14:0127(26)CA - Treasury, IRS and Treasury, IRS Austin Service Center and NTEU and NTEU Chapter 72 -- 1984 FLRAdec CA



[ v14 p127 ]
14:0127(26)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:


 14 FLRA No. 26
 
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AND UNITED STATES
 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE
 SERVICE, AUSTIN SERVICE CENTER
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION
 AND NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES
 UNION, CHAPTER 72
 Charging Party
 
                                            Case No. 6-CA-30019
 
                            DECISION AND ORDER
 
    The Administrative Law Judge issued his Decision in the
 above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in
 certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that the Respondent be
 ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
 action.  /1/ Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Judge's
 Decision.
 
    Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations
 and section 7118 of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
 Statute (the Statute), the Authority has reviewed the rulings of the
 Judge and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.  The rulings
 are hereby affirmed.  upon consideration of the Judge's Decision and the
 entire record in this case, the Authority hereby adopts the Judge's
 findings, conclusions and recommendations only to the extent consistent
 herewith.
 
    The Judge concluded that the Respondent's failure to pay employee
 Knight for his travel and per diem expenses incurred as a union
 negotiator during negotiations conducted July 6-9, 1982, August 3-6,
 1982, and November 2-5, 1982, constituted a failure and refusal to
 comply with section 7131(a) of the Statute in violation of section
 7116(a)(1) and (8) of the Statute.  Subsequent to the issuance of the
 Judge's Decision, the United States Supreme Court concluded in Bureau of
 Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 104 S.Ct. 439(1983) that the
 obligation of an agency under section 7131(a) of the Statute to provide
 official time to employees representing an exclusive representative in
 the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement does not encompass
 the payment of travel expenses and per diem allowances.  Pursuant to
 that decision, and for the reasons set forth by the Court, the Authority
 concludes herein that the Respondent did not fail or refuse to comply
 with the provisions of section 7131(a) of the Statute.  Therefore, it
 follows that the Respondent did not violate section 7116(a)(1) and (8)
 of the Statute.
 
                                   ORDER
 
    IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the complaint in Case No. 6-CA-30019 be,
 and it hereby is, dismissed.  /2/
 
    Issued, Washington, D.C., March 23, 1984
 
                                       Barbara J. Mahone, Chairman
                                       Ronald W. Haughton, Member
                                       Henry B. Frazier III, Member
                                       FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -------------------- ALJ$ DECISION FOLLOWS --------------------
 
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE
    TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
    AND UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE
    TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
    AUSTIN SERVICE CENTER
                                Respondent
 
    and
 
    NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION
    AND NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES
    UNION, CHAPTER 72
                              Charging Party
 
                                       Case No.: 6-CA-30019
 
    W. B. Riley, Esquire
    Gary A. Anderson, Esquire
    William P. Lehman, Esquire
    For the Respondent
 
    Anne Ellzey, Esquire
    For the Charging Party
 
    Susan E. Jelen, Esquire
    For the General Counsel
 
    Before:  WILLIAM B. DEVANEY
    Administrative Law Judge
 
                                 DECISION
 
                           Statement of the Case
 
    This case, under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
 Statute, Chapter 71 of Title 5 of the United States Code, 5 U.S.C. 7101,
 et seq., /3/ and the Final Rules and Regulations issued thereunder, 5
 C.F.R. 2423.1 et seq., solely involves Respondent's conceded refusal to
 pay travel and per diem expenses for an employee-union negotiator.
 
    The Charge was filed on October 21, 1982 (Exh. 1 to General Counsel's
 Motion for Summary Judgment), a First Amended Charge was filed on
 December 20, 1982 (Exh. 4 to General Counsel's Motion for Summary
 Judgment), and the Complaint and Notice of Hearing issued on December
 28, 1982.  The Notice of Hearing set the hearing for February 15, 1983,
 in Austin Texas.  Counsel for Charging Party, because of previously
 scheduled annual leave on the date of the hearing, moved to Postpone the
 Date for Hearing by Motion dated January 7, 1983, and received in this
 Office on January 12, 1983.  On January 25, 1983, Counsel for General
 Counsel filed with the Regional Director a Motion for Summary Judgment
 which was referred to this Office for disposition by the Regional
 Director on January 25, 1983, pursuant to Sec. 2423.22(b) of the
 Regulations.  On January 31, 1983, this Office issued an Order to Show
 Cause and Order Postponing Hearing.  The Order stated, in part, that:
 
          " . . . From the Motion for Summary judgment it would not
       appear that Respondent, by its Answer, has raised any litigable
       issue and/or that Respondent has raised any material issue of
       fact.  Accordingly, an Order to Show Cause will be issued and,
       pending Respondent's response, the hearing, scheduled for February
       15, 1983, in Austin, Texas, will be cancelled and the case will be
       indefinitely postponed to be rescheduled for hearing only if
       Respondent shows some material issue of fact to be litigated.
       Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to pass on the Motion
       of the Charging Party and it is hereby dismissed as moot . . .
 
    It was,
 
       "ORDERED, that Respondent show cause on or before February 22,
       1983, why the Motion of the General Counsel for Summary Judgment
       should not be granted.  All responses must be in writing and must
       be received in this Office before the close of business on
       February 22, 1983, or they will be rejected as untimely.  It is
 
          "FURTHER ORDERED, that the hearing scheduled for February 15,
       1983, in Austin, Texas, be and the same is hereby cancelled and
       further hearing is indefinitely postponed pending disposition of
       the Motion for Summary Judgment." (Order, dated January 31, 1983).
 
    In response to General Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment,
 Respondent filed its own Motion for Summary Judgment, received by this
 Office on February 10, 1983, in which it prayed that General Counsel's
 Motion for Summary Judgment be denied and that its Motion for Summary
 Judgment be granted.  Charging Party filed no response to General
 Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgement.  Both from General Counsel's
 Motion for Summary Judgment and from Respondent's Motion for Summary
 Judgment it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact
 and that only legal issues are involved.  Moreover, as each party has
 filed a Motion for Summary judgment, disposition of this matter by
 summary judgment in lieu of a hearing is agreed.  /4/ Both the General
 Counsel and Respondent filed excellent briefs in support of their
 respective Motions for Summary Judgment.
 
    The undersigned was duly designated to handle this matter.
 
                             Findings of Fact
 
    The Complaint alleged, and Respondent by its Answer admitted, inter
 alia, that the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) is the
 recognized exclusive representative for employees of the Internal
 Revenue Service (IRS);  that IRS and NTEU are parties to a national
 agreement;  and that Chapter 72 is the local representative of NTEU at
 the Austin Service Center of Respondent (Exhibits 7 and 9 to General
 Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment).
 
    The material admitted facts, as stated by Respondent, and fully in
 accord with General Counsel's statement of facts, are as follows:
 
          "On or about July 6-9, 1982, August 3-6, 1982, and November
       2-5, 1982, the respondent and the National Treasury Employees
       Union (NTEU) engaged in mid-term negotiations in Washington, D.C.
       concerning the appraisal system and incentive awards for
       bargaining unit employees.  Employee-union negotiator Bill Knight
       traveled from Austin, Texas, to Washington, D.C. to participate in
       these negotiations.  Pursuant to the parties' national contract
       respondent provided Mr. Knight official time for those hours
       actually spent in the negotiating sessions.  However, Mr. Knight
       was not granted official time for travel to and from the
       negotiation sessions /5/ and was not paid travel and per diem
       allowances." /6/ (Respondent's Brief In Support of Its Motion for
       Summary Judgment, pp. 2-3).
 
                                Conclusions
 
    Section 31(a) of the Act provides,
 
          "(a) Any employee representing an exclusive representative in
       the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement under this
       chapter shall be authorized official time for such purposes,
       including attendance at impasse proceedings, during the time the
       employee otherwise would be in a duty status.  The number of
       employees for whom official time is authorized under this
       subsection shall not exceed the number of individuals designated
       as representing the agency for same purposes." (5 U.S.C. 7131(a)).
 
 On December 19, 1979, the Authority issued its Interpretation and
 Guidance (Case Nos. O-PS-3 and O-PS-6), 2 FLRA 264(1979) on, inter alia,
 whether employees are entitled to payment from agencies for their travel
 and per diem expenses when representing an exclusive representative in
 negotiations.  /7/ Although the Authority recognized that "Neither the
 Statute, nor its legislative history, expressly adverts to the payment
 of travel expenses or per diem during participation in these negotiation
 activities" (2 FLRA at 269) and that, "Under section 20 of E.O. 11491,
 as amended, travel expenditures were not authorized for union
 representatives engaged in negotiation activities (Labor-Management
 Relations in the Federal Service (1975) at 581" (2 FLRA at 269 n.6),
 nevertheless, the Authority concluded, in pertinent part, as follows:
 
          "2.  Employees who are on official time under section 7131 of
       the Statute while representing an exclusive representative in the
       negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement are entitled to
       payments from agencies for their duty time and travel and per diem
       expenses." (2 FLRA at 272).
 
    The Authority has followed its Interpretation and Guidance, supra, in
 numerous cases since it was issued including, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
 and Firearms, Western Region, Department of the Treasury, San Francisco,
 California, 4 FLRA No. 40(1980);  Florida National Guard, 5 FLRA No. 49
 (1981);  U.S. Department of Agriculture, Science and Education
 Administration, Agricultural Research, North Central Region,
 Dakotas-Alaska Area, 6 FLRA No. 45(1981);  United States Customs
 Service, 7 FLRA No. 68(1981);  Division of Military and Naval Affairs,
 State of New York (Albany, New York), 7 FLRA No. 69(1981);  Bureau of
 The Mint, Department of the Treasury, 7 FLRA No. 70(1981);  Department
 of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, North Atlantic
 Region (New York, New York), 8 FLRA No. 70(1982);  and Department of the
 Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Its Midwest
 Region, 9 FLRA No. 29(1982).
 
    The first case to be decided by a Court of Appeals was Bureau of
 Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Western Region, Department of Treasury,
 San Francisco, supra, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals enforced
 the Order of the Authority, 672 F.2d 732, 109 LRRM 3307 (9th Cir. 1982).
  The Court concluded,
 
          "The FLRA's Interpretation and Guidance is reasonable and
       supportable, and therefore will be given deference by this Court.
       The FLRA, acting in its own area of expertise, has interpreted the
       relevant language of Title VII in a clearly defensible manner, and
       we are neither permitted nor inclined to substitute a different
       judgment." (672 F.2d at 738, 109 LRRM at 3310).
 
    Thereafter, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, by a divided panel,
 Judge Oakes dissenting, in Division of Military and Naval Affairs, State
 of New York and Department of Defense, supra, 683 F.2d 45, 110 LRRM
 2990, (2d Cir. 1982), reached an opposite conclusion and denied
 enforcement of the Order of the Authority.  The Court majority stated,
 in part, as follows:
 
       " . . . Under all the circumstances we cannot believe that
       Congress meant the government to assume such an unusual burden, so
       different from any accepted practice in dealings between employers
       and employees, absent a clear and specific provision to that
       effect." (683 F.2d at 49, 110 LRRM at 2992).
 
    Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, also by a divided
 panel, Judge Heaney dissenting, in United States Department of
 Agriculture v. Federal Labor Relations Authority and American Federation
 of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Intervenor/Respondent, 691 F.2d 1242,
 111 LRRM 2007 (8th Cir. 1982), like the Second Circuit, denied
 enforcement of the Authority's Order.  The Court majority stated, in
 part, as follows:
 
       " . . . The FLRA reasons that by adopting completely new language,
       allowing official time for hours spent in negotiations if the
       employee would otherwise be in a duty status, Congress intended to
       reject the Executive Order's limitations of official time,
       including its prohibitions on travel expenses and per diem.
 
          "We find this argument unpersuasive.  In the absence of any
       comment in the legislative history, we cannot know why Congress
       rejected the Senate version.  In addition, any change reflects, at
       most, a desire to alter the official time provision, (footnote
       omitted) indicating nothing about the congressional view of travel
       expenses and per diem.  If anything, congressional silence would
       point towards its acceptance of prior practice, which did not
       allow travel expenses and per diem.  /8/
 
 More recently, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Florida
 National Guard and Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations
 Authority, 699 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1983), has joined the Second and
 eighth Circuits and denied enforcement of the Authority's order to pay
 travel expenses and per diem for a union-employee negotiator.
 
    The Authority remains unpersuaded by the decisions of the Second,
 Eighth and Eleventh Circuits and, embracing the decision of the Ninth
 Circuit, has adhered to its view that agencies must pay travel and per
 diem expenses of employees while representing an exclusive
 representative in negotiations.  See, for example, United States
 Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. and United States
 Environmental Protection Agency, Region IV, Atlanta, Georgia, 10 FLRA
 No. 30(1982);  United States Department of the Treasury, Internal
 Revenue Service and United States Department of the Treasury, Internal
 Revenue Service, Austin District, 10 FLRA No. 38(1982);  Department of
 Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 10 FLRA No. 52(1982);
  and Department of the Air Force, Air Force Logistics Command,
 Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 10 FLRA No. 53(1982).
 
    On January 17, 1983, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bureau
 of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. Federal Labor Relation Authority, et
 al., No. 82-799, -- U.S. -- , 103 S.Ct. 784(1983).  (Petitions for
 certiorari by the Authority are pending in Federal Labor Relations
 Authority v. Department of Agriculture, No. 82-979 (12/13/82), and in
 Federal Labor Relations Authority v. Division of Military and Naval
 Affairs, No. 82-1021 (12/16/82).  Obviously, the Supreme Court will, as
 it must in view of the split of the Circuits, ultimately resolve this
 issue.  /9/ Respondent's arguments here, that the Authority's
 Interpretation and Guidance, 2 FLRA 264, is without support in the Act
 or its legislative history;  and that Respondent is without authority to
 expend its appropriated funds for the payment of employee-union
 negotiators' travel and per diem expenses, have previously been
 considered by the Authority and rejected in its decisions set forth
 above.  Thus, in Bureau of the Mint, Department of the Treasury, supra,
 the Authority stated, in part, as follows:
 
       " . . . Respondent argues that such precedent should be reversed
       because the Authority's decision in Interpretation and Guidance,
       supra, is without a basis in the Statute.  The Respondent also
       argues that it does not have legal authority to expend
       appropriated funds for the payment of travel and per diem expenses
       to employees serving as Union negotiators . . .
 
                                .  .  .  .
 
          "The Authority has considered the Respondent's arguments,
       essentially based on the Respondent's reading of the legislative
       history, that established precedent . . . be reversed.  However,
       no basis has been advanced to demonstrate that the established
       precedent is incorrect, nor has the Respondent raised arguments
       not previously considered.  Thus, the Authority concluded in its
       decision in Interpretation and Guidance and subsequent cases based
       upon an analysis of the Statute and the legislative history of
       section 7131 that any employee who is on official time under
       section 7131 while representing an exclusive representative in the
       negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement is entitled to
       payment from agencies for travel and per diem expenses.
       Therefore, . . . Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1) and (8)
       when it declined to pay travel and per diem expenses.  . . . " (7
       FLRA at 465).
 
 And, in United States Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue
 Service and United States Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue
 Service, Austin District, supra, the Authority stated, in part, as
 follows:
 
          "The facts and positions of the parties are substantially
       identical to those in Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,
       Western Region, Department of the Treasury, San Francisco,
       California, 4 FLRA No. 40(1980), enforced sub nom.  Bureau of
       Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations
       Authority, 672 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1982).  (footnote 1, which cites
       the contrary decisions of the Second Circuit and Eighth Circuit,
       Supra, Omitted) Thus, for the reasons set forth therein, the
       Authority finds that the Respondent has failed and refused to
       comply with section 7131(a) of the Statute and therefore has
       violated section 7116(a)(1) and (8) of the Statute." (footnote
       omitted)
 
    Of course, as an Administrative Law Judge, I am bound by the
 Authority's pronouncements and decisions until such time as they are
 overruled by higher authority.  As to the Authority's decisions on the
 obligation of agencies to pay travel and per diem expenses, although
 there is a split by the Circuits, the Authority adheres to its position
 as initially stated in its Interpretation and Guidance, supra, which is
 fully supported by the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
 and unless and until that decision is reversed by the Supreme Court I am
 constrained to follow the Authority's decisions.  Accordingly, by its
 failure to pay employee-Union negotiator Bill Knight for his travel and
 per diem expenses, Respondent failed and refused to comply with Sec.
 31(a) of the Statute and, therefore, has violated Secs. 16(a)(1) and (8)
 of the Statute.
 
    Having found that Respondent violated Sec. 16(a)(1) and (8) of the
 Statute, I recommend that the Authority adopt the following:
 
                                   ORDER
 
    Pursuant to Sec. 2423.29 of the Regulations, 5 C.F.R. 2423.29, and
 Sec. 18 of the Statute, 5 U.S.C. 7118, the Authority hereby orders that
 the United States Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service
 and United States Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service,
 Austin Service Center /10/ shall:
 
    1.  Cease and desist from:
 
          (a) Failing and refusing to reimburse employee Bill Knight for
       travel and per diem expenses incurred, pursuant to Sec. 31(a) of
       the Statute, 5 U.S.C. 7131(a), as the designated representative of
       the National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 72, the exclusive
       representative of its employees, in mid-term negotiations
       conducted in July, August and November, 1982.
 
          (b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
       restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their
       rights assured by the Statute.
 
    2.  Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the
 purposes and policies of the Statute:
 
          (a) Reimburse employee Bill Knight, based upon the previously
       submitted vouchers, for travel and per diem expenses incurred,
       pursuant to Sec. 31(a) of the Statute, 5 U.S.C. 7131(a), as the
       designated representative of the National Treasury Employees
       Union, Chapter 72, the exclusive representative of its employees,
       in mid-term negotiations conducted in July, August and November,
       1982.
 
          (b) Post at its facilities in the Austin Service Center copies
       of the attached Notice on forms to be furnished by the Authority.
       Upon receipt of such forms, they shall be signed by the Director
       of the Austin Service Center and shall be posted and maintained
       for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
       including all bulletin boards and other places where notices to
       employees are customarily posted.  The Director shall take
       reasonable steps to insure that such Notices are not altered,
       defaced, or covered by any other material.
 
          (c) Pursuant to Sec. 2423.30 of the Regulations, 5 C.F.R.
       2423.30, notify the Regional Director of the Federal Labor
       Relations Authority for Region 6, whose address is:  P.O. Box
       2640, Dallas, Texas 75221, in writing, within 30 days from the
       date of this Order, as to what steps have been taken to comply
       therewith.
 
                                       WILLIAM B. DEVANEY
                                       Administrative Law Judge
 
    Dated:  April 19, 1983
    Washington, D.C.
 
                                 APPENDIX
 
  NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF
 THE FEDERAL
 LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE
 POLICIES OF
 CHAPTER 71 OF TITLE 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE
 LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE
 
                   WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
 
    WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to reimburse employee Bill Knight for
 travel and per diem expenses incurred, pursuant to Sec. 31(a) of the
 Statute, 5 U.S.C. 7131(a), as the designated representative of the
 National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 72, our employees' exclusive
 representative, in mid-term negotiations conducted in July, August and
 November, 1982.
 
    WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain,
 or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights assured by the
 Statute.
 
    WE WILL reimburse employee Bill Knight, based upon the previously
 submitted vouchers, for travel and per diem expenses incurred, pursuant
 to Sec. 31(a) of the Statute, 5 U.S.C. 7131(a), as the designated
 representative of the National Treasury Employees Union, our employees'
 exclusive representative, in mid-term negotiations conducted in July,
 August and November, 1982.
                                       (Agency or Activity)
 
    Dated:
                                       By:
                                       (Signature)
 
    This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date
 of posting and must not be altered, defaced or covered by any other
 material.
 
    If employees have any questions concerning this Notice or compliance
 with any of its provisions, they may communicate directly with the
 Regional Director of the Federal Labor Relations Authority, Region 6,
 whose address is:  P.O. Box 2640, Dallas, Texas 75221, and whose
 telephone number is:  (214) 767-4996.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 --------------- FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
 
 
    /1/ In finding that the Respondent had engaged in the unfair labor
 practices alleged in the complaint, the Judge effectively granted the
 General Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment and denied the
 Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, the latter of which sought
 dismissal of the complaint.
 
 
    /2/ The Authority received a motion filed by the Counsel for the
 General Counsel seeking to have the case remanded to the Regional
 Director for withdrawal of the complaint and dismissal of the charge.
 In view of the Authority's disposition on the merits of this case, the
 Counsel for the General Counsel's motion is hereby denied.
 
 
    /3/ For convenience of reference, sections of the Statute hereinafter
 are, also referred to without inclusion of the initial "71" of the
 Statute reference, e.g., Section 7131 will be referred to simply as
 "Sec. 31".
 
 
    /4/ Because each party prays for summary judgment, it is unnecessary
 to review the authority for the use of summary judgment which has been
 well stated by Judge Nash, in Oklahoma Army National Guard, Oklahoma
 City, Oklahoma and National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1694,
 Case No. 6-CA-20160 (December 2, 1982) (OALJ-83-29), and by Judge
 Cappello, in American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local
 1617, and United States Department of Defense, Department of the Air
 Force, San Antonio Air Logistics Center, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas,
 Case Nos. 6-CO-20005 and 6-CO-20006 (February 8, 1983) (OALJ-83-50).
 
 
    /5/ The Complaint contains no allegation concerning the allowance of
 official time for travel or otherwise;  nor did either the Charge or
 First Amended Charge.  Accordingly, no issue of official time is before
 me.
 
 
    /6/ Mr. Knight's Travel Vouchers, as submitted to Respondent are
 attached to General Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment as Exhibits 10
 (July 5-11, 1982);  12 (August 3-6, 1982), 14 (November 2-5, 1982), and
 total $1,784.95.
 
 
    /7/ The Authority also held therein that Sec. 31(a) "encompass all
 negotiations . . . regardless of whether such negotiations pertain to
 the negotiation or renegotiation (mid-term) of a basic collective
 bargaining agreement." (2 FLRA at 268, 272).
 
 
    /8/ The FLRA has also argued that there was no need for Congress to
 address specifically travel expenses and per diem, because 'official
 time' means 'duty' status and because travel expenses are automatically
 permitted when an employee must travel in connection with that duty
 status.  The plain language of Sec. 7131, however, belies this
 contention because it authorizes official time only when the employee
 'otherwise would be in a duty status'.  If official time meant duty
 status, the quoted phrase would become superfluous.  We cannot accept
 such an interpretation." (691 F.2d at 1248-1249, 111 LRRM at 2012-2013)
 
 
    /9/ In view of the division of the Circuits (various appeals are also
 pending in different Circuits, including the D.C. Circuit and the Sixth
 Circuit), the grant of certiorari, and the fact that the position of all
 parties will be wholly unaffected by a further decision in this case, it
 would better have served the ends of justice had the parties each
 stipulated that they would forthwith comply with the decision of the
 Supreme Court and they had requested that further proceeding be held in
 abeyance pending decision by the Supreme Court;  but neither party has
 seen fit to do so.  To the contrary, by their respective Motions for
 Summary Judgment, each party seeks a decision in this case and, under
 the circumstances, I can perceive no justification for not complying
 with their desire.
 
 
    /10/ Respondent neither contends nor is there any ground shown in the
 Motions for Summary Judgment which either would permit or require that
 only the Ag