15:0720(142)CA - Boston District Recruiting Command, Boston, MA and AFGE Local 1900; Commander, Fort Devens, Fort Devens, MA and AFGE Local 1900; 94th Army Reserve Command, Hanscom AFB, MA and AFGE Local 1900; Army, Washington, DC and AFGE Local 1900; DOD, Washington, DC and AFGE Local 1900 -- 1984 FLRAdec CA



[ v15 p720 ]
15:0720(142)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:


 15 FLRA No. 142
 
 BOSTON DISTRICT RECRUITING COMMAND
 BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
 EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 1900
 Charging Party
 
                                            Case No. 1-CA-206
 
 COMMANDER, FORT DEVENS,
 FORT DEVENS, MASSACHUSETTS
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
 EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 1900
 Charging Party
 
                                            Case Nos. 1-CA-207 
                                                      1-CA-208
 
 94th U.S. ARMY RESERVE COMMAND
 HANSCOM AIR FORCE BASE, MASSACHUSETTS
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
 EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 1900
 Charging Party
 
                                            Case No. 1-CA-209
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 WASHINGTON, D.C.
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
 EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 1900
 Charging Party
 
                                            Case No. 1-CA-303
 
 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 WASHINGTON, D.C.
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
 EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 1900
 Charging Party
 
                                            Case No. 1-CA-304
 
                            DECISION AND ORDER
 
    The Administrative Law Judge issued the attached Decision in the
 above-entitled consolidated proceeding, finding that Respondents had
 engaged in certain unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, and
 recommending that they be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take
 certain affirmative action.  The Judge further found that the
 Respondents had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and
 recommended dismissal of the complaint with respect to them.  Exceptions
 to the Judge's Decision were filed by the General Counsel and
 Respondents Department of Defense (DOD, Department of the Army (DOA),
 and Fort Devens, an opposition to Fort Devens' exceptions was filed by
 the General Counsel, and a brief amicus curiae was filed by the Office
 of Personnel Management (OPM).  /1/ parkinson
 
    Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations
 and section 7118 of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
 Statute (the Statute), the Authority has reviewed the rulings of the
 Judge made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was
 committed.  The rulings are hereby affirmed.  Upon consideration of the
 Judge's Decision and the entire record, the Authority hereby adopts the
 Judge's findings, conclusions and recommended Order, only to the extent
 consistent herewith.
 
    The consolidated complaint alleged, inter alia, that Respondents DOD
 and DOA, through the issuance of various directives, violated the
 Statute by interfering with the right of the Charging Party, American
 Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1900 (the Union), to
 bargain with respect to the impact and implementation of the paid
 parking program.  More specifically, it is asserted that DOD and DOA
 were obliged under the Statute to bargain with the Union prior to
 issuing directives to subordinate elements where the directives went
 beyond the requirements of Government-wide regulations issued by the
 Office of Management and Budget (OMB Circular No. A-118) and the General
 Services Administration (Federal Property Management Regulations Temp.
 Reg. D-65).
 
    However, the Union is not the exclusive representative of a unit of
 employees at the DOD or DOA level, but exclusively represents
 appropriate units of employees in the Boston District Recruiting Command
 (hereinafter Recruiting Command), and the 94th U.S. Army Reserve Command
 (hereinafter 94th Command)-- i.e., at subordinate levels within the
 agency.  The duty of an agency under the Statute is to negotiate with an
 exclusive representative of an appropriate unit of its employees
 concerning conditions of employment affecting them, except as provided
 otherwise by Federal law and regulation, including Government-wide
 regulation.  DOD and DOA would have been required to bargain to the
 extent of their discretion in implementing the Government-wide paid
 parking program if exclusive recognition had existed at those levels.
 /2/ The Authority concludes that, absent such exclusive recognition at
 those levels, DOD and DOA had no duty to bargain with the Union before
 issuing internal directives to subordinate elements concerning the paid
 parking program.  /3/ Moreover, in the absence of any showing that DOD
 and DOA prevented those subordinate elements from fulfilling their duty
 to bargain with the Union at the level of exclusive recognition, /4/ the
 Authority finds that the complaint must be dismissed to the extent it
 alleges that DOD and DOA violated section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the
 Statute.  /5/
 
    With respect to that portion of the complaint alleging a failure to
 bargain over the impact and implementation of the paid parking program
 by Respondents Fort Devens, Recruiting Command and 94th Command, the
 Authority concludes, for the reasons which follow, that the complaint
 must be dismissed against Fort Devens.  The Authority further concludes,
 however, that a violation of the Statute has occurred with respect to
 the conduct of the Recruiting Command and the 94th Command.
 
    As previously stated, the duty of an agency under the Statute is to
 negotiate with an exclusive representative of an appropriate unit of its
 employees concerning their conditions of employment, except as provided
 otherwise by Federal law or regulation.  The record in this case
 indicates that, in October 1979, Fort Devens learned that it would be
 responsible for implementing the paid parking program for the South
 Boston Support Activity which housed a number of tenant activities,
 including the Recruiting Command and the 94th Command.  On November 6,
 1979, a meeting was held between representatives of Fort Devens, the
 Recruiting Command and the 94th Command, as well as other tenant
 activities, and the Union, concerning the paid parking program.  At the
 meeting, the Union President asked whether the representative of Fort
 Devens would be willing to bargain over the matter and the latter
 replied that he would be willing to do so.  Subsequently, on November 8,
 the Union sent a letter to Fort Devens and also to the 94th Command
 requesting to bargain over the impact and implementation of various
 aspects of the program.  The same letter was sent to the Recruiting
 Command on November 10.  No response was made by the Recruiting Command
 to the Union's written request.  However, in a separate, unrelated
 bargaining session between the Union and the Recruiting Command in which
 the matter of paid parking was briefly discussed, the latter indicated
 that the matter was a presidential decision and therefore there was
 nothing on which to negotiate.  On November 17, the 94th Command replied
 that Fort Devens would be the appropriate party with which to negotiate
 since the latter was responsible for implementing the paid parking
 program.  In the meantime, Fort Devens had indicated its willingness to
 bargain and, on November 26, Fort Devens and the Union met to negotiate
 various aspects of the program.
 
    In the Authority's view, the statutory obligation to bargain over the
 impact and implementation of the paid parking program existed only at
 the Recruiting Command and the 94th Command, at which level there exist
 the units of exclusive recognition represented by the Union herein.
 Therefore, management at each of these Commands was obligated to
 bargain, upon request, over various aspects of the program to the extent
 of its discretion, i.e., insofar as such matters concern conditions of
 employment and do not involve matters inconsistent with law,
 Government-wide rule or regulation, or an agency regulation for which a
 compelling need exists.  See American Federation of State, County and
 Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2477 and Library of Congress,
 Washington, D.C., 7 FLRA 578 (1982), enforced sub nom. Library of
 Congress v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 699 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.
 1983).  The record indicates, with respect to the 94th Command, that
 following receipt of the Union's request to bargain, the 94th Command
 stated that Fort Devens would be the appropriate bargaining party and
 noted that Fort Devens had already invited the Union to bargain.  By the
 conduct of the 94th Command in referring the Union to Fort Devens and by
 the conduct of Fort Devens in subsequently meeting and bargaining with
 the Union, the Authority finds that Fort Devens was acting in a
 representative capacity for the 94th Command which, as a matter of law,
 at all times retained the statutory duty to bargain at the level of
 exclusive recognition concerning unit employees' conditions of
 employment.  /6/ Thus, any improper acts or conduct engaged in by Fort
 Devens would be attributable to the 94th Command, and not to Fort Devens
 which itself had no statutory bargaining obligation vis-a-vis 94th
 Command's employees in the bargaining unit represented by the Union.
 Accordingly, when Fort Devens refused to bargain over the issue of a
 daily parking rate as found by the Judge, in its representative capacity
 for the 94th Command, the Authority concludes that such refusal
 constituted a violation of section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute by
 the 94th Command.  Additionally, with regard to those Union proposals
 which were asserted to conflict with DOD or DOA regulations, as the
 record fails to demonstrate that a compelling need existed for those
 regulations so as to bar negotiations on conflicting proposals, /7/ the
 Authority concludes that Fort Devens' improper refusal to bargain over
 such matters, again in its capacity as a representative of the 94th
 Command, also constituted a violation of section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of
 the Statute by the 94th Command.  However, no violation will be found
 with respect to a failure to bargain over those proposals which
 conflicted with Government-wide regulations on paid parking, as found by
 the Judge, and on those matters concerning which Fort Devens deferred
 negotiations with the Union's acquiescence.
 
    The Authority further concludes, but for a different reason, that the
 Recruiting Command violated the Statute.  As previously noted, the
 Recruiting Command failed to negotiate following the Union's request to
 bargain over the impact and implementation of the paid parking program
 as it affected the Recruiting Command's employees in the bargaining unit
 represented by the Union, and took the position instead that there was
 nothing on which to negotiate, although as agency management at the
 level of exclusive recognition, it was obligated to do so to the extent
 of its discretion.  The Authority thus finds that the Recruiting
 Command's failure to bargain to this extent constituted a violation of
 section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute.  /8/
 
    With regard to an appropriate order to remedy the unfair labor
 practices found, the Authority concludes that, inasmuch as there is no
 regulation in effect at this time requiring the collection of parking
 fees, /9/ it is unnecessary to order that Respondent's Boston District
 Recruiting Command and the 94th U.S. Army Reserve Command negotiate with
 the Union regarding this matter at the present time.
 
                                   ORDER
 
    Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Federal Labor Relations
 Authority's Rules and Regulations and section 7118 of the Statute, IT IS
 HEREBY ORDERED that the Boston District Recruiting Command and the 94th
 U.S. Army Reserve Command, shall:
 
    1.  Cease and desist from:
 
    (a) Failing or refusing to give notice to and, upon request, bargain
 with the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local
 1900, the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees located
 at the South Boston Support Activity, before implementation of any
 aspect of a paid parking program which may be established by
 Government-wide rule or regulation.
 
    (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining or
 coercing any employee in the exercise of rights assured by the Statute.
 
    2.  Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the
 purpose and policies of the Statute:
 
    (a) Post at the South Boston Support Activity copies of the attached
 Notice on forms to be furnished by the Federal Labor Relations
 Authority.  Upon receipt of such forms they shall be signed by the
 Commanders of the Boston District Recruiting Command and the 94th
 Command, or their designees, and shall be posted and maintained by them
 for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
 bulletin boards and other places where notices to employees are
 customarily posted.  Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that such
 Notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
 
    (b) Pursuant to section 2423.30 of the Authority's Rules and
 Regulations, notify the Regional Director, Region I, in writing, within
 30 days from the date of this Order, as to what steps are being taken to
 comply herewith.
 
    IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that those portions of the consolidated
 complaint alleging violations of the Statute by the other named
 Respondents be, and they hereby are, dismissed.
 
    Issued, Washington, D.C., August 28, 1984
 
                                       Barbara J. Mahone, Chairman
                                       Ronald W. Haughton, Member
                                       Henry B. Frazier, Member
                                       FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
 
 
 
 
 
                          NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
 
  PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR
 RELATIONS
 AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF CHAPTER 71
 OF TITLE
 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS
 
                   WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
 
    WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to give notice to and, upon request,
 bargain with the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO,
 Local 1900, the exclusive representative of employees located at the
 South Boston Support Activity, before implementation of any aspect of a
 paid parking program which may be established by Government-wide rule or
 regulation.
 
    WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain,
 or coerce any employee in the exercise of rights assured by the Statute.
                                       (Activity)
                                       By:  (Signature) (Title)
 
    Dated:  . . .
 
    This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date
 of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other
 material.
 
    If employees have any questions concerning this Notice or compliance
 with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Regional
 Director, Region I, Federal Labor Relations Authority, whose address is:
  441 Stuart Street, 9th Floor, Boston, MA 02116, and whose telephone
 number is:  (617) 223-0920.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -------------------- ALJ$ DECISION FOLLOWS --------------------
 
    Samuel S. Horn, Esq.
    For Respondents Department of Defense
    and Department of the Army
 
    William S. Key, Captain
    For Respondents Boston District Recruiting
    Command and Commander, Fort Devens
 
    Neil J. Roche, Esq.
    For Respondent 94th U.S. Army Reserve Command
 
    John M. Esposito, President
    For the Charging Party
 
    James R. Collins, Esq. and
    Richard D. Zaiger, Esq.
    For the General Counsel
 
    Before:  SALVATORE J. ARRIGO
    Administrative Law Judge
 
                                 DECISION
 
                           Statement of the Case
 
    This case arose under the provisions of the Federal Service
 Labor-Management Relations Statute, 92 Stat. 1191, 5 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.
 (herein referred to as the Statute) and the Rules and Regulations issued
 thereunder.
 
    Upon unfair labor practice charges filed by the American Federation
 of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1900, (herein the Union) against
 the Boston District Recruiting Command, Boston, Massachusetts, the 94th
 U.S. Army Reserve Command, Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts, and the
 Commander, Fort Devens on November 29, 1979 and against the Department
 of the Army and the Department of Defense on March 24, 1980, the General
 Counsel of the Authority, by the Regional Director for Region 1, issued
 an Order Consolidating Cases, Complaint and Notice of Hearing on March
 31, 1980 alleging Respondents engaged in unfair labor practices within
 the meaning of sections 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute.  The
 complaint, as amended at the hearing, essentially alleges that
 Respondents together violated the Statute by failing to bargain in good
 faith with the Union over the impact and implementation of a paid
 parking program and Respondents Department of the Army and Department of
 Defense, through the issuance of various directives, violated the
 Statute by interfering with the Union's right to bargain with respect to
 the paid parking program.  /10/
 
    A hearing on the complaint was conducted on May 22, 1980 in Boston,
 Massachusetts, at which time the parties were represented and afforded
 full opportunity to adduce evidence and call, examine and cross-examine
 witnesses and argue orally.  The parties joint request for an extension
 of time to August 8 to file briefs was granted and briefs filed by the
 parties have been duly considered.  /11/
 
    Upon the entire record in this matter, my observations of the
 witnesses and their demeanor, and from my evaluation of the evidence, I
 make the following:
 
                             Findings of Fact
 
    Background
 
    The Department of Defense (herein DOD), an "Agency" within the
 meaning of section 7117 of the Statute, is composed of numerous
 subordinate bodies including the Department of the Army (herein DOA), a
 "primary national subdivision" of DOD within the meaning of section 7117
 of the Statute.  DOA, in turn, is also comprised of subordinate
 components, including the Boston District Recruiting Command (herein the
 Recruiting Command), the 94th U.S. Army Reserve Command, Hanscom AFB,
 Massachusetts (herein the 94th Command) and Fort Devens, Massachusetts
 (herein Fort Devens), all of which are responsible to DOA through
 various separate chains of command.
 
    The Secretary of Defense is the highest authority within DOD, Overall
 policy and coordinating responsibilities for labor-management relations
 rest with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), which is
 organizationally one level below the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of
 Defense.  While it is not OSD's normal procedure to direct subordinate
 elements in labor negotiations, OSD does take positions on behalf of the
 entire agency when issues of negotiability are brought before the
 Authority.  Accordingly, whenever an issue of importance to the agency
 arises, OSD attempts to develop a DOD policy on the matter and if a
 policy is adopted, subordinate components are obligated to adhere to
 that position.
 
    If problems arise with respect to a subordinate component's
 labor-management relations program the component can and does seek
 assistance and guidance from OSD.  Regardless of whether a subordinate
 component requests assistance from OSD, if OSD perceives that the
 component has a labor-management problem, OSD can impose its policy and
 authority on that component.
 
    With regard to regulations issued by DOD, it is a common occurrance
 for subordinate components to seek advice from OSD when the component
 has a questions as to the meaning or implementation of the regulation.
 
    At all times material hereto the Union has been the exclusive
 collective bargaining representative of two separate appropriate units
 of employees in the Recruiting Command and the 94th Command.  Both the
 Recruiting Command and the 94th Command are tenants at an installation
 located at 666 Summer Street, Boston, Massachusetts, known as the South
 Boston Support Facility (herein the South Boston Facility or the
 Facility) and each Command has approximately 30 unit employees working
 at that location.  The physical property which constitutes the Facility,
 including the parking lot, is under the managerial jurisdiction and
 control of Fort Devens.  /12/
 
    The Paid Parking Program
 
    By Circular No. A-118, dated August 13, 1979, the Executive Office of
 the President, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) announced the
 establishment of a Government-wide policy dealing with Federal parking
 facilities.  /13/ According to OMB, a basis for charging for the use of
 parking facilities needed to be established which was equitable among
 employees and consistent with related policies regarding air quality,
 energy conservation and reduced traffic congestion.  In the Circular OMB
 stated, in part:
 
          " . . . It is the general policy of the executive branch to
       limit Federal installation parking facilities to the minimum
       necessary, to administer those facilities in full compliance with
       carpooling regulations, and to assess Federal employees,
       contractor employees and tenant employees who are provided parking
       in Government-controlled space a charge equivalent to the fair
       monthly rental value for the use of equivalent commercial space,
       subject to the terms, exemptions and conditions stated in this
       Circular."
 
    The ten page Circular specifically addressed such matters as
 conditions for exemptions from fees, the priorities to be considered for
 the allocation and assignment of parking spaces, the establishment of
 charges for employee parking, and the determination of rates.  With
 regard to matters concerning fees for parking, the Circular provided,
 inter alia:
 
    "a.  Establishment of charges.  Charges for employee use of
 Government-owned or leased parking facilities shall be assessed at all
 locations except where the rate, as determined in c. below, would be
 less than $10.00 per month.  For the initial period November 1, 1979,
 through September 30, 1981, the charges to be collected shall be 50
 percent of the full rate scheduled to be collected.  If the full rate is
 calculated to be between $10.00 and $19.99, the monthly charge between
 November 1, 1979 and September 30, 1981, shall be $10.00.  The full
 charge shall be collected after October 1, 1981."
 
    As to the determination of rates to be charged, the Circular stated:
 
    " . . . The Administrator of GSA shall determine the rate to be
 charged for Government furnished employee parking at each facility using
 generally accepted appraisal techniques.  Agencies other than GSA which
 hold title to property and desire to arrange their own appraisals must
 advise GSA in writing of their intent, and shall conduct such appraisals
 in accordance with GSA guidelines.  GSA shall review and approve all
 rates in accordance with 40 U.S.C. 490(k).  The rates shall approximate
 the prevailing value of comparable commercial property in the vicinity.
 The rate basis will be the fair rental value of such property as used in
 calculating Standard Level User Charges.  Fair rental value includes an
 allowance for the costs of parking facility management.  The rates so
 established shall be adjusted annually by the Administrator to reflect
 increases or decreases in value."
 
    The Circular further mandated that General Services Administration
 (GSA) "issue regulations implementing the provisions of this Circular
 regarding the determination of commercially equivalent rates for
 Government parking . . . (and) revise regulation and priorities as
 necessary, for the assignment of parking spaces." Rates at non-GSA
 facilities were to be determined by October 1, 1979.  Heads of
 departments and agencies were directed to assess charges consistent with
 the provisions of the Circular and GSA regulations and immediately
 request GSA to determine rates to be assessed at their facilities " . .
 . to enable rate determination to be completed prior to November 1,
 1979", with late rate determination to be applied retroactively to
 November 1.  With guidance from GSA, agencies were permitted to conduct
 their own appraisals to set parking rates.  However rates developed in
 this fashion were to be submitted to GSA for review and approval.
 Agencies were further required to " . . . issue such instructions as may
 be needed to maximize carpooling and implement the provisions of this
 Circular and regulations issued by GSA".  The OPM Circular also provided
 that final agency regulations should be issued prior to November 1,
 1979.
 
    Pursuant to the above OMB Circular, GSA issued Government-wide
 regulation FPMR Temp. Reg. D-51, dated September 6, 1979.  /14/ The GSA
 Federal employee parking regulation designated November 1, 1979 as the
 effective date for agency implementation of the regulation and imposed
 on agencies specific requirements relating to priority assignments of
 parking spaces for non-employees and employees, methods to establish
 parking fees, and rates to be charged, all of which were in accordance
 with the OMB Circular.  The GSA regulation provided that at non-GSA
 controlled facilities, as in the cases herein the responsible agency
 would allocate employee parking in accordance with OMB Circular No.
 A-118.
 
    On September 20, 1979 DOD forwarded a draft DOD "Instruction"
 implementing OMB Circular A-118 to the National President of the
 American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE).  An accompanying
 letter indicated that the Federal parking program mandated by OMB,
 including assessment of fees, would become effective November 1, 1979.
 The letter continued:
 
          "The DOD Instruction must . . . be issued as early as possible
       in October so that it will reach installation commanders
       responsible for its implementation before November 1.  Accordingly
       I must ask that you review the draft Instruction and forward any
       comments to reach this office by the close of business on October
       3 at the latest."
 
    The National office of AFGE responded to DOD by letter of September
 26.  In that letter AFGE indicated it had reviewed the draft DOD
 "Instruction" and suggested that the document, including the subject of
 parking fees, was "negotiable between the parties" in accordance with
 the provisions of section 7117(a)(1) of the Statute and suggested " . .
 . that negotiating the . . . issues relating to parking are the best
 actions which AFGE could pursue to successfully combat parking fees for
 Federal employees." /15/
 
    On October 11, 1979 DOD issued an "advance copy" of its interim paid
 parking regulation to subordinate command activities.  /16/ The DOD
 directive designated the specific parking fees which would be charged at
 various installations effective November 1, 1979.  The parking fee for
 South Boston Facility was set at $10.00 a month.  /17/ A cover letter
 accompanying the directive noted that the advance copy was being
 provided " . . . to permit implementation of the President's program,
 particularly the paid parking aspect, on November 1, 1979 . . . ".  The
 DOD directive designated specific parking fees which would be charged at
 numerous DOD installations, including those controlled by DOA, effective
 November 1, 1979.  Further, the DOD regulation incorporated elements of
 the OMB and GSA directives;  set out an expanded list of specific
 classes of personnel and vehicles which would be exempt from payment of
 parking fees;  set out certain priorities in the assignment and
 allocation of parking spaces;  and designated those responsible to
 implement and enforce the regulation at various subordinate managerial
 levels.  In addition, DOD, inter alia, required Secretaries of the
 military Departments and Directors of defense agencies to operate,
 control and issue instructions relative to the paid parking program in
 accordance with the provisions of the related OPM Circular, the GSA
 regulation and the DOD directive.
 
    DOD's directive treated numerous subjects in a rather comprehensive
 manner thereby substantially limiting DOA's flexibility to independently
 fashion its own regulations for implementation at the installation
 level.  Nevertheless, various matters in the DOD directive provided DOA
 with considerable discretion including:  establishing the number of
 spaces assigned to employees working unusual hours;  developing
 incentives to encourage and facilitate the use of car and van pools and
 public transportation;  issuance of parking permits to individuals who
 use their privately owned vehicles for government business;  and
 developing a mechanism for deterring abuse of parking space allocation.
 Moreover, since DOA was directed to establish a paid parking program for
 its subordinate bodies, and since various matters were not governed by
 OMB, GSA or DOD directives, DOA was left a substantial range of possible
 avenues to utilize in implementing a paid parking program.
 
    On October 19, 1979 DOA provided to its subordinate installations,
 including Fort Devens, advance copies of its own regulation implementing
 DOD's parking regulation of October 11.  DOA's regulation (postdated to
 October 24) took the form of an interim change to DOA parking regulation
 AR 210-4.  The DOA regulation essentially incorporated and made more
 explicit the requirements contained in the OMB Circular and the GSA and
 DOD regulations and required installation commanders to institute a
 permit, fee collection and carpool program at their facilities.  The
 directive changed existing DOA parking regulations and provided guidance
 to installation commanders on such matters as:  the personnel to be used
 to implement the program;  alternatives available to installation
 commanders for the operation of the program (automated, contractor
 operated, or installation operated);  the sale of parking permits on a
 yearly, quarterly, bi-monthly, or daily basis;  the site used for the
 sale of permits;  standards for enforcing the program;  and the manner
 of collecting fees.  The DOA regulation left installation commanders
 with a substantial amount of discretion in implementing the program at
 their local facilities and reminded installation commanders of the
 obligation under the Statute " . . . to negotiate with exclusively
 recognized labor organizations over the impact and implementation of the
 installation's parking plan."
 
    Fort Devens first received knowledge that a paid parking program
 would be instituted at the South Boston Facility through receipt, in
 mid-October 1979, of the October 11, 1979 DOD parking directive.  Around
 this time Colonel John M. Cononico, Director of Personnel and Community
 Activities, Fort Devens, was informed by DOA through Forces Command,
 Fort Devens next superior level in the chain of command, that Fort
 Devens would be responsible for implementing the paid parking program at
 the Facility.  Colonel Cononico was placed in charge of implementing the
 plan and on October 19 submitted a request to higher authority that Fort
 Devens be excepted from the requirement for instituting a paid parking
 program.  Nevertheless, Cononico at the same time began to "gear up" to
 implement a program.  Sometime during the third week of October Fort
 Devens received DOA's paid parking regulations dated October 19 and
 Cononico was told on October 31 that, notwithstanding the pending
 request for an exception, he was to implement a paid parking program at
 the Facility by November 1, 1979.
 
    The South Boston Facility houses approximately 25 "tenant"
 activities, including the Recruiting Command and the 94th Command, and
 contains approximately 800 parking spaces, the assignment of which were
 under the control of Fort Devens.  At Colonel Cononico's request the
 various activity representatives at Fort Devens, including the
 Recruiting Command and the 94th Command, met on November 6, 1979.  AFGE,
 Local 1900 was represented at the meeting by its President, John
 Esposito.  Copies of the DOA regulations of October 19 were circulated
 and Colonel Cononico informed those in attendance that a paid parking
 program was to be inaugurated at the Facility pursuant to order of the
 President of the United States.  It was explained that a survey would be
 conducted to facilitate the use of carpools and permits for parking
 would be issued at a cost of $10.00 per month, payable in advance,
 beginning on or about December 1, 1979.  The matter of a daily parking
 fee, which was provided for in the DOA regulation, supra, was questioned
 and Cononico replied that the Facility's program would not include a
 daily parking fee since there was inadequate staff at Fort Devens to
 implement that provision of the regulation.  Various other questions
 asked by those in attendance were responded to by management quoting
 from "existing directives".  Union President Esposito suggested that
 management was not demonstrating good faith in this matter since a
 change in a condition of employment was being implemented without prior
 notice to the exclusive representatives of bargaining units at the
 Facility.  /18/ Colonel Cononico responded that the Union had its
 "avenues to follow" if it felt it had a problem or objection.  Esposito
 asked if Cononico was willing to bargain with the Union on the matter
 and Cononico answered in the affirmative.  Immediately following the
 meeting Esposito told Cononico he would be sending a letter requesting
 bargaining over the impact and implementation of the paid parking
 program.
 
    On November 8, 1979, the Union sent the following letter to Fort
 Devens and the 94th Command:  /19/
 
          "At a meeting convened by the Deputy Commander, Fort Devens, at
       1100 Hours, 6 November 1979, at Fox Corner Auditorium, located at
       the Boston USAR Center, AFGE Local 1900 was informed that the
       Commander, Fort Devens, is implementing a Personal Parking
       Facilities Program.  This is a unilateral change of a condition of
       employment and is being done without prior notice and notification
       to Local 1900, the exclusive representative of the 94th ARCOM and
       Boston DRC civilian employees, tenants of the Boston USAR Center.
 
          "Accordingly, by copy of this letter, Local 1900 requests to
       negotiate the impact and implementation of this program
       immediately.  The areas which we seek to negotiate are as follows:
 
          "a.  Allocation of parking spaces.
 
          "b.  Determination of exemptions from parking fees, in addition
       to those set by OMB or GSA.
 
          "c.  Choice of appraisal techniques and the determination of
       actual fees to be charged.
 
          "d.  Method of payment of fees, especially to avoid undue
       hardship to lower paid employees.
 
          "Non-compliance with our request within five working days from
       receipt of this letter will be considered an unfair labor practice
       and will initiate the charge.
 
          "Further, until negotiations are completed, no positive action
       will be taken and any implementation shall be deemed in violation
       of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and an unfair labor
       practice charge as well as a motion for temporary restraining
       order will be filed with the Federal Labor Relations Authority."
 
    By letter to the Union dated November 9, 1979, Fort Devens indicated
 its willingness to bargain with the Union "at the nearest possible date
 and time that is agreeable to all parties", and, inter alia, suggested
 that when the Union wished, it should contact Fort Devens'
 representative to make arrangements for a meeting.  Fort Devens stated
 that a minimum of one day's advance notice for such a meeting would be
 required.  /20/
 
    Representatives of Fort Devens and the Union met on November 26, 1979
 for the purpose of negotiating on the paid parking program.  /21/ The
 parties discussed those matters the Union indicated it wished to pursue
 in its November 8 letter, above.  With regard to the subject of
 allocations of parking spaces, while there was an existing system for
 allotting spaces at the Facility the DOA directive, above, contained new
 provisions for the allocation of spaces to various groups of employees
 including handicapped, executive personnel and carpool employees and
 Esposito wished to enter into negotiations on this feature of the
 parking program.  Management indicated it was willing to discuss any
 aspect of the subject but pointed out that without first obtaining a
 layout chart of the parking lot, the parties would not have enough
 information to fully consider the subject and complete negotiations on
 the matter.  The Union did not attempt to pursue this issue further at
 that time.
 
    As to the Union's request to negotiate regarding the determination of
 exemptions from parking fees, in addition to those set by OMB and GSA,
 Esposito maintained that he considered the matter to be negotiable and
 stated that no one at the Facility should be obligated to pay for
 parking until every Federal employee in the country was paying for
 parking.  Esposito also contended that lower graded employees, GS 1-5,
 should not be required to pay the same rate of parking as higher level
 employees.  Fort Devens took the position that these subjects were
 non-negotiable.  Esposito further expressed interest in visitor parking
 at the Facility including where they would park, what fees they would
 pay, and how long a visitor could park free before being deemed an
 employee for parking fee purposes.  Cononico replied that since the DOA
 directive fully covered visitor parking, he considered the matter
 non-negotiable and therefore had no intention of discussing this issue
 any further.  /22/
 
    When the subject of the choice of appraisal techniques and
 determination of actual fees arose, the Union argued that it should have
 been involved in the selection of the appropriate appraisal technique
 used to determine the fee at the Facility.  It was the Union's
 contention that in setting the fee, management incorrectly considered
 the parking rates in downtown Boston, whereas the Facility was located
 in South Boston, where, the Union contended, industry historically
 provided free parking for its employees.  Cononico however took the
 position that the Union's request to negotiate on this subject was
 non-negotiable and indicated he did not wish to discuss the matter
 further.
 
    Management agreed that the subject of the method of fee payment,
 especially to avoid undue hardship to lower paid employees, was
 negotiable to some extent, but, expressed the view that some aspects of
 this subject might not be negotiable.  Management suggested that the
 Union point out the particular hardship situation about which it was
 concerned.  The parties discussed the possibility of payroll deduction
 for parking fees and whether employees would be interested in payroll
 deductions for this purpose.  Management agreed that payment by check or
 cash would be acceptable.
 
    Union President Esposito also urged that, as mandated by the DOA
 directive, a daily parking rate be established.  /23/ Esposito argued
 that if daily payment was not permitted, some employees who did not use
 their cars every day during the entire month would be penalized by
 paying the monthly rate.  Management maintained that there were neither
 funds nor personnel available to implement a daily parking fee program.
 Management also pointed out that Fort Devens' reasons in support of its
 application for an exemption from paid parking for the Facility included
 the insufficient staffing and money problems.  Esposito indicated that,
 in any event, he wished to negotiate the details of a daily rate but
 management declined.
 
    Esposito also questioned who would be responsible for damage to cars
 while parked at the Facility.  Management took the position that
 liability for damage would reside with the employees or their insurance
 carriers.
 
    The meeting of November 26, 1979 concluded by Colonel Cononico
 summarizing, that December 3 would be the implementation date of the
 paid parking program;  Captain Andrews of Fort Devens would be sent to
 the Facility on November 27 to begin collecting advance payments of the
 $10.00 monthly parking fee;  there would not be any daily parking rate
 and anyone not paying $10.00 by December 3 would not be allowed to use
 the Facility parking lot;  since there was not enough time before
 December 3 to allocate different parking areas, parking would remain as
 it had been up to that point;  and management agreed that allocation of
 parking was a negotiable matter and the parties would meet again as soon
 as management constructed a parking layout chart.  /24/
 
    On Tuesday, November 27, 1979, Captain Andrews began collecting the
 $10.00 monthly parking fees.  /25/ By Friday, November 30, Colonel
 Cononico came to the conclusion that a number of employees would not
 have had the opportunity to purchase monthly parking permits by Monday,
 December 3.  Cononico also concluded by this date that the Unnion's
 position on establishing a daily parking rate was well taken.
 Accordingly, on Friday, November 30, Cononico instructed Captain Andrews
 to establish a system to sell daily parking permits on Monday, December
 3.  According to Cononico, the Union was not advised of this change due
 to the lack of time available between the decision and the Monday date
 of implementation and, in any event, notification to the Union was
 deemed unnecessary since the Union had requested a daily permit.  On
 December 3, the paid parking program, including daily permits, was in
 effect at the Facility.  /26/
 
    Issues
 
    Counsel for the General Counsel contends that since on or about
 November 7, 1979, and more particularly on December 3, Respondents Fort
 Devens, the Recruiting Command, and the 94th Command failed to bargain
 in good faith with the Union regarding the impact and implementation of
 the paid parking program at the Facility.  Counsel for the General
 Counsel further contends that DOD and DOA, by issuance of their
 respective directives of October 11 and October 19, 1979, interfered
 with the Union's right to bargain with respect to the parking program by
 denying the Union the opportunity to negotiate, prior to publication of
 the directives or their implementation, concerning the impact of the
 program on bargaining unit employees and the method and procedures to be
 used in implementing the program, to the extent not mandated by
 Government-wide rule or regulation.  Thus, the General Counsel urges
 that DOD and DOA were obliged under the Statute to bargain with the
 Union prior to issuing directives to subordinate units where the
 directives went beyond the requirements of the OPM Circular and GSA
 regulation and contends that without doing so, the directives could not
 preclude bargaining at the level of recognition with regard to any
 discretionary matter which was not encompassed by the Government-wide
 directives.
 
    Respondents contend that the DOD directive of October 11, 1979 is an
 "agency rule or regulation within the meaning of section 7117 et seq. of
 the Statute and since DOA is a "primary national subdivision" of DOD,
 its directive of October 19, 1979 is also an agency rule or regulation
 within the meaning of the Statute.  /27/ Accordingly, Respondents argue
 no duty to bargain exists with regard to the terms of these regulations,
 absent a determination by the Authority of "no compelling need" for the
 regulations.  /28/ Respondents further contend that at the Facility
 level, Fort Devens fully negotiated with the Union to the extent it had
 discretion under the parking regulations.
 
                        Discussion and Conclusions
 
    It is clear that the OMB and GSA parking directives herein are
 Government-wide regulations within the meaning of section 7117(a)(1) of
 the Statute and, as such, no duty to bargain on the subject matter of
 these regulations is required.  However, while the OMB regulation sets
 forth various specific instructions on paid parking, it did not cover
 all matters relative to instituting a paid parking program.  Rather, the
 OMB regulation mandated all agencies, including DOD, issue such
 instructions as may be needed to implement the provisions of the OMB and
 GSA regulations.  Thus, DOD, while obligated to follow the OMB and GSA
 regulations, was left substantial discretion as to the practices and
 procedures it might choose to utilize in formulating a paid parking
 program for the agency.  Pursuant to OMB and GSA regulations, DOD issued
 its paid parking directive applicable to its subordinate bodies and
 pursuant thereto, DOA issued its own directive applicable to its
 subordinate organizations.  I conclude, in these circumstances, that the
 DOD directive of October 11, 1979, was an "agency" regulation and the
 DOA directive of October 19, 1979 was a regulation issued by a "primary
 national subdivision of (an) agency" within the meaning of section
 7117(a)(3) of the Statute.
 
    Under section 7117(a)(2) and (3) of the Statute, an agency or a
 primary national subdivision of an agency is not obligated to bargain
 with a union regarding matters encompassed by their regulations unless a
 union represents the majority of employees in the agency or national
 primary subdivision or unless the Authority has determined, under
 section 7117(b) of the Statute, that no compelling need exists for the
 regulation in effect.  /29/ The Union herein does not represent the
 majority of employees in DOD or DOA.  However, Counsel for the General
 Counsel urges that section 7117(a) of the Statute should be construed to
 mean that a regulation of an agency or primary national subdivision of
 an agency precludes negotiations on matters encompassed by such
 regulation and calls into play procedures to determine compelling need
 only where the regulation and conditions of employment under the
 regulation are already in effect and a union thereafter seeks to bargain
 on a matter covered by the regulation and the agency defends the
 regulation by claiming compelling need.
 
    The specific language of the Statute clearly does not impose any such
 limitation of application suggested by Counsel for the General Counsel.
 /30/ Further, an examination of the legislative history of the Statute
 discloses the following explanation given by Senator Morris Udall on
 September 13, 1978 regarding the meaning of section 7117 ultimately
 enacted into law, termed the "substitute" bill, as distinguished from an
 earlier bill which was not enacted into law, termed the "reported" bill:
  /31/
 
          "Under the reported bill, agency-wide rules or regulations are
       never a bar to negotiations, and any Government-wide rule or
       regulation may be removed as a bar to negotiations if there is no
       "compelling need" for the rule or regulation, as determined by the
       Federal Labor Relations Authority under the reported section 7117.
 
          "The substitute's section 7117 makes Government-wide rules and
       regulations an absolute bar to negotiations (subsection (a)(1)).
 
          "Subsection (a)(2) of the substitute provides that agency rules
       or regulations are a bar to negotiations, subject to subsection
       (a)(3), unless a finding of "no compelling need" for the rule or
       regulation is made by the Authority (as determined under
       regulations prescribed by the Authority).
 
          "Subsection (a)(3) states that the provisions of subsection
       (a)(2) apply to any rule or regulation issued by any agency, or
       issued by any primary national subdivision of such agency, unless
       an exclusive representative represents an appropriate unit which
       includes a majority of the employees in the issuing agency or
       primary national subdivision to whom the rule or regulation is
       applicable.
 
          "The net effect of the substitute's subsection (a)(3) is to
       make rules or regulations of agencies, or of primary national
       subdivisions of agencies, bars to negotiation, subject to the
       'compelling needs' test, except in cases in which an exclusive
       representative represents a bargaining unit which includes a
       majority of the employees in the issuing agency or primary
       national subdivision to whom the rule or regulation is applicable.
        In those latter cases, the agency or primary national subdivision
       rule or regulation is not, for purposes of that unit, a bar to
       negotiations on the subject matter of the rule or regulation."
 
    Thus, it does not appear that an interpretation or limitation on the
 application of section 7117 as urged by Counsel for the General Counsel
 was envisioned by Congress.  Rather, it appears the terms of section
 7117 were meant to apply generally to all situations where an agency
 defends against a demand to negotiate on a matter by interposing the
 existence of an appropriate regulation.  /32/
 
    Counsel for the General Counsel also suggests, as an alternative
 argument, that if the agency regulation stands as a bar to negotiations,
 then the proceeding herein served to put the issue of compelling need
 before the Authority for determination.  In my view neither the Statute
 nor the Authority's regulations appear to envision this approach.
 Indeed, section 7117(b)(3) of the Statute provides that where a hearing
 is held to make a determination of compelling need, it " . . . shall not
 include the General Counsel as a party." /33/ Accordingly, to combine a
 compelling need determination with an unfair labor practice proceeding,
 where the General Counsel has the responsibility of presenting the
 evidence in support of the complaint and carries the burden of proving
 the allegations of the complaint, would run contrary to Statutory
 prohibition.  Therefore, Counsel for General Counsel's contention is
 rejected.
 
    However, in the situation herein, I conclude that there existed a
 duty to bargain with the Union as to matters which were not precluded by
 express provisions of Government-wide regulations or the regulations
 issued by DOD and DOA.  The DOD AND DOA regulations were not self
 implementing and the regulations did not provide for all possible
 contingencies.  Thus, installation commanders were instructed to
 institute a parking plan applicable to their individual facilities.
 Although any plan had to be in accord with the requirements of
 outstanding regulations, management at levels subordinate to DOA, where
 employees were represented by a union, as herein, were vested with
 substantial discretion and authority as to both the content on the plan
 and its operation.  Moreover, the DOA regulation of October 19, 1979
 itself envisioned that some matters regarding the specific paid parking
 plan to be installed at the Facility were negotiable, the DOA regulation
 specifically requiring that installation commanders " . . . negotiate
 with exclusively recognized labor organizations over the impact and
 implementation of the installation's plan", supra.  Accordingly, I
 conclude that Respondent's management was obligated under the Statute to
 negotiate with the Union to whatever extent management had discretion
 under applicable Government-wide and agency regulations in the
 implementation of the paid parking program at the Facility.  /34/
 
    Pursuant to the Union's request, representatives of Fort Devens met
 with the Union on November 26, 1979 to negotiate various aspects of the
 paid parking program as it was to be implemented at the South Boston
 Facility.  Counsel for the General Counsel contends that the Recruiting
 Command and the 94th Command violated the Statute by Recruiting
 Command's failure to respond to the Union's request to bargain of
 November 10 and the 94th Command's suggestion that Fort Devens would be
 the appropriate party to negotiate on the parking program.  I reject
 these contentions.
 
    The record reveals that at the level of implementation only Fort
 Devens had control over the operation of the parking lot and the parking
 program.  Neither the Recruiting Command nor the 94th Command could
 effectively negotiate on the parking program since the matter was not
 the responsibility of either.  The 94th Command referred the Union to
 Fort Devens as the appropriate party to negotiate on the matter and
 obviously the Union was aware that, absent authority from higher
 command, only Fort Devens could realistically engage in negotiations
 which would be binding.  Indeed, Fort Devens accepted the obligation of
 bargaining with the Union on behalf of those DOA subordinates which had
 employees at the Facility represented by the Union.  In these
 circumstances no useful purpose would be served by the Recruiting
 Command and the 94th Command acknowledging to the Union that they had a
 duty to bargain and accordingly, I conclude that neither the 94th
 Command nor the Recruiting Command independently violated the Statute,
 as alleged above.
 
    Turning now to the negotiations of November 26, 1979, I conclude
 that, except for the issue of daily rates, the evidence fails to
 establish that Fort Devens refused to bargain with the Union on the
 parking program to the extent it had discretion over such matters and
 was therefore obligated to do so.  When the subject of allocation of
 parking spaces was discussed, the Union acquiesced in management's
 suggestion to withhold further negotiations until a layout chart of the
 parking area was obtained.  As to the Union's proposals regarding
 determination of parking fees, no parking payments for Facility
 employees until all Federal employees were paying for parking, lower
 parking payments for lower grade employees, and the fees and duration of
 visitor parking, these were all matters which were specifically mandated
 by Government-wide, DOD and/or DOA regulations from which Fort Devens
 had no discretion to deviate.  The issue of where visitors parked was
 intrinsically related to the allocation of parking spaces, above, and it
 would appear that this subject, to the extent it was negotiable, would
 more appropriate be a matter of discussion only after a layout was
 available.  The question of appraisal techniques was a matter solely
 within the responsibility and control of DOD and the technique used in
 the appraisal was obviously outside the discretionary area for
 negotiations at the Fort Devens level.
 
    As to the Union's demand to bargain on the method of parking fee
 payments including the aspect of undue hardship, management's position
 was that the subject might or might not be negotiable, and essentially
 asked Esposito what particular hardship situation he had in mind.  The
 record discloses that the discussion on this topic concerned only the
 possibility of payroll deductions and payment by cash or checks and,
 other than as stated above, it appears that the hardship issue was not
 pursued further by the Union.  The question of liability for damages to
 employees' cars while parked was discussed and management took the
 position that liability would rest with the employee with apparently no
 further conversation occurring on this topic.
 
    In summary, during the above discussions, on some matters management
 refused to bargain with the Union since the items were ones over which
 Fort Devens had no authority to vary;  on other matters the Union
 acquiesced in management's position, such as postponing negotiations
 until a parking layout was obtained;  and on the remaining subjects the
 parties discussed the issues but management simply did not agree with
 the Union's position and the Union did not pursue the issue further.  In
 these circumstances I conclude that the preponderance of evidence does
 not establish that Respondents violated sections 7116(a)(1) or (5) of
 the Statute by failing to negotiate in good faith with the Union on the
 above matters.
 
    With regard to the daily parking rate issue, at the Monday, November
 26 meeting, management refused to fully discuss a daily rate since it
 believed, at the time, that it did not have sufficient funds or
 personnel to implement a daily fee program.  On Friday, November 30
 management concluded it could institute daily parking rates and on
 Monday, December 3, daily rates were effectuated.  Management did not
 attempt to contact the Union and the Union, therefore, was not notified,
 prior to implementation, of management's change in disposition and given
 an opportunity to bargain about the daily fee program or the procedures
 used to collect the money involved.  I recognize that in these
 circumstances it might have been difficult to contact the Union to set
 up a bargaining meeting to discuss the subject, but, in my view,
 management was obliged to make a reasonable effort to fulfill its
 bargaining obligations with the Union.  However, management made no
 attempt to contact the Union on November 30 or during the following
 weekend.  Rather, it unilaterally devised a program and without notice
 to the Union unilaterally implemented it.  Accordingly, in these
 circumstances I find that by its conduct with regard to the
 establishment and implementation of a daily parking rate at the
 Facility, Respondents failed and refused to bargain with the Union and,
 thereby, violated sections 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute.
 
    Remedy
 
    The remedial aspects of this case present an unusual situation.
 Thus, while Fort Devens has managerial control over the South Boston
 Facility, it is the Recruiting Command and the 94th Command whose
 employees are represented by the Union.  However, in the peculiar
 circumstances herein I conclude that DOD, DOA, Fort Devens, the
 Recruiting Command, and the 94th Command together constitute an
 affiliated or joint enterprise with regard to the implementation of the
 paid parking program at the South Boston Facility.
 
    Organizationally there is a commonality which binds together all
 these components of DOD.  While Fort Devens, the Recruiting Command, and
 the 94th Command have separate chains of command to DOA, all are
 ultimately responsible to and are subordinate components of DOD which,
 through OSD, has overall policy components within DOD.  In this regard
 it is DOD which decides the policy to be adopted when negotiability
 matters under the Statute are at issue and represents component
 organizations in the presentation of such cases before the Authority.
 Further, DOD is available to subordinate components for assistance and
 guidance, and if DOD deems it appropriate, it can impose its policies on
 any subordinate entity.
 
    In the case herein, not only did DOD and DOA have an integral
 relationship with the organizations and employees most proximately
 involved with the paid parking program, but DOD and DOA both played
 essential roles in the chain of events which resulted in the
 implementation of the program.  It was DOD's regulations which were
 acted upon and transmitted through DOA's regulations to Fort Devens for
 implementation at the Facility and impacted on the Recruiting Command
 and the 94th Command employees, all of whom were under the umbrella of
 DOD's ultimate control.  True, neither the Recruiting Command nor the
 94th Command had an independent right to bargain with the Union on the
 parking program and Fort Devens had no independent obligation to bargain
 on the matter.  However, all Respondents were inextricably involved in
 the situation and Fort Devens, obviously aware of the responsibilities
 which flowed from this relationship, accepted the obligation to bargain
 with the Union on the matter.
 
    Accordingly, while I have concluded that Fort Devens violated the
 Statute in its dealings with the Union on the implementation of the paid
 parking program at the South Boston Facility, all related organizations
 involved are charged to cooperate in the effectuation of the order
 recommended herein.  /25/
 
    Finally, the Union requests as a remedy to any violation found herein
 that the situation be restored to the status quo ante until such time as
 negotiations have been completed and an agreement is reached by the
 parties.  I do not conclude that the circumstances of this case warrant
 this remedy and, therefore, will not recommend the Authority impose such
 an order.  /36/
 
    Having found and concluded that by the conduct described above,
 Respondents, by the actions of Fort Devens, violated sections 7116(a)(1)
 and (5) of the Statute, I recommend the Authority issue the following:
 /37/
 
                                   Order
 
    Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Federal Labor Relations
 Authority's regulations and section 7118 of the Federal Service
 Labor-Management Relations Statute, it is hereby ordered that the
 Department of Defense, Department of the Army, the Boston District
 Recruiting Command, and the 94th U.S. Army Reserve Command, and the
 Commander, Fort Devens, shall:
 
    1.  Cease and desist from:
 
    (a) Failing and refusing to negotiate with the American Federation of
 Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1900, the exclusive representative
 of Boston District Recruiting Command and 94th U.S. Army Reserve Command
 employees at the South Boston Support Facility, with regard to the
 establishment and Government-wide and agency regulations.
 
    (b) Instituting changes with regard to the establishment and
 implementation of a daily parking rate without notifying the American
 Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1900, the exclusive
 representative of Boston District Recruiting Command and 94th U.S. Army
 Reserve Command employees at the South Boston Support Facility, and
 affording it a reasonable opportunity to negotiate on such matters to
 the extent consonant with Government-wide and agency regulations.
 
    (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or
 coercing employees in the exercise of rights assured by the Federal
 Labor-Management Relations Statute.
 
    2.  Take the following affirmative action:
 
    (a) Upon request, meet and negotiate with the American Federation of
 Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1900, concerning the establishment
 and the implementation of a daily parking rate at the South Boston
 Support Facility to the extent consonant with Government-wide and agency
 regulations.
 
    (b) Post, at the South Boston Support Facility, copies of the
 attached Notice marked "Appendix" on forms to be furnished by the
 Federal Labor Relations Authority.  Upon receipt of such forms they
 shall be signed by the Commander, Fort Devens, and shall be posted and
 maintained by him for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
 places, including bulletin boards and other places where notices are
 customarily posted.  The Commander shall take reasonable steps to insure
 that such Notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other
 material.
 
    (c) Notify the Federal Labor Relations Authority, in writing, within
 30 days from the date of this order as to what steps have been taken to
 comply herewith.
 
                                       SALVATORE J. ARRIGO
                                       Administrative Law Judge
 
    Dated:  December 22, 1980
    Washington, D.C.
 
                                 APPENDIX
 
                          NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
 
  PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR
 RELATIONS
 AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF CHAPTER 71
 OF TITLE
 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS
 
                   WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
 
    WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to negotiate with the American Federation
 of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1900, the exclusive bargaining
 representative of Boston District Recruiting Command and 94th U.S. Army
 Reserve Command employees, with regard to the establishment and
 implementation of a daily parking rate at the South Boston Support
 Facility to the extent consonant with Government-wide and agency
 regulations.
 
    WE WILL NOT institute changes with regard to the establishment and
 implementation of a daily parking rate at the South Boston Support
 Facility without notifying the American Federation of Government
 Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1900, the exclusive bargaining representative
 of Boston District Recruiting Command and 94th U.S. Army Reserve Command
 employees, and affording it a reasonable opportunity to bargain to the
 extent consonant with Government-wide and agency regulations.
 
    WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain or
 coerce employees in the exercise of their rights assured by the Statute.
 
    WE WILL, upon request, meet and negotiate with the American
 Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1900, the exclusive
 bargaining representative of Boston District Recruiting Command and 94th
 U.S. Army Reserve Command employees, concerning the establishment and
 implementation of a daily parking rate at the South Boston Support
 Facility to the extent consonant with Government-wide and agency
 regulations.
                                       (Agency or Activity)
                                       By:  (Signature)
 
    Dated:  . . .
 
    This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date
 of posting and must not be altered, defaced or covered by any other
 material.
 
    If employees have question concerning this Notice, or compliance with
 any of its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Regional
 Director, Federal Labor Relations Authority, Region I, whose address is:
  441 Stuart Street, 9th Floor, Boston, Massachusetts 02116.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 --------------- FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
 
 
    /1/ The Office of Personnel Management was granted permission to
 participate in this proceeding as amicus curiae pursuant to section
 2429.9 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations.
 
 
    /2/ See Department of Housing and Urban Development, 9 FLRA 136
 (1982).
 
 
    /3/ See Defense Logistics Agency (Cameron Station, Virginia), 12 FLRA
 No. 86 n.9 (1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-2017 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 26,
 1983).
 
 
    /4/ To the contrary, as found by the Judge, DOA's proposed
 implementing regulation distributed to subordinate installations
 specifically reminded them of their obligation under the Statute "to
 negotiate with exclusively recognized labor organizations over the
 impact and implementation of the installation's parking plan."
 
 
    /5/ The Authority has previously held that the acts and conduct of
 higher level agency management may constitute an unfair labor practice
 where such conduct prevents agency management at the level of exclusive
 recognition from fulfilling its bargaining obligation under the Statute.
  Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security
 Administration, Region VI, and Department of Health and Human Services,
 Social Security Administration, Galveston, Texas District, 10 FLRA 26
 (1982);  Department of the Interior, Water and Power Resources Service,
 Grand Coulee Project, Grand Coulee, Washington, 9 FLRA 385 (1982).
 
 
    /6/ The Authority has held that "the Statute clearly requires the
 parties to provide representatives who are empowered to negotiate and
 enter into agreements on all matters within the scope of negotiations
 within the bargaining unit." National Treasury Employees Union and
 Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, 13 FLRA No. 93
 (1983).  See also American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO,
 Local 3656 and Federal Trade Commission, Boston Regional Office,
 Massachusetts, 4 FLRA 702 (1980).
 
 
    /7/ After the Judge issued his decision herein, the Authority
 concluded, contrary to the Judge, that questions concerning the
 existence of a compelling need for agency regulations may appropriately
 be decided in an unfair labor practice proceeding, and that management
 is required to come forward with affirmative support for its assertion
 that there is a compelling need for the regulation in question which
 justified its refusal to bargain.  See Defense Logistics Agency (Cameron
 Station, Virginia), supra n. 3.  See also U.S. Army Engineer Center and
 Fort Belvoir, 13 FLRA No. 116 (1984);  United States Marshals Service,
 12 FLRA No. 129 (1983).
 
 
    /8/ See Veterans Administration Central Office, Veterans
 Administration Medical Center, Long Beach, 9 FLRA 325 (1982);  General
 Services Administration, Region 8, Denver, Colorado, 10 FLRA 257 (1982).
 
 
    /9/ During the pendency of the instant case before the Authority, the
 United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the
 paid parking plan, as embodied in OMB Circular A-118, was invalid, and
 ordered that the GSA regulation be set aside and its enforcement
 permanently enjoined.  American Federation of Government Employees,
 AFL-CIO, et al. v. Freeman, 510 F.Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1981).  Thereafter,
 GSA revised the regulation to suspend the collection of parking fees in
 accordance with the injunction.  (46 F.R. 40191 (1981)).  The District
 Court's decision was subsequently reversed.  American Federation of
 Government Employees, AFL-CIO, et al. v. Carmen, 669 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir.
 1981).  However, President Reagan has stated that the collection of
 parking fees will not be reinstated.  Statement by the President on
 Parking Fees for Federal Employees, 17 Weekly Comp.of Pres.Doc. 1161
 (Dec. 17, 1981).
 
 
    /10/ While the caption of the complaint included the Commander, Fort
 Devens, the Department of the Army, and the Department of Defense as
 Respondents, it was not alleged in the gravamen of the complaint that
 these parties violated the Statute.  However, the Commander, Fort Devens
 was named in the complaint as an agent of Respondents;  answers to the
 complaint were filed on behalf of all Respondents;  and the complaint
 was amended at the hearing to include an allegation that certain
 Department of Defense and Department of the Army conduct interfered with
 the Union's bargaining rights.  Moreover, the theory of the case
 expressed by Counsel for the General Counsel at the opening of the
 hearing was that all named Respondents were collectively obligated to
 bargain with the Union over discretionary aspects of published
 Government-wide regulations, infra, and all Respondents were represented
 by counsel at the hearing.  Accordingly, I conclude that the omission in
 the gravamen of the complaint as stated above is of no significance with
 regard to the litigation or disposition of the matter at issue herein.
 
 
    /11/ In his submission, counsel for Respondent Commander, Fort Devens
 moved that the complaint against the Commander, Fort Devens, be
 dismissed.  For reasons explicated hereinafter, the motion is denied.
 
 
    /12/ See Defense Contracts Administration Services Region, Boston,
 Massachusetts, et al., Case Nos. 1-CA-212, et al., Decision and Order of
 the undersigned issued this day.
 
 
    /13/ 44 Fed.Reg.No. 161, at 48638-48641 (August 17, 1979).
 
 
    /14/ 44 Fed.Reg.No. 179, at 53161-53163 (September 13, 1979).
 
 
    /15/ Section 7117(a)(1) of the Statute provides:  "subject to
 paragraph (2) of this subsection, the duty to bargain in good faith
 shall, to the extent not inconsistent with any Federal law or any
 Government-wide rule or regulation, extend to matters which are the
 subject of any rule or regulation only if the rule or regulation is not
 a Government-wide rule or regulation." However, AFGE's response, while
 quoting this section, omitted the words "Subject to paragraph (2) of
 this subsection."
 
 
    /16/ DOD issued its final parking regulation on December 7, 1979
 which, in large measure, was identical to the earlier interim
 regulation.
 
 
    /17/ A draft of the OMB Circular, dated April 6, 1979, which was
 circulated to various Government agencies for comment, indicated that
 GSA would establish the parking fee to be assessed at all Government
 installations.  Subsequent to the circulation of this draft, DOD
 "negotiated" with OMB and GSA on the matter and received permission to
 do the appraising at its military installations.  The permission was
 conditioned on the use of professional appraisers of the U.S. Corps of
 Engineers and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command;  that the
 appraisals be performed using commonly accepted appraisal standards;
 that the GSA appraisal form be used;  and that GSA would have final
 authority on the appraisal.  DOD's appraisal and a determination of a
 parking rate at the South Boston Facility was completed on August 24,
 1979.
 
 
    /18/ Previously, parking at the Facility was provided at no cost to
 employees.
 
 
    /19/ The Union sent an identical letter to the Recruiting Command on
 November 10.
 
 
    /20/ The 94th Command declined the Union's request to bargain by
 letter of November 17, 1979 and suggested that Fort Devens, since it was
 charged with implementing the paid parking program, would be the
 appropriate party with whom to seek to negotiate on the matter.  The
 Recruiting Command did not specifically respond to the Union's request
 to bargain.
 
 
    /21/ The record does not reveal any contact between the parties after
 November 9 and before November 26.
 
 
    /22/ The DOA directive of October 19, 1979 treats visitor parking in
 numerous sections of that document, e.g., paragraph 7(a)(2)(c) states
 that "visitor parking should be identified in convenient locations", and
 paragraph 11(e)(1)(b), et seq., exempts from payment of a parking fee
 official and unofficial visitors up to a limit of 3 hours, daily rates
 to apply thereafter.
 
 
    /23/ Paragraph 11(h)(3) of the directive provides:  "Commanders will
 make arrangements for the selling of daily rate permits to accommodate
 personnel who desire to use and pay for parking on a daily basis".
 
 
    /24/ Subsequently, after numerous telephone conversations between the
 parties, Fort Devens met with the Union on February 7, 1980 and
 presented the Union with a proposal on the allocation of parking spaces
 and negotiations continued thereon.
 
 
    /25/ On November 29, 1979, the Union filed unfair labor practice
 charges alleging Fort Devens, the Recruiting Command, and the 94th
 Command on November 26 refused to negotiate with the Union to the extent
 required by the Statute and on November 27, unilaterally implemented a
 new paid parking program.
 
 
    /26/ Esposito testified that he was not satisfied with the system
 used for selling daily parking permits and the procedure produced
 "chaos".
 
 
    /27/ Sections 7117(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Statute provide:
 
          "(a)(1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, the duty
       to bargain in good faith shall, to the extent not inconsistent
       with any Federal law or any Government-wide rule or regulation,
       extend to matters which are the subject of any rule or regulation
       only if the rule or regulation is not a Government-wide rule or
       regulation.
 
          "(2) The duty to bargain in good faith shall, to the extent not
       inconsistent with Federal law or any Government-wide rule or
       regulation, extend to matters which are the subject of any agency
       rule or regulation referred to in paragraph (3) of this subsection
       only if the Authority has determined under subsection (b) of this
       section that no compelling need (as determined under regulations
       prescribed by the Authority) exists for the rule or regulation.
 
          "(3) Paragraph (2) of the subsection applies to any rule or
       regulation issued by any agency or issued by any primary national
       subdivision of such agency, unless an exclusive representative
       represents an appropriate unit including not less than a majority
       of the employees in the issuing agency or primary national
       subdivision, as the case may be, to whom the rule or regulation is
       applicable."
 
 
    /28/ The Union has not sought nor has the Authority been presented
 with a request for a compelling need determination regarding the
 regulations under consideration herein.
 
 
    /29/ Section 7117(b) sets forth the process and standards for
 Authority determination of no compelling need.  Procedures and criteria
 for determining compelling need are found in Authority regulations,
 sections 2424.1 and 2424.11.
 
 
    /30/ Counsel for the General Counsel cites no legislative history to
 support his position.
 
 
    /31/ Legislative History of the Federal Service Labor-Management
 Relations Statute, Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,
 96th Congress, 1st Session, Committee Print No. 96-7, (November 19,
 1979) at 927.
 
 
    /32/ It is not alleged nor do the facts herein support a finding that
 Respondents' claim of non-negotiability is based upon a patently
 inapplicable regulation or that