18:0666(79)CA - DOD, Navy, Navy Public Works Center, Norfolk, Virginia and Tidewater Virginia FEMT Council -- 1985 FLRAdec CA



[ v18 p666 ]
18:0666(79)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:


 18 FLRA No. 79
 
 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
 NAVY PUBLIC WORKS CENTER 
 NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 
 Respondent 
 
 and 
 
 TIDEWATER VIRGINIA FEDERAL EMPLOYEES 
 METAL TRADES COUNCIL, AFL-CIO 
 Charging Party
 
                                            Case No. 4-CA-20279
 
                            DECISION AND ORDER
 
    The Administrative Law Judge issued the attached Decision in the
 above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent Navy Public Works
 Center (NPWC) had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in
 the complaint and recommending dismissal of the complaint with respect
 to NPWC.  The Judge further found that Respondent Department of the Navy
 had engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the
 complaint and recommended that it be ordered to cease and desist
 therefrom and take certain affirmative action.  Thereafter, Respondent
 Department of the Navy filed exceptions to the Judge's Decision.
 
    Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations
 and section 7118 of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
 Statute (the Statute), the Authority has reviewed the rulings of the
 Judge made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was
 committed.  The rulings are hereby affirmed.  Upon consideration of the
 Judge's Decision and the entire record, the Authority hereby adopts the
 Judge's findings, conclusions and recommendations, only to the extent
 consistent herewith.
 
    Contrary to the Judge, the Authority finds that Respondent Department
 of the Navy did not violate section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute by
 preventing Respondent NPWC from bargaining with the Tidewater Virginia
 Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, the exclusive
 representative of unit employees, regarding a unilateral change in the
 method of distributing unit employees' paychecks and earnings
 statements.  Subsequent to the issuance of the Judge's Decision in this
 case, the Authority issued its decision in Federal Employees Metal
 Trades Council, AFL-CIO and Department of the Navy, Mare Island Naval
 Shipyard, Vallejo, California, 16 FLRA No. 88 (1984), petition for
 review filed, No. 85-7039 (9th Cir. Jan. 22, 1985), finding that an
 agency's selection of the method of paycheck distribution concerns the
 methods and means of performing work within the meaning of section
 7106(b)(1) of the Statute /1/ and thus is negotiable only at the
 election of the Agency.  Thus, the Authority finds that Respondent
 Department of the Navy's alleged interference with the bargaining
 relationship between NPWC and the Union, by preventing bargaining
 concerning a change in the method of paycheck delivery, did not
 constitute a violation of section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute.  In
 addition, in adopting the Judge's conclusion that the complaint should
 be dismissed as to Respondent NPWC, i.e., management at the level of
 exclusive recognition, the Authority notes that, in the absence of an
 election to do so, there was no duty to bargain over the change in the
 method of paycheck delivery.  /2/ The Authority further adopts the
 Judge's conclusion that the section 7116(a)(7) allegation must be
 dismissed.  Thus, as found by the Judge, the General Counsel failed to
 establish that the Navy regulation herein conflicted with any provision
 of the current collective bargaining agreement between NPWC and the
 Union. Therefore, the complaint shall be dismissed in its entirety.
 
                                   ORDER
 
    IT IS ORDERED that the complaint in Case No. 4-CA-20279 be, and it
 hereby is, dismissed.  
 
 Issued, Washington, D.C., June 21, 1985
 
                                       Henry B. Frazier III, Acting
                                       Chairman
                                       William J. McGinnis, Jr., Member
                                       FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -------------------- ALJ$ DECISION FOLLOWS --------------------
 
    DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY AND
    NAVY PUBLIC WORKS CENTER,
    NORFOLK, VIRGINIA
                              Respondent /3/
 
    and
 
    TIDEWATER VIRGINIA FEDERAL
    EMPLOYEES METAL TRADES COUNCIL,
    AFL-CIO
                              Charging Party
 
                                       Case No. 4-CA-20279
 
    Walter B. Bagby, Esq.
    For the Respondents
 
    Thomas E. Rinehart
    For the Charging Party
 
    Barbara S. Liggett, Esq., and
    Pamela B. Jackson, Esq.
    For the General Counsel
 
    Before:  SALVATORE J. ARRIGO, Administrative Law Judge
 
                                 DECISION
 
    This is a proceeding under the Federal Service Labor-Management
 Relations Statute, Chapter 71 of Title 5 of the U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C.
 7101, et seq.
 
    Upon an unfair labor practice charge filed by the Tidewater Virginia
 Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO (herein referred to as
 the Union) against the Department of the Navy, Navy Public Works Center,
 Norfolk, Virginia (herein sometimes jointly referred to as Respondent),
 the General Counsel of the Authority, by the Regional Director for
 Region IV, issued a Complaint and Notice of Hearing on October 20, 1982
 alleging Respondent violated the Statute when it implemented changes in
 the manner of distributing paychecks and leave and earnings statements
 to employees, contending such conduct patently breached the terms of the
 collective bargaining agreement between the Navy Public Works Center and
 the Union.
 
    A hearing on the Complaint was conducted on March 14, 1983 at which
 time all parties were represented and afforded full opportunity to
 adduce evidence, call, examine and cross-examine witnesses and argue
 orally.  /4/ At the hearing the Complaint was amended to allege that
 implementation of the changes also constituted a unilateral change in
 terms and conditions of employment.
 
    Upon the entire record in this matter, /5/ including the briefs by
 Respondents, the General Counsel which have been duly considered, my
 observation of the witnesses and their demeanor and from my evaluation
 of the evidence, I make the following:
 
                             Findings of Fact
 
    At all times material herein the Union has been the exclusive
 collective bargaining representative for various career and career
 conditional employees in the Navy Public Works Center, Norfolk, Virginia
 (herein referred to as the Public Works Center).  The Union and the
 Public Works Center are parties to a three year collective bargaining
 agreement executed August 5, 1981.  Prior thereto, the Union and the
 Public Works Center were parties to a collective bargaining agreement
 effective August 1978 to August 1981.
 
    On August 12, 1981 the Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) sent a
 letter to subordinate activities, /6/ including all disbursing offices
 serving civilian payroll offices, instructing them that a new standard,
 comprehensive leave and earnings statement (LES) would replace the leave
 and earnings statement then in use for Navy civilian employees.  /7/
 Implementation of the new LES was directed to be completed by the end of
 the first full pay period in calendar year 1982.  Prior to the change
 the LES was attached to the employees paycheck.  The new LES would be a
 separate document enclosed in an envelope which indicated the name of
 the employee and was designed to be a "self mailer." The revised LES's
 were to be printed separately from payroll checks and provide the
 employee with substantially more information regarding leave, earnings
 and payroll deduction data.
 
    On October 6, 1981, the Secretary of the Navy issued SECNAV
 Instruction 7200.17 to subordinate activities announcing future policy
 regarding paydays and methods of payment for all civilian employees.
 /8/ The instruction, widely publicized among Navy employees, indicated
 that the Secretary of the Navy favored a system of electronic "Direct
 Deposit" of paychecks to employee accounts in financial institutions.
 /9/ At that time, one-third of the Navy's employees participated in the
 direct deposit program and the Instruction set goals for future
 increased participation citing benefits of this procedure to employees
 and the Navy, including substantial reduction in check preparation
 costs.  Thus, a 40 percent civilian employee participation goal was set
 for October 1982, 45 percent for October 1983, 50 percent for October
 1985, 55 percent for October 1987 and 75 percent for October 1990.
 
    Instruction 7200.17 indicated it was Department of the Navy (DON)
 policy:
 
          "(1) To distribute civilian pay by PDQ/Direct Deposit or mail
       upon entry of all civilian employees hired within DON.
 
          "(2) Where feasible, to discontinue hand delivery of pay and
       leave and earnings statements for current civilian personnel.  Pay
       will be forwarded to a designated financial institution or mailed
       to a non-work address.  Leave and earnings statements likewise
       will be mailed to a non-work address.
 
          "(3) To enhance and accomplish payroll processing to permit the
       utilization of the Direct Deposit Program.
 
          "(4) To implement a DON standard civilian payroll system,
       including the capability to implement Direct Deposit."
 
    Instruction 7200.17 stated that NAVCOMPT would exercise control and
 coordination responsibilities to assure that DON goals would be achieved
 and provide "amplifying policy" in this regard.
 
    The Instruction further required that subordinate activities comply
 with the instruction and with implementing procedures provided by
 NAVCOMPT and be responsible for, inter alia, the following:
 
          "(1) Supporting these DON goals within their activities;
 
          "(2) Coordinating efforts with NAVCOMPT in the promotion of
       PDQ/Direct Deposit;
 
          "(3) Supporting central enhancement efforts and accelerate
       payroll processing, as necessary, so as to permit utilization of
       the PDQ/Direct Deposit program;
 
          "(4) Supporting the establishment of civilian pay distribution
       policy by PDQ/Direct Deposit or mail upon entry of all civilian
       employees hired by any DON activity on and after 1 October 1982;
 
          "(5) Supporting to the maximum extent possible within current
       labor agreement and resource constraints, the discontinuance by 1
       October 1982, of hand delivery of pay and leave and earnings
       statements for civilian employees through the use of PDQ/Direct
       Deposit or mail.  Unless activity exception has been granted,
       discontinue all hand delivery of pay, and leave and earning
       statements for civilian personnel by 1 October 1985;
 
                                  * * * *
 
          "(7) Reporting to NAVCOMPT, as directed, results of efforts and
       progress to achieve these objectives;
 
          "(8) Implementing systems and procedural changes promulgated by
       NAVCOMPT;  and
 
          "(9) Ensuring that future labor agreements/renewals do not
       conflict with the policies reflected herein."
 
    Payroll and disbursing services for the Public Works Center provided
 by the Regional Financial Services Department of the Naval Supply Center
 (herein referred to as the Supply Center).  /10/ The Supply Center
 provides payroll and disbursing services for some 60 activities
 involving some 18,000 employees, including the approximately 1600 unit
 employees at the Public Works Center, on a non-reimbursable basis and
 considers itself to have a "customer relationship" with such activities.
  While both the Public Works Center and the Supply Center are activities
 within the Department of the Navy, they have separate chains of command
 to the Secretary of the Navy:  the Public Work Center reports to SECNAV
 through the Naval Facilities Energy Command and the Supply Center
 reports through the Naval Supply Systems Command.
 
    Upon receipt of the NAVCOMPT letter and the SECNAV Instruction,
 supra, Supply Center personnel determined that the procedures involved
 in producing and distributing the new LES and disbursing payroll checks
 would result in more time than previously expended to produce the
 documents.  /11/ According to Frankie Brinkley, the Supply Center's
 Director of Regional Financial Services, previously the LES and paycheck
 were printed at the same time.  When NAVCOMPT ordered the use of the new
 LES, the processing involved printing the LES and paycheck separately
 and required six more hours of print time due to the inclusion of
 additional information which the new LES's would contain.  Thus Supply
 Center concluded that it would not be able to continue to disburse
 checks by 11:30 a.m. on Thursdays, as had been the longstanding general
 practice at least at the Public Works Center, and payday would now have
 to be on Fridays.  /12/ The Supply Center negotiated on the matter with
 the unions representing its employees and notified the Public Works
 Center and the other activities that it serviced of its agreements and
 what the future distribution system would be at these activities.  The
 notification, dated November 17, 1981, referred to the August 12, 1981
 NAVCOMPT letter, supra, and the October 6, 1981 SECNAV Instruction,
 supra, and after setting forth the terms of its distribution agreements
 with the unions at the Supply Center, stated, inter alia:
 
          "3.  As your payroll and disbursing activity, NSC Norfolk must
       also require the same pay distribution system for your activity.
       It is suggested that union officials and employees of your
       activity be advised of this change as quickly as possible.  Within
       the next several days, you will receive address cards for each
       employee to be used in updating addresses.  It is extremely
       important that these cards be returned by the date specified in
       the forwarding letter.  Your servicing Civilian Personnel Office
       must be notified to forward a valid address with the SF-50 for
       each new employee hired after 10 January 1982.  If the PDQ option
       is selected, a SF-1189 should be forwarded also.  Option cards
       will also be forwarded for employees to exercise their individual
       option.  Since the new LES provides more data than the one
       currently in use, training will be provided for the personnel
       clerks in your activity.
 
          "4.  Individual exceptions for LESs and checks to be mailed to
       a work address may be made at the Commanding Officer level, but
       should be granted in a judicious manner.  (SECNAV Instruction
       7200.17) provides guidelines for granting exceptions.  Any
       questions relating to implementation of this change should be
       directed to Frankie Brinkley."
 
    On December 4, 1981 the Supply Center notified its employees of the
 new pay and LES arrangements through an agency information publication
 called the "Supply Chest." The December "Supply Chest" revealed that
 beginning with the last payday of January 1982 employees then currently
 on the payroll would be required to select one of the following options
 for paycheck distribution:
 
          1.  Mailing to a non-work address on Wednesday.
 
          2.  Pay transferred to a financial institution using the
       electronic PDQ system on Wednesday.
 
          3.  Paychecks distributed on the job after 3:30 p.m. on Friday.
        This option would not be available to those who begin employment
       in January 1982 and would cease to be an available method of
       distribution for any employee after October 1, 1985.  Regardless
       of the option chosen for paycheck distribution, the newly revised
       LES's would be delivered by mail.  /13/
 
    The Union was unaware that the Navy had effectuated a change in its
 payroll and LES distribution prior to the publication of the December 4
 "Supply Chest." /14/ After obtaining a copy of the "Supply Chest" the
 Union brought the document to the attention of the Public Works Center's
 Civilian Personnel Department and inquired whether the changes announced
 in the "Supply Chest" would also be applicable at the Public Works
 Center.  Berton Owens, Labor Relations spokesman for the Public Works
 Center, ascertained that this was the case and so advised the Union
 which requested a meeting on the matter.
 
    Representatives of the Union and management met to on or about
 December 8, 1981.  /15/ At the meeting Owens "confirmed" that in January
 1982 the Supply Center intended to implement the changes as set out in
 the "Supply Chest" above, and the changes would affect Public Works
 Center employees.  Owens contended that the Public Works Center did not
 have control over the matter, explaining that the change had been
 directed by the Supply Center and the Public Works Center Commanding
 Officer had no authority to order the Supply Center to "cease and
 desist." Owens suggested that the situation probably presented a
 "compelling need" question and should be referred to Washington.  The
 Union responded that in such a case it would be "burning up the lines to
 Washington." Owens informed the Union that he would be happy to talk
 with the Union as to the impact of the change on employees but he could
 not negotiate with the Union on the implementation of the change itself.
  /16/ The Union representatives indicated they were concerned with the
 adverse impact the mailing of checks and LES's might have on the
 employees who had not been totally honest with spouses about earnings
 over a period of time;  Friday paydays precluding a long week-end
 vacation;  the possibility of mail thefts;  computer breakdowns and
 delays in PDQ procedures;  and how moving the regular Thursday payday to
 Friday would disrupt family budgeting which was geared to a Thursday
 payday.  Further, the Union, relying on Article 24, Section 9 of the
 parties' collective bargaining agreement took the position that
 procedures concerning employees' pay had been previously negotiated and
 should remain as they were.  /17/ Management's response was that the
 contract language merely meant to reflect management's commitment to
 distribute payroll checks promptly when received, as had been their
 practice.  /18/ Owens indicated that in light of the Union's objections
 he would contact the Supply Center to see what accommodations could be
 made and get back to the Union.
 
    Owens thereafter contacted the Supply Center to relay his problems
 with the Union.  Owens also contacted the Southern Field Division of the
 Navy Civilian Personnel Command to "prevail on them to get a delay in
 the thing because (he) felt (they) were going to have difficulty in
 negotiating on the impact, if nothing else."
 
    On December 17, 1981 Respondent and the Union met again to discuss
 the change.  Owens, having been in contact with the Supply Center,
 indicated it was the Supply Center's position that although the Public
 Works Center was "pushing" the Supply Center to continue the old
 practice entirely, there was "no room" to talk about the change itself
 and the LES change would have to be put into effect even if hand
 delivery of checks continued.  The Union asked if there might be someway
 to continue with the old system mechanically.  Owens described the new
 LES format and explained the difficulty of sending it to the Public
 Works Center for Thursday hand delivery since machine processing of both
 checks and LES's was involved.  Thus, Owens explained, additional
 processing would be required if the system as programmed was not
 followed.  Owens further related that it was the Supply Center's
 position that the LES change appeared inevitable and the then current
 system of check delivery could only be extended for a limited time since
 there only existed a 90-day supply of checks in the old format.  The
 Union was unwilling to accept any system other than the current one,
 relying again on the language of Article 24, Section 9 of the contract.
 Owens did not change his position, acknowledged that "problems" would
 exist, but was willing to discuss the impact on employees and suggested
 that the parties send a joint letter to employees to get their current
 addresses in the event the January implementation date could not be
 avoided.  The Union's representatives responded that they would check
 with their Washington office on this and the meeting ended.
 
    The parties met again on December 21, 1981.  At this meeting the
 Union rejected the joint letter proposal and wanted a commitment that
 the Thursday payday and LES delivery would continue.  Owens indicated
 that while he could negotiate on the impact of the change, the Supply
 Center was not giving him any flexibility to negotiate on the change
 itself which would go ahead as planned.  Owens further related that he
 received a concession from the Supply Center that paychecks would be
 available for distribution at noon on Friday rather than 3:30 p.m. as
 originally planned.  However, the Union remained adamant that the checks
 and LES's continued to be delivered at the worksite on Thursdays.
 
    Another meeting was held on January 6, 1982.  Owens announced that he
 had been given additional time to negotiate with the Union on the impact
 and implementation of the change, and hand delivery of paychecks and
 LES's to the worksite would continue during that time.  However, Owens
 made it clear that the Public Works Center was not in control of the
 situation and could not negotiate on the change in the system of pay and
 LES delivery.  Owens also indicated that the Supply Center now
 determined that the LES's could be assembled for hand delivery at the
 worksite.  The Union again insisted that Article 24, Section 9 of the
 contract required the continuation of the pay practice as it was and
 Owens maintained his position that the Union was misinterpreting the
 contract.  According to Owens the employer did not have control over the
 payday;  they were "at the mercy" of the Supply Center;  and the
 contract clause in question merely required that when the Public Works
 Center got the checks, they would be delivered promptly.  The Union
 requested a meeting with Frankie Brinkley, the Supply Center's Director
 of the Regional Financial Services Department to pursue retaining the
 Thursday payday and the meeting adjourned.
 
    On January 8, 1982 Owens issued an "All Hands Bulletin" to Public
 Works Center employees which stated that there would be no change in pay
 procedures during January 1982.  The "All Hands Bulletin" indicated that
 discussions concerning changes in how and when employees would be paid "
 . . . started as the result of computer program changes at the Naval
 Supply Center which prepares our payroll and payrolls for 68 other
 activities." The announcement set forth the "Current Status" on the
 matter as follows:
 
          "1.  Since the Metal Trades Council has requested impact
       bargaining the change planned by NSC has been postponed and may be
       modified as it applies to this Center.  Bargaining is now going
       on.
 
          "2.  Until further notice you will receive your paycheck and
       leave and earnings statement just as you have in the past.  The
       leave and earnings statement will be in a different format.  There
       may be a few hours delay caused by new paperwork, but we plan to
       continue Thursday paydays until you are further advised."
 
    Director Brinkley, Owens and representatives of the Union met on
 January 11, 1982.  /19/ At this time the Union asked Brinkley if the
 Thursday payday could be retained.  Brinkley stated it could not due to
 the added computer time and high costs for overtime pay which would be
 required to maintain a Thursday payday at the Public Works Center.
 Brinkley responded to other Union questions and described the new
 standardized, computerized pay procedures in detail and explained the
 advantages of the system to employees and the government.  Brinkley
 advised that because of the "flimsy" nature of the new LES's, they would
 be mailed to an employee's home or non-work address even though the
 employee might opt to receive pay at the worksite.  Brinkley indicated
 that at the almost 60 other activities serviced by the Supply Center
 employees were given the choice of hand versus direct deposit delivery
 and very few employees were selecting hand delivery and accordingly,
 since the Union didn't know how the employees felt, they didn't
 represent the employees.  The Union countered that the employees at the
 other activities were merely taking the lesser of two evils when making
 their selection.  Brinkley stated that the Supply Center had worked out
 its problems with its union and she had neither the time nor inclination
 to deal with unions at some 60 activities on the subject.  Brinkley
 further stated that she was working on a "compelling need" argument for
 the Navy relative to the matter.
 
    On January 28, 1982, Joshua Hardy, Senior Labor Advisor for the
 Public Works Center and a Assistant Labor Advisor, and Owens met with
 Union representatives to discuss the change.  Hardy advised the Union
 that the time allotted to the Public Works Center by the Supply Center
 "to get on with bargaining and reach an accord" was rapidly running out.
  Hardy indicated that the changes were inevitable and the Union should
 learn to live with changes.  The Union again stated its position that
 the contract covered pay procedures and suggested that a Thursday payday
 could be retained by renting Post Office boxes and having managers
 personally pick up the checks for the Supply Center.  The Union
 indicated a willingness to reopen the contract for negotiations on the
 matter if negotiations included an unrelated subject regarding the
 employer's providing tools to employees.  The offer was not taken
 seriously by Hardy and the discussion ended without agreement.
 
    Thereafter, Respondent concluded that the parties were at impasse and
 on February 2, 1982 sent the Union a letter indicating that changes in
 pay procedures were going forward.  The letter, after referring to
 having previously "provided for a continuation of hand delivery of
 checks and LES's . . . on a short term basis to accommodate the (Public
 Works Center's) need for time to engage in bargaining with the Council
 over a change in a condition of employment," stated, inter alia:
 
          "4.  Council should be aware that since PWC received its
       payroll and disbursing services from the NSC on a non-reimbursable
       basis, PWC is in no position to make a decision as to what day and
       in what manner our employees are to be paid.  That decision is
       reserved to the head of the activity which provides the service,
       NSC Norfolk.
 
          "5.  As of this date, officials at PWC have met with the
       Council Executive Committee on 6 occasions . . . to bargain on the
       impact of the pending change in paying civilian employees.  The
       PWC is aware of the MTC position that there should be no change in
       civilian pay practices until the existing agreement between the
       parties . . . comes up for renegotiations in 1984, and that
       separate ULP charges against PWC and the Secretary of the Navy
       over this matter are currently before Region IV of the Federal
       Labor Relations Authority.
 
          "6.  PWC is on notice from NSC that the move from Thursday to
       Friday delivery of checks for civilian employees is imminent.  To
       facilitate the changeover, notice is hereby given that PWC plans
       to distribute the employee option forms to employees during the
       weeks of 22 February 1982.  This will afford each employee an
       opportunity to indicate their preference of the options described
       in paragraph 2 above by which they will be paid in the future.
 
          "7.  . . . officials of PWC will remain available to meet with
       the Council and bargain, upon request, concerning this matter.
       Since there have been no specific proposals proffered by the
       Council other than to maintain the status quo, we would
       particularly welcome suggestions which would lessen any adverse
       impact of the proposed changes."
 
    The parties did not engage in any further bargaining on the matter
 and sometime during the last week of February 1982 the Public Works
 Center notified its employees by a bulletin that pay procedures would be
 revised beginning with the pay period ending April 3, 1982.  The
 bulletin indicated, inter alia, that employees had options identical to
 those set out in the December 4, 1981 Supply Center "Supply Chest"
 notification to its employees, supra.  However, in a subsequent bulletin
 dated February 25, 1982 the Public Works Center informed employees pay
 procedures previously announced would be revised to provide that checks
 would be distributed at the worksite prior to 3:00 p.m. instead of after
 3:30 p.m. on Fridays and upon request, LES's would be delivered to the
 worksite rather than being mailed to a non-work address.  The changes
 were implemented as scheduled.  /20/
 
                        Discussion and Conclusions
 
    The Alleged Breach of Contract
 
    Counsel for the General Counsel alleges that Respondent Public Works
 Center obligated itself to maintain the procedures concerning the
 distribution of paychecks and LES's by the terms of Article 24, Section
 9 of the collective bargaining agreement and to change those procedures
 without the express consent of the Union constituted a patent breach of
 the agreement in violation of section 7116(a)(5) and (1) of the Statute,
 and, under the circumstances herein, a violation of section 7116(a) (7)
 as well.  /21/ Respondent denies that such an obligation flows from
 Article 24, Section 9 and contends that the clause only requires it to
 continue its past practice of promptly distributing paychecks when they
 were received from the Supply Center.
 
    I find that the evidence fails to support the General Counsel's
 contention in this regard.  The wording of the clause itself is open to
 varying interpretations.  However, Respondent's witnesses testified
 without contradiction that during contract negotiations involving this
 clause, concern centered on maintaining a Thursday payday.  There is no
 evidence that other matters were under consideration when this clause
 was discussed.  Further, the same testimony reveals that Respondent
 clearly indicated to the Union that by the execution of this article it
 was only binding itself to continue doing what it had done in the past:
 promptly distributing paychecks when it received them from the Supply
 Center.  Accordingly, since I find the underlying meaning of the article
 is not as urged by the General Counsel, I conclude the General Counsel
 has not sustained its burden of proof and reject the contention that a
 patent breach of contract occurred.  Therefore, I recommend the
 allegation that Respondent violated the Statute in this regard be
 dismissed.
 
    Other Contentions
 
    Counsel for the General Counsel also contends that Respondent
 unilaterally changed the practice regarding distribution of payroll
 checks and leave and earnings statements and thereby failed and refused
 to bargain in good faith with the Union.  Essentially, Counsel for the
 General Counsel alleges that Respondent refused to bargain with the
 Union over the substance of the change and, when it effectuated the
 change in these circumstances, Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1)
 and (5) of the Statute.  More particularly, Counsel for the General
 Counsel alleges that:  (1) Respondent Department of the Navy violated
 the Statute by directing and requiring the Public Works Center, through
 the conduct of the Supply Center, DON's agent, to violate its collective
 bargaining obligation and implement the change and;  (2) to the extent
 that Respondent Public Works Center retained discretion with respect to
 pay procedure changes, it also committed an unfair labor practice by
 implementing the changes.
 
    In its brief, Respondent contends that the Department of the Navy,
 (Secretary of the Navy) did not violate the Statute by the issuance of
 SECNAVINST 7200.17, arguing that:  (1) the method of paycheck
 distribution concerns a method of performing the work of NAVCOMPT and
 therefore constitutes the exercise of a reserved right protected by
 section 7106(b)(1) of the Statute;  /23/ (2) pursuant to Section 7118 of
 the Statute the unfair labor practice charge was untimely filed since
 the SECNAV Instruction issued on October 6, 1981, the Union had prior
 notice through receipt of a proposed draft of the Instruction sometime
 before June 22, 1981 and the charge was not filed until May 6, 1982,
 more than six months later;  /23/ (3) the Instruction does not require
 any conduct which would violate the Statute;  (4) requiring newly hired
 employees to be governed by the new mail distribution policy does not
 change or alter any established pay distribution policy for any unit
 employee.
 
    Respondent further denies that the Public Works Center violated the
 Statute contending:  (1) the dispute herein involves a question of
 "compelling need" and accordingly the procedures established in section
 7117 of the Statute rather than the unfair labor practice procedures
 should have been utilized;  (2) substance and impact and implementation
 bargaining on the proposed changes in fact took place and implementation
 occurred only after impasse;  (3) no change occurred which materially
 and substantially affected bargaining unit employees and therefore, no
 obligation to bargain existed;  (4) the Public Works Center had no
 choice but to ministerially follow the provisions of SECNAVINST 7200.17
 and therefore cannot be held liable for any alleged refusal to bargain;
 and (5) the Public Works Center had no control over the computerized
 payroll system at the Supply Center, "a separate and distinct activity,"
 which precipitated the change and therefore cannot be held accountable
 for the changes.
 
    There is no contention that the distribution of paychecks and LES's
 is not a matter concerning terms and conditions of employment.  Indeed,
 the Public Works Center in its February 2, 1982 letter to the Union,
 supra, expressly acknowledge the fact.  In any event, in agreement with
 the findings and conclusions of Administrative Law Judge William B.
 Devaney in United States Department of Defense, Department of the Army,
 McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, Case No. 6-CA-1041, OALJ-82-77, April
 30, 1982, at 22, I find that matters concerning the distribution of
 paychecks and LES's are conditions of employment within the meaning of
 the Statute.  See also the decisions of Administrative Law Judge Eli
 Nash, Jr. in Department of the Navy, Office of the Secretary
 (Washington, D.C.) and Naval Underwater Systems Center (Newport, Rhode
 Island), Case Nos. 1-CA-30010, 1-CA-30011, OALJ-83-138, September 29,
 1983, and Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., Case No. 9-CA-30108,
 OALJ-83-140, September 30, 1983.
 
    However, Respondent does contend that the manner of paycheck
 distribution is a reserved right of management within the meaning of
 section 7106(b)(1) of the Statute.  Respondent's theory is that the
 Secretary of the Navy when acting through the Comptroller of the Navy
 exercised DON's reserved right in designing and developing financial
 systems and procedures.  Respondent equates such activity to determining
 the "technology, methods and means of performing work." Thus, according
 to Respondent, the decision to effectuate the change was not a
 bargainable matter since Respondent had not elected to bargain on the
 matter.
 
    This contention is without merit.  The Authority held in American
 Federation of State, County and Municiple Employees, AFL-CIO, Local
 2477, et a., 7 FLRA 578 at 582, 583 (1982) that "the technology . . . of
 performing work" as used in the Statute "means the authority of the
 Agency to determine the technical method in accomplishing or furthering
 the performance of the Agency's work." In that case the Authority went
 on to hold that in order to constitute the technology of performing
 work, the activities in question had to be more than merely incidental
 to the performance of the Agency's work.  Id at 584, 587, 588.  In a
 later case, the Authority found that a union's bargaining proposal did
 not conflict with management's reserved authority to determine the
 technology methods, and means in accomplishing or furthering the
 performance of an agency's work where it was not shown, nor did it
 otherwise appear, that the matter under consideration was "principally"
 or "directly" related to the performance of the agency's work.  American
 Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3525 and United
 States Department of Justice, Board of Immigration Appeals, 10 FLRA 61
 (1982) at 64.  See also National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 6 and
 Internal Revenue Service, New Orleans District, 3 FLRA 747 (1980).
 
    In the case herein, clearly the manner of distribution of paychecks
 and leave and earnings statements is not concerned with the technical
 method in accomplishing or furthering the performance of the Department
 of the Navy's work nor principally or directly related to the work of
 the Agency.  Accordingly, I conclude that the distribution of paychecks
 and LES's is not a matter within management's reserved authority within
 the meaning of "the technology methods, and means of performing work" as
 set forth in section 7106(b)(1) of the Statute.  Cf. Internal Revenue
 Service, Chicago, Illinois, 9 FLRA No. 73 (1982), rev. on other grounds,
 717 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1983).
 
    I further reject Respondent's contentions that the unfair labor
 practice charge as applicable to the Department of the Navy was untimely
 filed.  It is true the Instruction 7200.17 (October 6, 1981) issued more
 than six months prior to the filing of the charge on May 6, 1982, as was
 the NAVCOMPT letter (August 12, 1981).  However, Counsel for the General
 Counsel contends it was not the promulgation, but the enforcement or
 implementation of the SECNAV Instruction (and I assume the NAVCOMPT
 letter), through the actions of the Public Works Center and the Supply
 Center, which violated the Statute.  Accordingly, there being no action
 of the Department of the Navy alleged to violate the Statute which lies
 more than six months before the filing of the charge on May 6, 1982,
 Respondent's position is not well taken.
 
    Further, since the General Counsel's theory of violation with regard
 to the Department of the Navy is based upon the actions of the Supply
 Center as an agent of the Department and not any independent action of
 the Department, I find the question of whether SECNAV Instruction
 7200.17 required any subordinate body to take any action which would
 violate the Statute to be immaterial to a resolution of the issues
 presented herein.  It is the conduct of the agent and not the principal
 that is the focal point herein.  Cf. Department of Defense Dependent
 Schools, 11 FLRA No. 100 (1983).
 
    For the same reason I conclude that the question of whether the
 Department of the Navy Instruction required newly hired employees to be
 governed by the new distribution policy is similarly immaterial.
 However, since, according to the General Counsel's theory, if the
 Department's alleged agent was in any way responsible for the change and
 the Department is responsible for the acts of its agent, then the
 question of whether such requirement changed or altered an established
 pay distribution policy must be resolved.  Respondent's argument in this
 regard appears to be that employees hired after the new distribution
 policy was effectuated did not have their individual pay practice
 changed since they never had a different pay practice.  Carrying this
 argument to its logical conclusion, any existing condition of employment
 (and contract provision?) will not be applicable to new unit employees
 and an employer could set their conditions of employment upon hiring as
 management saw fit.  I find Respondent's contention to be without merit.
  Apparently the same argument was made to Administrative Law Judge Eli
 Nash, Jr. in Department of the Navy, Office of the Secretary
 (Washington, D.C.) and Naval Underwater Systems Center (Newport, Rhode
 Island), supra.  In that case, (footnote 6, at 14), Judge Nash, in
 rejecting respondent's position, found the argument to be novel and
 without precedent and " . . . fundamentally at odds with the Statute's
 sentiments and conclusions in this regard.
 
    Respondent also contends that, in any event, the change herein did
 not "materially and substantially" affect bargaining unit employees.  I
 reject this contention.  In my view when and where an employee receives
 a paycheck is a matter which can have a significant impact on an
 employee.  Thus, household budgets and payment schedules are frequently
 governed by when income is received.  All employees doubtless do not
 have bank accounts to receive PDQ payments and would be required to open
 an account in order to have cash made immediately available on a given
 payday and incur the attendant costs of maintaining such an account.  A
 desirable bank might be far removed from an employee.  The time and date
 of receipt of a paycheck can substantially affect when and where that
 check can be converted into needed cash, and home mail delivery may pose
 a security problem for an employee.  /24/ With regard to receipt of
 LES's, the information contained on the document, e.g., amount of
 salary, tax, deductions, contributions and leave available, is personal
 to that employee and the employee has a substantial interest in where
 the LES is delivered in order to control who has the document available
 for viewing.  Thus, the lack of security of home mail delivery may
 present a problem and domestic arrangements and conditions might cause
 an employee to prefer that such documents not be delivered to the home,
 e.g. marital difficulties, inquisitive family members or others residing
 with the employee who have no right to have such information and
 destructive and mischievous children.
 
    The Obligation to Negotiate
 
    Turning now to the other issues involved herein, I conclude that
 since the manner of distributing paychecks and LES's is a term and
 condition of employment, and not a matter within Respondent's reserved
 authority as Respondent contends, Respondent Public Works Center was
 obligated to negotiate with the Union on the decision to change the
 manner of distribution as well as the impact and implementation of the
 change.  /25/ Clearly there was a failure and refusal to bargain with
 the Union on the decision to change, i.e. whether there would be a
 change in the practice of (1) distributing paychecks and LES's at the
 worksite to all of those employees who so desired and, (2) having the
 checks and LES's delivered on Thursdays.  Thus, throughout discussions
 the Public Works Center's negotiator, Owens, insisted that he could not
 negotiate the change in manner and date of distribution, but was willing
 to negotiate on the impact and implementation.  Further, Owens
 repeatedly indicated that the Public Works Center's authority to
 negotiate was limited in this situation and the Supply Center was really
 the party which controlled what could be negotiated.  On January 11,
 1982 the Supply Center, convinced that SECNAV 7200.17 and NAVCOMPT
 logistically and physically required moving the payday and mailing
 paychecks and LES's, indicated to the Union it was not willing to
 negotiate on the matter.  Supply Center Financial Services Director
 Brinkley reenforced this position by flatly stating she had neither time
 nor the inclination to deal with unions at some 60 activities on the
 subject.  In view of the facts herein, I conclude no good faith
 bargaining as to the decision on distribution occurred nor was it
 invisioned that bargaining on the decision would take place in the
 future.
 
    I conclude however that although the exclusive representative, the
 Public Works Center was not authorized or empowered to negotiate with
 the Union on the decision to change paycheck and LES distribution, the
 Public Works Center was authorized to and indeed did negotiate in good
 faith with the Union on the impact and implementation of the decision.
 However, the organization of the Department of the Navy is such that the
 decision herein involved was a matter which the Supply Center had
 control and not the activity where recognition resided.  The Public
 Works Center merely acted as a conduit to relay the Supply Center's
 decisions in this matter.  Thus I conclude that the Public Works Center
 negotiated in good faith to the extent of its authority and the actual
 refusal to negotiate on the decision was the act of the Supply Center.
 Accordingly, since it is the policy of the Authority to dismiss
 complaints against respondent activities in such circumstances, I am
 constrained to recommend that the complaint be dismissed against
 Respondent Public Works Center.  Department of the Interior, Water and
 Power Resources Service, Grand Coulee Project, Grand Coulee, Washington,
 9 FLRA No. 46 (1982) and Department of Health and Human Services, Social
 Security Administration, Region VI, and Department of Health and Human
 Services, Social Security Administration, Galveston, Texas District, 10
 FLRA No. 9 (1982).
 
    The Department of the Navy is a complex, integrated operation.  The
 authority and responsibilities of subordinate organizations within the
 Department is dictated by the Department, at least with regard to the
 activities concerned herein.  It is the Department that sets policy and
 decided how payroll functions will be administered.  It was pursuant to
 that policy that the Supply Center was obligated and authorized to act
 in this matter and it concluded that bargaining on the decision involved
 herein was either nor required or desirable.  The Supply Center acted as
 agent for the Department and accordingly, I conclude that Department of
 the Navy, being responsible for the act of its agent, is ultimately
 responsible for the failure and refusal to negotiate found herein.  Cf.
 Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D.C. and Internal Revenue Service,
 Hartford District Office, 4 FLRA 237 (1980).  See also Department of
 Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, Region VI,
 and Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security
 Administration, Galveston, Texas District, 10 FLRA No. 9 (1982) at 28
 where the Authority held:  " . . . under the Statute, when the
 obligation to negotiate is breached by the acts and conduct of agency
 management, such a breach may provide the basis for a section 7116(a)(1)
 and (5) violation regardless of the location of that agency management
 in the agency chain of command."
 
    Compelling Need
 
    Finally, I reject Respondent's contention that this matter should
 have been resolved under the "compelling need" procedures set forth in
 Section 7117 of the Statute and not the unfair labor practice
 procedures.  In Defense Logistics Agency (Cameron Station, Virginia), et
 al., 12 FLRA No. 86 (1983), the Authority held:
 
          " . . . in exercising its statutory authority to resolve
       disputes involving alleged unilateral changes in conditions of
       employment where issues of negotia0ility are also raised, the
       Authority has promulgated procedures which recognize a labor
       organization's right to seek a resolution of the negotiability
       issues 0y filing an unfair labor practice charge and a
       negotiability appeal and which require the labor organization to
       select the forum in which to proceed first.  (See sections 2423.5
       and 2424.5 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations.) Accordingly
       . . . where a labor organization selects the unfair labor practice
       forum with regard to alleged unilateral changes in conditions of
       employment affecting unit employees resulting from the issuance of
       a new regulation or, as here, modification of an existing
       regulation, and agency management raises as an affirmative defense
       that it refused to bargain on the basis that there is a compelling
       need for the regulation in question, the compelling need must
       perforce be decided in the unfair labor practice proceeding.
       (Footnote omitted).  Of course, an agency which raises compelling
       need as an affirmative defense in an unfair labor practice
       proceeding is required, as it would be in a negotiability
       proceeding, to come forward with affirmative support for that
       assertion." (Footnote omitted).
 
    In the case herein, the dispute involved as alleged unilateral change
 and the Union selected the unfair labor practice forum on which to
 proceed.  Accordingly, to whatever extent Respondent has raised a
 compelling need for the regulations which set into motion the actions
 concerned herein, this unfair labor practice proceeding is the proper
 vehicle to resolve that question.  Further, in order to prevail in this
 proceeding Respondent had the obligation to affirmatively support that
 assertion.  Section 2424.11 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations
 sets forth various "illustrative criteria" for determining a compelling
 need for an agency's rules and regulations.  Section 2424.11 provides:
 
          "A compelling need exists for an agency rule or regulations
       concerning any condition of employment when the agency
       demonstrates that the rule or regulation meet one or more of the
       following illustrative criteria:
 
          "(a) The rule or regulation is essential, as distinguished from
       helpful or desirable, to the accomplishment of the mission or the
       execution of functions of the agency or primary national
       subdivision in a manner which is consistent with the requirements
       of an effective and efficient government.
 
          "(b) The rule or regulation is necessary to insure the
       maintenance of basic merit principles.
 
          "(c) The rule and regulation implements a mandate to the agency
       or primary national subdivision under law or other outside
       authority, which implementation is essentially nondiscretionary in
       nature."
 
    I find little, if any, record evidence to indicate the existence of a
 compelling need within the meaning of the Statute and the Rules and
 Regulations for the Respondent's regulations at issue herein.
 Therefore, I conclude that Respondent has failed to affirmatively
 support its assertion that a compelling need exists for the regulations
 involved herein so as to excuse it from its bargaining obligation.  Cf.
 National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1332 and Headquarters,
 U.S. Army Material Development and Readiness Command, Alexandria,
 Virginia, 6 FLRA 361 (1981);  American Federation of Government
 Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3804 and Federal Deposit Insurance
 Corporation, Chicago Region, Illinois, 7 FLRA 217 (1981);  and American
 Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2670, et al., 10 FLRA
 No. 19 (1982).
 
    Accordingly, in view of the entire foregoing /26/ I conclude that the
 Department of the Navy, by the conduct described herein, violated
 section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute and recommend the Authority
 issue the following:
 
                                   ORDER
 
    Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Federal Labor Relations
 Authority's Rules and Regulations and section 7118 of the Statute, it is
 hereby ordered that the Department of the Navy shall:
 
    1.  Cease and desist from:
 
          (a) Unilaterally changing established conditions of employment
       at the Navy Public Works Center, Norfolk, Virginia concerning the
       manner of distri0uting paychecks and leave and earnings statements
       of employees represented by the Tidewater Virginia Federal
       Employees Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, the employees' exclusive
       collective bargaining representative.
 
          (b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
       restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their
       rights assured by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
       Statute.
 
    2.  Take the following affirmative action:
 
          (a) Withdraw and rescind the change concerning the manner of
       distributing paychecks and leave and earnings statements of
       employees represented by the Tidewater Virginia Federal Employees
       Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, the employees' exclusive collective
       bargaining representative, which became effective with the pay
       period ending April 3, 1982 and reinstate the procedures and
       policies in effect prior thereto.
 
          (b) Notify the Tidewater Virginia Federal Employees Metal
       Trades Council, AFL-CIO, the exclusive representative of the
       employees in the Navy Public Works Center, Norfolk, Virginia, of
       any intended change in the manner of distributing bargaining unit
       employees' paychecks and leave and earnings statements and provide
       such exclusive representative an opportunity to request
       negotiations with the Navy Public Works Center, Norfolk, Virginia,
       or other appropriate management representatives, and bargain in
       good faith on any such proposed change in established conditions
       of employment.
 
          (c) Post at its Navy Public Works Center, Norfolk, Virginia and
       Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, Virginia, copies of the attached
       Notice (Appendix A) on forms to be furnished by the Federal Labor
       Relations Authority.  Upon receipt of such forms, they shall be
       signed by the Secretary, Department of the Navy, and shall be
       posted and maintained by him for sixty consecutive days
       thereafter, in conspicuous places, including bulletin boards and
       all other places where notices to employees in the Navy Public
       Works Center, Norfolk, Virginia and Naval Supply Center, Norfolk,
       Virginia are customarily posted.  The Secretary, Department of the
       Navy shall take reasonable steps to insure that such notices are
       not altered, defaced, or covered by other material.
 
          (d) Pursuant to section 2423.30 of the Authority's Rules and
       Regulations, notify the Regional Director of Region IV, Federal
       Labor Relations Authority, in writing, within 30 days from the
       date of this Order as to what steps have been taken to comply
       herewith.
 
    IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the Complaint in Case No.
 4-CA-20279, insofar as it alleges a violation of section 7116(a)(7) and
 violation of the Statute by Respondent Navy Public Works Center,
 Norfolk, Virginia be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
 
                                       SALVATORE J. ARRIGO
                                       Administrative Law Judge
 
    Dated:  January 16, 1984
    Washington, D.C.
 
 
 
                                APPENDIX A
 
                          NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
 
 PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR
 RELATIONS
 AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF CHAPTER 71
 OF TITLE
 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS
 WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
 
    WE WILL NOT change established conditions of employment at the Navy
 Public Works Center, Norfolk, Virginia concerning the manner of
 distributing paychecks and leave and earnings statements of employees
 represented by the Tidewater Virginia Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, the
 employees' exclusive collective bargaining representative, without
 notifying the exclusive representative and providing it with an
 opportunity to request negotiations with the Public Works Center or
 other appropriate management representatives, concerning the proposed
 change.
 
    WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain,
 or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights assured by the
 Statute.
 
    WE WILL withdraw and rescind the change concerning the manner of
 distributing paychecks and leave and earnings statements of employees
 represented by the Tidewater Virginia Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, the
 employees' exclusive collective bargaining representative, which became
 effective with the pay period ending April 3, 1982 and will reinstate
 the procedures and policies in effect prior thereto.
                                       (Activity or Agency)
 
    Dated:  By:  (Signature)
 
    This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date
 of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other
 material.
 
    If employees have any questions concerning this Notice or compliance
 with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Regional
 Director, Region IV, Federal Labor Relations Authority, whose address
 is:  1776 Peachtree Street, NW., Suite 501, North Wing, Atlanta, Georgia
 30309, and whose telephone number is:  (404) 881-2324.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 --------------- FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
 
 
    /1/ Section 7106(b)(1) provides in pertinent part:
 
          Sec. 7106.  Management rights
 
                                  * * * *
 
          (b) Nothing in this section shall preclude any agency and any
       labor organization from negotiating--
 
          (1) at the election of the agency, . . . on the technology,
       methods, and means of performing work(.)
 
 
    /2/ In view of the Authority's decision herein, it is unnecessary to
 address the Respondent's assertion that a compelling need exists under
 section 7117 of the Statute for the agency regulation involved herein.
 
 
    /3/ The General Counsel contends that the Department of the Navy and
 the Navy Public Works Center each violated the Statute by conduct
 hereinafter described.  Accordingly, I have amended the caption herein
 to more accurately reflect that there are two Respondents in this case.
 Further, although named in the Complaint, at the hearing Counsel for the
 General Counsel withdrew the Department of Defense as a Respondent.
 
 
    /4/ Pursuant to Counsel for the General Counsel's unopposed motion to
 correct the transcript of that proceeding and upon my own recollection,
 the transcript is hereby amended as noted in Appendix B.
 
 
    /5/ For reasons explicated hereinafter, the motion at the hearing to
 dismiss the Department of the Navy as a Respondent is hereby denied.
 
 
    /6/ There is no evidence that the Union received a copy of this
 letter.
 
 
    /7/ Such an instruction by the Comptroller of the Navy has the same
 force and effect as a directive from the Secretary of the Navy.
 
 
    /8/ Some aspects of this instruction governed military pay practices
 and accordingly, are not relevant to matters at issue herein.
 
 
    /9/ A precursor to this system was termed "PDQ" (Pay Deposited
 Quicker) which relied on the transfer of funds primarily by mail.
 
 
    /10/ Pursuant to a decision of the Comptroller of the Navy, binding
 upon the Public Works Center and the Supply Center, payroll services
 have been supplied since 1967 and disbursing activities have been
 provided since April 1981.
 
 
    /11/ The Supply Center is required to implement the changes as
 drafted by the Comptroller of the Navy.
 
 
    /12/ On only six or seven occasions over the prior two year period
 had paychecks been distributed to employees other than on a Thursday.
 
 
    /13/ The "Supply Chest" also announced the change in LES's and
 explained the new format of the LES's.
 
 
    /14/ The Union has National Consultation Rights within the Department
 of the Navy and pursuant thereto was provided with a draft of
 Instruction 7200.17.  On June 22, 1981, Tommy Maynard, Chairman of the
 Metal Trades Council at the Public Works Center signed a response to the
 draft, authorized by the President of the Metal Trades Council, wherein
 the Union opposed the changes proposed in the draft.  However, the
 record does not disclose whether the draft was identical to the
 Instruction as ultimately published.
 
 
    /15/ The factual finding of what transpired at this and subsequent
 meetings is a composite of the credited testimony of the various
 individuals who attended the meetings and testified at the hearing on
 the subject.
 
 
    /16/ It is clear from the testimony of witnesses who testified on
 this matter that "implementation" as used in discussions herein
 frequently was meant to mean bargaining on the substance of the change,
 i.e., the decision itself.
 
 
    /17/ Article 24, Section 9 of the agreement provides:  "The EMPLOYER
 will promptly distribute payroll checks upon receipt in accordance with
 past practices."
 
 
    /18/ Owens and Joshua Hardy, Public Works Center Senior Labor
 Advisor, testified that they were directly involved in negotiations
 concerning Article 24, Section 9.  According to both Owens and Hardy,
 this same language was found in the parties' prior agreement and was
 meant merely to indicate that when the Public Works Center received
 paychecks from the Supply Center, they would distribute them to
 employees without delay as they had done in the past.  Indeed, during
 negotiations which gave rise to the 1981 contract the Union sought to
 commit Respondent to a more specific clause dealing with the day checks
 would be distributed and Respondent declined to guarantee a Thursday
 payday or obligate itself any further than the language set out above.
 
 
    /19/ Brinkley testified that she was at the meeting ". . . to lend
 assistance to Public Works Center management in negotiating this change
 with their union officials (and) to explain the change (and) the impact
 that it had over the Naval Supply Center."
 
 
    /20/ Employees who have so opted receive their paychecks at the
 worksite around 11:30 a.m. on Fridays.  The option to receive paychecks
 and LES's at the worksite was not available to those employees hired
 after implementation.
 
 
    /21/ The relevant portions of section 7116 of the Statute provide:
 
          "(a) For the purpose of this chapter, it shall be an unfair
       labor practice for an agency--
 
          "(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee in the
       exercise by the employee of any right under this chapter;
 
                                  * * * *
 
          (5) to refuse to consult or negotiate in good faith with a
       labor organization as required by this chapter;
 
                                  * * * *
 
          "(7) to enforce any rule or regulation (other than a rule or
       regulation implementing section 2302 of this title) which is in
       conflict with any applicable collective bargaining agreement if
       the agreement was in effect before the date the rule or regulation
       was prescribed . . . "
 
 
    /22/ Section 7106(b)(1) of the Statute provides:
 
          "(b) Nothing in this section shall preclude any agency and any
       labor organization from negotiating--
 
          "(1) at the election of the agency, on the numbers, types, and
       grades of employees or positions assigned to any organizational
       subdivision, work project, or tour of duty, or on the technology,
       methods, and means of performing work . . . ."
 
 
    /23/ Section 7118(a)(4) of the Statute provides, in releva