVING AID AND ABETMENT TO THEM
 AGAINST THE MEMBERSHIP.  I AM AWARE THAT JUDGE OLIVER FOUND THAT LOCAL
 2000 VIOLATED SEC. 19(C) OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED, BY
 EJECTING WHITAKER FROM THE NOVEMBER 13, 1978, MEETING AND, FROM JUDGE
 OLIVER'S DECISION, IT APPEARS THAT THE "AIDING AND ABETTING" BY MS.
 MIXON CONSISTED OF HER "STATEMENT . . . THAT WHITAKER WAS A MEMBER IN
 GOOD STANDING." NEVERTHELESS, THE INQUIRY CONCERNING MS. MIXON'S CONDUCT
 WAS A LEGITIMATE INTERNAL UNION CONCERN.  INDEED, FOCUS ON THE STATEMENT
 ALONE IS UNREALISTIC.  MS.  MIXON'S STATEMENT THAT MS. WHITAKER WAS "IN
 GOOD STANDING" NECESSARILY RELATED TO CHARGE 16, FOR EXAMPLE, AS TO
 WHETHER MS. MIXON HAD FALSIFIED RECORDS, WHICH, IN MY JUDGMENT, WAS A
 WHOLLY PROPER INQUIRY.
 
    I FIND ONLY THAT:  A) THE CHARGES AGAINST MS. MIXON CONCERNED
 LEGITIMATE INTERNAL UNION AFFAIRS;  AND B) THE DECISION IN AMERICAN
 FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 2000, SUPRA, THAT
 LOCAL 2000 VIOLATED THE ORDER AND THE STATUTE AS TO MEMBERS WHITAKER AND
 MCDONALD, DID NOT RENDER THE CHARGES AGAINST MS. MIXON, WHICH INVOLVED
 WHITAKER AND MCDONALD (CHARGES 4, 6, 12 AND 16), IMPROPER OR IN
 VIOLATION OF SEC. 19 OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER OR OF SECS. 16(C) OR
 16(B)(8) OF THE STATUTE INASMUCH AS THE CHARGES AGAINST MS. MIXON
 CONCERNED HER CONDUCT AS AN OFFICER OF LOCAL 2000 AND SAID INQUIRY WAS A
 LEGITIMATE INTERNAL UNION AFFAIR WHOLLY APART FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF
 UNION ACTION AS TO MEMBERS WHITAKER AND MCDONALD.
 
    SEC. 16(C) OF THE STATUTE LEAVES A UNION FREE TO ENFORCE DISCIPLINE
 "IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES UNDER ITS CONSTITUTION OR BY-LAWS TO THE
 EXTENT CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CHAPTER" WHICH, FOR
 REASONS SET FORTH ABOVE, I CONCLUDE MEANS:  AY THAT FREEDOM OF
 SELF-REGULATION MUST CONCERN LEGITIMATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS;  AND B) THAT
 "TO THE EXTENT CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CHAPTER" REFERS TO
 SEC. 20, STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR LABOR ORGANIZATIONS.  THE CHARGES
 AGAINST MS. MIXON INVOLVED, WHOLLY, MATTERS OF LEGITIMATE INTERNAL UNION
 INTEREST.  THE DISCIPLINE AGAINST MS. MIXON IS CHALLENGED BECAUSE, IT IS
 ALLEGED, LOCAL 2000 DID NOT COMPLY WITH ITS CONSTITUTION AND/OR THAT MS.
 MIXON WAS NOT AFFORDED A FULL AND FAIR HEARING, ETC.  THE RECORD PLAINLY
 SHOWS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THERE MAY BE SUBSTANTIAL MERIT TO SUCH
 ASSERTIONS;  BUT SUCH ALLEGATIONS CONCERN SEC. 20 AND SUBSECTION (D)
 CONFERS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION ON THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, I.E.,
 "COMPLAINTS OF VIOLATIONS OF THIS SECTION SHALL BE FILED WITH THE
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY."
 
    HAVING FOUND THAT THE DISCIPLINE OF WILDER M. MIXON INVOLVED
 LEGITIMATE INTERNAL UNION AFFAIRS AND THAT ENFORCEMENT OF DISCIPLINE
 PURPORTED TO BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF LOCAL
 2000, SECTION 20 OF THE STATUTE, 5 U.S.C. 7120, HAS DELEGATED EXCLUSIVE
 JURISDICTION TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS TO CONSIDER COMPLAINTS OF VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 20.
 ACCORDINGLY, AS THE COMPLAINT ALLEGES THAT WILDER M.  MIXON WAS DENIED
 MEMBERSHIP OTHER THAN "IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES UNDER ITS
 CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS" EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION UNDER THE STATUTE TO
 CONSIDER SUCH ALLEGATIONS HAS BEEN DELEGATED TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
 AND SUCH ALLEGATIONS MAY NOT BE LITIGATED UNDER SEC. 16 AS UNFAIR LABOR
 PRACTICES.  IT IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED, THAT THE COMPLAINT BE
 DISMISSED.
 
                         WILLIAM B. DEVANEY
                         ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
 
    DATED:  AUGUST 13, 1980
    WASHINGTON, D.C.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 --------------- FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
 
    /1/ FOR CONVENIENCE OF REFERENCE, SECTIONS OF THE STATUTE HEREINAFTER
 ARE ALSO REFERRED TO WITHOUT INCLUSION OF THE INITIAL "71", E.G.,
 SECTION 7116(B)(1) WILL BE REFERRED TO AS "SEC. 16(B)(1);" HOWEVER,
 UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFICALLY INDICATED ALL SUCH REFERENCES ARE TO
 CHAPTER 71 OF THE STATUTE.
 
    /2/ A FURTHER ALLEGATION OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST WILDER MIXON
 "BECAUSE OF HER PARTICIPATION IN AND ASSISTANCE TO PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
 THE . . .  AUTHORITY," IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 16(B)(8), WAS WHOLLY WITHOUT
 BASIS AND WAS NOT ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT.
 
    /3/ THE LETTER ADDRESSED TO MS. MIXON, DATED MARCH 8, 1979, HAS THE
 NOTATION AT THE TOP "RRR 97273" WHICH PRESUMABLY MEANT RETURN RECEIPT
 REQUESTED NO. 97273, WHICH MS. MIXON TESTIFIED HER INQUIRY AT THE POST
 OFFICE INDICATED HAD "NEVER BEEN USED" (TR. 90).
 
    /4/ THE NEXT REGULAR MEETING AFTER THE JUNE 29, 1979, TRIAL WOULD
 HAVE BEEN IN JULY;  BUT MS. MIXON TESTIFIED THAT THE JULY MEETING WAS
 NOT HELD BECAUSE OF AN ALERT AT BARKSDALE.  THE REGULAR MEETING IN
 AUGUST WAS CANCELLED THE NIGHT OF THE MEETING BY PRESIDENT ADAMS.  WHILE
 MS. MIXON'S TESTIMONY WOULD INDICATE THAT THE MEETING WAS OPENED AND
 THEN DISMISSED, IT SEEMS MORE PROBABLE, AS MS. LUCAS TESTIFIED, THAT THE
 MEETING WAS NEVER CALLED TO ORDER, I.E., WAS NEVER OPENED.
 
    /5/ AS NOTED IN RESPONDENT'S ANSWER, THE AFGE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE
 COUNCIL'S DECISION WAS TO SUSPEND MS. MIXON FROM MEMBERSHIP FOR TWO
 YEARS.
 
    /6/ COUNT 1 "MS. MIXON'S DISRUPTIVE ACTIONS AT UNION MEETINGS" DOES
 NOT ON ITS FACE SHOW ANY NECESSARY RELATIONSHIP TO EITHER WHITAKER OR
 MCDONALD AND THE "MINUTES OF THE TRIAL" (G.C. EXH. 8) DO NOT SHOW ANY
 RELATION OF THIS CHARGE TO EITHER WHITAKER OR MCDONALD.
 
    /7/ "THIS SUBSECTION DOES NOT PRECLUDE ANY LABOR ORGANIZATION FROM
 ENFORCING DISCIPLINE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES UNDER ITS
 CONSTITUTION OR BY LAWS TO THE EXTENT CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF
 THIS CHAPTER." (5 U.S.C. 7116(C)).
 
    /8/ "PROVIDED, THAT THIS PARAGRAPH (IT SHALL BE AN UNFAIR LABOR
 PRACTICE FOR A LABOR ORGANIZATION OR ITS AGENTS - (1) TO RESTRAIN OR
 COERCE (A) EMPLOYEES IN THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHTS GUARANTEED IN SECTION
 7) SHALL NOT IMPAIR THE RIGHT OF A LABOR ORGANIZATION TO PROSECUTE ITS
 OWN RULES WITH RESPECT TO THE ACQUISITION OR RETENTION OF MEMBERSHIP
 THEREIN" (29 U.S.C. 158(B)(1)(A)).
 
    /9/ 29 C.F.R.PART 208, SUBPART A, INTER ALIA, SEC. 208.2(5)
 "SAFEGUARDS AGAINST IMPROPER DISCIPLINARY ACTION;" SUBPART B -
 PROCEEDINGS FOR ENFORCING STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, SEC. 208.50 ET SEQ.; CF.
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 2206, AFL-CIO AND
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, 1 FLRA NO.
 77(1979).
 
    /10/ EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED, DID NOT CONTAIN THE LANGUAGE
 OF SEC. 16(C) OF THE STATUTE THAT,
 
    "FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER IT SHALL BE AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
 . . . ."
 
    RATHER, SECTION 19(C) OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER PROVIDED,
 
    "(C) A LABOR ORGANIZATION WHICH IS ACCORDED EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION
 SHALL NOT DENY MEMBERSHIP
 
    TO ANY EMPLOYEE IN THE APPROPRIATE UNIT EXCEPT FOR FAILURE TO MEET
 REASONABLE OCCUPATIONAL
 
    STANDARDS UNIFORMLY REQUIRED FOR ADMISSION, OR FOR FAILURE TO TENDER
 INITIATION FEES AND DUES
 
    UNIFORMLY REQUIRED AS A CONDITION OF ACQUIRING AND RETAINING
 MEMBERSHIP.  THIS PARAGRAPH DOES
 
    NOT PRECLUDE A LABOR ORGANIZATION FROM ENFORCING DISCIPLINE IN
 ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES
 
    UNDER ITS CONSTITUTION OR BY-LAWS WHICH CONFORM TO THE REQUIREMENTS
 OF THIS ORDER."
 
    IT IS UNNECESSARY TO CONSIDER THE EFFECT, IF ANY, OF THE DIFFERENCE
 IN LANGUAGE OF SEC. 19(C) OF THE ORDER AND SEC. 16(C) OF THE STATUTE.
 HEREIN, THE MORE DEFINITIVE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE WILL BE CONSIDERED
 TO APPLY;  HOWEVER, UNDER THE STATUTE WHICH GOVERNS THE JURISDICTION OF
 THE AUTHORITY, JURISDICTION OVER COMPLAINTS OF VIOLATIONS OF SEC. 20,
 STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, WAS NOT TRANSFERRED TO THE AUTHORITY BUT WAS
 DELEGATED TO THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
 LABOR FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS.  ACCORDINGLY, WHILE THE DISCIPLINE
 INVOLVED HEREIN OCCURRED IN 1978 UNDER THE EXECUTIVE ORDER, THE
 JURISDICTION OF THE AUTHORITY IS GOVERNED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE
 STATUTE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT UNDER THE EXECUTIVE ORDER THE ASSISTANT
 SECRETARY HAD JURISDICTION OVER BOTH UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES (SEC. 19)
 AND COMPLAINTS OF VIOLATIONS OF STANDARDS OF CONDUCT (SEC. 18).
 
    /11/ BECAUSE COMPLAINTS OF VIOLATION OF STANDARDS OF CONDUCT ARE
 MATTERS SPECIFICALLY DELEGATED BY SEC. 20 TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, IT
 WOULD BE IMPROPER TO DECIDE ISSUES RELATING TO RESPONDENT'S
 CONSTITUTION.  NEVERTHELESS, IT IS APPROPRIATE TO NOTE THA