10:0346(62)CO - AFGE Local 1778 and Air Force, HQ, 438th Air Base Group (MAC), McGuire AFB -- 1982 FLRAdec CO



[ v10 p346 ]
10:0346(62)CO
The decision of the Authority follows:


 10 FLRA No. 62
 
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
 EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1778, AFL-CIO
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
 HEADQUARTERS, 438TH AIR BASE
 GROUP (MAC)
 MC GUIRE AIR FORCE BASE
 Charging Party
 
                                            Case No. 2-CO-12
 
                            DECISION AND ORDER
 
    THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ISSUED THE ATTACHED DECISION IN THE
 ABOVE-ENTITLED PROCEEDING FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD ENGAGED IN
 CERTAIN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT, AND
 RECOMMENDING THAT IT BE ORDERED TO CEASE AND DESIST THEREFROM AND TAKE
 CERTAIN AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS.  THEREAFTER, THE RESPONDENT, THE GENERAL
 COUNSEL, AND THE CHARGING PARTY FILED EXCEPTIONS TO THE JUDGE'S DECISION
 AND ACCOMPANYING BRIEFS.
 
    PURSUANT TO SECTION 2423.29 OF THE AUTHORITY'S RULES AND REGULATIONS
 AND SECTION 7118 OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
 STATUTE (THE STATUTE), THE AUTHORITY HAS REVIEWED THE RULINGS OF THE
 JUDGE MADE AT THE HEARING AND FINDS THAT NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS
 COMMITTED.  THE RULINGS ARE HEREBY AFFIRMED.  UPON CONSIDERATION OF THE
 JUDGE'S DECISION AND THE ENTIRE RECORD IN THIS CASE, THE AUTHORITY
 HEREBY ADOPTS THE JUDGE'S FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ONLY
 TO THE EXTENT CONSISTENT HEREWITH.
 
    THE JUDGE FOUND THAT THE RESPONDENT UNION, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
 GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1778, AFL-CIO, PRESENTED TO EACH NONMEMBER
 WHO SOUGHT ITS ASSISTANCE A COPY OF THE DUES DEDUCTION AUTHORIZATION
 FORM (SF 1187) BY WHICH AN EMPLOYEE MAY JOIN A LABOR ORGANIZATION,
 AND/OR A SO-CALLED AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES FORM DEVISED BY THE RESPONDENT
 UNDER WHICH, IN EFFECT, A NONMEMBER WOULD AGREE TO DEFRAY THE
 RESPONDENT'S EXPENSES INCURRED IN THE COURSE OF REPRESENTING THE
 NONMEMBER EMPLOYEE.  THE JUDGE ALSO FOUND THAT THE RESPONDENT'S
 REPRESENTATIVES WHO PRESENTED THESE FORMS TO NONMEMBERS SEEKING THE
 UNION'S ASSISTANCE STATED THAT "WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO SIGN ONE OR THE
 OTHER" BUT FAILED TO CLEARLY INFORM SUCH NONMEMBERS THAT THE RESPONDENT
 WOULD REPRESENT THEM IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THEY AGREED TO SIGN EITHER
 FORM.  THE JUDGE CONCLUDED THAT THE RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS APPEARED TO SET
 CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO THE RESPONDENT'S FULFILLING ITS OBLIGATION AS
 EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE UNDER SECTION 7114(A)(1) OF THE STATUTE /1/ TO
 REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF ALL EMPLOYEES IN THE BARGAINING UNIT WITHOUT
 REGARD TO LABOR ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP.  THE JUDGE FURTHER CONCLUDED
 THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR INDICATION TO NONMEMBERS THAT THE
 RESPONDENT WOULD REPRESENT THEIR INTERESTS WITHOUT REGARD TO UNION
 MEMBERSHIP, THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 7114(A)(1) AND
 THEREFORE VIOLATED SECTION 7116(B)(8) OF THE STATUTE.  THE JUDGE
 ADDITIONALLY FOUND THAT THE RESPONDENT'S CONDUCT VIOLATED SECTION
 7116(B)(1) BY INTERFERING WITH, RESTRAINING, AND COERCING THE EMPLOYEES
 IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR PROTECTED RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 7102 OF THE
 STATUTE.  /2/
 
    THE AUTHORITY DISAGREES WITH THE JUDGE'S CONCLUSION THAT SUCH CONDUCT
 BY THE RESPONDENT UNION CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF SECTION 7116(B)(8) OF
 THE STATUTE, BUT AGREES THAT IT DID CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF SECTION
 7116(B)(1).
 
    SECTION 7114(A)(1) OF THE STATUTE REQUIRES AN EXCLUSIVE
 REPRESENTATIVE TO REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF ALL EMPLOYEES IN THE UNIT
 WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION AND WITHOUT REGARD TO LABOR ORGANIZATION
 MEMBERSHIP, AND A UNION WHICH FAILS TO DO SO THEREBY VIOLATES SECTION
 7116(B)(8) OF THE STATUTE.  THUS, IN TIDEWATER VIRGINIA FEDERAL
 EMPLOYEES METAL TRADES COUNCIL/INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS,
 LOCAL NO. 441, 8 FLRA NO. 47 (1982), THE AUTHORITY ADOPTED THE JUDGE'S
 FINDING THAT THE UNION'S CONDUCT IN AVOIDING AND THEN PROVIDING A BARE
 MINIMUM OF HELP TO A NONMEMBER UNIT EMPLOYEE RATHER THAN ACTIVELY
 ASSISTING HIM IN INITIATING A GRIEVANCE "WAS DONE IN ACCORD WITH
 WELL-ENTRENCHED POLICY OF THE UNION LEADERSHIP NOT TO INITIATE
 GRIEVANCES FOR NON-UNION MEMBERS," AND THEREFORE WAS INCONSISTENT WITH
 SECTION 7114(A)(1) AND VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 7116(B)(8) OF THE STATUTE.
 /3/ IN THE INSTANT CASE, BY CONTRAST, THE AUTHORITY CONCLUDES THAT THE
 RECORD FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE RESPONDENT UNION HAD AN ESTABLISHED
 POLICY OF DISCRIMINATING AGAINST NONMEMBER UNIT EMPLOYEES IN THE
 PERFORMANCE OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AS EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE OR THAT
 THERE WAS IN FACT DISPARATE TREATMENT OF NONMEMBERS BY THE RESPONDENT IN
 PROVIDING REPRESENTATION TO BARGAINING UNIT EMPLOYEES.  THUS, WHILE THE
 RESPONDENT'S REPRESENTATIVES INDICATED THAT THEY "WOULD LIKE" TO HAVE
 NONMEMBERS WHO SOUGHT UNION REPRESENTATION SIGN A DUES DEDUCTION
 AUTHORIZATION FORM (SF 1187) OR A PROMISE TO DEFRAY THE COSTS OF
 REPRESENTATION, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED THAT NONMEMBERS WHO
 REFUSED TO SIGN EITHER DOCUMENT WERE DENIED REPRESENTATION ON THAT
 BASIS.  RATHER, AS DISCUSSED BELOW, THE EVIDENCE IS TO THE CONTRARY WITH
 RESPECT TO THE SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF DISPARATE TREATMENT AGAINST
 NONMEMBERS CONTAINED IN THE COMPLAINT.  HOWEVER, IN AGREEMENT WITH THE
 JUDGE, THE AUTHORITY CONCLUDES THAT THE RESPONDENT'S CONDUCT SET FORTH
 ABOVE CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF SECTION 7116(B)(1) OF THE STATUTE.
 THUS, BY CREATING THE IMPRESSION THAT NONMEMBERS SEEKING THE UNION'S
 ASSISTANCE MIGHT BE DENIED REPRESENTATION IF THEY DID NOT AGREE TO
 BECOME MEMBERS OR TO PAY THE EXPENSES OF THEIR REPRESENTATION, THE
 RESPONDENT INTERFERED WITH, RESTRAINED, AND COERCED NONMEMBER EMPLOYEES
 IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR PROTECTED RIGHT UNDER SECTION 7102 OF THE
 STATUTE TO JOIN OR REFRAIN FROM JOINING, FREELY AND WITHOUT FEAR OF
 PENALTY OR REPRISAL, THE RESPONDENT UNION OR ANY OTHER LABOR
 ORGANIZATION.
 
    WITH RESPECT TO THE FOUR SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF DISPARATE TREATMENT OF
 NONMEMBER EMPLOYEES ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT, THE AUTHORITY FINDS THAT
 THE GENERAL COUNSEL HAS FAILED TO MEET THE BURDEN OF PROVING SUCH
 ALLEGATIONS.  THUS, IN THE CASE OF EMPLOYEE COX, WHO JOINED THE
 RESPONDENT AFTER BEING CONFRONTED WITH THE FORMS DISCUSSED ABOVE, THE
 RESPONDENT'S REPRESENTATIVES TESTIFIED THAT THEY ADVISED COX TO FILE A
 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CLAIM WITH HIS SUPERVISOR WHICH, ACCORDING TO THE
 RESPONDENT, IS ITS STANDARD PROCEDURE.  COX FAILED TO TAKE THIS
 PRELIMINARY STEP.  THE RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT ITS TREATMENT OF
 EMPLOYEE COX WAS NOT DISSIMILAR TO THAT ACCORDED OTHER EMPLOYEES IN
 SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES WAS NOT REBUTTED.  THE JUDGE GAVE SIGNIFICANT
 WEIGHT TO THE RESPONDENT'S APPARENT WARNING TO COX THAT HE WOULD BE
 LIABLE FOR CERTAIN FEES IF HIS CLAIM REACHED A CERTAIN STAGE OF
 DEVELOPMENT.  IN THIS REGARD, HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO REBUTTAL OF THE
 RESPONDENT'S TESTIMONY THAT IT REQUIRES ALL EMPLOYEES WHOM IT ASSISTS
 WITH WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CLAIMS TO PAY THEIR OWN ATTORNEYS' FEES WHEN
 A COMPENSATION CLAIM IS APPEALED BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF MCGUIRE AIR
 FORCE BASE.
 
    WITH RESPECT TO EMPLOYEE MENDLER, WHILE THE JUDGE FOUND THAT A
 REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RESPONDENT TOLD HER THAT SHE HAD TO DECIDE WHETHER
 SHE WANTED TO JOIN THE UNION OR SIGN THE OTHER FORM BEFORE HE COULD HELP
 HER, THE RECORD CONTAINS NO EVIDENCE THAT MENDLER WAS IN FACT DENIED
 REPRESENTATION OR RECEIVED LESS ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION THAN WAS
 AFFORDED TO MEMBERS OF THE RESPONDENT.  SIMILARLY, WHILE THE JUDGE FOUND
 THAT EMPLOYEE PANAGOTOPULOS ORIGINALLY WAS TOLD THAT THE RESPONDENT
 WOULD NOT REPRESENT HIM, THE JUDGE FURTHER FOUND THAT REPRESENTATION WAS
 ACCORDED TO THE EMPLOYEE DESPITE HIS REFUSAL TO BECOME A MEMBER OR TO
 PAY THE COSTS OF HIS REPRESENTATION.  MOREOVER, THERE WAS NO ALLEGATION
 THAT SUCH REPRESENTATION FAILED TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION
 7114(A)(1) OF THE STATUTE.  ACCORDINGLY, WHILE THE ABOVE STATEMENTS TO
 BOTH EMPLOYEES VIOLATED SECTION 7116(B)(1), AS FOUND BY THE JUDGE, THEY
 DO NOT, WITHOUT MORE, CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF SECTION 7116(B)(8).
 
    WITH RESPECT TO EMPLOYEE CHARITY, WHILE THE JUDGE APPEARED TO
 QUESTION THE TIMING OF A LETTER SENT TO THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL IN HER
 CASE, THAT LETTER INCLUDED THE COMPLAINTS OF A NUMBER OF OTHER EMPLOYEES
 WHO WERE APPARENTLY MEMBERS OF THE RESPONDENT AND WHO HAD RAISED SIMILAR
 QUESTIONS ABOUT A PAY MATTER.  THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT CHARITY WAS
 TREATED DIFFERENTLY FROM THE OTHER EMPLOYEES WHO RAISED THE SAME ISSUE
 WITH THE RESPONDENT.
 
    FINALLY, THE JUDGE FOUND THAT EMPLOYEES MYERS AND CASTELLANO, WHILE
 ON OFFICIAL TIME TO REPRESENT THE RESPONDENT UNION PURSUANT TO THE
 PARTIES' NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT, CONFRONTED NONMEMBER EMPLOYEES SEEKING
 THE RESPONDENT'S ASSISTANCE WITH DUES AUTHORIZATION FORMS, AS NOTED
 ABOVE.  ALTHOUGH THE JUDGE CONCLUDED THAT SUCH ACTIVITY CONSTITUTED
 SOLICITATION OF MEMBERSHIP, I.E., INTERNAL UNION BUSINESS, HE FURTHER
 CONCLUDED THAT SINCE THE SOLICITATION TOOK PLACE WHILE THE RESPONDENT'S
 REPRESENTATIVES WERE ON OFFICIAL TIME PURSUANT TO SECTION 7131(D) OF THE
 STATUTE IT WAS INSULATED FROM THE REQUIREMENT IN SECTION 7131(B) THAT
 SOLICITATION MAY ONLY OCCUR WHEN AN EMPLOYEE IS IN A NONDUTY STATUS.
 /4/ THE AUTHORITY DISAGREES.  AN EMPLOYEE ON OFFICIAL TIME PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 7131 IS IN A DUTY, OR WORK, STATUS.  /5/ AS SECTION 7131(B)
 REQUIRES THAT AN EMPLOYEE MAY ONLY SOLICIT UNION MEMBERSHIP WHILE IN A
 NONDUTY STATUS, THE SOLICITATION ENGAGED IN BY EMPLOYEES MYERS AND
 CASTELLANO AS AGENTS OF THE RESPONDENT UNION, ALTHOUGH IT MAY HAVE BEEN
 ONLY INCIDENTAL TO THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ACTIVITIES FOR WHICH THEY HAD
 BEEN GRANTED OFFICIAL TIME, NEVERTHELESS WAS IN VIOLATION OF SECTION
 7131(B) AND THEREFORE WAS VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 7116(B)(1) AND (8) OF THE
 STATUTE, AS ALLEGED BY THE GENERAL COUNSEL.
 
                                   ORDER
 
    PURSUANT TO SECTION 2423.29 OF THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS
 AUTHORITY'S RULES AND REGULATIONS AND SECTION 7118 OF THE STATUTE, IT IS
 HEREBY ORDERED THAT THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,
 LOCAL 1778, AFL-CIO, SHALL:
 
    1.  CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
 
    (A) CREATING THE IMPRESSION THAT NONMEMBER UNIT EMPLOYEES SEEKING
 REPRESENTATION BY THE
 
    AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1778, AFL-CIO, THE
 EMPLOYEES' EXCLUSIVE
 
    REPRESENTATIVE, WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SIGN EITHER A DUES DEDUCTION
 AUTHORIZATION FORM (STANDARD
 
    FORM 1187) OR AN AGREEMENT TO PAY THE COSTS OF REPRESENTATION
 (AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES) AS A
 
    RECONDITION TO RECEIVING REPRESENTATION.
 
    (B) SOLICITING MEMBERSHIP IN THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
 EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1778,
 
    AFL-CIO, THROUGH THE ACTS OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES WHILE SUCH
 EMPLOYEES ARE ON OFFICIAL
 
    TIME.
 
    (C) INTERFERING WITH, RESTRAINING, OR COERCING UNIT EMPLOYEES IN THE
 EXERCISE OF THEIR
 
    RIGHT TO JOIN OR TO REFRAIN FROM JOINING FREELY AND WITHOUT FEAR OF
 PENALTY OR REPRISAL, THE
 
    AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1778, AFL-CIO, OR
 ANY OTHER LABOR
 
    ORGANIZATION.
 
    (D) IN ANY LIKE OR RELATED MANNER INTERFERING WITH, RESTRAINING, OR
 COERCING UNIT EMPLOYEES
 
    IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS ASSURED BY THE STATUTE.
 
    2.  TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE
 PURPOSES AND POLICIES OF THE STATUTE:
 
    (A) PROVIDE CLEAR NOTICE TO ALL NONMEMBER UNIT EMPLOYEES SEEKING
 REPRESENTATION BY THE
 
    AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1778, AFL-CIO, THE
 EMPLOYEES' EXCLUSIVE
 
    REPRESENTATIVE, THAT THEY ARE NOT REQUIRED TO SIGN EITHER A DUES
 DEDUCTION AUTHORIZATION FORM
 
    (STANDARD FORM 1187) OR AN AGREEMENT TO PAY THE COSTS OF
 REPRESENTATION (AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES)
 
    AS A PRECONDITION TO RECEIVING REPRESENTATION.
 
    (B) OFFER EMPLOYEES ROY B. COX AND REGINA MENDLER SIXTY DAYS FROM THE
 DATE OF THIS ORDER IN
 
    WHICH TO RESIGN FROM THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,
 LOCAL 1778, AFL-CIO, BY
 
    SUBMITTING A STANDARD FORM 1188, REVOCATION OF DUES AUTHORIZATION
 FORM, AND REIMBURSE EACH
 
    SUCH EMPLOYEE WHO CHOOSES TO RESIGN OR HAS ALREADY RESIGNED FROM
 MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNION FOR
 
    ANY DUES AND FEES PAID BY OR DEDUCTED FROM THEIR PAY SINCE NOVEMBER
 6, 1979 IN THE CASE OF
 
    MS. MENDLER AND SINCE AUGUST 27, 1979 IN THE CASE OF MR. COX.  /6/
 
    (C) POST AT ITS LOCAL BUSINESS OFFICE, AT ITS NORMAL MEETING PLACES,
 AND AT PLACES WHERE
 
    NOTICES TO MEMBERS AND TO EMPLOYEES OF DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
 HEADQUARTERS, 438TH AIR
 
    BASE GROUP (MAC), MCGUIRE AIR FORCE BASE, N.J., ARE CUSTOMARILY
 POSTED, INCLUDING FACILITIES
 
    PROVIDED BY THE ACTIVITY TO THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
 EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1778,
 
    AFL-CIO, COPIES OF THE ATTACHED NOTICE ON FORMS TO BE FURNISHED BY
 THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS
 
    AUTHORITY.  UPON RECEIPT OF SUCH FORMS THEY SHALL BE SIGNED BY THE
 PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN
 
    FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1778, AFL-CIO, AND SHALL BE
 POSTED AND MAINTAINED BY
 
    HIM FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS THEREAFTER.  REASONABLE STEPS SHALL BE
 TAKEN BY THE AMERICAN
 
    FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1778, AFL-CIO, TO INSURE
 THAT SUCH NOTICES ARE NOT
 
    ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL.
 
    (D) PURSUANT TO SECTION 2423.30 OF THE AUTHORITY'S RULES AND
 REGULATIONS, NOTIFY THE
 
    REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REGION II, FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, IN
 WRITING, WITHIN 30 DAYS
 
    FROM THE DATE OF THIS ORDER, AS TO WHAT STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO
 COMPLY HEREWITH.
 
    IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE SECTION 7116(B)(1) AND (8) ALLEGATIONS
 OF THE COMPLAINT PREDICATED ON THE RESPONDENT'S NONCOMPLIANCE WITH
 SECTION 7114(A)(1) OF THE STATUTE BE, AND THEY HEREBY ARE, DISMISSED.
 
    ISSUED, WASHINGTON, D.C., OCTOBER 8, 1982
 
                       RONALD W. HAUGHTON, CHAIRMAN
                       HENRY B. FRAZIER III, MEMBER
                       LEON B. APPLEWHAITE, MEMBER
                       FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES
 
                                PURSUANT TO
 
                        A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE
 
                     FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
 
                AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF
 
                       CHAPTER 71 OF TITLE 5 OF THE
 
                            UNITED STATES CODE
 
                FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
 
          WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR MEMBERS AND OTHER EMPLOYEES THAT:
 
    WE WILL NOT CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT NONMEMBER UNIT EMPLOYEES
 SEEKING OUR REPRESENTATION OF THEIR INTERESTS ARE REQUIRED TO SIGN
 EITHER A DUES DEDUCTION AUTHORIZATION FORM (STANDARD FORM 1187) OR AN
 AGREEMENT TO PAY THE COSTS OF REPRESENTATION (AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES) AS A
 PRECONDITION TO RECEIVING SUCH REPRESENTATION AS IS PROVIDED TO UNIT
 EMPLOYEES WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE UNION.
 
    WE WILL NOT SOLICIT MEMBERSHIP IN THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
 GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1778, AFL-CIO, THROUGH THE ACTS OF OUR
 REPRESENTATIVES WHILE SUCH EMPLOYEES ARE ON OFFICIAL TIME.
 
    WE WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH, RESTRAIN, OR COERCE EMPLOYEES IN THE
 EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHT TO JOIN OR TO REFRAIN FROM JOINING, FREELY AND
 WITHOUT FEAR OF PENALTY OR REPRISAL, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
 EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1778, AFL-CIO, OR ANY OTHER LABOR ORGANIZATION.
 
    WE WILL NOT IN ANY LIKE OR RELATED MANNER INTERFERE WITH, RESTRAIN OR
 COERCE UNIT EMPLOYEES IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS ASSURED BY THE
 STATUTE.
 
    WE WILL PROVIDE CLEAR NOTICE TO ALL NONMEMBER UNIT EMPLOYEES SEEKING
 OUR REPRESENTATION OF THEIR INTERESTS THAT THEY ARE NOT REQUIRED TO SIGN
 EITHER A DUES DEDUCTION AUTHORIZATION FORM (STANDARD FORM 1187) OR AN
 AGREEMENT TO PAY THE COSTS OF REPRESENTATION (AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES) AS A
 PRECONDITION TO RECEIVING SUCH REPRESENTATION AS IS PROVIDED TO UNIT
 EMPLOYEES WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE UNION.
 
    WE WILL OFFER MR. ROY B. COX AND MS. REGINA MENDLER SIXTY DAYS FROM
 THE DATE OF THIS ORDER IN WHICH TO RESIGN FROM THE AMERICAN FEDERATION
 OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1778, AFL-CIO, BY SUBMITTING A STANDARD
 FORM 1188, REVOCATION OF DUES AUTHORIZATION FORM, AND REIMBURSE EACH
 EMPLOYEE WHO CHOOSES TO RESIGN OR HAS ALREADY RESIGNED FROM MEMBERSHIP
 IN THE UNION FOR ANY DUES AND FEES PAID BY OR DEDUCTED FROM THE PAY OF
 SUCH EMPLOYEES SINCE NOVEMBER 6, 1979 IN THE CASE OF MS. MENDLER AND
 SINCE AUGUST 27, 1979 IN THE CASE OF MR. COX.
 
                           (LABOR ORGANIZATION)
 
    DATED:  BY:  (SIGNATURE) (TITLE)
 
    THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE
 OF POSTING, AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER
 MATERIAL.
 
    IF EMPLOYEES HAVE ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE, OR COMPLIANCE
 WITH ITS PROVISIONS, THEY MAY COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH THE REGIONAL
 DIRECTOR, FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, REGION II, WHOSE ADDRESS
 IS:  ROOM 241, 26 FEDERAL PLAZA, NEW YORK, N.Y.10007, AND WHOSE
 TELEPHONE NUMBER IS:  (212) 264-4934.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -------------------- ALJ$ DECISION FOLLOWS --------------------
 
    KEVIN M. GRILE, ESQUIRE
    (JAMES R. ROSA, ESQUIRE
    ON BRIEF)
                       FOR THE COMPLAINANT
 
    JAMES E. PETRUCCI, ESQUIRE
    STEVEN SHARFSTEIN, ESQUIRE
                       FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL
 
    CAPTAIN JAMES L. LINSEY
                      FOR THE CHARGING PARTY
 
    BEFORE:  WILLIAM B. DEVANEY
    ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
 
                            DECISION AND ORDER
 
                           STATEMENT OF THE CASE
 
    THIS IS A PROCEEDING UNDER THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS STATUTE, 5 U.S.C. CHAPTER 71 /6/ AND THE FINAL RULES AND
 REGULATIONS ISSUED THEREUNDER, 5 C.F.R. 2415.1, ET SEQ., FED.REG., VOL.
 45, NO. 12, JANUARY 17, 1980.  THE CHARGE (G.C.  EXH. 1(A)) WAS FILED
 DECEMBER 27, 1979, A FIRST AMENDED CHARGE (G.C. EXH. 1(C)) WAS FILED
 APRIL 23, 1980, AND THE COMPLAINT AND NOTICE OF HEARING (G.C. EXH. 1(E))
 ISSUED ON APRIL 29, 1980 /7/ PURSUANT TO WHICH A HEARING WAS DULY HELD
 BEFORE THE UNDERSIGNED AT MCGUIRE AIR FORCE BASE, NEW JERSEY, ON JULY 2
 AND 3, 1980.  /8/
 
    THIS CASE INVOLVES ALLEGATIONS THAT THE UNION, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
 GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1778, AFL-CIO (HEREINAFTER ALSO REFERRED TO
 AS "LOCAL 1778" OR "UNION") VIOLATED THE STATUTE, IN ESSENCE, BY
 CONDITIONING ITS REPRESENTATION OF NON-MEMBERS ON THEIR EXECUTING A DUES
 ALLOTMENT AUTHORIZATION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, EXECUTING AN AFFIDAVIT
 OF CHARGES;  BY VIOLATION OF THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION;  AND/OR BY
 SOLICITATION OF UNION MEMBERSHIP WHILE IN A DUTY STATUS.  THE COMPLAINT
 RESULTED FROM CHARGES FILED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
 HEADQUARTERS 438TH AIR FORCE GROUP, MCGUIRE AIR FORCE BASE (HEREINAFTER
 ALSO REFERRED TO "AGENCY").  UNION'S ASSERTION THAT AGENCY WAS WITHOUT
 STANDING TO FILE THE CHARGES WAS DENIED PRIOR THE HEARING, BUT, HAVING
 BEEN RENEWED IN UNION'S BRIEF AND HAVING BEEN ARGUED FURTHER IN GENERAL
 COUNSEL'S BRIEF, IS FURTHER ADDRESSED HEREINAFTER.
 
    EACH PARTY WAS REPRESENTED BY ABLE COUNSEL, WAS AFFORDED FULL
 OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, TO EXAMINE AND CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES AND TO
 PRESENT EVIDENCE BEARING ON THE ISSUES INVOLVED HEREIN.  AT THE
 CONCLUSION OF THE TESTIMONY, THE PARTIES WERE AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY
 TO PRESENT ORAL ARGUMENT, WHICH RIGHT WAS EXERCISED ONLY BY COUNSEL FOR
 THE AGENCY, AND AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING AUGUST 4, 1980, WAS
 FIXED AS THE DATE FOR MAILING POST-HEARING BRIEFS WHICH DATE WAS
 SUBSEQUENTLY EXTENDED FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, AND, SPECIFICALLY, DELAY IN
 RECEIPT OF TRANSCRIPT, TO SEPTEMBER 10, 1980.  EACH PARTY TIMELY MAILED
 AN EXCELLENT BRIEF, RECEIVED ON OR BEFORE SEPTEMBER 16, 1980, WHICH HAVE
 BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED.  UPON THE BASIS OF THE ENTIRE RECORD,
 INCLUDING MY OBSERVATION OF THE WITNESSES AND THEIR DEMEANOR, I MAKE THE
 FOLLOWING FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:
 
                  I.  STANDING OF AGENCY TO FILE CHARGES
 
    UNION FILED A MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DATED MAY 29,
 1980, WITH MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITY, ETC., WHICH, HAVING BEEN
 DULY REFERRED PURSUANT TO SEC.  2423.22(B) OF THE REGULATIONS, WAS
 DENIED BY ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED JUNE 20,
 1980.  RESPONDENT, AND ITS BRIEF (P. 7) READILY CONCEDES THAT THE
 CONTENTION ASSERTED IN ITS BRIEF HAD BEEN ADDRESSED AND DECIDED BY THE
 ORDER OF JUNE 20, 1980.  THUS, RESPONDENT STATES, IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "RESPONDENT RECOGNIZES THAT THIS ARGUMENT HAS BEEN ADDRESSED IN THE
 ORDER ON MOTION FOR
 
    PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ISSUED JUNE 20, 1980." (RESPONDENT'S BRIEF,
 P. 7).
 
    THE GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
 JUDGMENT, HEREBY REAFFIRMED AND INCORPORATED HEREIN BY REFERENCE,
 PREMISED DIRECTLY ON THE AGENCY'S ASSERTED LACK OF STANDING TO FILE
 CHARGES IN REGARD TO A LABOR ORGANIZATION'S ALLEGED BREACH OF DUTY OF
 FAIR REPRESENTATION OR A LABOR ORGANIZATION'S ALLEGED COERCION,
 INTERFERENCE WITH, OR RESTRAINT OF EMPLOYEE'S EXERCISE OF RIGHTS FOR
 WHICH THE AGENCY HAS NO RESPONSIBILITY OR LIABILITY, WERE FULLY SET
 FORTH IN THE ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DATED JUNE
 20, 1980, NEED NOT BE REPEATED IN DETAIL BEYOND NOTING THAT THE ORDER
 STATED, IN PART, THAT:
 
    "THE STATUTE AND THE RULES AND REGULATIONS SPECIFICALLY PROVIDE THAT,
 'PERSON' MEANS, INTER
 
    ALIA, AN AGENCY;  ANY 'PERSON', INCLUDING AN AGENCY, MAY FILE A
 CHARGE THAT, INTER ALIA, A
 
    LABOR ORGANIZATION HAS ENGAGED IN ANY UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
 PROHIBITED UNDER SECTION 16 OF THE
 
    STATUTE AND THE FACT THAT THE PERSON FILING SAID CHARGE HAS NEITHER
 RESPONSIBILITY OR
 
    LIABILITY IN REGARD TO THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE IS
 IMMATERIAL" (CITATIONS OMITTED)
 
    (ORDER, P. 3).
 
    THE ORDER FURTHER STATED, IN PART, THAT:
 
    " . . . UNDER THE STATUTE AN AGENCY, INTER ALIA, MAY FILE A CHARGE
 WITHOUT REGARD TO ITS
 
    INTEREST IN THE MATTER AND THE RIGHT OF THE AUTHORITY, BY ITS GENERAL
 COUNSEL, TO INVESTIGATE
 
    THE CHARGE, TO ISSUE AND MAINTAIN THE COMPLAINT IS NOT AFFECTED."
 (ORDER P. 3).
 
    IT IS TRUE, OF COURSE, AS RESPONDENT STATES, THAT THE LAST SENTENCE
 OF SECTION 1(A) OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED, WHICH PROVIDED, IN
 PART, THAT, "THE HEAD OF EACH AGENCY SHALL TAKE THE ACTION REQUIRED TO
 ASSURE . . . THAT NO INTERFERENCE, RESTRAINT, COERCION, OR
 DISCRIMINATION IS PRACTICES WITHIN HIS AGENCY TO ENCOURAGE OR DISCOURAGE
 MEMBERSHIP IN A LABOR ORGANIZATION", WAS NOT INCORPORATED IN THE
 STATUTE.  WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE AUTHORITY, IN NATIONAL TREASURY
 EMPLOYEES UNION (NTEU), CHAPTER 202, ET AL., 1 FLRA NO. 104(1979), VERY
 PROPERLY RELIED ON THE FOREGOING PROVISION OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER IN
 DETERMINING THAT THE AGENCY OR ACTIVITY INVOLVED IN EACH OF THE
 CONSOLIDATED CASES UNDER THE EXECUTIVE ORDER HAD STANDING TO "BRING THE
 ACTIONS IN THE RESPECTIVE CASES" AND BECAUSE THE GROUND RELIED UPON BY
 THE AUTHORITY IN 1 FLRA NO. 104 WAS NOT APPLICABLE TO CASES ARISING
 UNDER THE STATUTE, I NEITHER CITED NOR RELIED UPON THE AUTHORITY'S
 DECISION IN THAT, OR SIMILAR CASES UNDER THE EXECUTIVE ORDER, SEE, FOR
 EXAMPLE, NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION, WASHINGTON, D.C., 2 FLRA NO.
 51 (1979).  UNDER THE EXECUTIVE ORDER, THE CHARGING PARTY NOT ONLY
 INITIATED THE CHARGE BUT PROSECUTED THE MATTER SO THAT,, AS THE
 AUTHORITY NOTED, IT WAS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE AGENCY OR
 ACTIVITY HAD SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO BRING THE RESPECTIVE UNFAIR LABOR
 PRACTICE COMPLAINTS.
 
    CONGRESS, IN DEVISING THE STATUTE, WHOLLY ALTERED PROSECUTION OF
 UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE COMPLAINTS BY THE CHARGING PARTY AND UNDER THE
 STATUTE, AS IS TRUE UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, AFTER WHICH
 CONGRESS INTENTIONALLY AND CONSCIOUSLY PATTERNED THE STRUCTURE OF THE
 STATUTE, THE PURPOSE OF THE CHARGE IS TO SET IN MOTION THE MACHINERY OF
 AN INQUIRY BY THE GENERAL COUNSEL.  CONGRESS UNDER THE STATUTE HAS
 IMPOSED UPON THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE AUTHORITY RESPONSIBILITY FOR
 MAKING THAT INVESTIGATION AND OF FRAMING THE ISSUES, NOT UPON THE
 CHARGING PARTY.  ALTHOUGH A CHANGE IS ESSENTIAL TO THE INVOCATION OF
 JURISDICTION OF THE AUTHORITY, ONCE THE INVESTIGATORY MACHINERY OF THE
 AUTHORITY IS SET IN MOTION, BY THE CHARGE, IT IS THE GENERAL COUNSEL'S
 EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY TO INVESTIGATE AND, IF HE FINDS CAUSE TO
 BELIEVE THAT AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE HAS OCCURRED, TO ISSUE A COMPLAINT
 WHICH HE, ADJUDICATES IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST.  SECTION 3(A)(1) OF THE
 STATUTE DEFINES "PERSON" AS " . . .  AN INDIVIDUAL, LABOR ORGANIZATION,
 OR AGENCY";  SECTION 18(A)(1) PROVIDES, IN PART, "IF ANY AGENCY OR LABOR
 ORGANIZATION IS CHARGED BY ANY PERSON WITH HAVING ENGAGED IN OR ENGAGING
 IN AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE, THE GENERAL COUNSEL SHALL INVESTIGATE THE
 CHARGE AND MAY ISSUE . . . A COMPLAINT";  AND SECTION 2423.3 OF THE
 REGULATIONS PROVIDES, IN PART, "AN ACTIVITY, AGENCY, OR LABOR
 ORGANIZATION MAY BE CHARGED BY ANY PERSON WITH HAVING ENGAGED IN OR
 ENGAGING IN ANY UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROHIBITED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 7-16".
 ACCORDINGLY, UNDER THE STATUTE, THE AGENCY HAD STANDING TO FILE THE
 CHARGE AND WHETHER IT HAD EITHER RESPONSIBILITY OR LIABILITY IN REGARD
 TO THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE IS IMMATERIAL, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
 SUCH SHOWING OF INTEREST MAY HAVE BEEN REQUIRED UNDER THE EXECUTIVE
 ORDER.  /10/
 
                                 FINDINGS
 
    1.  THE UNION IS THE EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE FOR ALL EMPLOYEES
 SERVICED BY THE BASE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OFFICE, MCGUIRE AIR FORCE BASE,
 THAT UNIT BEING MORE FULLY DESCRIBED IN THE PARTIES' CURRENT COLLECTIVE
 BARGAINING AGREEMENT (JT. EXH. 1).  THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 1500
 EMPLOYEES IN THE BARGAINING UNIT BUT ONLY ABOUT 500 OF THEM ARE MEMBERS
 OF THE UNION.  UNION DUES AT ALL TIMES MATERIAL WERE $8.75 PER PAY
 PERIOD ($227.50 PER YEAR).
 
    2.  THE AGENCY AND LOCAL 1778 ARE, ALSO, SIGNATORIES TO AN ANNUAL
 DUES ALLOTMENT REVOCATION AGREEMENT, DATED JANUARY 30, 1979 (G.C. EXH.
 9).
 
    3.  MS. CLAUDIA STORICKS, A PAID EMPLOYEE OF LOCAL 1778 (I.E., NOT A
 GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE), IS IN CHARGE OF THE UNION'S SECRETARIAL AND
 DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS OF THE UNION'S OFFICE.  WHEN A UNIT EMPLOYEE COMES
 TO THE OFFICE WITH A PROBLEM, THE EMPLOYEE IS NORMALLY SEEN FIRST BY MS.
 STORICKS.  RESPONDENT CONCEDES THAT SHE IS INSTRUCTED TO, AND DOES IN
 FACT, SCREEN EMPLOYEES AS TO THEIR MEMBERSHIP STATUS.  MS. STORICKS
 STATED THAT SHE GENERALLY KNEW WHO WAS A UNION MEMBER BUT, IF SHE WERE
 UNCERTAIN, SHE CONSULTED A ROLODEX FILE ON HER DESK WHICH SHE MAINTAINS
 AND WHICH CONTAINS THE NAMES OF ALL UNION MEMBERS.
 
    4.  AFTER DETERMINING MEMBERSHIP STATUS, MS. STORICKS GIVES EACH
 EMPLOYEE CERTAIN FORMS TO FILL OUT.  ALL EMPLOYEES, MEMBERS AND
 NON-MEMBERS ALIKE, RECEIVE A COMPLAINT FORM /11/ (G.C. EXH. 5) AND A
 POWER OF ATTORNEY (G.C. EXH. 4).  EACH NON-MEMBER IS GIVEN TWO OTHER
 FORMS:  A DUES ALLOTMENT AUTHORIZATION (G.C. EXH. 3) AND AN AFFIDAVIT OF
 CHARGES (G.C. EXH. 6).
 
    5.  THE DUES ALLOTMENT AUTHORIZATION, GENERALLY REFERRED TO AS A FORM
 NO. 1187, OR SIMPLY AS AN 1187, IS THE FORM BY WHICH EMPLOYEES JOIN THE
 UNION AND AGREE TO HAVE DUES DEDUCTED FROM THEIR PAYCHECKS EACH BIWEEKLY
 PAY PERIOD.
 
    6.  THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES IS AN AGREEMENT WHEREBY THE EMPLOYEE
 AGREES TO PAY $24.00 PER HOUR TO COVER COSTS INCURRED DURING
 REPRESENTATION AND, IN ADDITION, TO ASSUME ALL EXPENDITURES AS A RESULT
 OF HEARINGS, ARBITRATION, COURT PROCEEDINGS, ETC.  THE AFFIDAVIT OF
 CHARGES PROVIDED AS FOLLOWS:
 
                           "AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES
 
   "I,                     AGREE TO PAY THE AMERICAN
 
 
                                FEDERATION
 
    OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1778, THE WILLIAM G. BAILLIE, JR.
 LOCAL, $24.00 PER HOUR, OR
 
    ANY PORTION THEREOF, IN ORDER TO COVER THE COST OF ADMINISTRATION AND
 MATERIALS INCURRED
 
    DURING THE PROCESSING OF MY COMPLAINT.
 
             "I FURTHER AGREE TO ASSUME ANY AND ALL CUSTOMARY
 
                               EXPENDITURES
 
    CREATED AS A RESULT OF PROCEEDINGS, I.E., HEARINGS, ARBITRATION,
 COURT, ETC.
 
    "WITNESS COMPLAINANT"
 
    (G.C. EXH. 6).
 
    7.  THE $24.00 PER HOUR CHARGE, SET FORTH IN THE AFFIDAVIT OF
 CHARGES, BEARS NO RELATION TO THE ACTUAL COST OF PROCESSING A COMPLAINT
 /12/ NOR WAS THERE ANY INDICATION OF WHAT, OR WHOSE, HOURS WERE TO BE
 USED, ALTHOUGH THE OBVIOUS INTENT WAS TO IMPLY - INDEED, MS. STORICKS
 DIRECTLY STATED THAT THE TIME INCLUDED ". . . THE TIME THE OFFICIALS AND
 SHOP STEWARDS WOULD SPEND . . . ." (TR. 37) - THAT ALL TIME SPENT BY
 UNION OFFICIALS IN HANDLING A COMPLAINT WOULD CONSTITUTE THE HOURS
 EXPENDED TO BE MULTIPLIED BY $24.00;  HOWEVER, EXCEPT FOR TIME SPENT BY
 MS. STORICKS AND/OR OTHER EMPLOYEES OF LOCAL 1778, IN TYPING OR HANDLING
 ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS OF A COMPLAINT, OFFICERS AND STEWARDS, EXCEPT
 POSSIBLY WHEN LEAVE WITHOUT PAY MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED, HANDLE SUCH
 MATTERS ON OFFICIAL TIME AND ANY CHARGE FOR HOURS FOR WHICH THEY RECEIVE
 OFFICIAL TIME WOULD CLEARLY HAVE BEEN UNJUSTIFIED AS REIMBURSEMENT FOR
 AN EXPENSES NOT INCURRED BY THE UNION.  THE AGENCY PROVIDED OFFICE SPACE
 AND UTILITIES WITHOUT CHARGE SO THAT THE COST TO THE UNION OF THE NORMAL
 HANDLING OF ANY EMPLOYEE COMPLAINT BY AN OFFICER OR STEWARD WOULD BE
 NOMINAL.
 
    8.  MS. STORICKS ADMITTED THAT IF THE NON-MEMBER SEEKING ASSISTANCE
 DOES NOT WANT TO JOIN THE UNION BY SIGNING THE 1187, DUES ALLOTMENT
 AUTHORIZATION, SHE THEN PRESENTS THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES;  THAT SHE
 EXPLAINS WHAT THE FORM INVOLVES AND ADMITTED THAT SHE ENCOURAGES
 EMPLOYEES TO SIGN ONE OR THE OTHER BEFORE SUBMITTING THEIR COMPLAINT.
 SHE TESTIFIED,
 
    "I SAY THAT WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO SIGN ONE OR THE OTHER.
 
    "THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES OR THE MEMBERSHIP FORM." (TR. 36).
 
    MS. STORICKS FURTHER TESTIFIED THAT SHE DOES NOT INFORM THE EMPLOYEE
 THAT SIGNING EITHER FORM IS PURELY VOLUNTARY AND/OR THAT IF THE EMPLOYEE
 CHOOSES NOT TO SIGN HE, OR SHE, WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY THE UNION.
 
    9.  THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES FORM WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE EXECUTIVE
 BOARD OF LOCAL 1778 IN THE SPRING OF 1978.  FROM THAT TIME, MS. STORICKS
 WAS INSTRUCTED TO, AND HAS, PRESENTED THIS FORM TO NON-MEMBERS, IN
 ADDITION TO FORM 1187, WHENEVER THEY COME TO THE UNION FOR ASSISTANCE.
 MS. STORICKS TESTIFIED THAT A NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES HAS JOINED THE UNION
 SINCE THE INSTITUTION OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES, ALTHOUGH NO EMPLOYEE
 HAS EVER SIGNED AN AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES.
 
    10.  ON AUGUST 27, 1979, MR. ROY B. COX, THEN A NON-MEMBER OF THE
 UNION, WENT TO THE UNION OFFICE FOR ASSISTANCE IN FILING A WORKMEN'S
 COMPENSATION CLAIM FOR A HEARING LOSS.  HE WAS TOLD TO COME BACK LATER
 AND DID SO, AT ABOUT 10:30 A.M. AT THE SAME DAY, WHEN HE TALKED TO MR.
 ALGERNON S. MYERS, SECRETARY-TREASURER OF LOCAL 1778.  MR. MYERS
 TESTIFIED THAT, AS A UNION OFFICIAL HE TOOK CARE OF FINANCIAL RECORDS,
 THE MEMBERSHIP RECORDS, AND "AS A REPRESENTATIVE, I HANDLE COMPENSATION
 MATTERS" (TR. 199) FOR WHICH HE IS GRANTED OFFICIAL TIME.  AFTER BEING
 INTRODUCED TO MR. MYERS, MR. COX TESTIFIED THAT MR. MYERS ASKED WHETHER
 HE WAS A MEMBER AND WHEN HE TOLD HIM HE WAS NOT A MEMBER, MR. MYERS
 STATED THAT THERE WOULD BE FEES IF HE WERE NOT A MEMBER.  THERE IS NO
 DISPUTE THAT MR. MYERS GAVE MR. COX AN 1187, ON WHICH THE AMOUNT OF DUES
 WAS BLANK, WHICH MR. COX TOOK WITH HIM AND SIGNED AND RETURNED THE
 FOLLOWING DAY (G.C. EXH. 7);  HOWEVER, MR.  MYERS STATED THAT THE
 DISCUSSION OF MEMBERSHIP TOOK PLACE AFTER HE TOLD MR. COX WHAT THE UNION
 COULD DO ON HIS BEHALF.  ALTHOUGH MR. MYERS TESTIFIED THAT HE DID NOT
 REMEMBER FEES HAVING BEEN DISCUSSED, I FULLY CREDIT MR. COX'S TESTIMONY
 THAT MR. MYERS STATED THAT THERE WOULD BE FEES IF HE WERE NOT A MEMBER.
 INDEED, MR. ORLANDO BERGERSON, LABOR RELATIONS OFFICER AT MCGUIRE,
 TESTIFIED THAT, IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION IN OCTOBER, 1979, MR. MYERS
 STATED TO HIM IN REFERENCE TO MR. COX,
 
    '"WELL, HE'S GOT A CASE, AND IF HE WANTS TO PURSUE IT AND HE'S NOT A
 MEMBER, WE'LL HAVE TO
 
    CHARGE HIM FEES FOR ANYTHING THAT HAPPENS OFF BASE."'
 
    "NOW, MYERS SAID THAT OFF BASE IS THE PHYSICAL LIMITATIONS OF
 MCGUIRE.  THAT AREA IS
 
    HANDLED BY THE COP." (TR. 128).
 
    RATHER THAN PAY FEES FOR REPRESENTATION, MR. COX DECIDED TO JOIN THE
 UNION AND, AS NOTED ABOVE, RETURNED THE SIGNED 1187 ON AUGUST 28, 1979.
 IT SEEMS PROBABLE, AS MR. COX TESTIFIED, THAT THE AMOUNT OF UNION DUES
 WAS NOT MENTIONED BY MR. MYERS, WHICH IS BORNE OUT BY THE FACT THAT THE
 AMOUNT OF DUES WAS LEFT BLANK ON THE 1187 FURNISHED, AND SIGNED BY, MR.
 COX;  HOWEVER, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE WHATEVER THAT MR. MYERS IN ANY WAY
 MISREPRESENTED THE AMOUNT OF UNION DUES, NOTWITHSTANDING MR. COX'S
 ASSUMPTION, NOT BASED ON ANY STATEMENT BY MR. MYERS, THAT DUES WERE
 ABOUT $4.00 PER MONTH AND/OR HIS DISMAY WHEN HE LEARNED, WHEN DEDUCTIONS
 BEGAN, THAT DUES WERE, IN FACT, $8.75 PER PAY PERIOD.  /13/
 
    11.  ON NOVEMBER 6, 1979, REGINA MENDLER, THEN A NON-MEMBER OF THE
 UNION, WENT TO THE UNION OFFICE ABOUT A LEAVE RESTRICTION LETTER SHE HAD
 RECEIVED.  SHE FELT THE LETTER WAS NOT JUSTIFIED AND WANTED TO GRIEVE
 THE MATTER.  MS. MENDLER TESTIFIED THAT WHEN SHE RECEIVED THE LEAVE
 RESTRICTION LETTER ON NOVEMBER 2 SHE HAD GONE NEXT DOOR TO HER SECTION
 CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OFFICE TO ASK WHO TO SEE ABOUT FILING A GRIEVANCE AND
 TALKED TO A RECEPTIONIST WHOSE NAME WAS RUBY.  THE RECEPTIONIST DID NOT
 KNOW BUT TOLD MS. MENDLER SHE WOULD MAKE SOME CALLS AND FIND OUT;  THAT
 THE RECEPTIONIST CAME BACK AND "SAID THAT I HAD AN APPOINTMENT AT 1:30
 ON THE 6TH OF NOVEMBER WITH THE UNION OFFICE HERE AT MCGUIRE AND THE
 NAME ON THE PAPER WAS -- I WAS TO SEE A MR.  CASTELLANO." (TR. 112) MS.
 MENDLER FURTHER STATED THAT SHE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CLEAR THE MATTER
 WITH HER SUPERVISOR SINCE THE MEETING WOULD BE DURING DUTY HOURS AND
 THAT SHE HAD GIVEN HER SUPERVISOR THE SLIP OF PAPER.  SHE TESTIFIED THAT
 AFTER HER LUNCH BREAK ON NOVEMBER 6, SHE WAS RELEASED AT 1:30 P.M. FOR
 THE MEETING;  THAT SHE HAD GONE TO THE UNION OFFICE AND TOLD THE
 RECEPTIONIST SHE WAS THERE TO SEE MR. CASTELLANO AND THE RECEPTIONIST,
 MS. STORICKS, INTRODUCED HER TO MR. CASTELLANO;  THAT THERE WERE A LOT
 OF OTHER PEOPLE THERE;  AND THAT SHE DID NOT REMEMBER SEEING ANY FOOD ON
 MR. CASTELLANO'S DESK.
 
    MS. STORICKS ADMITTED THAT AN APPOINTMENT HAD BEEN MADE FOR MS.
 MENDLER FOR 1:30 P.M. ON NOVEMBER 6;  BUT DENIED THAT SHE WAS TO SEE MR.
 CASTELLANO, AND STATED THAT THE APPOINTMENT WAS TO SEE THE STEWARD FOR
 MS. MENDLER'S AREA, AND THAT SHE HAD CALLED MS. MENDLER TO SET UP THE
 APPOINTMENT AND HAD NOT TALKED TO ANYONE FROM PERSONNEL, BUT THAT MS.
 MENDLER HAD ARRIVED EARLY FOR HER APPOINTMENT, AT 12:45 P.M., AND,
 BECAUSE "MR. CASTELLANO HAPPENED TO BE SITTING THERE, AND THE 514TH IS
 HIS AREA OF REPRESENTATION" HE TALKED TO MS. MENDLER.  MS. STORICKS
 ADMITTED THAT MS. MENDLER'S SUPERVISOR HAD CALLED TO CONFIRM MS.
 MENDLER'S APPOINTMENT;  AND, AFTER STATING SHE DIDN'T REMEMBER WHO WAS
 THE STEWARD FOR MS. MENDLER'S AREA, STATED THAT ANY SHOP STEWARD HANDLES
 MATTERS IN ANY AREA AND IT COULD HAVE BEEN ANY STEWARD.
 
    MR. VINCENT CASTELLANO, A VICE PRESIDENT OF LOCAL 1778, READILY
 ADMITTED THAT HE TALKED TO MS. MENDLER ON NOVEMBER 6;  BUT, LIKE MS.
 STORICKS, HE INSISTED THAT SHE CAME IN AT ABOUT 12:45 WHILE HE WAS
 EATING LUNCH AT HIS DESK;  HE ALSO INSISTED THAT MS. MENDLER "WALKED IN
 AT THE LAST MINUTE.  THAT WAS NOT A SCHEDULED MEETING" (TR. 183).  MR.
 CASTELLANO TESTIFIED THAT HE HAD A SCHEDULED MEETING AT 1:30 P.M. ON
 NOVEMBER 6 WITH CIVIL ENGINEER HEATING PLANT FOR WHICH HE HAD BEEN
 RELEASED FROM WORK AT 11:30 A.M. IN ORDER TO PREPARE FOR THE 1:30
 MEETING.  MR. CASTELLANO STATED THAT HIS NORMAL LUNCH BREAK WHEN AT WORK
 IS 11:30 - 12:00;  THAT HE WAS "EATING AT THE OFFICE TO PREPARE FOR THE
 MEETING" (TR. 137) OR "I PREPARED FOR MY MEETING FIRST AND THEN I WAS
 EATING WHEN MISS MENDLER CAME IN" (TR. 182).  OF COURSE, THE RECORDS
 SHOWED THAT MR. CASTELLANO HAD NOT WORKED AT ALL ON NOVEMBER 6 BUT HAD
 BEEN RELEASED FOR UNION ACTIVITY FROM 7:30 A.M. TO 4:00 P.M. (G.C. EXH.
 10).
 
    I FOUND MS. MENDLER TO BE A VERY CREDIBLE WITNESS AND HER TESTIMONY
 THAT, SHE, IN FACT, HAD AN APPOINTMENT FOR 1:30 P.M. ON NOVEMBER 6,
 1979, WAS FULLY CORROBORATED BY THE TESTIMONY OF MS. STORICKS.  THE
 TESTIMONY OF BOTH MS. STORICKS AND MR. CASTELLANO AS TO THE TIME MS.
 MENDLER CAME TO THE UNION OFFICE AND THEIR DENIAL THAT THE APPOINTMENT
 HAD BEEN FOR MS. MENDLER TO SEE MR. CASTELLANO WAS UNCONVINCING;
 APPEARED CONTRIVED TO AVOID THE ALLEGATION THAT MR. CASTELLANO WAS ON
 DUTY, ALBEIT UNION DUTIES, AT THE TIME HE SOLICITED MS. MENDLER'S UNION
 MEMBERSHIP;  AND MR. CASTELLANO'S TESTIMONY, AS TO THE TIME OF HIS
 RELEASE FOR UNION ACTIVITY ON NOVEMBER 6, WAS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTED BY
 THE CONTEMPORARY RECORD OF TIME SPENT ON UNION ACTIVITIES, PREPARED BY
 CASTELLANO AND APPROVED BY HIS SUPERVISOR (G.C. EXH. 10).  RECOGNIZING
 THAT, AS MS. STORICKS STATED, MS. MENDLER'S SUPERVISOR HAD CALLED TO
 CONFIRM THE 1:30 P.M. TIME FOR MS. MENDLER'S APPOINTMENT, IT WOULD
 STRAIN CREDULITY BEYOND ALL REASON TO BELIEVE THAT MS. MENDLER WOULD,
 NEVERTHELESS, HAVE BEEN RELEASED AT LEAST 45 MINUTES PRIOR TO A
 SCHEDULED 1:30 P.M. MEETING.  ACCORDINGLY, I FULLY CREDIT MS. MENDLER'S
 TESTIMONY, AND REJECT THE TESTIMONY OF MS. STORICKS AND MR. CASTELLANO,
 AND FIND THAT ON NOVEMBER 2, 1979, AN APPOINTMENT HAD BEEN MADE FOR MS.
 MENDLER TO TALK TO MR. CASTELLANO AT 1:30 P.M. ON NOVEMBER 5, 1979;
 THAT MS. MENDLER WAS RELEASED TO ATTEND THE MEETING AT 1:30 P.M.; THAT
 MS. MENDLER ARRIVED AT THE UNION OFFICE SHORTLY AFTER 1:30 P.M., TOLD
 MS. STORICKS SHE WAS THERE TO SEE MR. CASTELLANO AND THAT MS. STORICKS
 INTRODUCED HER TO MR.  CASTELLANO.
 
    MR. CASTELLANO'S TESTIMONY THAT MS. MENDLER OPENED THEIR DISCUSSION
 BY STATING,
 
    " . . . AND WHEN SHE CAME IN, SHE TOLD ME SHE WAS NOT AWARE OF THE
 UNION BUT SHE WOULD LIKE
 
    TO BECOME A MEMBER." (TR. 138).  WAS CATEGORICALLY DENIED BY MS.
 MENDLER WHO TESTIFIED THAT SHE DID NOT HAVE ANY INTEREST IN JOINING THE
 UNION (TR. 116);  THAT AFTER SHE HAD SHOWN MR. CASTELLANO HER COPY OF
 THE LEAVE RESTRICTION LETTER AND HE HAD READ IT, HE STATED,
 
    " . . . 'WELL, I THINK WE CAN HANDLE THIS,' AND HE LEFT AND HE CAME
 BACK AGAIN AND HE SAID,
 
    'BEFORE I CAN HELP YOU, BEFORE I'M JUSTIFIED TO HELP YOU IN ANY WAY,
 YOU HAVE TO DECIDE
 
    WHETHER OR NOT YOU WANT TO JOIN THE UNION . . . OR YOU WOULD AGREE TO
 SIGN THIS OTHER FORM
 
    . . . ' THAT READ THAT I WOULD PAY $24 AN HOUR FOR THE SERVICES
 RENDERED IF I DIDN'T CHOOSE TO
 
    BE A UNION MEMBER." (TR. 113).
 
    "A.  WELL, I SAID, 'I CAN'T AFFORD $24 SO I GUESS IF I NEED THE HELP
 AND I DO, I GUESS I'LL
 
    HAVE TO JOIN THE UNION BECAUSE THAT WAS -- HE STATED TO ME SOME $16
 AND SOME ODD CENTS OUT OF
 
    YOUR PAY CHECK." (TR. 113-114).
 
    ALTHOUGH MR.  CASTELLANO TESTIFIED, "WE REPRESENT ALL MEMBERS OF THE
 BARGAINING UNIT, ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE BARGAINING UNIT.  MEMBER AND
 NON-MEMBER DOES NOT MATTER." (TR. 140-141), IN THE FOLLOWING COLLOQUY
 MR. CASTELLANO, WITH PERHAPS A FREUDIAN SLIP, ALSO STATED:
 
    "Q.  IF A NON-MEMBER WHO YOU WERE REPRESENTING OR WHO THE LOCAL WAS
 REPRESENTING REFUSED TO
 
    JOIN THE UNION, WHAT WOULD THE LOCAL'S RESPONSE BE?
 
    "A.  THERE WOULD BE NO RESPONSE.  THEY DON'T HAVE TO REPRESENT THE
 MEN." (TR. 141).
 
    MR. CASTELLANO ADMITTED HE GAVE MS. MENDLER AN AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES
 AND THAT HE EXPLAINED IT TO HER.  I DID NOT FIND CONVINCING HIS
 JUSTIFICATION AND, THEREFORE, FULLY CREDIT MS. MENDLER'S TESTIMONY.
 
    AS MS. MENDLER FURTHER TESTIFIED, AFTER MR. CASTELLANO TOLD HER THAT
 IF SHE WANTED THE UNION TO HELP HER SHE MUST EITHER JOIN THE UNION OR
 SIGN THE FORM PROVING THAT SHE WOULD PAY $24.00 AN HOUR FOR SERVICES
 RENDERED, SHE DID SIGN THE 1187;  THE UNION DID REPRESENT HER AND THE
 LEAVE RESTRICTION WAS WITHDRAWN;  AND SHE HAS NOT SOUGHT TO REVOKE HER
 UNION MEMBERSHIP.
 
    12.  ON FEBRUARY 28, 1980, CHERYL CHARITY, A NON-MEMBER OF THE UNION,
 WENT TO THE UNION OFFICE BECAUSE A PROMOTION TO A GS-4 POSITION FROM A
 TRAINEE POSITION HAD NOT BECOME EFFECTIVE ON FEBRUARY 3, 1980, AS
 SCHEDULED, BUT HAD COME TWO WEEKS LATER DUE TO LOST PAPERWORK AT THE
 CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OFFICE.  SHE SAW MR. KEITH VAN LAARHAVEN, A VICE
 PRESIDENT OF LOCAL 1778, AND FILLED OUT A COMPLAINT FORM AND SIGNED A
 POWER OF ATTORNEY.  NO ACTION WAS TAKEN ON HER COMPLAINT AT THAT TIME.
 MS. CHARITY TESTIFIED THAT MS. STORICKS CALLED HER AND ASKED HER TO COME
 TO THE UNION OFFICE ON MARCH 5, 1980.  MS. STORICKS ADMITTED MEETING
 WITH MS. CHARITY ON MARCH 5, BUT DENIED THAT SHE HAD CALLED HER.  I GIVE
 NO CREDENCE WHATEVER TO MS. STORICKS' TESTIMONY IN THIS REGARD AND FULLY
 CREDIT MS. CHARITY'S TESTIMONY.  MS. STORICKS ADMITTED THAT SHE GAVE MS.
 CHARITY A FORM 1187 AND AN AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES;  THAT SHE EXPLAINED THE
 BENEFITS OF MEMBERSHIP;  THAT SHE "EXPLAINED TO HER THAT IT DID COST
 SOMETHING TO RUN THE LOCAL AND FOR US TO EXIST AND ASKED HER IF SHE
 WOULD BE WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE COSTS" (TR. 40);  THAT "I TOLD HER
 THAT WE'RE ASKING -- I TOLD HER IT COST SOMETHING TO RUN THE LOCAL AND
 WE WOULD LIKE HER TO CONTRIBUTE TO THAT COST." (TR. 41);  THAT SHE
 EXPLAINED THE $24.00 PER HOUR CHARGE AND, IN ADDITION, THE FURTHER
 POTENTIAL COSTS TO HER IF HER CASE WENT TO ARBITRATION, WHICH MS.
 CHARITY TESTIFIED MS. STORICKS HAD STATED AS RUNNING ANYWHERE FROM
 $500.00 TO $1,000.00.  MS. STORICKS ADMITTED, PURSUANT TO HER REGULAR
 PRACTICE, THAT SHE DID NOT TELL MS. CHARITY THAT SHE WOULD BE
 REPRESENTED BY THE UNION WHETHER OR NOT SHE JOINED THE UNION OR SIGNED
 THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES;  HOWEVER MS. STORICKS DID STATE THAT SHE TOLD
 MS. CHARITY THAT HER COMPLAINT "WOULD HAVE BEEN HANDED OVER TO THE UNION
 SHOP STEWARD AND HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH HER." (TR. 44).
 
    MS. CHARITY TESTIFIED, IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "Q.  WHAT, IF ANYTHING, DID YOU DO WITH THE FORMS?
 
    "A.  I ASKED HER (STORICKS) DID I HAVE TO SIGN IT THEN, AND I THINK
 SHE SAID NO.
 
    "I SAID, 'WELL, I WILL GET BACK TO YOU,' BUT SHE INFORMED ME THAT
 UNLESS I FILLED OUT ONE
 
    FORM OR THE OTHER, THE UNION WASN'T GOING TO DO ANYTHING SO I TOOK
 BOTH FORMS AND
 
    LEFT." (TR. 103).
 
    MS. CHARITY TESTIFIED THAT, ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER SHE RETURNED TO
 HER OFFICE, MR. CHARLIE GOULD, A UNION STEWARD, CALLED HER AND STATED
 THAT ". . . THERE WERE A COUPLE OF OTHER CASES FROM CP THAT HAD THE SAME
 PROBLEM AS MINE.  THEN HE SAID HE WOULD GET BACK TO ME AT A LATER DATE."
 (TR. 105).
 
    MS. CHARITY DID NOT JOIN THE UNION AND DID NOT SIGN AN AFFIDAVIT OF
 CHARGES, NOR DID SHE HEAR FURTHER FROM THE UNION;  HOWEVER, BY LETTER
 DATED JUNE 20, 1980, CHIEF SHOP STEWARD WILLIAM V. FINLEY, ON BEHALF OF
 FIVE EMPLOYEES INCLUDING MS. CHARITY, SOUGHT RELIEF FROM THE COMPTROLLER
 GENERAL (RES. EXH. 2).  I AM AWARE, AS GENERAL COUNSEL STATES, THAT MR.
 FINLEY'S LETTER IS DATED NEARLY TWO MONTHS AFTER THE COMPLAINT AND
 NOTICE OF HEARING HAD ISSUED AND THAT MS. CHARITY KNEW NOTHING OF THE
 LETTER UNTIL TWO DAYS PRIOR TO THE HEARING.  (TR. 107).
 
    13.  IN MARCH, 1980, MR. PETER PANAGOTOPULOS, A NON-MEMBER OF THE
 UNION, WAS RATED INELIGIBLE FOR A MERIT PROMOTION FOR WHICH HE HAD
 APPLIED.  AGENCY'S OFFICE OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS TOLD HIM HE WOULD HAVE
 TO GO THROUGH THE UNION TO GRIEVE THE MATTER.  ACCORDINGLY, ON APRIL 1,
 1980, MR. PANAGOTOPULOS WENT TO THE UNION OFFICE AND MET MS. STORICKS.
 AFTER GIVING HIM A COMPLAINT FORM AND A POWER OF ATTORNEY, WHICH HE
 FILLED OUT, MS. STORICKS THEN PRESENTED HIM WITH AN APPLICATION TO JOIN
 THE UNION (FORM 1187) AND AN AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES.  HE TOLD MS. STORICKS
 HE DID NOT WANT TO JOIN THE UNION AND DIDN'T WANT TO SIGN ANY FORM FOR
 $24 AN HOUR.  MS. STORICKS TOLD HIM "THEY WOULD CONTACT ME" (TR. 80) AND
 HE LEFT.
 
    WHEN MR. PANAGOTOPULOS ARRIVED AT HIS OFFICE, WHICH HE SHARES WITH A
 MR. KIMENHOUR, A UNION STEWARD, HE TOLD MR. KIMENHOUR WHAT HAD OCCURRED
 AT THE UNION OFFICE AND HE STATED THAT MR. KIMENHOUR STATED THAT, IN HIS
 OPINION, THE UNION WOULD NOT REPRESENT HIM.  MR. PANAGOTOPULOS LATER
 RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL IN WHICH HE WAS INFORMED THAT THE UNION WOULD
 NOT REPRESENT HIM (TR. 83).  ON APRIL 2, 1980, MR. PANAGOTOPULOS WENT TO
 THE BASE LEGAL OFFICE AND GAVE AN AFFIDAVIT ABOUT THE DENIAL OF
 REPRESENTATION.  WHEN HE RETURNED TO HIS OFFICE, HE TOLD MR. KIMENHOUR
 THAT HE HAD GIVEN AN AFFIDAVIT AND ON OR ABOUT, APRIL 4, 1980, MR.
 PANAGOTOPULOS WAS TOLD BY MR. KIMENHOUR THAT THE UNION WOULD NOW
 REPRESENT HIM AND THAT HE HAD ARRANGED A MEETING BY MR. CASTELLANO, A
 UNION VICE PRESIDENT, WITH MR. LONG, THE SUPERVISOR WHO HAD RATED MR.
 PANAGOTOPULOS INELIGIBLE.  MR. CASTELLANO MET WITH MR. LONG;  MR. LONG
 MAINTAINED HIS POSITION THAT MR. PANAGOTOPULOS WAS INELIGIBLE AND, AT
 THE DATE OF THE HEARING, NO FURTHER ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN.  HOWEVER, ON
 MAY 13, 1980, MR. PANAGOTOPULOS WROTE A LETTER INDICATING THAT SINCE THE
 UNION WAS REPRESENTING HIM, HIS AFFIDAVIT WAS "USELESS (SIC) BECAUSE THE
 UNION IS HANDLING MY GRIEVANCE /14/ ." (RES. EXH. 1).
 
    14.  RESPONDENT OFFERED DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY TO SHOW
 THAT IT DOES, IN FACT, REPRESENT NON-MEMBERS (RES. EXHS. 6-16;  18-22).
 GENERAL COUNSEL VERY PROPERLY NOTES THAT RESPONDENT EXHIBITS 8-12, 15
 AND 16 INVOLVE ALLEGED REPRESENTATIONAL ACTIVITIES AFTER ISSUANCE OF THE
 COMPLAINT AND THAT RESPONDENT EXHIBITS 6, 7, 13 AND 14 RELATE TO SUCH
 ALLEGED ACTIVITIES AFTER COMMENCEMENT OF THE AUTHORITY'S INVESTIGATION
 OF THE CHARGE FILED ON DECEMBER 27, 1979.  RESPONDENT EXHIBITS 18-22
 REPRESENT CORRESPONDENCE ON BEHALF OF AN EMPLOYEE, ALLEGEDLY A
 NON-MEMBER, TO A MEMBER OF CONGRESS CONCERNING A COMPENSATION MATTER.
 
                                CONCLUSIONS
 
    A.  CONDITIONING REPRESENTATION OF NON-MEMBERS.
 
    THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT LOCAL 1778 HAS, SINCE THE SPRING OF 1978,
 CONFRONTED EACH NON-MEMBER WHO HAS SOUGHT THE ASSISTANCE OF THE UNION
 WITH A FORM 1187, DUES DEDUCTION AUTHORIZATION, AND AN AFFIDAVIT OF
 CHARGES.  MS. STORICKS, AN EMPLOYEE AND AGENT OF LOCAL 1778, WHO
 NORMALLY SEES ALL MEMBERS AND NON-MEMBERS WHEN THEY COME TO THE UNION
 OFFICE, MADE IT CLEAR THAT, AS SHE WAS INSTRUCTED BY THE EXECUTIVE BOARD
 OF LOCAL 1778, SHE DOES, IN FACT, PRESENT A FORM 1187 AND AN AFFIDAVIT
 OF CHARGES TO EACH NON-MEMBER IN ORDER, AS SHE ASSERTED, TO ENCOURAGE
 NON-MEMBERS TO JOIN THE UNION.  INDEED, AS IN THE CASE OF MS. CHERYL
 CHARITY, WHEN A NON-MEMBER FILES A COMPLAINT WITHOUT HAVING BEEN
 PRESENTED WITH THE FORM 1187 AND THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES, MS. STORICKS
 CALLS THEM TO THE UNION OFFICE FOR THAT PURPOSE.
 
    I HAVE NO DOUBT, CERTAINLY, THAT A UNION MAY ENCOURAGE MEMBERSHIP IN
 THE UNION, OR THAT IT MAY EVEN ENCOURAGE VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS FROM
 NON-MEMBERS FOR REPRESENTATIONAL ASSISTANCE;  BUT ENCOURAGEMENT MAY NOT
 LAWFULLY BE CONVOLUTED TO A THREAT, HOWEVER VEILED OR SUBTLE, THAT
 REPRESENTATION WILL NOT BE PROVIDED UNLESS THE BARGAINING UNIT EMPLOYEE
 JOINS THE UNION OR AGREES TO PAY FEES FOR REPRESENTATION.  /15/
 
    THE RECORD SHOWS WITHOUT DISPUTE THAT RESPONDENT IN 1978 EMABARKED ON
 A DELIBERATE SCHEME TO COERCE NON-MEMBERS, WHO SOUGHT THE ASSISTANCE OF
 THE UNION IN REPRESENTATIONAL MATTERS, TO JOIN THE UNION BY:  A)
 CONFRONTING EACH NON-MEMBER WITH AN 1187, DUES DEDUCTION AUTHORIZATION
 AND AN AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES;  B) INSISTING THAT THE NON-MEMBER SIGN ONE
 OR THE OTHER;  C) AT THE VERY LEAST, IMPLYING THAT REPRESENTATION WOULD
 NOT BE PROVIDED UNLESS THE INDIVIDUAL JOINED THE UNION OR SIGNED THE
 AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES.  THUS, MS. STORICKS ADMITTED, "I SAY THAT WE WOULD
 LIKE YOU TO SIGN ONE OR THE OTHER . . . THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES OR THE
 MEMBERSHIP FORM" AND THAT SHE DOES NOT TELL THE EMPLOYEE THAT SIGNING
 EITHER FORM IS PURELY VOLUNTARY AND/OR THAT IF THE EMPLOYEE CHOOSES NOT
 TO SIGN HE, OR SHE, WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY THE UNION.  THERE CAN BE NO
 SERIOUS QUESTION THAT THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES WAS, AND IS, BY DESIGN, A
 TOOL OF COERCION.  THE HOURLY RATE OF $24.00 PER HOUR, THE OPEN-ENDED
 HOURS, AND CHARGES OVER AND ABOVE THE HOURLY RATE OBLIGATION, WHICH MS.
 STORICKS FREELY ADVISED MIGHT RUN BETWEEN $500.00 TO $1,000.00,
 DETERRED, AS INTENDED, ANY EMPLOYEE FROM SIGNING AN AFFIDAVIT OF
 CHARGES.  BY COMPARISON, UNION DUES APPEARED MODEST.  EMPLOYEES MENDLER
 AND COX WERE DEFINITELY INFLUENCED TO JOIN THE UNION BY RESPONDENT'S
 STATEMENTS CONCERNING CHARGES AND FEES FOR NON-MEMBERS AND RESPONDENT
 ADMITTED THAT OTHER EMPLOYEES HAD SIGNED DUES ALLOTMENT AUTHORIZATION
 AFTER BEING PRESENTED WITH THE TWO FORMS.
 
    THE CONFRONTATION OF EACH NON-MEMBER WHO COMES TO THE UNION OFFICE
 FOR REPRESENTATIONAL ASSISTANCE WITH A MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION AND A FORM
 REQUIRING THE PAYMENT OF FEES COUPLED WITH THE REQUEST THAT THE EMPLOYEE
 SIGN ONE OR THE OTHER VIOLATES THE RESPONSIBILITY IMPOSED BY SECTION
 14(A)(1) OF THE STATUTE.  THE UNION MAY NOT CONDITION REPRESENTATION ON
 LABOR ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP NOR MAY IT DISCRIMINATE IN REPRESENTING
 THE INTERESTS OF ALL EMPLOYEES IN THE UNIT.  PRESENTATION OF A UNION
 MEMBERSHIP FORM AS PART OF THE UNION'S PROCEDURE TO INSTITUTE, OR TO
 PROCESS, A COMPLAINT, EVEN IF, AS MS. STORICKS TESTIFIED, THE EMPLOYEE
 IS TOLD ONLY THAT THE UNION "WOULD LIKE YOU TO SIGN", VIOLATES SECTION
 14(A)(1) OF THE STATUTE AND CONSTITUTES AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE IN
 VIOLATION OF SECTION 16(B)(8) OF THE STATUTE WHETHER OR NOT SUCH CONDUCT
 CONSTITUTES INTERFERENCE, RESTRAINT, OR COERCION WITHIN THE MEANING OF
 SECTION 16(B)(1) OF THE STATUTE.  NOR, OF COURSE, DUES THE ACTUAL
 PRACTICE OF THE UNION, OF PRESENTING THE NON-MEMBER WITH A UNION
 MEMBERSHIP FORM, 1187, AND AN AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES, GIVING THE
 NON-MEMBER A CHOICE, I.E., " . . . WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO SING ONE OR THE
 OTHER", MAKE THE PRACTICE ANY LESS VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 14(A)(1) AND
 16(B)(8) OF THE STATUTE.  SECTION 14(A)(1) IMPOSES AN AFFIRMATIVE
 OBLIGATION ON THE EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE TO REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF
 ALL EMPLOYEES IN THE UNIT WITHOUT REGARD TO UNION MEMBERSHIP.  ANY
 ACTION BY A UNION WHICH WOULD COMPROMISE THIS OBLIGATION, WHETHER BY
 SUBMITTING A UNION MEMBERSHIP FORM OR FEE SCHEDULE, IS PRESUMPTIVELY
 VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 14(A)(1) AND THE UNION, IF IT IS TO AVOID THE
 CONSEQUENCES OF ITS OWN ACTION, MUST TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO ASSURE
 THAT THE NON-MEMBER IS INFORMED THAT THE UNION WILL REPRESENT HIS
 INTERESTS WITHOUT REGARD TO UNION MEMBERSHIP.  CLEARLY MS. STORICKS' "WE
 WOULD LIKE" LANGUAGE, EVEN IF INTENDED, AS RESPONDENT ASSERTS, TO MEAN
 THAT SIGNING "ONE OR THE OTHER . . . THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES OR THE
 MEMBERSHIP FORM" WAS VOLUNTARY, WAS WHOLLY INEFFECTUAL TO OVERCOME THE
 PRESUMTIVE VIOLATION OF SECTION 14(A)(1) WHICH OCCURRED WHEN THE UNION
 INTERJECTED THE UNION MEMBERSHIP FORM AND THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES AND
 STATED "WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO SIGN ONE OR THE OTHER." /16/
 
    VIOLATION OF SECTION 16(B)(8) ALSO, DERIVATIVELY, CONSTITUTES A
 VIOLATION OF 16(B)(1).  INDEED, INTERJECTION BY THE UNION OF UNION
 MEMBERSHIP IN REPRESENTATION OF THE INTEREST OF EMPLOYEES IN VIOLATION
 OF SECTIONS 14(A)(1) AND 16(B)(8) CONSTITUTES AN INDEPENDENT VIOLATION
 OF SECTION 16(B)(1) SINCE SUCH CONDUCT WOULD INHERENTLY INTERFERE WITH,
 RESTRAIN, OR COERCE AN EMPLOYEE IN THE EXERCISE OF RIGHTS ASSURED UNDER
 THE STATUTE, INCLUDING THE PROTECTED RIGHT OF EACH EMPLOYEE "TO FORM,
 JOIN, OR ASSIST ANY LABOR ORGANIZATION, OR TO REFRAIN FROM ANY SUCH
 ACTIVITY, FREELY AND WITHOUT FEAR OF PENALTY OR REPRISAL." (SECTION 2).
 MOREOVER, THE RECORD CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THE UNION INTERFERED
 WITH, RESTRAINED, OR COERCED EMPLOYEES IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR
 PROTECTED RIGHTS IN VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 14(A)(1), 16(B)(1) AND (8) OF
 THE STATUTE, INTER ALIA, IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER.  FIRST, THE
 CONFRONTATION OF EACH NON-MEMBER WITH A MEMBERSHIP FORM AND A FORM FOR
 THE PAYMENT OF FEES, COUPLED WITH THE STATEMENT "WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO
 SIGN ONE OR THE OTHER" IMPLIED, AS THE UNION OBVIOUSLY INTENDED IT
 SHOULD, THAT UNLESS ONE FORM OR THE OTHER WAS SIGNED THE UNION WOULD NOT
 REPRESENT THE EMPLOYEE.  SECOND, UTILIZATION OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES
 WAS, ITSELF, A TOOL OF COERCION.  THIRD, MS. STORICKS, WHO NORMALLY SAW
 ALL EMPLOYEES WHEN THEY CAME TO THE UNION OFFICE, AS A UNIFORM PRACTICE
 DID NOT ADVISE NON-MEMBERS THAT THE UNION WOULD REPRESENT THEM WHETHER
 THEY JOINED THE UNION OR SIGNED THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES.  FOURTH, THE
 CREDITED TESTIMONY OF MS. MENDLER SHOWS THAT MR. CASTELLANO A VICE
 PRESIDENT OF LOCAL 1778 TOLD HER THAT "BEFORE I CAN HELP YOU, BEFORE I'M
 JUSTIFIED TO HELP YOU ANY WAY, YOU HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT YOU
 WANT TO JOIN THE UNION . . . OR YOU WOULD AGREE TO SIGN THIS OTHER FORM
 (AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES)"';  /17/ THE CREDITED TESTIMONY OF MR. COX SHOWS
 THAT MR. MYERS, SECRETARY-TREASURER OF LOCAL 1718, TOLD MR. COX, AFTER
 HE ASCERTAINED THAT MR. COX WAS NOT A MEMBER OF THE UNION, THAT THERE
 WOULD BE FEES IF HE WERE NOT A MEMBER.  MR. COX'S TESTIMONY WAS FULLY
 CORROBORATED BY MR. BERGERSON WHO TESTIFIED THAT MR. MYERS TOLD HIM IN A
 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION THAT IF MR. COX WERE NOT A MEMBER AND WANTED THE
 UNION TO PURSUE HIS COMPENSATION CLAIM, "WE'LL HAVE TO CHARGE HIM FEES".
  THE RECORD FURTHER SHOWS WITHOUT CONTRADICTION THAT AFTER MR.
 PANAGOTOPULOS TOLD MS. STORICKS THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO JOIN THE UNION
 OR SIGN THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES SHE TOLD HIM "THEY WOULD CONTACT" HIM;
 THAT WHEN HE RETURNED TO HIS OFFICE WHICH HE SHARED WITH MR. KIMENHOUR,
 A UNION STEWARD, MR.  PANAGOTOPULOS TOLD MR. KIMENHOUR WHAT HAD OCCURRED
 AT THE UNION OFFICE AND MR. KIMENHOUR TOLD MR.  PANAGOTOPULOS THAT, IN
 HIS OPINION, THE UNION WOULD NOT REPRESENT HIM;  AND, MR. PANAGOTOPULOS
 LATER RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL IN WHICH HE WAS INFORMED THAT THE UNION
 WOULD NOT REPRESENT HIM.  MR.  PANAGOTOPULOS WENT TO THE BASE LEGAL
 OFFICE TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE DENIAL OF REPRESENTATION AND GAVE AN
 AFFIDAVIT.  WHEN HE RETURNED TO HIS OFFICE, HE TOLD MR. KIMENHOUR WHAT
 HE HAD DONE AND TWO DAYS LATER MR. KIMENHOUR TOLD MR. PANAGOTOPULOS THAT
 THE UNION WOULD, NOW REPRESENT HIM AND HE, KIMENHOUR, HAD ARRANGED FOR A
 MEETING BY MR. CASTELLANO, A UNION VICE PRESIDENT, AND MR. LONG, THE
 SUPERVISOR WHO HAD RATED MR. PANAGOTOPULOS INELIGIBLE FOR THE MERIT
 PROMOTION FOR WHICH HE HAS APPLIED.  /18/ FROM THE FOREGOING, THE RECORD
 SHOWS, INTER ALIA, THAT THE UNION TOLD NON-MEMBERS THAT THE UNION WOULD
 NOT REPRESENT THEIR INTERESTS UNLESS THEY JOINED THE UNION OR SIGNED THE
 AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES;  THAT THE UNION TOLD NON-MEMBERS THAT FEES WOULD
 BE CHARGED, WHICH WERE NOT REQUIRED OF MEMBERS;  AND THAT REPRESENTATION
 WAS REFUSED WHEN AN EMPLOYEE REFUSED TO JOIN THE UNION OR TO PAY FEES
 FOR REPRESENTATION.  WITHOUT MORE, BY SUCH CONDUCT THE UNION, NOT ONLY
 VIOLATED ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF ALL EMPLOYEES
 IN THE UNIT WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION OR WITHOUT REGARD TO LABOR
 ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP, BUT INTERFERED WITH, RESTRAINED, OR COERCED
 EMPLOYEES IN THE EXERCISE BY THE EMPLOYEE OF RIGHTS UNDER THE STATUTE IN
 VIOLATION OF SECTION 16(B)(1).
 
    ALTHOUGH THE NLRB HAS TREATED DISPARATE TREATMENT OF NON-MEMBERS AS
 DISTINCT FROM THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION OF MEMBERS, INTERNATIONAL
 ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 697,
 AFL-CIO, 223 NLRB 832, 91 LRRM 1529 (1976);  BUT, SEE, THE WALLACE
 CORPORATION V. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255-256 (1944), SECTION 14(A)(1) OF
 THE STATUTE ENCOMPASSES BOTH A DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION (WITHOUT
 DISCRIMINATION) AND THE DISPARATE TREATMENT OF NON-MEMBERS (WITHOUT
 REGARD TO LABOR ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP).  IT IS RECOGNIZED, OF COURSE,
 THAT THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION MAY EXTEND SUBSTANTIALLY BEYOND
 DISCRIMINATION, SEE, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,
 AFL-CIO, LOCAL 987, 3 FLRA NO. 115 (1980), AND IN PARTICULAR THE
 DISCUSSION AND CASES CITED IN THE DECISION OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE
 LAW JUDGE.  INDEED, RESPONDENT'S RELIANCE ON PORTIONS OF JUDGE FENTION'S
 DECISION AS WARRANTING RESPONDENT'S CONDUCT IN THIS CASE IS WHOLLY
 MISPLACED.  CLEARLY, JUDGE FENTON ADDRESSED SOLELY APPLICATION OF A
 UNION'S RESPONSIBILITY, PURSUANT TO ITS DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION, FOR
 AN INNOCENT MISTAKE OR DISAGREEMENT WITH A UNION'S EXERCISE OF
 DISCRETION (THERE AN INNOCENT MISTAKE WHICH MAY HAVE TERMINATED A
 MERITORIOUS GRIEVANCE).  I FULLY AGREE WITH HIS VIEW THAT NO BREACH OF
 DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION SHOULD BE PREDICATED MERELY UPON PROOF THAT
 A UNION WAS "INEPT, NEGLIGENT, UNWISE, INSENSITIVE OR INEFFECTUAL";
 BUT, RATHER, THAT "SUCH BREACHES SHOULD BE FOUND ONLY WHERE THE UNION'S
 CONDUCT WAS IMPROPERLY MOTIVATED . . . OR BY IRRELEVANT OR INVIDIOUS
 CONSIDERATIONS . . . OR WHERE IT WAS WHOLLY ARBITRARY OR GROSSLY
 NEGLIGENT." HE NOTED THAT A BROADER, MORE COMPREHENSIVE RULE WOULD BE
 DESTRUCTIVE OF GOOD BARGAINING RELATIONSHIPS, OF RESPONSIBLE
 REPRESENTATION AND EVEN . . . OF THE ORGANIZATION ITSELF;  THAT THE
 SUPREME COURT;  IN IBEW V. FOUST, 99 S.CT. 2121, 101 LRRM 2365 (1979),
 HAD BARRED PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN A FAIR REPRESENTATION SUIT, INDICATING
 THE NEED TO PROTECT THE UNION'S FINANCIAL RESOURCES AND THEREBY ITS
 EFFECTIVENESS;  AND HE STATED, "THIS FACTOR ACQUIRES EVEN GREATER WEIGHT
 IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR WHERE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS CANNOT COMPEL THE
 PAYMENT OF DUES OR SERVICE FEES AND WHERE THEY OFTEN REPRESENT UNITS
 WHICH DWARF THEIR DUES - PAYING MEMBERSHIP", A VIEW WITH WHICH I, ALSO,
 FULLY AGREE IN THE CONTEXT WHICH JUDGE FENTON CAREFULLY STATED ITS
 APPLICATION.  OBVIOUSLY, HIS REFERENCE TO RIGHTS PROTECTED UNDER SECTION
 1(A) OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491 (SECTION 2 OF THE STATUTE) MEANS THAT HE
 WOULD FIND A BREACH OF DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION WHERE, AS HERE, SUCH
 BREACH WAS IMPROPERLY MOTIVATED BY SECTION 1(A), NOW SECTION 2 OF THE
 STATUTE, CONSIDERATIONS.  MOREOVER, THE PRESENT CASE, UNLIKE AMERICAN
 FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, SUPRA, WHICH AROSE UNDER EXECUTIVE
 ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED, IS GOVERNED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE
 AND THE OBLIGATION OF AN EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE TO REPRESENT THE
 INTERESTS OF ALL EMPLOYEES IN THE UNIT WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION AND
 WITHOUT REGARD TO LABOR ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP IS NOW GOVERNED BY QUITE
 SPECIFIC STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND NO LONGER IS SUBJECT MERELY TO THE
 GENERAL OBLIGATION OF FAIR REPRESENTATION.  SINCE IT IS UNNECESSARY FOR
 THE DECISION OF ANY ISSUE IN THIS CASE, I NEITHER REACH, NOR HAVE I
 GIVEN CONSIDERATION TO, LIABILITY OF RESPONDENT UNDER ITS DUTY OF FAIR
 REPRESENTATION BEYOND THE RESPONSIBILITY SPECIFICALLY IMPOSED BY SECTION
 14(A)(1) OF THE STATUTE.
 
    B.  SOLICITATION OF UNION MEMBERSHIP DURING DUTY TIME.
 
    THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE CREDITED TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE SHOWS, AND I
 FIND, THAT BOTH MR. MYERS AND MR. CASTELLANO SOLICITED UNION MEMBERSHIP
 DURING DUTY HOURS AND, SPECIFICALLY, THAT NEITHER WAS ON A MEAL BREAK AT
 THE TIME OF THE SOLICITATION OF MEMBERSHIP OF MR.  COX (BY MR. MYERS AT
 APPROXIMATELY 10:30 A.M. ON AUGUST 27, 1979) AND OF MS. MENDLER (BY MR.
 CASTELLANO AT APPROXIMATELY 1:30 P.M. ON NOVEMBER 6, 1979).  MS. MENDLER
 WAS SPECIFICALLY SHOWN TO HAVE BEEN RELEASED ON DUTY TIME TO GO TO THE
 UNION OFFICE AND, ACCORDINGLY, SHE WAS ON DUTY TIME WHEN MR. CASTELLANO
 SOLICITED HER MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNION.  MR. COX WENT TO THE UNION OFFICE
 DURING DUTY HOURS AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY THAT HE WAS ON
 BREAK TIME.  THEREFORE, I DRAW THE INFERENCE THAT HE WAS ON DUTY TIME
 WHEN MR. MYERS SOLICITED HIS MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNION.
 
    SECTION 31(B) PROVIDES, IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "(B) ANY ACTIVITIES PERFORMED BY ANY EMPLOYEE RELATING TO THE
 INTERNAL BUSINESS OF A LABOR
 
    ORGANIZATION (INCLUDING THE SOLICITATION OF MEMBERSHIP . . . ) SHALL
 BE PERFORMED DURING THE
 
    TIME THE EMPLOYEE IS IN A NON-DUTY STATUS." (5 U.S.C. 7131(B)).
 
    WHILE IT IS CLEAR THAT MESSRS. MYERS AND CASTELLANO WERE ON DUTY TIME
 (CLOCK TIME) IT IS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT EACH HAD BEEN RELEASED ON OFFICIAL
 TIME TO ATTEND TO UNION DUTIES AT THE UNION OFFICE AND THAT EACH
 SOLICITED MEMBERSHIP OF AN EMPLOYEE IN CONNECTION WITH THE PERFORMANCE
 OF UNION DUTIES FOR WHICH EACH HAD BEEN GRANTED OFFICIAL TIME, I.E., MR.
 MYERS IN CONNECTION WITH A COMPENSATION MATTER (HE TESTIFIED THAT HIS
 REPRESENTATIONAL DUTIES, FOR COMPENSATION) AND MR. CASTELLANO IN
 CONNECTION WITH A GRIEVANCE (HIS REPRESENTATIONAL DUTIES, FOR WHICH HE
 WAS GRANTED OFFICIAL TIME, INCLUDED THE HANDLING OF GRIEVANCES).  AS MR.
 MYERS AND MR. CASTELLANO HAD BEEN RELEASED TO PERFORM UNION DUTIES,
 NEITHER WAS IN A DUTY STATUS IN THE SENSE OF AGENCY WORK TIME.
 NEVERTHELESS, IT MAY NOT BE SAID THAT THEY WERE IN A "NONWORK TIME"
 STATUS, SUCH AS BREAK TIME, CF.  OKLAHOMA CITY AIR LOGISTICS CENTER
 (AFLC), TINKER AIR FORCE BASE AND AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
 EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 916, CASE NO. 6-CA-175 (ALJ, MAY 23, 1980).
 
    GENERAL COUNSEL AND THE CHARGING PARTY ASSERT THAT EACH WAS IN A DUTY
 STATUS AT THE TIME OF SOLICITATION OF MEMBERSHIP AND, THEREFORE, THE
 SOLICITATION VIOLATED SECTION 31(B) AND CONSTITUTED AN UNFAIR LABOR
 PRACTICE UNDER SECTION 16(B)(8).  LITERALLY, PERHAPS, THEIR CONSTRUCTION
 OF SECTION 31(B) WOULD SUPPORT A VIOLATION.  I AM AWARE THAT CONGRESSMAN
 FORD STATED, IN EXPLAINING THE UDAL SUBSTITUTE, THAT:
 
    "SECTION 7132(B) OF THE COMPROMISE (ENACTED WITHOUT CHANGE AS
 7131(B)) PRECLUDES THE USE OF
 
    OFFICIAL TIME BY EMPLOYEES FOR CONDUCTING THE INTERNAL BUSINESS OF A
 LABOR ORGANIZATION.  THIS
 
    SUBSECTION SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED THAT EMPLOYEES SHALL NOT SOLICIT
 MEMBERSHIPS . . . ON
 
    OFFICIAL TIME." (LEG. HISTORY P. 957).  NEVERTHELESS, WHERE, AS HERE,
 THE SOLICITATION OCCURS IN THE COURSE OF THE ACTIVITY FOR WHICH OFFICIAL
 TIME HAS BEEN GRANTED, I DO NOT FIND THAT SOLICITATION VIOLATES SECTION
 31(B) OF THE STATUTE, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT, FOR REASONS SET FORTH ABOVE,
 THE SOLICITATION HAS BEEN FOUND TO VIOLATE SECTIONS 14(A)(1), 16(B)(1)
 AND (8) OF THE STATUTE.  ACCORDINGLY, I SHALL RECOMMEND THAT THIS
 PORTION OF THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED.
 
    HAVING FOUND THAT RESPONDENT HAS ENGAGED, AND IS ENGAGING, IN CERTAIN
 CONDUCT IN VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 14(A)(1), 16(B)(1) AND (8) OF THE
 STATUTE, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE AUTHORITY ISSUE THE FOLLOWING:
 
                                   ORDER
 
    PURSUANT TO SECTION 18(A)(7) OF THE STATUTE, 5 U.S.C. 7118(A)(7), AND
 SECTION 2423.26 OF THE FINAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, 5 C.F.R. CHAPTER
 XIV, SECTION 2423.26, FED.REG., VOL. 45, NO. 12, JANUARY 17, 1980, THE
 AUTHORITY HEREBY ORDERS THAT AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
 EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1778, AFL-CIO, SHALL:
 
    1.  CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
 
    (A) SUBMITTING UNION MEMBERSHIP FORMS (FORM 1187) AND/OR FORMS FOR
 PAYMENT OF FEES FOR
 
    REPRESENTATIONAL SERVICES (AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES) TO NON-MEMBERS WHO
 SEEK REPRESENTATION OF
 
    THEIR INTERESTS.
 
    (B) CONDITIONING REPRESENTATION OF NON-MEMBERS ON THEIR JOINING THE
 UNION OR ON THEIR
 
    AGREEING TO PAY FEES FOR REPRESENTATION.
 
    (C) FAILING OR REFUSING TO REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF ALL EMPLOYEES
 IN THE UNIT IT
 
    REPRESENTS WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION AND WITHOUT REGARD TO LABOR
 ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP.
 
    (D) IN ANY LIKE OR RELATED MANNER INTERFERING WITH, RESTRAINING, OR
 COERCING ANY EMPLOYEE
 
    IN THE EXERCISE OF ANY RIGHT UNDER THE STATUTE OR OTHERWISE FAILING
 OR REFUSING TO COMPLY WITH
 
    ANY PROVISION OF THE STATUTE.
 
    2.  TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE
 PURPOSE AND POLICIES OF THE STATUTE:
 
    (A) DISCONTINUE ALL USE OF THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED "AFFIDAVIT OF
 CHARGES."
 
    (B) OFFER TO ACCEPT THE IMMEDIATE RESIGNATION OF MR. ROY B.  COX AND
 MS. REGINA MENDLER AS
 
    MEMBERS OF THE UNION;  FORTHWITH TERMINATE THE DUES AUTHORIZATION
 EXECUTED BY EACH;  AND
 
    REIMBURSE MR. COX AND MS. MENDLER FOR ALL UNION DUES AND FEES PAID BY
 MR. COX ON AND AFTER
 
    AUGUST 27, 1979, AND PAID BY MS. MENDLER ON AND AFTER NOVEMBER 6,
 1979, TOGETHER WITH INTEREST
 
    AT THE RATE OF 12% PER ANNUM UNTIL PAID IN FULL.  /19/
 
    (C) ADVISE ALL EMPLOYEES IN THE UNIT IT REPRESENTS THAT LOCAL 1778
 WILL REPRESENT THE
 
    INTERESTS OF ALL EMPLOYEES IN THE UNIT WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION AND
 WITHOUT REGARD TO LABOR
 
    ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP.
 
    (D) POST ON EACH UNION BULLETIN BOARD AT HEADQUARTERS, 438TH AIR BASE
 GROUP, MCGUIRE AIR
 
    FORCE BASE, AND AT THE OFFICE OF LOCAL 1778, COPIES OF THE ATTACHED
 NOTICE MARKED
 
    "APPENDIX" ON FORMS TO BE FURNISHED BY THE AUTHORITY.  UPON RECEIPT
 OF SUCH FORMS, THEY SHALL
 
    BE SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT OF AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
 EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1778,
 
    AFL-CIO, AND SHALL BE POSTED AND MAINTAINED BY HIM FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE
 DAYS THEREAFTER IN
 
    CONSPICUOUS PLACES WHERE NOTICES TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS ARE
 CUSTOMARILY POSTED.  THE
 
    PRESIDENT OF LOCAL 1778 SHALL TAKE REASONABLE STEPS TO INSURE THAT
 SAID NOTICES ARE NOT
 
    ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL.
 
    (E) PURSUANT TO SECTION 2423.30 OF THE FINAL RULES AND REGULATIONS,
 NOTIFY THE REGIONAL
 
    DIRECTOR OF REGION 2, ROOM 241, 26 FEDERAL PLAZA, NEW YORK, NEW YORK
 10278, IN WRITING WITHIN
 
    30 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS ORDER AS TO WHAT STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN
 TO COMPLY HEREWITH.
 
                         WILLIAM B. DEVANEY
                         ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 APPENDIX
 
                          NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
 
                                PURSUANT TO
 
                        A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE
 
                     FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
 
                AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF
 
                       CHAPTER 71 OF TITLE 5 OF THE
 
                            UNITED STATES CODE
 
                FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
 
        WE HEREBY NOTIFY ALL MEMBERS OF THE BARGAINING UNIT THAT:
 
    WE WILL NOT SUBMIT UNION MEMBERSHIP FORMS (FORM 1187) AND/OR FORMS
 FOR PAYMENT OF FEES FOR REPRESENTATIONAL SERVICES (AFFIDAVIT OF CHARGES)
 TO NON-MEMBERS WHO SEEK REPRESENTATION OF THEIR INTERESTS.
 
    WE WILL NOT CONDITION REPRESENTATION OF NON-MEMBERS ON THEIR JOINING
 THE UNION OR ON THEIR AGREEING TO PAY FEES FOR REPRESENTATION.
 
    WE WILL NOT FAIL OR REFUSE TO REPRESENT TO INTERESTS OF ALL EMPLOYEES
 IN THE UNIT WE REPRESENT WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION AND WITHOUT REGARD TO
 LABOR ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP.
 
    WE WILL NOT IN ANY LIKE OR RELATED MANNER INTERFERE WITH, RESTRAIN,
 OR COERCE ANY EMPLOYEE IN THE EXERCISE OF ANY RIGHT UNDER THE STATUTE OR
 OTHERWISE FAIL OR REFUSE TO COMPLY WITH ANY PROVISION OF THE STATUTE.
 
    WE WILL DISCONTINUE ALL USE OF THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED "AFFIDAVIT OF
 CHARGES".
 
    WE WILL OFFER TO ACCEPT THE IMMEDIATE RESIGNATIONS OF MR. ROY B.  COX
 AND MS. REGINA MENDLER AS MEMBERS OF THE UNION;  FORTHWITH TERMINATE THE
 DUES AUTHORIZATION EXECUTED BY EACH;  AND REIMBURSE MR. COX AND MS.
 MENDLER FOR ALL UNION DUES AND FEES PAID BY MR. COX ON AND AFTER AUGUST
 27, 1979, AND PAID BY MS. MENDLER ON AND AFTER NOVEMBER 16, 1979,
 TOGETHER WITH INTEREST.
 
    WE WILL ADVISE ALL EMPLOYEES IN THE BARGAINING UNIT THAT LOCAL 1778
 WILL REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF ALL EMPLOYEES IN THE UNIT WITHOUT
 DISCRIMINATION AND WITHOUT REGARD TO LABOR ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP.
 
                     AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
 
                      EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1778, AFL-CIO
 
    DATED:  BY:  PRESIDENT, LOCAL 1778
 
    THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE
 OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER
 MATERIAL.
 
    IF EMPLOYEES HAVE ANY QUESTION CONCERNING THIS NOTICE, OR COMPLIANCE
 WITH ANY OF ITS PROVISIONS, THEY MAY COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH THE
 REGIONAL DIRECTOR, FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, REGION 2, WHOSE
 ADDRESS IS ROOM 241, 26 FEDERAL PLAZA, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10278
 (TELEPHONE NUMBER 212-264-4934).
 
 
 
 
 
 --------------- FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
 
 
    /1/ SECTION 7114(A)(1) PROVIDES:
 
    SECTION 7114.  REPRESENTATION RIGHTS AND DUTIES
 
    (A)(1) A LABOR ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS BEEN ACCORDED EXCLUSIVE
 RECOGNITION IS THE EXCLUSIVE
 
    REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EMPLOYEES IN THE UNIT IT REPRESENTS AND IS
 ENTITLED TO ACT FOR, AND
 
    NEGOTIATE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS COVERING, ALL EMPLOYEES IN
 THE UNIT.  AN EXCLUSIVE
 
    REPRESENTATIVE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF ALL
 EMPLOYEES IN THE UNIT IT
 
    REPRESENTS WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION AND WITHOUT REGARD TO LABOR
 ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP.
 
    /2/ SECTION 7102 PROVIDES, IN PERTINENT PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    SECTION 7102.  EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS
 
    EACH EMPLOYEE SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO FORM, JOIN, OR ASSIST ANY LABOR
 ORGANIZATION, OR TO
 
    REFRAIN FROM ANY SUCH ACTIVITY, FREELY AND WITHOUT FEAR OF PENALTY OR
 REPRISAL, AND EACH
 
    EMPLOYEE SHALL BE PROTECTED IN THE EXERCISE OF SUCH RIGHT.
 
    /3/ SEE ALSO NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION (NTEU), CHAPTER 202,
 ET AL., 1 FLRA 910 (1979), CITED BY THE JUDGE, WHEREIN THE AUTHORITY
 FOUND THAT THE UNION VIOLATED ITS DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION UNDER
 EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491, AS AMENDED, BY VIRTUE OF ITS DISPARATE POLICY OF
 SUPPLYING NATIONAL OFFICE ATTORNEYS TO REPRESENT UNION MEMBERS WHILE
 SUPPLYING LOCAL STEWARDS TO REPRESENT NONMEMERS.  THE AUTHORITY
 FOLLOWED
 THE NTEU DECISION IN FEDERAL AVIATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL
 ASSOCIATION DIVISION, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, 2
 FLRA 802 (1989).
 
    /4/ SECTION 7131 PROVIDES, IN PERTINENT PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    SECTION 7131.  OFFICIAL TIME
 
   .          .          .          .
 
 
    (B) ANY ACTIVITIES PERFORMED BY ANY EMPLOYEE RELATING TO THE INTERNAL
 BUSINESS OF A LABOR
 
    ORGANIZATION (INCLUDING THE SOLICITATION OF MEMBERSHIP, ELECTIONS OF
 LABOR ORGANIZATION
 
    OFFICIALS, AND COLLECTION OF DUES) SHALL BE PERFORMED DURING THE TIME
 THE EMPLOYEE IS IN A
 
    NONDUTY STATUS.
 
   .          .          .          .
 
 
    (D) EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN THE PRECEDING SUBSECTIONS OF THIS SECTION--
 
    (1) ANY EMPLOYEE REPRESENTING AN EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE, OR
 
    (2) IN CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER MATTER COVERED BY THIS CHAPTER, ANY
 EMPLOYEE IN AN
 
    APPROPRIATE UNIT REPRESENTED BY AN EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE, SHALL BE
 GRANTED OFFICIAL TIME IN
 
    ANY AMOUNT THE AGENCY AND THE EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE INVOLVED AGREE
 TO BE REASONABLE,
 
    NECESSARY, AND IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
 
    /5/ SEE INTERPRETATION AND GUIDANCE, 2 FLRA 264 (1979) AT 269.
 
    /6/ INASMUCH AS INTEREST IS NOT AVAILABLE AGAINST THE FEDERAL
 GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXPRESS PROVISION IN A RELEVANT STATUTE
 OR CONTRACT, AND NO RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION EXPRESSLY PERMITS THE
 PAYMENT OF SUCH INTEREST BY FEDERAL AGENCIES (SEE PORTSMOUTH NAVAL
 SHIPYARD AND FEDERAL EMPLOYEES METAL TRADES COUNCIL (FALLON,
 ARBITRATOR), 7 FLRA NO. 9 (1981)), THE AUTHORITY CONCLUDES THAT IT WOULD
 NOT EFFECTUATE THE PURPOSES OF THE STATUTE TO REQUIRE LABOR
 ORGANIZATIONS TO PAY INTEREST IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES AS INCLUDED BY
 THE JUDGE IN HIS RECOMMENDED ORDER.  ACCORDINGLY, THE JUDGE'S
 RECOMMENDATION THAT THE RESPONDENT BE REQUIRED TO PAY INTEREST TO
 MENDLER AND COX IS REJECTED.
 
    /7/ FOR CONVENIENCE OF REFERENCE, SECTIONS OF THE STATUTE ARE ALSO
 REFERRED TO HEREINAFTER WITHOUT INCLUSION OF THE INITIAL "71" OF THE
 STATUTE REFERENCE, E.G., SECTION 7116(B)(1) SIMPLY AS "SECTION 16(B)(1);
  HOWEVER, UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFICALLY INDICATED ALL SUCH REFERENCES
 ARE TO CHAPTER 71 OF THE STATUTE.
 
    /8/ RESPONDENT'S ANSWER (G.C. EXH. 1(G)), DATED MAY 19, 1980, WAS
 RECEIVED BY THE REGIONAL OFFICE OF MAY 27, 1980;  AND RESPONDENT'S
 AMENDMENT TO ANSWER (G.C.  EXH. 1(H)) DATED JUNE 20, 1980, WAS RECEIVED
 BY THE REGIONAL OFFICE ON JUNE 23, 1980.
 
    /9/ RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO CORRECT TRANSCRIPT, DATED AND RECEIVED
 SEPTEMBER 10, 1980, IS GRANTED AND THE TRANSCRIPT IS HEREBY CORRECTED AS
 FOLLOWS:
 
    A.  P. 19, LINE 5, THE WORDS EITHER OR ARE CORRECTED TO READ
 "EITHER-OR".
 
    B.  P. 135, LINE 10, THE WORD UNOFFICIAL IS CORRECTED TO READ
 OFFICIAL.
 
    C.  P. 140, LINE 17 AND P. 146, LINE 16 UOP IS CORRECTED TO EACH
 INSTANCE TO READ ULP.
 
    D.  P. 321, LINE 7, THE WORD THESE IS CORRECTED TO READ FEES.
 
    /10/ WHILE I DO NOT DEEM THE AGENCY'S "INTEREST", OR LACK THEREOF,
 MATERIAL AND DO NOT BASE MY DECISION ON THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF SUCH
 INTEREST, IF NECESSARY, THE RECORD, NEVERTHELESS, SHOWS:  A) REASONABLY
 CAUSE TO BELIEVE, AS ALLEGED IN THE CHARGE, THAT SOLICITATION OF
 MEMBERSHIP OCCURRED DURING THE TIME THE EMPLOYEE WAS IN A DUTY STATUS,
 WHICH IF TRUE WOULD VIOLATE SECTION 31(B) AND CONSTITUTE AN UNFAIR LABOR
 PRACTICE UNDER SECTION 16(B)(8);  AND B) REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE, AS
 CHARGED, THAT LOCAL 1778 BREACHED ITS DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION BY
 REFUSING TO REPRESENT NON-MEMBERS, IN MATTERS FOR WHICH THE AGENCY
 PROVIDED OFFICIAL TIME, UNLESS THEY AGREED TO PAY A FEE OR JOINED THE
 UNION.
 
    /11/ THE "COMPLAINT REPORT" IS USED TO STATE THE NATURE OF COMPLAINT,
 OR PROBLEM, AND "REQUEST FOR RESOLVE", WHICH I ASSUME MEANS RELIEF
 REQUESTED.  I AM AWARE THAT MS. STORICKS STATED THAT THIS FORM WAS USED
 FOR ALL KINDS OF COMPLAINTS EXCEPT "FOR COMPENSATION" (TR. 27) BY WHICH
 I ASSUME SHE MEANT WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION.  HOWEVER, SHE STATED THERE
 WAS NO OTHER FORM AND FROM MR. MYERS' TESTIMONY (TR. 207) IT SEEMS
 PROBABLE THAT THE "COMPLAINT REPORT" FORM IS, IN FACT, ALSO USED FOR
 COMPENSATION PROBLEMS.
 
    /12/ THE $24.00 PER HOUR FIGURE WAS DERIVED BY TAKING THE COST OF
 RUNNING THE LOCAL, BASED ON RESPONDENT'S MARCH 31, 1978, FINANCIAL
 STATEMENT (RES. EXH. 5), LESS COST OF CONVENTION EXPENSE (562.00),
 ENTERTAINMENT-DINNER DANCE (1,167.00) AND FOOD FOR MEETINGS (706.00),
 DIVIDED BY THE NUMBER OF HOURS THE UNION OFFICE WAS OPEN (7 HOURS PER
 DAY, 5 DAYS A WEEK, 52 WEEKS PER YEAR -LESS 56 HOURS TO ACCOUNT FOR
 HOLIDAYS).  OF COURSE, INCLUDED WERE SUCH EXPENSES AS PER CAPITA
 ASSESSMENT TO THE NATIONAL OFFICE (SECTION 21, 311.00);  CLEANING AND
 JANITORIAL ($788.00);  PRINTING ($1,339.00);  AUDIT ($1,000.00);
 DEPRECIATION ($910.00);  TRAVEL ($758.00);  MISCELLANEOUS ($1,980.00);
 ETC., NONE OF WHICH BORE ANY DIRECT RELATIONSHIP TO THE COST OF
 PROCESSING A COMPLAINT.  INDEED, WHILE EXPENSES FOR SALARIES
 ($9,669.00), PAYROLL TAXES ($1,103.00);  TELEPHONE ($953.00);  LEAVE
 WITHOUT PAY ($806.00);  OFFICE SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT ($3,016.00) COULD,
 TO SOME EXTENT, RELATE TO THE COST OF PROCESSING A COMPLAINT, NO EFFORT
 WHATEVER WAS MADE TO DETERMINE THE COST OF PROCESSING A COMPLAINT.
 
    /13/ SECTION 15(A) OF THE STATUTE PROVIDES, IN PART THAT:
 
    " . . . ANY SUCH ASSIGNMENT MAY NOT BE REVOKED FOR A PERIOD OF 1
 YEAR."
 
    THE 1187 PROVIDED, IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    " . . . REVOCATION WILL NOT BE EFFECTIVE HOWEVER UNTIL THE FIRST FULL
 PAY PERIOD FOLLOWING
 
    ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE THE FIRST DEDUCTION WAS MADE BY THE PAYROLL
 OFFICE PROVIDED THE FORM OR
 
    REQUEST IS RECEIVED IN A TIMELY FASHION . . . ." (G.C. EXH. 7).
 
    THE ANNUAL DUES ALLOTMENT REVOCATION, SIGNED BY THE PARTIES ON
 JANUARY 30, 1979, PROVIDES, IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "THE DATE FOR REVOCATION OF VOLUNTARY DUES WITHHOLDING WILL BE THE
 FIRST PAY PERIOD THAT
 
    FALLS AFTER 1 JUNE ANY YEAR.  REVOCATIONS CAN BE ACCEPTED ANY TIME,
 BUT WILL BE EFFECTIVE ONLY
 
    AFTER 1 JUNE EACH YEAR AND MUST BE RECEIVED PRIOR TO 1 JUNE . .  . ."
 (G.C. EXH. 9).
 
    MR. COX IN OCTOBER, 1979, SOUGHT TO REVOKE HIS DUES DEDUCTION
 AUTHORIZATION.  I AM AWARE THAT MR. BERGERSON TESTIFIED THAT, PURSUANT
 TO THE ANNUAL DUES ALLOTMENT REVOCATION, DUES MAY BE REVOKED ONLY ONCE A
 YEAR AND THAT THE EARLIEST MR. COX COULD REVOKE HIS ALLOTMENT WOULD BE
 JUNE, 1981.  AS THIS ISSUE IS NOT BEFORE ME, I EXPRESS NO OPINION AS TO
 WHETHER SUCH INTERPRETATION WAS PROPER, IS IN ACCORD WITH THE STATUTE
 AND/OR THE AUTHORITY'S INTERPRETATION AND GUIDANCE, FLRA NO. O-PS-1,
 APRIL 19, 1979.  WITH FULL RECOGNITION THAT GENERAL COUNSEL SUGGESTS A
 BASIS FOR POSSIBLE VIOLATION CF. CAMERON IRON WORKS, INC. 235 NLRB 286,
 97 LRRM 1516 (1978), ENF.  DENIED ON OTHER GROUNDS, -F.2D-, 100 LRRM
 3005 (5TH CIR. 1979), INASMUCH AS THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT ASSERT SUCH
 CONDUCT AS A VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE, I EXPRESSLY DECLINE COMMENT ON
 ITS VALIDITY AND LEAVE DETERMINATION OF THE QUESTION FOR RESOLUTION IN
 AN APPROPRIATE CASE.
 
    /14/ GENERAL COUNSEL VERY CORRECTLY NOTES THAT "NO CONTRACTUAL
 GRIEVANCE HAS BEEN FILED." (G.C. BRIEF P. 9, N. 23) AND THAT IT WOULD
 APPEAR ANY SUCH GRIEVANCE IS TIME BARRED.  (JT. EXH. 1, ART. 34, G.C.
 BRIEF, SUPRA.)
 
    /15/ RESPONDENT ASSERTS THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AS TO MR.
 COX, WHO SOUGHT ASSISTANCE ON A WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION CLAIM, AND AS TO
 MS. CHARITY, WHO SOUGHT ASSISTANCE WITH RESPECT TO A DELAYED PROMOTION,
 SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR THE ASSERTED REASON THAT "NOTHING IN THE
 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (JOINT EXHIBIT NO. 1) BETWEEN RESPONDENT
 AND CHARGING PARTY COVERS THE HANDLING OF SUCH COMPENSATION CLAIMS . . .
 SIMILARLY, THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH BROUGHT MS. CHARITY INTO THE UNION
 OFFICE . . . DID NOT COME WITHIN THE SCOPE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
 AGREEMENT." (RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, P. 10).  IT IS RECOGNIZED, AS THE
 SUPREME COURT STATED IN VACA V. SIPES, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967), THAT
 THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION IS, " . . . A STATUTORY DUTY FAIRLY TO
 REPRESENT ALL OF THOSE EMPLOYEES, BOTH IN ITS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING . .
 . AND IN ITS ENFORCEMENT OF THE RESULTING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
 AGREEMENT."
 
    AT THE OUTSET, IT MUST BE NOTED THAT SECTION 14(A)(1) OF THE STATUTE,
 UNLIKE SECTION 9(A) OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, CONTAINS A
 SPECIFIC NON-DISCRIMINATION PROVISION.  THUS, SECTION 14(A)(1) PROVIDES
 AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "(A)(1) A LABOR ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS BEEN ACCORDED EXCLUSIVE
 RECOGNITION IS THE EXCLUSIVE
 
    REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EMPLOYEES IN THE UNIT IT REPRESENTS AND IS
 ENTITLED TO ACT FOR, AND
 
    NEGOTIATE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS COVERING, ALL EMPLOYEES IN
 THE UNIT.  AN EXCLUSIVE
 
    REPRESENTATIVE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF ALL
 EMPLOYEES IN THE UNIT IT
 
    REPRESENTS WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION AND WITHOUT REGARD TO LABOR
 ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP." (5
 
    U.S.C. 7114(A)(1).
 
    (THE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION 9(A) OF THE NLRA IS SUBSTANTIALLY
 SIMILAR TO THE FIRST
 
    SENTENCE OF SECTION 14(A)(1) OF THE STATUTE AND PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS:
 
    "SEC. 9(A) REPRESENTATIVES DESIGNATED OR SELECTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF
 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
 
    BY THE MAJORITY OF THE EMPLOYEES IN A UNIT APPROPRIATE FOR SUCH
 PURPOSES, SHALL BE THE
 
    EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL THE EMPLOYEES IN SUCH UNIT FOR THE
 PURPOSES OF COLLECTIVE
 
    BARGAINING IN RESPECT TO RATES OF PAY, WAGES, HOURS OF EMPLOYMENT, OR
 OTHER CONDITIONS OF
 
    EMPLOYMENT.  . . . ")
 
    SECTION 8(B)(1) OF THE NLRB, ENACTED IN 1947, PROVIDES:
 
    "(B) IT SHALL BE AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE FOR A LABOR ORGANIZATION OR
 ITS AGENTS -
 
    (1) TO RESTRAIN OR COERCE (A) EMPLOYEES IN THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHTS
 GUARANTEED IN SECTION
 
    7 . . . ."
 
    HOWEVER, AS THE SUPREME COURT NOTED IN VACA V. SIPES, SUPRA, THE
 BOARD DID NOT UNTIL MIRANDA FUEL CO., 140 NLRB 181, 51 LRRM 1584 (1962),
 INTERPRET A BREACH OF A UNION'S DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION AS AN UNFAIR
 LABOR PRACTICE.  MIRANDA FUEL CO. WAS, MOREOVER, DENIED ENFORCEMENT, 326
 F.2D 172, 54 LRRM 2715 (2D CIR. 1963);  HOWEVER, THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
 UPHELD THE BOARD'S MIRANDA FUEL DOCTRINE 1966), CERT. DENIED, 389 U.S.
 837 (1967).
 
    IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT SECTION 14(A)(1) OF THE STATUTE SPECIFICALLY
 PROVIDES THAT "AN EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR
 REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF ALL EMPLOYEES IN THE UNIT IT REPRESENTS
 WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION AND WITHOUT REGARD TO LABOR ORGANIZATION
 MEMBERSHIP." VIOLATION OF THIS OBLIGATION CONSTITUTES AN UNFAIR LABOR
 PRACTICE UNDER SECTION 16(B)(8).  OF COURSE, SUCH CONDUCT MAY ALSO
 VIOLATE SECTION 16(B)(1);  BUT IT SEEMS OBVIOUS THAT A UNION COULD BE
 GUILTY OF AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 16(B)(8)
 MERELY BECAUSE IT FAILED OR REFUSED TO REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF ALL
 EMPLOYEES IN THE UNIT AND/OR BECAUSE IT FAILED OR REFUSED TO REPRESENT
 ALL EMPLOYEES WITHOUT REGARD TO UNION MEMBERSHIP, EVEN IF ITS CONDUCT
 SHOULD NOT BE DEEMED TO HAVE RISEN TO THE LEVEL OF INTERFERENCE,
 RESTRAINT, OR COERCION SO AS TO VIOLATE SECTION 15(B)(1).  IN
 CONSIDERING DECISIONS UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, THE
 SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN STATUTORY LANGUAGE MUST BE KEPT IN MIND.
 CONDUCT WHICH WOULD VIOLATE SECTION 8(B)(2)(A) OF THE NLRA WOULD ALSO
 CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF SECTION 16(B)(1) OF THE STATUTE;  BUT CONDUCT
 WHICH WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF SECTION 8(B)(1)(A), SUCH AS
 THAT DISCUSSED HEREINAFTER IN AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, SUPRA, MAY,
 NEVERTHELESS, CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE.  IT IS NOT, SIMPLY,
 THAT THE STATUTE HAS INCORPORATED A NON-DISCRIMINATION, OR DUTY OF FAIR
 REPRESENTATIVE;  BUT THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE, FOR EXAMPLE,
 "RESPONSIBLE FOR REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF ALL EMPLOYEES IN THE
 UNIT" IS BROAD AND MAY WARRANT, IF NOT, INDEED, MANDATE, REPRESENTATION
 THAT WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED UNDER THE NLRA.
 
    ALTHOUGH NOT CITED BY ANY PARTY, I HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION
 TO THE MEMORANDUM OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL'S DIVISION OF ADVICE, NATIONAL
 LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, IN THE MATTER OF AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION,
 NINE-O-TWO AREA LOCAL, CASE NO. 31-CB-3755(P), DATED SEPTEMBER 30, 1980
 (SEE, GOV. EMP. REL. REP. P. 887:9, NOVEMBER 10, 1980), WHICH INVOLVED A
 UNION'S REFUSAL TO HELP A NONUNION MEMBER OF THE BARGAINING UNIT PROCESS
 A WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION CLAIM, WHILE IT PROVIDED SUCH ASSISTANCE TO
 MEMBERS.  THE CHARGE ALLEGED A VIOLATION OF 8(B)(1)(A) OF THE NLRA AND
 THE GENERAL COUNSEL'S DIVISION OF ADVICE CONCLUDED THAT THE UNION'S
 CONDUCT DID NOT CONSTITUTE RESTRAINT OR COERCION BASED ON THE
 NON-MEMBER'S EXERCISE OF HIS SECTION 7 RIGHTS AND, THUS, WAS NOT
 VIOLATIVE OF THE ACT.  IN REACHING THIS RESULT, THE MEMORANDUM NOTED, IN
 PART:
 
    " . . .  IF . . . THE UNION REFUSES TO PROCESS THE GRIEVANCE OF A
 NONUNION MEMBER OF THE
 
    UNIT BECAUSE SAID EMPLOYEE REFUSES TO PAY THE COSTS INCIDENT THERETO,
 THEN THE UNION'S CONDUCT
 
    VIOLATES THE ACT . . .  ON THE OTHER HAND, A UNION MAY LAWFULLY TREAT
 UNIT EMPLOYEES
 
    DISPARATELY IN THE PROVISION OF SERVICES OR BENEFITS WHICH DERIVE
 SOLELY FROM UNION MEMBERSHIP
 
    (I.E., THOSE SERVICES OR BENEFITS WHICH DO NOT INVOLVE A TERM OR
 CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT, DO
 
    NOT DERIVE FROM THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, AND DO NOT FALL
 WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE
 
    EXCLUSIVE DUTIES OR PREROGATIVES OF THE UNION AS THE CERTIFIED
 BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE).
 
    " . . . THE SUBJECT OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION IS NOT ENCOMPASSED
 WITHIN THE COLLECTIVE
 
    BARGAINING AGREEMENT.  HOWEVER, WORKER'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS DO
 ARISE OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT
 
    RELATIONSHIP AND ARE OF COMMON INTEREST TO OTHER EMPLOYEES . . .
 
    "IT WAS CONCLUDED, THEREFORE, THAT THE UNION'S CONDUCT . . .  DID NOT
 CONSTITUTE EITHER
 
    RESTRAINT OR COERCION, BUT RATHER WAS MERELY AN INDUCEMENT TO
 ENCOURAGE UNION
 
    MEMBERSHIP.  THIS THE UNION WAS PRIVILEGED TO DO . . . ."
 
    ACCEPTING, BUT WITHOUT PASSING ON THE VALIDITY THE ANALYSIS AS
 PERTAINS TO A UNION'S DUTY UNDER THE STATUTE, SEE DISCUSSION ABOVE, I
 CONCLUDE THAT THE RULING OF THE DIVISION OF ADVICE IN THE ABOVE CASE IS
 NOT DETERMITIVE OF THE PRESENT CASE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:  FIRST,
 THE SUBJECT OF WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION IS ENCOMPASSED BY THE PARTIES'
 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (JT. EXH. 1), ART. 16, SECS. 11 AND 12).
  SECOND, THE AGENCY GRANTS MR. MYERS OFFICIAL TIME FOR HANDLING
 COMPENSATION MATTERS.  ACCORDINGLY, IN THIS CASE, UNION'S REFUSAL TO
 ASSIST A NON-MEMBER IN FILING A COMPENSATION CLAIM, IF TRUE, WOULD
 CONSTITUTE RESTRAINT OR COERCION IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 16(B)(1) OF THE
 STATUTE AND WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A PRIVILEGED INDUCEMENT OF MEMBERSHIP.
 MOREOVER, SECTION 14(A)(1) OF THE STATUTE IMPOSES ON THE EXCLUSIVE
 REPRESENTATIVE RESPONSIBILITY "FOR REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF ALL
 EMPLOYEES IN THE UNIT . . . WITHOUT REGARD TO LABOR ORGANIZATION
 MEMBERSHIP." WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARISE OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT
 RELATIONSHIP, ARE OF COMMON INTEREST TO ALL EMPLOYEES AND, UNDER THE
 STATUTE, THE UNION IS RESPONSIBLE FOR REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF ALL
 EMPLOYEES WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION.  THE FAILURE OR REFUSAL OF THE UNION
 TO REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF NON-MEMBERS IN WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION
 MATTERS IN THE SAME MANNER AS IT REPRESENTS THE INTERESTS OF MEMBERS
 VIOLATES SECTION 14(A)(1) AND CONSTITUTES AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE IN
 VIOLATION OF SECTION 16(A)(8) OF THE STATUTE.  AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
 GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 2126, AFL-CIO, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, 1
 FLRA NO.  112, FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, REPORT OF CASE
 DECISIONS NO. 17, OCTOBER 10, 1979, CITED AND RELIED UPON BY RESPONDENT,
 AROSE UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491 AND, BECAUSE THE LANGUAGE OF THE
 STATUTE IS SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT, IS OF QUESTIONABLE RELEVANCE SINCE
 THE PRESENT CASE INVOLVES, SOLELY, THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE.
 
    SECTION 14(A)(1) OF THE STATUTE, I.E., "REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF
 ALL EMPLOYEES IN THE UNIT" CERTAINLY, IN MY OPINION, INCLUDES THE
 INTEREST OF AN EMPLOYEE FOR RELIEF FOR DELAY OF A PROMOTION AND/OR
 DENIAL OF A PAY DIFFERENTIAL FOR ANY PERIOD OF ENTITLEMENT.  VARIOUS
 ARTICLES OF THE AGREEMENT (JT. EXH. 1) RELATE TO SIMILAR AREAS, E.G.,
 ART. 21 "POSITION CLASSIFICATION", ART. 22 "PERFORMANCE EVALUATION";
 ART. 23 "MERIT PROMOTION";  ART. 26 "UPWARD MOBILITY PROGRAM PLAN OF
 ACTION".  IT IS NO ANSWER THAT A PARTICULAR PROMOTION, I.E., TO A GS
 POSITION FROM A TRAINEE POSITION, IS NOT SET FORTH IN THE AGREEMENT.
 INDEED, ART. 34, "NEGOTIATED GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE", PROVIDES, IN PART,
 THAT THE PROCEDURE SHALL GOVERN, " . . . ISSUES AFFECTING PERSONNEL
 POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF RULES,
 REGULATIONS AND LAWS, AND OTHER MATTERS AFFECTING THE GENERAL WORKING
 CONDITIONS . . . " WHETHER DELAY OF A PROMOTION BECAUSE OF
 ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR COULD PROPERLY, OR MORE ACCURATELY, SUCCESSFULLY,
 BE GRIEVED, OR WHETHER IT WAS MORE APPROPRIATELY, AS THE UNION ELECTED
 TO TREAT IT, A MATTER FOR APPEAL TO THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, IT WAS AN
 INTEREST THE UNION WAS OBLIGATED TO REPRESENT AS TO ALL EMPLOYEES,
 WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION AND WITHOUT REGARD TO UNION MEMBERSHIP.
 
    ACCORDINGLY, RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF THE PORTIONS OF THE
 COMPLAINT RELATING TO MR. COX AND MS. CHARITY, I.E., "THE EVENTS OF ON
 OR ABOUT AUGUST 27, 1979, AND MARCH 5, 1980" (RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, P. 8),
 IS DENIED.
 
    /16/ FOR REASONS SET FORTH ABOVE, ONCE A UNION COMPROMISES ITS
 OBLIGATION UNDER 14(A)(1), I AM PERS