13:0203(39)CA - Government Printing Office and Joint Council of Unions, GPO -- 1983 FLRAdec CA



[ v13 p203 ]
13:0203(39)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:


 13 FLRA No. 39
 
 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 JOINT COUNCIL OF UNIONS, GPO
 Charging Party
 
                                            Case No. 3-CA-549
 
                            DECISION AND ORDER
 
    The Administrative Law Judge issued the attached Decision in the
 above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in
 certain unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, and
 recommending that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take
 certain affirmative action.  Thereafter, Respondent and the General
 Counsel filed exceptions to the Judge's Decision with supporting briefs,
 and the Respondent filed an opposition to the General Counsel's
 exceptions.
 
    Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations
 and section 7118 of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
 Statute (the Statute), the Authority has reviewed the rulings of the
 Judge made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was
 committed.  The rulings are hereby affirmed.  Upon consideration of the
 Judge's Decision and the entire record, the Authority hereby adopts the
 Judge's findings, conclusions and recommendations, except as modified
 herein.
 
    The Judge found that the Respondent, U.S. Government Printing Office
 (GPO), violated section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute by failing to
 provide the Charging Party, Joint Council of Unions, GPO (Joint
 Council), as designated agent of its constituent locals in the
 Production Department, with adequate notice of management's decision to
 reorganize the Production Department so as to provide the Joint Council
 with an opportunity to negotiate concerning the procedures to be
 followed in implementing the reorganization (section 7106(b)(2)) or
 appropriate arrangements for adversely affected employees (section
 7106(b)(3)).  /1/ More specifically, the Judge found that GPO failed to
 satisfy its obligation to provide timely and sufficient notice of the
 reorganization "when it waited until Friday morning September 28 to
 announce that there would be a reorganization and it would be instituted
 on Monday October 1." He further found that GPO's refusal to delay the
 reorganization, as requested by the Joint Council, to allow the
 exclusive representatives an opportunity to determine what impact would
 be caused by the reorganization and to negotiate with respect thereto,
 was in derogation of GPO's obligation under section 7106(b)(3) and (2)
 of the Statute respectively, to negotiate the impact and implementation
 of its decision.  In this latter regard, the Judge found that the
 General Counsel had met the burden of proving that GPO's reorganization
 resulted in actual substantial impact adversely affecting bargaining
 unit employees, as well as a reasonable likelihood of substantial
 adverse impact on them in the future.
 
    The Authority concludes, in agreement with the Judge's conclusion,
 that GPO failed to meet its statutory duty to negotiate concerning the
 impact and implementation of the reorganization in violation of section
 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute.  Thus, GPO's notice to the Joint
 Council on a Friday that a major reorganization would be implemented the
 following Monday clearly was inadequate to permit the Joint Council to
 bargain, if it desired, concerning the procedures to be observed in
 implementing, and appropriate arrangements for employees adversely
 affected by, the reorganization.  In this regard, the Authority notes
 particularly that GPO rejected the Joint Council's immediate request
 that implementation be delayed in order to permit negotiations
 concerning the reasonably foreseeable impact of the reorganization on
 the employees involved.  In so concluding, the Authority emphasizes that
 where an agency in exercising a management right under section 7106 of
 the Statute, changes conditions of employment of unit employees as here,
 /2/ the statutory duty to negotiate comes into play if the change
 results in an impact upon unit employees or such impact was reasonably
 foreseeable.  In such circumstances, where an agency exercises a
 management right but has failed to provide adequate prior notice thereof
 to the exclusive representative of its employees or has rejected a
 timely request for negotiations pursuant to section 7106(b)(2) and (3)
 of the Statute, /3/ the agency will be found to have violated section
 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute.  /4/
 
    In the instant case, the record fully supports the Judge's conclusion
 that some of the changes resulting from the reorganization (such as
 those concerning sick leave policy and the probe procedure) had an
 impact on employees, and in addition that it was reasonably foreseeable
 that the reorganization of the Production Department would have an
 impact by reducing promotional opportunities and eliminating jobs.
 Therefore, the Authority concludes that the Respondent's failure to
 provide adequate notice of such changes to the Joint Council constituted
 a violation of section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute.
 
    With regard to the remedy herein, the Judge ordered GPO to cease and
 desist from further implementing the reorganization of its Production
 Department without first notifying the Joint Council and affording it a
 reasonable opportunity to negotiate concerning the procedures to be
 observed in implementing, and appropriate arrangements for employees
 adversely affected by, the reorganization, and affirmatively ordered GPO
 to bargain with the Joint Council upon request and to post appropriate
 notices.  The General Counsel has requested that the Authority issue a
 status quo ante remedy, while GPO opposes such request.
 
    The Authority concludes that a status quo ante remedy is not
 warranted.  Thus, taking into consideration the various factors set
 forth in Federal Correctional Institution, 8 FLRA No. 111 (1982), the
 Authority concludes that an order requiring GPO to bargain upon request
 about impact and implementation will best effectuate the purposes and
 policies of the Statute.  In this regard, the Authority notes the
 evidence in the record that the Respondent and the exclusive
 representative(s) of employees affected by the changes in sick leave and
 probe procedures resulting from the reorganization in October 1979 have
 reached a negotiated resolution of their differences in these areas.
 Further, the record discloses that, as subsequent technological changes
 were implemented in connection with the ongoing reorganization of GPO's
 operations, the Respondent engaged in negotiations regarding the
 changes.  In these circumstances, and noting particularly that a status
 quo ante remedy would seriously disrupt the accomplishment of the
 Respondent's mission and the efficiency of its operations inasmuch as
 the reorganization was part of a long range plan which included
 substantial changes in plant and equipment now in place, the Authority
 shall adopt the Judge's order.
 
                                   ORDER
 
    Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Rules and Regulations of the
 Federal Labor Relations Authority and section 7118 of the Federal
 Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, the Authority hereby orders
 that the U.S. Government Printing Office shall:
 
    1.  Cease and desist from:
 
          (a) Any further implementation of the October 1, 1979
       reorganization of the Production Department without first
       providing adequate notice to the Joint Council of Unions, GPO, the
       agent of the employees' exclusive bargaining representatives, and
       affording it an opportunity to negotiate on (1) the procedures to
       be observed in any further implementation of the reorganization,
       and (2) appropriate arrangements for employees who have been or
       may be adversely affected by the reorganization.
 
          (b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
       restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
       assured by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.
 
    2.  Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the
 purposes and policies of the Statute:
 
          (a) Upon request by the Joint Council of Unions, GPO, the agent
       of the employees' exclusive bargaining representatives, negotiate
       concerning (1) the procedures to be observed in implementing the
       reorganization of its Production Department, and (2) appropriate
       arrangements for employees who have been or may be adversely
       affected by the reorganization.
 
          (b) Post at all facilities wherein there are bargaining unit
       employees represented by constituent locals of the Joint Council,
       GPO, copies of the attached Notice on forms to be furnished by the
       Federal Labor Relations Authority.  Upon receipt of such forms
       they shall be signed by the Public Printer or his designee and
       shall be posted and maintained for a period of 60 consecutive days
       thereafter, in conspicuous places, including bulletin boards and
       other places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
       Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that such Notices are
       not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
 
          (c) Notify the Regional Director of Region III, Federal Labor
       Relations Authority, in writing, within 30 days from the date of
       this Order, as to what steps have been taken to comply herewith.
 
 Issued, Washington, D.C., September 30, 1983
 
                                       Barbara J. Mahone, Chairman
                                       Ronald W. Haughton, Member
                                       Henry B. Frazier III, Member
                                       FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
 
 
 
 
 
                          NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
 
  PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR
 RELATIONS
 AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF CHAPTER 71
 OF TITLE
 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS
 WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
 
 WE WILL NOT further implement the October 1, 1979 reorganization of the
 Production Department without first providing adequate notice to the
 Joint Council of Unions, GPO, the agent of the employees' exclusive
 bargaining representatives, and affording it an opportunity to negotiate
 on (1) the procedures to be observed in any further implementation of
 the reorganization of the Production Department, and (2) appropriate
 arrangements for employees who have been or may be adversely affected by
 the reorganization.  WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
 with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights
 assured by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.  WE
 WILL, upon request by the Joint Council of Unions, GPO, the agent of the
 employees' exclusive bargaining representatives, negotiate concerning
 (1) the procedures to be observed in any further implementation of the
 reorganization of the Production Department, and (2) appropriate
 arrangements for employees who have been or may be adversely affected by
 the reorganization.
                                       (Agency or Activity)
 
 Dated:  . . .  (Signature) This Notice must remain posted for 60
 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered,
 defaced, or covered by any other material.  If employees have any
 questions concerning this Notice or compliance with its provisions, they
 may communicate directly with the Regional Director, Region III, Federal
 Labor Relations Authority, whose address is:  P.O. Box 33758,
 Washington, D.C.  20033-0758, and whose telephone number is:  (202)
 653-8452.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -------------------- ALJ$ DECISION FOLLOWS --------------------
 
                                       Case No. 3-CA-549
 
    Neal Fine, Esq.
                     For the Respondent
 
    Lee Mingledorff, Esq.
                     For the General Counsel
 
    Cornelius McIntyre
                    For the Charging Party
 
    Before:  FRANCIS E. DOWD
                    Administrative Law Judge
 
                                 DECISION
 
                           Statement of the Case
 
    This is a proceeding under the Federal Service Labor-Management
 Relations Statute (the Statute), 92 Stat. 1191, 5 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.
 It was instituted by the issuance of a Complaint and Notice of Hearing
 on May 6, 1980 based upon a charge filed on October 1, 1979.  The
 complaint alleges that the U.S. Government Printing Office (Respondent)
 unilaterally implemented a reorganization of its Production Department
 on October 1, 1979, thereby precluding bargaining over the impact and
 implementation of the reorganization with the Joint Council of Unions,
 GPO (Charging Party).  Such conduct is alleged to be a violation of
 Sections 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute.
 
    Respondent denies that it violated the Act and asserts that (1) it
 had no statutory obligation to negotiate with the GPO Joint Council of
 Unions since the Council is not a labor organization which is the
 exclusive representative of any GPO employees, and (2) it had no
 obligation to provide prior notice of its actions and the opportunity to
 negotiate because the "realignment" did not materially impact on the
 conditions of employment of GPO employees.
 
    At the hearing in Washington, D.C. all parties were afforded full
 opportunity to be heard, adduce evidence, examine and cross-examine
 witnesses, and argue orally.  Thereafter, Respondent and the General
 Counsel filed briefs which have been duly considered.  /5/
 
    Upon consideration of the entire record in this case, from my
 observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, and from all of the
 testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, I make the following
 findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommended order.
 
                  Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
 
 A. Jurisdiction
 
    At all times material herein Respondent has been an agency within the
 meaning of Section 7103(a)(3) of the Statute (G.C. Exh. No. 1(c) and
 1(d)).  The Authority has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
 Section 7118 of the Statute.  B.  Status of the Joint Council
 
    1.  Mr. Cornelius McIntyre has been an offset pressman with the
 Respondent for 24 years.  He is also the President of the Washington
 Printing and Graphics Communication Union, Local 1, and Chairman of the
 Joint Council of Unions, an organization consisting of 14 unions holding
 exclusive recognition for various units of employees of the Respondent.
 A description of the various units of recognition within Respondent's
 Production Department are contained in the Appendix attached to the
 complaint.  The Joint Council's 14 constituent unions represent 85 to 95
 percent of Respondent's employees at its central office.  All seven
 craft unions in Respondent's Production Department belong to the Joint
 Council whose function is to coordinate the bargaining of its
 constituent locals into a single process so that such locals may bargain
 with management in a unified fashion regarding matters of overall impact
 on employees.
 
    2.  The testimony of McIntyre and Mr. Lawrence Kenelly, Respondent's
 Associate Director of Labor Relations and its Chief of Negotiations,
 establishes that Respondent and the Joint Council have dealt with one
 another on matters of overall concern since, at least, January 1978.
 More specifically, Respondent has dealt with the Joint Council on
 matters regarding performance ratings, Respondent's internal grievance
 procedure, late entrance passes, bulletin boards, proposed leave
 regulations, and agency instructions regarding occupational health and
 safety (G.C. Exh. 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11).  Since October 1978,
 Respondent and the Joint Council have been in the process of negotiating
 a master agreement for all 14 constituent locals of the Joint Council.
 In addition, the Joint Council consistently insisted during the period
 prior to the reorganization, that it was responsible for bargaining, on
 behalf of its locals, regarding matters of overall concern and overall
 impact (G.C. Exh. No. 13).  C. The Decision to Reorganize the Production
 Department and Notification of this Decision to the Joint Council and
 the Union
 
    1.  Respondent admits that the reorganization of the Production
 Department had been a topic of high-level supervisory discussions since
 May of 1979.  Nevertheless, it was the position of Mr. Johnson McRorie,
 Respondent's Production Manager and Head of the Production Department,
 that discussions with the Joint Council, or the affected labor
 organizations, could not take place until after the reorganization plan
 had been officially approved by the Public Printer.  Such official
 approval did not occur until September 24, 1979.
 
    2.  At best, McIntyre and other local union officials only knew by
 rumor that "something" was to occur, but they did not know the extent or
 the details.  In early or mid-September, Cornelius McIntyre had a
 conversation with Mr. Robert Thien, the Superintendent of Letterpress
 Division.  Thien told McIntyre that the Offset Division and the
 Letterpress Division would be combined into one division, that he would
 be superintendent, and that he would be looking for the union's help.
 The information served to confirm rumors McIntyre had been hearing for
 some time.  Thereupon, McIntyre went to see Joseph Amann, Director of
 Labor-Management Relations, to inquire further about the rumored
 reorganization.  Amann indicated that he had limited knowledge of any
 proposed reorganization but assured McIntyre he would be notified in
 such event.  McIntyre made clear to both Thien and Amann that the
 Council wanted to negotiate about any impact.  Amann did not testify at
 the hearing.
 
    3.  On Thursday afternoon, September 27, Amann's secretary telephoned
 McIntyre to inform him of a meeting the next morning at 9:00 a.m. on the
 reorganization.  He was requested to notify the unions representing
 employees in the Production Department.  McIntyre then went to see Amann
 who said he'd just been notified that the reorganization was going into
 effect on Monday, October 1.  Respondent did not notify individually any
 other unions.  This was done by McIntyre;  it was done at the request of
 Respondent;  and I find that it was done in his capacity as Chairman of
 the Joint Council.
 
    4.  At the September 28 meeting, Production Manager Johnson McRorie
 passed out an organizational chart (G.C. Exh. No. 14) and stated that
 the reorganization was being put into effect on October 1.  When
 McIntyre asked why that date had been selected, he was told by McRorie
 that "we have already changed the data over into the computer as to
 October 1st because that is the beginning of the fiscal year and that's
 the way it is." In response to inquiries about "impact," McRorie stated
 simply that there would be no impact.
 
    5.  McIntyre asked McRorie (1) to delay the reorganization so that
 the unions could study it and determine if there was an impact, and (2)
 if there was an impact, the union wanted to negotiate about it.  McRorie
 replied that there was no need for delay because. in his opinion, there
 would be no impact.
 
    6.  At the conclusion of management's briefing the members of the
 Joint Council met and voted to authorize McIntyre to file the unfair
 labor practice charge herein.  All the union presidents who testified
 /6/ substantiated the fact that McIntyre, as Chairman of the Joint
 Council, had the authority to request, on behalf of the Joint Council
 and its constituents locals, a delay in management's implementation of
 its reorganization plan and should management have agreed to impact and
 implementation negotiations, to have entered into such negotiations at
 that time or at a later time.
 
    7.  Later that day, McIntyre filled out and completed an unfair labor
 practice charge and sent it to the Federal Labor Relations Authority
 where it was docketed on October 1, 1980.
 
    8.  There is no dispute that the reorganization went into effect on
 October 1 as scheduled.  D.  Objectives of the Reorganization
 
    1.  Respondent, in order to demonstrate that the reorganization
 concept was really nothing new, introduced into evidence a July 24, 1973
 memorandum from Production Manager Rothman to the Public Printer in
 which the combining of the press divisions is discussed at length, as
 well as the transfer of certain functions to the Electric
 Photocomposition Division.  /7/ Although the recommendation was not
 adopted at that time, I note that the October 1, 1979 reorganization
 pretty much followed these 1973 recommendations.  Further, I note that
 two reorganization objectives mentioned in the 1973 memorandum were as
 follows:  (a) to eliminate much duplication of effort and (b) to reduce
 work schedules.
 
    2.  Respondent also introduced into evidence a memorandum (Resp. Exh.
 No. 7) dated September 20, 1979 purporting to answer some questions
 about the proposed reorganization asked by the Public Printer.  In
 addition to saving money by eliminating certain supervisory positions,
 the reorganization of 1979 had the following additional objectives:  (a)
 to achieve eventual labor savings through improved efficiency;  (b) to
 reduce scheduling and other production problems;  (c) to adapt more
 readily to changes in workload or technology;  and (d) to realize other
 improvements in operating efficiency and economy.  E.  The
 Reorganization of October 1, 1981
 
    1.  According to Respondent, all that happened was that "a simple
 paper realignment of divisions and sections within the Production
 Department was effectuated." Indeed, Respondent argues that the term
 "paper reorganization" is applicable here because no employees were
 physically moved and no work was changed as of October 1, 1979.
 
    2.  In my opinion, the long planned reorganization was more extensive
 in scope than merely changing titles of the Deputy Production Managers.
 Indeed, it appears to me that the change of titles was a result of the
 reorganization because the new titles reflected the changes brought
 about by the transfer of functions performed by employees.  Thus, the
 Deputy Manager (Electronics) was retitled Deputy Production Manager
 (Prepress) because certain prepress functions, including the Copy
 Preparation and Negative Sections, were transferred to him.  An
 objective of this transfer, according to a September 12, 1979 memorandum
 of the Production Manager (Joint Exh. No. 2) was to "permit greater
 efficiencies and allow a smoother transition from hot metal to
 photocomposition processes."
 
    3.  Another aspect of the reorganization was discussed in the
 September 12, 1979 memorandum as follows:
 
          The existing Letterpress and Offset Division will be merged
       under one division entitled the Press Division which will also
       include the platemaking functions.  The Letterpress and Offset
       Press sections will remain separate entities pending the outcome
       of the current court action involving the latter.  This will
       greatly enhance the workload balancing problems encountered under
       separate press divisions and facilitate the transition from
       letterpress to offset printing.
 
 So, from the foregoing, we see that additional objectives of the
 reorganization were to "enhance the workload balancing problems" and to
 "facilitate the transition from letterpress to offset printing." This
 latter objective belies the contention of Respondent that the merger of
 the letterpress and offset divisions was intended to achieve a monetary
 savings by eliminating the job of one division superintendent.  Saving
 the money paid to one managerial official was a byproduct or result of
 the reorganization, but it was not the main purpose.  Merger of
 functions and phasing out letterpress printing were the real objectives.
 
    4.  Prior to the reorganization, the Letterpress Division had 5
 sections.  After the reorganization only two remained intact:  Main
 Press and Postal Card.  The remaining three (Electrotying,
 Photoengraving, Stereotyping) were consolidated into one section which
 was retitled Photopolymer, consisting of about 32 employees.
 
    5.  Prior to the reorganization, the Offset Division had 4 sections.
 Afterwards, only 2 remained:  Offset Plate and Offset Press.  The other
 two, Offset Copy Production and Offset Negative, together having about
 223 employees, were transferred to the Deputy Production Manager
 (Prepress) and placed into the existing Electronic Photocomposition
 Division.
 
    6.  Prior to the reorganization, the Composing Division consisting of
 about 932 employees was one of four divisions reporting to the Deputy
 Production Manager (Printing).  This entire division was transferred to
 the Deputy Production Manager (Electronics) who, as noted above, had
 part of his title changed from Electronics to Prepress.
 
    7.  The reorganization also resulted in the creation of a new
 division named the Production Support Division consisting of 149
 employees in 6 sections.  It appears that almost all of these employees
 were previously a "miscellaneous segment" reporting to the Deputy
 Production Manager (Printing) but now reporting directly to the
 Production Manager.  The new division had a new section called Quality
 Control with 12 employees.
 
    8.  The employees who were immediately affected by the reorganization
 were those who reported to the same familiar job site on Monday but
 found themselves under a new superintendent or in a new division.  F.
 Impact:  Change in Policies and Procedures Experienced by Employees
 Transferred to a New Division and/or to a New Superintendent
 
    1.  In General.
 
    a.  A major impact involved in the abolition of the Offset Press
 Division was the transfer of each section of the Offset Press Division
 to the Press and Electronic Photocomposition Divisions thus placing them
 under the control of a new superintendent with his own policies.  The
 testimony of Sever, Lord, Valentine, Mandelblatt, and Allen establishes
 that there were significant differences, particularly from an employee
 standpoint, in the procedures, interpretation, and application of
 Government Printing Office policies and instructions in the Press
 Division and the Electronic Photocomposition Division compared with what
 had existed as policy and practices by the superintendent and foremen in
 the old Offset Division.  Specific incidents are discussed hereinafter.
 
    2.  Change in Sick Leave Procedure.
 
    a.  Mr. David Sever, President of the Washington Government Photo
 Offset Union, Local 538, and an offset platemaker/stripper in the Plate
 Section of the new Press Division testified that when the Plate Section
 was part of the Offset Division it was the practice of immediate
 supervisors to give employees 9 days of personal certification sick
 leave each year without subjecting them to discipline or challenge for
 abuse of leave.  Personal certification sick leave constitutes leave
 when an employee presents no doctor's certificate but merely certifies
 that he was ill.  According to Sever, soon after the reorganization he
 was instructed that his members no longer could take 9 days of personal
 certification sick leave and that 13 of his employees were being
 subjected to review and possible discipline because of their use of sick
 leave prior to the reorganization.  Sever further testified that he
 filed 13 grievances with regard to these employees challenging the
 retroactive application of new and stricter standards of sick leave
 taken by employees when they were in the Offset Press Division.  The
 policy of the new Press Division, a carryover from what had been
 practiced in the old Letterpress Division, was that an employee was
 allowed no specific number of personal certification sick leave.  The
 grievances went to hearing and were eventually resolved.
 
    b.  Mr. Sever's testimony is supported by the credited testimony of
 Mr. George Lord who stated that in June 1979 subsequent to being sworn
 in as Chapel Chairman for the Third Shift, the assistant foreman in
 charge of his section took him up to the night superintendent's office
 and introduced him to the superintendent.  Upon returning to his desk
 the assistant foreman pulled out a letter (G.C. Exh. No. 15), and gave
 it to him stating that this was the Offset Division's policy on late and
 on sick leave personal certification.
 
    c.  Further evidence of a change in sick leave policy comes from the
 testimony of Mr. Richard Valentine, a steward for the Graphics Arts
 International Union, Local 285, who represents people in the Negative
 Section of the Electronic Photocomposition Division, a section formerly
 in the Offset Division.  He testified that upon their transfer to the
 Electronic Photocomposition Division, a supervisor notified employees
 that there would be a change in procedure for taking leave such as sick
 leave, emergency annual leave and tardiness leave.  Under the old
 procedure in the Offset Division an employee was allowed to take 9 days
 of personal certification sick leave, emergency annual leave, and late
 leave.  The new procedure in the Electronic Photocomposition Division,
 to the contrary, was that employees were only allowed to take 5 days of
 such leave without challenge by their supervisors.
 
    d.  Mr. Frederick Allen, a printing plant worker and President of
 Respondent's Printing Plant Workers Union, supported this testimony when
 he testified that one of the major areas of change that resulted from
 the abolition of the Offset Division and the transfer of Offset Division
 personnel to the new Press Division was that the Press Division, headed
 by the former superintendent of the Letterpress Division, followed a
 stricter interpretation and application of GPO instructions regarding
 sick leave, work assignments, break periods, etc.  According to Allen,
 the new policies of the Press Division were applied retroactively to
 employee-members of his bargaining unit who had taken leave consistent
 with the more liberal Offset Division practice and as a consequence were
 penalized retroactively for leave that had been taken and approved
 previously.
 
    e.  In summary the change in sick leave policy affected members of
 the Printing Plant Workers Union and employees from the Plate and the
 Negative sections.  The change was directly related to the transfer of
 Offset Division employees to EPD as well to the merger with Letterpress.
  Although the change was not plant-wide in scope, it certainly was not
 confined to one small section as alleged by Respondent.
 
    3.  Change in Probing In and Out Procedure
 
    a.  The Probe Machine apparently is a combination of a time clock and
 a computer terminal.  When an employee inserts his identification badge
 into the machine in the morning, he is in effect punching a time clock
 and recording his attendance.  One of the effects of living in a
 computer age is that an employee no longer "punches" in and out rather,
 he "probes" in and out.  Of course, one of the main purpose of the probe
 machine is to record other information.  Thus, at the end of the day, an
 employee's production data can be recorded on the machine simply by
 inserting one's identification badge into the machine and at the same
 time pressing certain pre-programmed numbers and production codes.  Use
 of the probe machine for this purpose serves to eliminate the need for
 handwritten reports on sheets of paper from each employee.
 
    b.  Prior to reorganization, employees could begin probing out at
 4:06 p.m. so as to be through by 4:30 p.m.  As a result of the
 reorganization and the shift of employees from the Offset Division to
 the Electronic Photocomposition Division, under different ultimate
 supervision and different managerial policies, the employees had to
 change their departure probe from 4:06 p.m. to 4:15 p.m. to conform to
 the rest of their new division.  Clearly, this was a change in working
 conditions.  In addition, the employees had to probe out twice whereas,
 prior to the reorganization, they only probed out once.  This was also a
 change in working conditions.  As things worked out, the new departure
 probe time of 4:15 p.m. caused delays and disputes as employees leaving
 the job site competed for positions on the computer with the incoming
 shift.  In addition, employees experienced a loss of cleanup time "on
 the clock." The resulting problem was eventually solved by changing the
 time to 4:10 p.m.  The foregoing facts are based upon the testimony of
 Irwin Mandelblatt, a shop steward of GAU Local 285 and a copy prep
 journeyman stripper in the Electronics Photocomposition Division (EPD).
 His section formerly was part of the Offset Division.  This testimony is
 corroborated by Mr. Richard Valentine, a stripper in the Offset Negative
 Section which was transferred from the Offset Division to EPD.
 
    c.  Use of the probe machine was also related to another change as
 illustrated by the testimony of Mr. Sever.  Prior to the reorganization
 Plate Section employees filed written reports of their work production.
 Afterwards, they were required to use the probe machine for this
 purpose.  In its brief, Respondent described this as a minor change in
 the method of recording work.
 
    4.  Alleged Changes in a Training Program
 
    a.  The General Counsel contends that a further consequence of the
 reorganization and the disestablishment of the Offset Division was
 established by Mr. Greer and Mr. Allen.  Greer testified that during the
 time the Negative Section was in the Offset Division his union, the
 Graphic Arts Union, Local 285, negotiated a training program to furnish
 upward mobility for printing plant workers who were identified as Offset
 Photographers Assistants so that they could become offset Photographers
 Apprentices.  According to Greer, he heard a rumor that employees in the
 training program would not be moved up to journeyman status as
 originally planned in the program.  He thereupon went to the head of the
 Electronic Photocomposition Division who, according to Greer, told him
 that because of the excess of personnel now in the division he couldn't
 say with any reasonable degree of certainty that these people would
 continue to journeyman status in that program (Tr. 132, 142).  This
 meeting was in February 1980, at least four months after the
 reorganization.  On cross examination, Mr. Greer conceded that the
 excess of people had been there "for sometime" but asserted that the
 reorganization had a chilling effect on the training program.  Mr. Wood
 denied telling Greer that employees would not reach journeyman status.
 
    b.  Mr. Allen, the President of the Printing Plant Workers Union,
 testified that another aspect of the training program was that printing
 plant workers, who are semi-skilled employees, would not be assigned any
 further skilled duties normally within the jurisdiction of Greer's craft
 Union unless they were given an opportunity to enter into the training
 program which would lead eventually to the employees being given
 journeyman status within the Graphic Arts Union.  According to Allen,
 this was being ignored by the new management.
 
    c.  I can understand the concern expressed by Greer and Allen, and if
 the alleged change could be more specifically identified I would agree
 that an adverse impact was possible.  But much of this testimony is
 based on speculation and feelings.  As of the date of the hearing, 8 1/2
 months had elapsed since the reorganization.  Certainly, this was an
 ample period of time in which to gather evidence about specific changes
 in the training program adversely impacting on employees.  Accordingly,
 I find that the General Counsel has not established by this evidence any
 adverse impact directly related to or resulting from the reorganization.
 
    5.  Alleged Changes in Emergency Snow Procedures
 
    a.  I am not persuaded by the testimony of Mr. Richard Valentine that
 the reorganization resulted in a change of policy with respect to
 identifying asserted personnel for purposes of emergency snow
 conditions.  Even if such a change occurred, the effect on employees was
 minimal and would not constitute adverse impact, in my opinion.  G.
 Impact:  Probable Changes Resulting From the Transfer of the Composing
 Division
 
    1.  As previously noted, the reorganization had purposes and
 objectives which were not to be achieved overnight.  But there can be no
 question that the reorganization was an instrument for change.  In terms
 of its immediate and eventual impact on employees, the most significant
 change was the transfer of the Composing Division from the Deputy
 Production Manager, Printing to the Deputy Manager, Prepress.  Joint
 Exhibit No. 2 clearly establishes that the major purpose of this
 reorganization, combined with the transfer of the Offset Copy
 Preparation and Negative Sections to the Electronic Photocomposition
 Division was to promote greater efficiency and allow for a smoother
 transition of work from hot metal processes to photocomposition
 processes.  A specific example of how this consolidation of work was to
 occur is found in Respondent's Exhibit No. 7, a letter from the Deputy
 Public Printer to the Public Printer responding to certain questions
 concerning the reorganization.  Question No. 6 in this memo asks whether
 or not thought has been given to creating a common proof room.  In
 response to this question the Deputy Public Printer states:
 
          The establishment of a single proof room is definitely one of
       the major objectives of the proposed reorganization.  This section
       would combine main proof, EPD proof, patents proof, and job proof,
       and would be planned to become operational concurrently with the
       transition of the Congressional Record to Photocomposition.  This
       change-over is planned for January 1981, when the first session of
       the Ninety-Seventh Congress convenes.  (Resp. Exh. No. 7).
 
    2.  Mr. William Boarman, President of Columbia Typographical Union,
 #101, testified that prior to the reorganization his Union was the only
 craft Union in the Electronic Photocomposition Division and it had
 exclusive recognition for purposes of collective bargaining throughout
 the Division.  As a result of the reorganization there are now two
 separate craft units with different rates of pay, etc. within the
 Electronic Photocomposition Division operating under the same division
 supervision.  Thus, the General Counsel contends that a possible impact
 of the reorganization is that there is now a possibility for a
 requirement of a unit clarification regarding the jurisdiction of the
 two craft Unions in the Electronic Photocomposition Division.
 
    3.  Boarman also testified that promotional opportunities in the
 Electronic Photocomposition Division which were primarily, if not
 solely, filled by employees from his craft, are now filled in part by
 employees from an additional craft and thus, he asserts, there has been
 an impact on promotional opportunities for his people.
 
    4.  Now that the Deputy Production Manager for Prepress is in charge
 of the Electronic Photocomposition Division and the Composing Division,
 he has, as a result of his increased authority, began a program to
 combine the operations of both divisions in certain areas.
 Specifically, Boarman referred to the combining of the Proof and Copy
 Mark-up Sections in the Electronic Photocomposition Division with the
 Proof Section of the Composition Division (Resp. Exh. 7;  Tr. 207, 215).
  According to Boarman, the result of this combination will be that some
 of the "up-rates", employees within his bargaining unit, will be
 classified "surplus" employees.  Boarman complained that there had, at
 the time of the reorganization, been no negotiations to provide for the
 impact of such consolidation on employees.  (See also G.C. Exh. No. 16).
  Also, according to Boarman, the Monotype Section in the Composing
 Division is scheduled, as a result of the consolidations made possible
 under this reorganization, to be closed down.  The area where the
 Monotype Section is presently located, on the 7th Floor of the
 Government Printing Office, is to be renovated for a new combined Proof
 Room.  Employees in the Monotype Section are to be moved to the Hand
 Section in the Composing Division which is located on the 6th Floor and
 "up-rate" employees in the Monotype Section and supervisors in that
 section will be declared "surplus" because "up-rate" bargaining unit
 positions in the Hand Section are already filled.  Again there has been
 no negotiation on the impact and implementation of these changes which
 are closely related to the reorganization and are planned to inevitably
 flow from it.  (See also G.C. Exh. No. 16).  McRorie, Respondent's
 Production Manager, supported this contention by Mr. Boarman when he
 admitted that it is the intention of the Respondent to transfer all work
 eventually from the Composing Division to the Electronic
 Photocomposition Division and that one of the major results of the
 reorganization is that work can now easily be shifted by the Deputy
 Production Manager Prepress from the Composing Division to the
 Electronic Photocomposition Division.  Elmo Wood also testified that the
 two divisions eventually will be "merged and become one." H.  Impact:
 Changes Resulting From the Establishment of the Photopolymer Plate
 Section
 
    1.  Prior to the reorganization there were three separate sections:
 Electrotyping, Photoengraving, and Stereotyping.  The reorganization had
 the effect of formally abolishing these individual sections,
 consolidating them altogether as one, and retitling the new section as
 the Photopolymer Plate Section.  This was more than a change of name.
 As correctly pointed out by the General Counsel, and as any craft
 employee would readily know, the Respondent thereby implemented an
 "official" change in "status" of the Photoengraving Section from that of
 a section which did primarily photoengraving work to that of a section
 whose primary responsibility, and hence name, would be that of
 Photopolymer Plate Making.  Not only were the employees in these three
 sections merged together and given a new name, but to add to the
 confusion, the Letterpress Division (of which it was part) was merged
 with the Offset Press Division.
 
    2.  The purpose of the reorganization was to greatly enhance the
 workload balancing problems encountered by having separate press
 divisions and to facilitate the transition of work from letterpress to
 offset printing.  (Jt. Exh. No. 2).  One of Respondent's exhibits, a
 letter from the Deputy Public Printer to the Public Printer contains the
 following statement:
 
          "The Photoengraving Section is to be renamed to Photopolymer
       Plate Section to more accurately indicate its primary function.
       This section will of course continue to produce magnesium cuts for
       envelope work and other metal engraving as long as they are
       needed.  Consideration is being given to incorporating the
       Photopolymer Plate Section as a unit under the Offset Plate
       Section." (Resp. Exh. No. 7, p. 3).
 
 These two exhibits establish that the purpose and objective of the
 reorganization and the change in name from Photoengraving Section to
 that of Photopolymer Plate Section was to implement management's overall
 intention to change the way and manner in which work was done at the
 Agency.  Thus management intended to merge the letterpress and offset
 press functions as a means of facilitating the transition of work from
 Letterpress to Offset Printing thus abolishing the need, eventually, to
 have a separate Photopolymer Plate Section.
 
    3.  With this as background one can more easily understand the
 testimony of Mr. John Greer, President, Graphic Arts Union, Local 285,
 and that of his Special Assistant Mr. Anthony Gonzales, that the change
 of the section's name from Photoengraving to that of Photopolymer Plate
 Section not only foretold the future but in and of itself constituted an
 impact on employees in that section.  Greer and Gonzales established
 that there is at least 50 year history of tying employees' job
 classification to the title of the section in which they work, and as a
 consequence and because the rates of pay in this section are related to
 the rates of pay in private industry, anything that would support a
 change in the classification of employees from that of Offset
 Photographers to that of Photopolymer Platemakers has an actual as well
 as potential impact on employees in that section.
 
                                  Issues
 
          A. Whether there is any statutory prohibition to the filing of
       an unfair labor practice charge by the Joint Council?
 
          B.  Whether the Joint Council herein was authorized to act as
       the bargaining agent for the exclusive representatives?
 
          C. Whether Respondent had an obligation to bargain because
       there was a reasonable likelihood that the reorganization would
       result in an adverse impact, immediately or in the future, on
       employees in the production department?
 
          D.  Whether Respondent failed to provide the exclusive
       representatives with adequate notice of its decision to reorganize
       the production department?
 
          E.  Whether Respondent refused to bargain with the Joint
       Council as the designated agent of the exclusive representatives?
 
                     Discussion and Conclusions of Law
 
 A. Status of the Joint Council
 
    At the hearing Respondent challenged the right of the Joint Council
 to file an unfair labor practice charge.  In its brief, Respondent
 contends that the Council is not a labor organization which is the
 exclusive representative of any employees in the Government Printing
 Office and, therefore, Respondent had no statutory obligation to
 negotiate with the Council.  These contentions are without merit.
 
    Section 7118(a)(1) of the Statute and the implementing regulatory
 section, Section 2423.3 provide, in effect, that a charge may be filed
 by "any person," and Section 7103(a)(1) of the Statute provides that a
 person means "an individual, labor organization, or agency." Thus, the
 Statute requires that any individual or entity which is encompassed
 within the statutory definition of "person" set forth in Section
 7103(a)(1) of the Statute may file a charge alleging an unfair labor
 practice under any subsection of Section 7116 of the Statute.
 Accordingly, any "employee" within the meaning of Section 7103(a)(2) of
 the Statute, and any "labor organization" within the meaning of Section
 7103(a)(4) of the Statute has standing to file a charge alleging an
 unfair labor practice under Section 7116 of the Statute.  The filing of
 such charge invokes the General Counsel's jurisdiction to investigate
 the unfair labor practice and, if timely filed, consider such charge on
 the merits.
 
    The evidence herein establishes that Mr. McIntyre is an employee of
 the Respondent, Chairman of the Joint Council, and President of one of
 its constituent locals.  The evidence also establishes that the Joint
 Council is the designated agent of all seven Unions in the Production
 Department and had the function of representing the interests of such
 Unions in negotiations with management on matters of common concern.
 Finally, the evidence establishes that when McIntyre filed the charge
 herein, he had been specifically authorized by the membership of the
 Joint Council to do so.  Accordingly, I conclude that the charge herein
 was properly filed whether it was filed by Mr. McIntyre as an
 individual, or by Mr. McIntyre as the Chairman of the Joint Council, the
 authorized representative of the seven constituent locals who had units
 of recognition in the affected Production Department.
 
    Respondent has offered nothing sufficient to challenge the authority
 of Mr. McIntyre, or the Joint Council, to act as agent for its
 constituent locals of the Council, as established by the Union
 presidents.  Indeed, the evidence establishes that Respondent itself
 recognized the role of the Chairman McIntyre of the Joint Council when
 Mr. Amann's secretary called him on September 27 and requested him to
 notify the other unions of the next day's meeting to discuss the
 reorganization.  I find and conclude that the Joint Council was the
 designated agent of its constituent locals in the Production Department
 and had authority to request Respondent to delay the reorganization and
 to negotiate impact and implementation of the reorganization decision.
 B.  Other Pertinent Statutory Provisions
 
    1.  Section 7116(a) makes it an unfair labor practice for an agency -
 "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise by
 the employee of any right under this chapter" and (5) "to refuse to
 consult or negotiate in good faith with a labor organization as required
 by this chapter."
 
    2.  Section 7106 (the Management Rights section) states as follows:
 
          (a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, nothing in this
       chapter shall affect the authority of any management official of
       any agency--
 
          (1) to determine the mission, budget, organization, number of
       employees, and internal security practices of the agency;  . . .
 
          (b) Nothing in this section shall preclude any agency and any
       labor organization from negotiating-- . . .
 
          (2) procedures which management officials of the agency will
       observe in exercising any authority under this section;  or
 
          (3) appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected
       by the exercise of any authority under this section by such
       management officials.
 
 C. Contention of the Parties
 
    1.  There is no dispute that Respondent's decision to conduct a
 reorganization was a management right under Section 7106(a) of the
 Statute and not negotiable.  However, the General Counsel contends that
 Respondent has an obligation to negotiate about Section 7106(b)(2)
 "procedures" and Section 7106(b)(3) "arrangements for employees
 adversely affected."
 
    2.  Respondent asserts in its brief that it is fully cognizant of its
 obligation to negotiate with an exclusive representative before it
 effectuates a decision which has adverse impact on employees within a
 bargaining unit.  But in order to conclude that impact is "adverse,"
 Respondent asserts that impact must be substantial and meaningful.  More
 importantly, impact must be actual, not speculative.  On this latter
 point, Respondent contends that about every act of management is of some
 interest to employees, but from this it does not necessarily follow that
 every act has a material and substantial impact on employees and their
 conditions of employment.  With respect to the instant case, Respondent
 argues that the alleged change in sick leave policy and the actual
 change in probing in and out were relatively minor and insignificant
 matters which did materially impact on employees and therefore did not
 constitute adverse impact.  With respect to the remainder of the General
 Counsel's case, Respondent asserts that the alleged impact is pure
 speculation and should be accorded no significance.
 
    4.  The General Counsel contends that the language of Section 7106(a)
 of the Statute establishes the "primacy of negotiated procedures over
 the exercise of management rights" by making subsection (a) subject to
 the provisions of subsection (b).  The legislative history relied upon
 to support this argument are statements made by Congressman William Ford
 (124 Cong.Rec.H. 13607, Daily Ed., October 14, 1978).  However, since
 these statements were made after the enactment of the Statute, they do
 not constitute evidence of Congressional intent.  /8/ C. Nature of
 Impact
 
    1.  The central issue in this case resolves around the kind of impact
 to be shown, if any, and the nature of such impact.  Section 7106(a) of
 the Statute has its genesis in Section 11(a) of the Executive Order
 11491, as amended.  Cases arising under the Executive Order and the
 Statute clearly demonstrate that an agency's obligation to negotiate is
 not intended to embrace every issue which is of general interest to
 employees but may only affect them indirectly or in an unsubstantial
 way.  /9/ Thus, in cases arising under the Executive Order, a
 "substantial impact" test has come into existence and been applied
 uniformly in numerous cases.  Indeed, the Assistant Secretary, in a case
 under the Order stated quite clearly that Section 11(a) (now Section
 1706(a) under the Statute) encompassed matters which materially affect
 employees and have a substantial impact on personnel policies, practices
 and general working conditions.  /10/ Complaints have been dismissed
 when the substantial impact test has not been met.
 
    In the present case, and since I am of the opinion that a substantial
 impact test should be applied to cases arising under the Statute, /11/
 the issue is whether the substantial (or adverse) impact must actually
 be shown to have occurred (i.e. actual impact) or whether it is
 sufficient to show that it probably will occur at a future date.
 
    It is my conclusion that the legal principle to be applied to this
 case is as follows:  An agency's obligation to negotiate is contingent
 upon first showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
 unilateral change in conditions of employment has resulted or may
 reasonably be expected to result in substantial impact adversely
 affecting employees.  Thus, the foregoing test encompasses both actual
 and probable impact, but in either case the impact must be "substantial"
 and must "result from" the change in question.  Of course, the burden of
 proof would be with the General Counsel.
 
    1.  Actual impact.  This may occur contemporaneously with the change
 or at a later date, but when it happens, it is specific and
 identifiable.  It has really happened and there's no need for
 speculation.  This is illustrated herein by the change in sick leave
 policy and the change in the probing in and out procedure.  In
 disagreement with Respondent, I find that these changes had substantial
 impact on the affected employees.  These changes occurred in close
 proximity to the date of the reorganization and resulted from the
 reorganization.  The General Counsel attempted to show that the
 reorganization also resulted in changes in the upward mobility training
 program but, in my opinion, the evidence was insufficient to establish
 such a change and, therefore, the question of impact is not reached.
 The General Counsel also alleged that subsequent to the reorganization
 there were changes in the procedure for determining essential personnel
 in emergency snow conditions.  Although these changes did occur after
 the reorganization, the evidence did not persuasively establish that the
 change resulted from the reorganization or that it materially affected
 employees in a meaningful way so as to warrant the conclusion that it
 constituted substantial or adverse impact.
 
    2.  Probable Impact.  Not every change in conditions of employment
 results in an immediate impact of substantial nature.  But the lack of a
 substantial impact should not preclude finding an obligation to
 negotiate.  If an agency changes its RIF procedures, a union should not
 have to wait until an employee is terminated before requesting
 negotiations concerning the impact and implementation of the change.  If
 an agency changes its promotion procedures, a union should not have to
 wait until an employee is refused promotion before insisting on
 negotiations.  Whenever an agency institutes a change in conditions of
 employment without affording the exclusive representative an opportunity
 to request negotiations, the agency acts at its peril.
 
    In determining whether an agency has acted in derogation of its
 collective bargaining obligations, the question to be answered is simply
 this:  Was there a reasonable likelihood /12/ that the change would
 result in a substantial impact adversely affecting employees, either
 immediately or in the future?  Phrased in this manner, an agency may not
 escape its statutory obligation by asserting, as Respondent does herein,
 that there has been no impact-- yet.  Nor can the General Counsel too
 easily satisfy its burden of proof by arguing that adverse impact
 "could" happen, "might" happen or is "possible" of happening at some
 vague indefinite time in the future.  /13/ A fair compromise between
 these two extreme positions is to require the General Counsel, in the
 absence of actual substantial impact, to prove there was a reasonable
 likelihood of substantial impact resulting in the future from the
 agency's unilateral change.  On balance, I believe this would be a fair
 but not onerous burden of proof.
 
    In my opinion the "reasonable likelihood" test is applicable to and
 very well illustrated by the facts of this case.  Indeed, the Joint
 Council and its member unions were less concerned with the actual
 adverse impact (sick leave, changing the probe procedure, etc.) than
 they were with the probable and more serious adverse impact (loss of
 jobs, lower pay and fewer promotional opportunities) slated for the
 future.  Respondent asserts that there is no hard evidence of future
 changes and that the General Counsel's case is built upon speculation by
 the Union witnesses who testified.  I disagree.  It is clear from the
 testimony of Respondent's own witnesses and documentary evidence as
 well, that elimination of jobs was a principal objective of the
 reorganization.  The abolishment of sections and the merger of divisions
 were the first steps in the game plan, but the ultimate objectives were
 clear.  Based upon my review and analysis of the entire record, I
 conclude that as a result of the reorganization of the production
 department there was a reasonable likelihood that promotional
 opportunities would be diminished and that employees would lose their
 jobs.  There can be no question that such a result would adversely
 affect employees.  Accordingly, Respondent had an obligation to
 negotiate the impact and implementation of its decision to institute the
 reorganization.
 
    The reasonable likelihood test that I have utilized in evaluating the
 evidence herein may sound new, but it is not.  Rather, I am merely
 making explicit what has been implicit all along in decisions by the
 Assistant Secretary and the Authority.  To illustrate this point, I
 refer to a recent decision by the Authority in San Antonio Air Logistics
 Center (AFLC), Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, 5 FLRA No. 22 (February 17,
 1981).  Such terminology as actual, immediate, probable, and reasonably
 likely were not expressly used in the decision, but here is what
 happened.  The Activity in that case changed its appraisal Guidelines.
 While this did not have an immediate adverse impact, the eventual
 application of the guidelines to employees resulted in a lowering of
 scores, by the date of the hearing.  But even without this evidence of
 actual impact at a later date, it seems clear that the very nature of
 the change carried with it a reasonable likelihood that employees'
 scores would be adversely affected because an underlying reason for the
 new Guidelines was to correct a problem of a disproportionate number of
 high scores the preceding year.  In the case case, the Activity also
 cancelled certain GS-8 positions and replaced them with WG-11 positions
 and characterized this maneuver as the establishment of a new position
 rather than the reclassification of an old one.  Although no employees
 suffered an immediate pay reduction, it was held that the change
 resulted in a lower pay scale.  Thus, we see that the reason for finding
 substantial impact was not because any employees were, in fact,
 adversely affected but, rather, because there was a reasonable
 likelihood that employees would be adversely affected in the future by
 this change.
 
    Another case by the Authority is also important.  Department of the
 Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Jacksonville District, 3 FLRA No.
 103 (July 17, 1980).  There, the Respondent unilaterally adopted new
 time schedules for the processing of cases.  The effect of the change
 was to reduce the optimum time frame for the timely processing of a
 case-- before it became overage-- from 18 to 12 months.  There was no
 immediate adverse effect on employees and Respondent contended there was
 no actual impact because the new time frame had not been enforced.  In
 rejecting this contention, the Administrative Law Judge stated as
 follows:
 
          The absence of enforcement of same carries little weight in the
       absence of any statement from the supervisory hierarchy assuring
       continuance of such practice.  In the absence of such a statement
       the affected employees have no way of knowing what the future
       holds with respect to adherence to the March 14th memorandum.
 
 The Authority adopted the Administrative Law Judge's findings,
 conclusions, and recommendations.
 
    Turning back to the case before me, the Joint Council and its
 constituent locals were not really concerned with the changes in
 supervisory and managerial assignments.  Rather they were concerned--
 and with good reason-- that the abolishment of sections, merger of
 divisions and creation of the Photopolymer Section, were all leading in
 one direction:  loss of jobs and lower pay.  The reorganization was an
 integral and critical first step in the process and the Joint Council
 wanted to be in on the ground floor to negotiate probable impact before
 it was too late.  Only by objecting in a timely manner could the unions
 avoid criticism at a later date that they had slept on their legal
 rights.  Here, the unions, through the Joint Council, promptly filed an
 unfair labor practice charge but even this did not give the Respondent
 pause.  The reorganization was instituted as scheduled.  D.  Adequacy of
 Respondent's Notice
 
    1.  The General Counsel contends that the failure to provide timely
 and sufficient notice of the decision in order to afford ample
 opportunity for the unions to study the reorganization plan prior to its
 implementation was an "ipso facto" violation, irrespective of any actual
 impact.  I reject the contention that before an agency exercises any
 reserved management right it has an obligation to notify the union so
 that it may request bargaining about 7106(b)(2) procedures, irrespective
 of any showing of substantial impact.  /14/
 
    2.  My understanding of the law is that Respondent's obligation to
 provide adequate notice is contingent upon first establishing an
 obligation to bargain.  /15/ In the present case, I have determined that
 the decision to reorganize the production department had (1) an actual
 adverse impact and (2) a reasonable likelihood of future adverse impact.
  Therefore, Respondent had an obligation to negotiate the impact and
 implementation of its decision.  To fulfill this bargaining obligation,
 Respondent had an obligation to provide timely and sufficient notice.
 /16/ Clearly, the Respondent failed to satisfy this obligation when it
 waited until Friday morning September 28 to announce that there would be
 a reorganization and it would be instituted on Monday October 1.
 Furthermore, I conclude that Respondent, having already programmed its
 computer to the new setup, had no intention of even considering a delay
 in the reorganization.  As Production Manager McRorie said to McIntyre
 "we have already changed the data over into the computer . . . and
 that's the way it is."
 
    3.  Respondent's inadequate notice and its refusal to delay the
 reorganization was in derogation of its statutory obligation to
 negotiate the "impact and implementation" of its decision.  More
 specifically, in statutory terminology, Respondent had an obligation
 under Section 7106(b)(2) to negotiate the procedures to be followed in
 implementing the reorganization, and it had an obligation to negotiate
 under Section 7106(b)(3) appropriate arrangements for employees
 adversely affected by the reorganization.  /17/ Accordingly, I conclude
 that Respondent violated Section 7116(a)(5) by its conduct.  /18/
 Moreover, it is well settled that a violation of any subsection of
 Section 7116(a) necessarily tends to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
 employees in the exercise of their rights assured by the Statute and
 therefore is also a violation of Section 7116(a)(1).  /19/
 
    Having found that Respondent has engaged in conduct violative of
 Sections 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, I recommend that the Authority
 issue the following order designed to effectuate the purposes of the
 Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.
 
                                   ORDER
 
    Pursuant to Section 2423.29 of the Rules and Regulations of the
 Federal Labor Relations Authority and Section 7118 of the Federal
 Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, the Authority hereby orders
 that the U.S. Government Printing Office shall:
 
    1.  Cease and desist from:
 
          (a) Any further implementation of the October 1, 1979
       reorganization of the Production Department without first
       notifying the Joint Council of Unions, Government Printing Office,
       the agent of the employees' exclusive bargaining representatives,
       and affording it a reasonable opportunity to negotiate, to the
       extent consonant with law and regulations, on (1) the procedures
       to be observed in any further implementation of the
       reorganization, and (2) the arrangements for employees who have
       been or may be adversely affected by the reorganization.
 
          (b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
       restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
       assured by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.
 
    2.  Take the following affirmative action:
 
          (a) Upon request by the Joint Council of Unions, Government
       Printing Office, the agency of the employees' exclusive
       representatives, negotiate, to the extent consonant with law and
       regulations, (1) the procedures to be observed in implementing the
       reorganization of its Production Department, and (2) the
       arrangements for employees who have been or may be adversely
       affected by the reorganization.
 
          (b) Post at all facilities wherein there are bargaining unit
       employees represented by constituent locals of the Joint Council,
       copies of the attached Notice marked "Appendix a" on forms to be
       furnished by the Federal Labor Relations Authority.  Upon receipt
       of such forms they shall be signed by the Public Printer and shall
       be posted and maintained for a period of 60 consecutive days
       thereafter, in conspicuous places, including bulletin boards and
       other places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
       The Public Printer shall take reasonable steps to insure that such
       notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
       material;  and
 
          (c) Notify the Federal Labor Relations Authority, in writing,
       within 30 days from the date of this order as to what steps have
       been taken to comply herewith.
 
                                       FRANCIS E. DOWD
                                       Administrative Law Judge
 
 Dated:  April 9, 1981
          Washington, D.C.
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                APPENDIX A
 
                          NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
 
  PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR
 RELATIONS
 AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF CHAPTER 71
 OF TITLE
 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS
 WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
 
 WE WILL NOT institute any further changes in personnel policies,
 practices, and working conditions as a result of the reorganization of
 the Production Department, without first notifying the Joint Council of
 Unions, Government Printing Office, the agent of the employees'
 exclusive bargaining representatives, and affording it an opportunity to
 negotiate, to the extent consonant with law and regulations, on (1) the
 procedures to be observed in any further implementation of the
 reorganization of the Production Department, and (2) the arrangements
 for employees who have been or may be adversely affected by the
 reorganization.  WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
 with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights
 assured by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.  WE
 WILL, to the extent consonant with law and regulation, afford the Joint
 Council of Unions the opportunity to negotiate concerning any changes
 affecting personnel policies, practices, or working conditions, related
 to the reorganization of the Production Department including (1) the
 procedures to be observed in any further implementation of the
 reorganization of the Production Department and (2) the arrangements for
 employees who have been or may be adversely affected by the
 reorganization.
                                       (Agency or Activity)
 
 Dated:  . . .  (Signature) This Notice must remain posted for 60
 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered,
 defaced, or covered by any other material.  If employees have any
 questions concerning this Notice or compliance with its provisions, they
 may communicate directly with the Regional Director for the Federal
 Labor Relations Authority whose address is:  1133 15th Street, NW.,
 Suite 300, Washington, D.C.  20005
 
 
 
 
 
 
 --------------- FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
 
 
    /1/ Section 7106(b) of the Statute provides in pertinent part:
 
          Sec. 7106.  Management rights
 
                                .  .  .  .
 
          (b) Nothing in this section shall preclude any agency and any
       labor organization from negotiating--
 
          (2) procedures which management officials of the agency will
       observe in exercising any authority under this section;  or
 
          (3) appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected
       by the exercise of any authority under this section by such
       management officials.
 
 
    /2/ Section 7106(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:
 
          Sec. 7106.  Management rights
 
          (a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, nothing in this
       chapter shall affect the authority of any management official of
       any agency--
 
          (1) to determine the . . . organization . . . of the agency(.)
 
 
    /3/ The Authority finds it unnecessary, in the circumstances of this
 case, to distinguish between the nature of the bargaining obligations
 arising under section 7106(b)(2) and (3).  See generally American
 Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2782 and Department
 of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C., 7 FLRA No. 13
 (1981), rev'd sub nom. American Federation of Government Employees,
 AFL-CIO, Local 2782 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 702 F.2d 1183
 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (wherein the Court described section 7106(b)(2) as a
 provision which was intended to "clarify" the dichotomy between
 management's substantive rights governed by section 7106(a) and matters
 of procedure, but described section 7106(b)(3) as a provision which was
 intended as an "exception" to or a "limit" on management's prerogatives
 set forth in section 7106(a)).
 
 
    /4/ This is not to say that an agency is required to notify the
 exclusive representative of its employees every time it decides to
 exercise a management right under section 7106 of the Statute.  Thus,
 where the exercise of a management right has not changed conditions of
 employment so as to have an impact on bargaining unit employees and such
 impact cannot reasonably be foreseen, management's failure to have
 provided prior notice thereof to the exclusive representative will not
 be found to have violated section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute.
 See, e.g., Office of Program Operations, Field Operations, Social
 Security Administration, San Francisco Region, 5 FLRA No. 45 (1981).
 
 
    /5/ In its brief Respondent takes exception to my prehearing ruling
 denying a Motion for More Definite Statement.  The purpose of the motion
 was "to elicit specific information" because in civil litigation a
 "responding party is entitled to know upon what facts the complaining
 party is basing his allegations." To the extent that Respondent's motion
 is in the nature of a Request for a Bill of Particulars it was denied
 because the complaint, in my opinion, is sufficiently specific and
 detailed to apprise the Respondent of the issues and to enable
 Respondent to prepare for the hearing.  To the extent that Respondent is
 seeking discovery of the General Counsel's evidence in advance of the
 hearing, I reaffirm my previous denial of the motion for the reasons set
 forth in General Counsel's opposition to the motion.
 
 
    /6/ Mr. McIntyre, President, Washington Printing and Graphic
 Communications Union, Local 1;  Mr. Sever, President, Washington
 Government Photo Offset Union, Local 538;  Mr. Greer, President, Graphic
 Arts Union, Local 285;  Mr. Allen, President, Washington Printing Plant
 Workers Union, Local 713;  and Mr. Boarman, President Columbia
 Typographical Union, # 101.
 
 
    /7/ Upon reconsideration, I reverse my ruling at the hearing and
 receive Resp. Exh. No. 6 into evidence.
 
 
    /8/ United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258
 (1947);  National Woodwork Mfgs. Ass'n v. N.L.R.B., 386 U.S. 639 (1967);
  Blanchette v. Connecticut Insurance Corps., 491 U.S. 102 (1974).
 
 
    /9/ Department of Defense, Air National Guard, 6 A/SLMR 591.
 
 
    /10/ Department of Defense, Air National Guard, 6 A/SLMR 591;  Social
 Security Administration, 2 FLRA No. 27 (1979) Report No. 23.
 
 
    /11/ In a case decided under the Statute, the Authority has upheld
 the substantial impact requirement.  See Office of Program Operations,
 Field Operations, Social Security Administration, San Francisco Region,
 5 FLRA No. 45 (March 20, 1981).
 
 
    /12/ Webster's New World Dictionary defines likelihood as "the fact
 of being likely to happen;  probability." Used in this sense the word
 "likely" according to Webster's suggests "probability or an eventuality
 that can reasonably be expected."
 
 
    /13/ An agency should not be required to bargain about the impact and
 implementation of every management decision simply because there is a
 possibility, however remote and unrealistic, of adverse impact.  Such a
 requirement would be unduly burdensome and could indirectly interfere
 with management's 1706(a) decisional authority by causing unreasonable
 delay or so constrict management's discretion as to effectively deny
 that right altogether.  Report of the Federal Labor Relations Council,
 January 1970/December 1976 (FLRC 77-2).  But see, Department of Health,
 Education and Welfare, Social Security Administration, BRSI,
 Northeastern Program Service Center, 8 A/SLMR 1237, at 1243, (1978),
 affirmed 1 FLRA 19, relied upon by the General Counsel to support a
 contention that "possible" impact is negotiable.
 
 
    /14/ In its brief (p. 18), the General Counsel contends that even if
 I find "no substantial adverse impact, there is . . . an obligation to
 negotiate procedures, and procedures (sic) for employees