19:0586(77)CO - Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, NH and Lloyd C. Cochrane and Portsmouth FEMTC and Lloyd C. Cochrane -- 1985 FLRAdec CO



[ v19 p586 ]
19:0586(77)CO
The decision of the Authority follows:


 19 FLRA No. 77
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
 PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD
 PORTSMOUTH, NEW HAMPSHIRE
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 LLOYD C. COCHRANE
 Charging Party
 
                                            Case No. 1-CA-20262
 
 and
 
 PORTSMOUTH FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
 METAL TRADES COUNCIL, AFL-CIO
 Respondent
 
 and
 LLOYD C. COCHRANE
 Charging Party
 
                                            Case No. 1-CO-20009
 
                            DECISION AND ORDER
 
    The Administrative Law Judge issued the attached Decision in the
 above-entitled consolidated proceeding, finding that the Respondents,
 Department of the Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New
 Hampshire (the Activity) and Portsmouth Federal Employees Metal Trades
 Council, AFL-CIO (the Union) had engaged in the unfair labor practices
 alleged in the complaint, and recommending that they be ordered to cease
 and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action.  Thereafter,
 the Activity, the Union, and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the
 Judge's Decision accompanied by briefs.  /1/
 
    Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations
 and section 7118 of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
 Statute (the Statute), the Authority has reviewed the rulings of the
 Judge made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was
 committed.  The rulings are hereby affirmed.  Upon consideration of the
 Judge's Decision, and the entire record;  the Authority hereby adopts
 the Judge's findings and conclusions as modified herein.
 
    The facts, as found by the Judge, are not in dispute.  At all times
 material, the Activity and the Union were parties to collective
 bargaining agreements which required that any unit employee who had
 authorized the Activity to withhold Union dues from his or her paycheck
 could revoke that authorization only on the anniversary date of the
 authorization or during the 10-day period immediately preceding the
 anniversary date, and that such revocation could only be accomplished on
 a form to be obtained, executed and submitted at the Union office during
 that 10-day period, on the employee's non-duty time.  Employee Cochrane,
 the Charging Party, authorized the Activity to withhold dues from his
 pay, and attempted to withdraw that authorization over a year later, at
 a time when such withdrawal was not permitted by the agreements.
 
    The Judge found that those agreements between the Activity and the
 Union, and their application, infringed upon what he characterized as
 the "unfettered right" of the Charging Party to revoke his dues
 withholding authorization at any time after the expiration of one year,
 in violation of section 7115(a) of the Statute.  /2/ He therefore found
 that by imposing and adhering to those restrictions, the Activity
 interfered with the Charging Party's rights accorded by section 7115(a)
 and thereby violated section 7116(a)(1) of the Statute, and that such
 action encouraged membership in the Union and assisted the Union in
 violation of section 7116(a)(2), (3) and (8) of the Statute.  /3/ With
 respect to the Union, the Judge found that, by insisting on enforcement
 of the restrictions on revocation which were a product of its agreements
 with the Activity, the Union violated section 7116(b)(1), (2) and (8) of
 the Statute.  /4/
 
    The Authority finds, contrary to the Judge, that the Activity and the
 Union did not violate the Statute when they agreed to a reasonable time
 period for dues withholding revocation and enforced such agreement.
 Thus, the Authority has previously held that the language of section
 7115(a) that "any such assignment may not be revoked for a period of one
 year" means that authorized dues allotments may be revoked only at
 intervals of one year.  U.S. Army, U.S. Materiel Development and
 Readiness Command, Warren, Michigan, 7 FLRA 194 (1981).  /5/ In
 addition, the Authority has stated that parties may define through
 negotiations the yearly intervals required by section 7115(a) of the
 Statute.  See Veterans Administration Lakeside Medical Center, Chicago,
 Illinois, 12 FLRA 244 (1983).  Here, as found by the Judge, the Charging
 Party failed to comply with the time intervals established for dues
 revocation, and based upon the facts as found by the Judge, those
 limitations were well publicized and reasonable.  Such limitations did
 not, in the Authority's view, constitute what the Judge characterized as
 "unreasonable impediments" to the Charging Party's right to revoke his
 authorization.  Rather, the Authority concludes that neither the
 Activity nor the Union committed an unfair labor practice by complying
 with negotiated procedures which are themselves reasonable.
 
    However, the parties' negotiated procedures also required that
 revocation of dues withholding authorizations were to be executed on
 forms which could only be obtained from the Union at the Union hall, and
 which had to be executed and submitted directly to the Union there.  The
 Authority concludes that these requirements are inherently coercive of
 the employees' right to refrain from joining or assisting a labor
 organization /6/ as set forth in section 7102 of the Statute.  /7/
 Accordingly, the Authority finds that the Activity violated section
 7116(a)(1), (2), (3) and (8) of the Statute, and the Union violated
 section 7116(b)(1), (2) and (8) of the Statute, as alleged in the
 complaint, by entering into and enforcing agreements requiring the
 Charging Party to obtain, execute and submit dues withholding revocation
 forms at the Union office.  /8/
 
                                 ORDER /9/
 
    Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Federal Labor Relations
 Authority's Rules and Regulations and section 7118 of the Statute:
 
    A. Respondent Department of the Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard,
 Portsmouth, New Hampshire, shall:
 
    1.  Cease and desist from:
 
    (a) Encouraging membership in the Portsmouth Federal Employees Metal
 Trades Council, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by maintaining
 and enforcing a provision in a collective bargaining agreement which
 requires that Lloyd C. Cochrane, or any other employee, use a form
 obtained from, executed and submitted at the offices of the Portsmouth
 Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, in order to revoke dues
 withholding authorizations.
 
    (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining or
 coercing employees in the exercise of any right under the Federal
 Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.
 
    2.  Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the
 purposes and policies of the Statute:
 
    (a) Post at its facilities copies of the attached Notice marked
 Appendix A on forms to be furnished by the Federal Labor Relations
 Authority.  Upon receipt of such forms, they shall be signed by the
 Commander of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire,
 or a designee, and shall be posted and maintained for 60 consecutive
 days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all bulletin boards
 and other places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
 Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that such Notices are not
 altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
 
    (b) Notify the Federal Labor Relations Authority, in writing, within
 30 days from the date of this Order, as to what steps have been taken to
 comply herewith.
 
    B.  Respondent Portsmouth Federal Employees Metal Trades Council,
 AFL-CIO, shall:
 
    1.  Cease and desist from:
 
    (a) Maintaining or enforcing any provision of a collective bargaining
 agreement which requires that Lloyd C. Cochrane, or any other employee,
 use a form obtained from, executed and submitted at the offices of the
 Portsmouth Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, in order to
 revoke dues withholding authorizations.
 
    (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or
 coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under the Federal
 Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.
 
    2.  Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the
 purposes and policies of the Statute:
 
    (a) Post at its business offices and its normal meeting places,
 including all places where notices to members and employees of the
 Portsmouth Naval Shipyard are customarily posted in Portsmouth, New
 Hampshire, copies of the attached Notice marked Appendix B on forms to
 be furnished by the Federal Labor Relations Authority.  Upon receipt of
 such forms, they shall be signed by the President of the Federal
 Employees Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, or a designee, and shall be
 posted and maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
 places, including all bulletin boards and other places where notices to
 members and employees are customarily posted.  Reasonable steps shall be
 taken to ensure that such Notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
 by any other material.
 
    (b) Notify the Federal Labor Relations Authority, in writing, within
 30 days from the date of this Order, as to what steps have been taken to
 comply herewith.  
 
 Issued, Washington, D.C., August 12, 1985
 
                                       Henry B. Frazier III, Acting
                                       Chairman
                                       William J. McGinnis, Jr., Member
                                       FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
 
 
 
 
                                APPENDIX A
 
  NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE FEDERAL
 LABOR
 RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF
 CHAPTER
 71 OF TITLE 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE
 LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
 
 WE WILL NOT maintain and enforce a provision in a collective bargaining
 agreement which requires that Lloyd C. Cochrane, or any other employee,
 use a form obtained from, executed and submitted at the offices of the
 Portsmouth Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, in order to
 revoke dues withholding authorizations.  WE WILL NOT in any like or
 related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
 exercise of any right under the Federal Service Labor-Management
 Relations Statute.
                                       (Activity)
 
 Dated:  . . .  By:  (Signature) (Title) This Notice must remain posted
 for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be
 altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.  If employees have
 any questions concerning this Notice or compliance with any of its
 provisions, they may communicate directly with the Regional Director,
 Region I, Federal Labor Relations Authority, whose address is:  441
 Stuart Street, Ninth Floor, Boston, Massachusetts, and whose telephone
 number is:  (617) 223-0920.
 
 
 
                                APPENDIX B
 
                    NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES
 
  PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR
 RELATIONS
 AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF CHAPTER 71
 OF TITLE
 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS
 WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR MEMBERS AND OTHER EMPLOYEES THAT:
 
 WE WILL NOT maintain or enforce any provision of a collective bargaining
 agreement which requires that Lloyd C. Cochrane, or any other employee,
 use a form obtained from, executed and submitted at the offices of the
 Portsmouth Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, in order to
 revoke dues withholding authorizations.  WE WILL NOT in any like or
 related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
 exercise of their rights under the Federal Service Labor-Management
 Relations Statute.
                                       (Labor Organization)
 
 Dated:  . . .  By:  (Signature) (Title) This Notice must remain posted
 for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be
 altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.  If employees have
 any questions concerning this Notice or compliance with its provisions,
 they may communicate directly with the Regional Director, Region I,
 Federal Labor Relations Authority, whose address is:  441 Stuart Street,
 Ninth Floor, Boston, Massachusetts, and whose telephone number is:
 (617) 223-0920.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -------------------- ALJ$ DECISION FOLLOWS --------------------
 
                                       Case Nos.: 1-CA-20262, 1-CO-20009
 
    Robert Matisoff, Esquire
       For Respondent Union
 
    Mr. Herbert L. Zipperian
       For Respondent Agency
 
    Daniel F. Sutton, Esquire
       For the General Counsel
 
    Before:  BURTON S. STERNBURG
       Administrative Law Judge
 
                                 DECISION
 
                           Statement of the Case
 
    This is a proceeding under the Federal Service Labor-Management
 Relations Statute, Chapter 71 of Title 5 of the U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C.
 7101, et seq., and the Rules and Regulations issued thereunder, Fed.
 Reg., Vol. 45, No. 12, January 17, 1980, and Vol. 46, No. 154, August
 11, 1981, 5 C.F.R.Chapter XIV, Part 2411, et seq.
 
    Pursuant to amended charges first filed on June 14, 1982, by Lloyd C.
 Cochrane, an individual, a Consolidated Complaint and Notice of Hearing
 was issued on October 26, 1982, by the Regional Director for Region I,
 Federal Labor Relations Authority, Boston, Massachusetts.  The
 Consolidated Complaint alleges in substance that the Department of the
 Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire (hereinafter
 called the Naval Shipyard or Agency), and the Portsmouth Federal
 Employees Trades Council, AFL-CIO (hereinafter called FEMTC or Union),
 violated Sections 7116(a)(1), (2), (3) and (8), and Sections 7116(b)(1),
 (2) and (8), respectively, of the Federal Service Labor-Management
 Relations Statute (hereinafter called the Statute), by maintaining and
 enforcing an unlawfully restrictive dues revocation procedure and by
 refusing to permit Mr. Lloyd C. Cochrane, a unit member, to revoke his
 dues assignment pursuant to Section 7115(a) of the Statute.
 
    A hearing was held in the captioned matter on January 17, 1983, in
 Boston, Massachusetts.  All parties were afforded full opportunity to be
 heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence
 bearing on the issues involved herein.  The General Counsel, and
 respective counsel for the FEMTC and the Naval Shipyard submitted
 post-hearing briefs on February 28, 1983, which have been duly
 considered.
 
    Upon the basis of the entire record, including my observation of the
 witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following findings of fact,
 conclusions and recommendations.
 
                             Findings of Fact
 
    The Union is the certified exclusive representative of a number of
 Wage Grade and General Schedule employees working at the Portsmouth
 Naval Shipyard.  In 1977 the parties entered into a collective
 bargaining agreement which provided in Article 36, Section 11, a
 procedure for the revocation of dues allotments.  /10/ An identical
 provision is contained in Article 35, Section 11, of the current
 contract between the parties which was executed on September 21, 1981.
 
    On June 9, 1980, the Union and the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard executed
 a Memorandum of Understanding which provides in pertinent part as
 follows:
 
          An allotment for the deduction of an employee's union dues may
       also be terminated by the employees through a submission of a Dues
       Revocation Form (SF-1188) in accordance with the procedure set
       forth in Article 36, Section 11, on his anniversary date (the date
       the employee originally requested dues withholding) or within a
       ten calendar day period immediately before his annual anniversary
       date.
 
    The record reveals that on an unspecified date the Portsmouth
 Shipyard issued Information Bulletin No. 10-81 which contained
 information concerning termination of dues withholding for four of the
 units on the base which were represented by four different unions.
 Paragraph (b) of the Information Bulletin which pertained to the
 employees in the unit represented by the FEMTC provided as follows:
 
          SF 1188's, Revocation of Voluntary Authorization for Allotment
       of Compensation for Payment of Employee Organization Dues, shall
       be obtained from the Council office during nonwork hours on your
       anniversary date (the date you originally requested dues
       withholding) or within a ten day calendar day period immediately
       before your annual anniversary date.  Such termination of
       allotment shall become effective the first full pay period of the
       month following receipt of the SF 1188 by the Comptroller
       Department (630.12) provided dues allotment has been in effect for
       a period of one full year at the time it is received by the
       Comptroller Department (630.12) and is authorized by appropriate
       officials of the Council.
 
    Mr. Lloyd C. Cochrane, the charging party herein, commenced
 employment at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, as an Equipment Cleaner, on
 or about February 17, 1981.  Shortly after reporting to work he and a
 number of other new employees attended an orientation session conducted
 by a representative of the Union.  During the orientation session Mr.
 Cochrane and the other new employees were informed that they could join
 the Union and have their respective dues withheld from their respective
 bi-weekly pay checks and remitted to the Union if they executed a
 "Request and Authorization for Voluntary Allotment of Compensation for
 Payment of Employee Organization Dues".  Mr. Cochrane subsequently
 executed the appropriate dues withholding form on February 17 or 18,
 1981.  According to Mr. Cochrane's uncontested testimony, no mention of
 the procedure for revoking his dues assignment was made at either the
 orientation session or at the time he executed the dues withholding
 form.  /11/
 
    The second paragraph of the "Request and Authorization for Voluntary
 Allotment of Compensation for Payment of Employee Organization Dues"
 reads as follows:
 
          I understand that this authorization will become effective the
       first full pay period of the calendar month following its receipt
       in the payroll office of my employing agency.  I further
       understand that revocation forms Standard Form No. 1188,
       Revocation of Voluntary Authorization for Allotment of
       Compensation for Payment of Employee Organization Dues, may only
       be obtained and filled out in the offices of the employee
       organization on my anniversary date (the date I originally
       requested dues withholding) or within a ten calendar day period
       immediately before my anniversary date.  Such revocation will not
       be effective, however, until the first full pay period of the
       calendar month following receipt by the payroll office.
 
    In October of 1981, Mr. Cochrane switched jobs and joined the
 Painter's Union.  Shortly thereafter he called the FEMTC Union office
 and spoke to Mr. John P. O'Brien, President of the FEMTC, and, after
 identifying himself, informed Mr. O'Brien that he would like to get out
 of the FEMTC.  When Mr. O'Brien asked why he wanted to get out of the
 FEMTC, Mr. Cochrane informed him that he was now a member of the
 Painter's Union and since he was a painter he saw no reason for
 belonging to the FEMTC, and paying dues to two organizations.  Mr.
 O'Brien asked about Mr. Cochrane's anniversary date, and upon being
 informed that it was February 17, 1981, told Mr. Cochrane to come back
 on the anniversary date since he would have had to be in the Union for a
 full year before he could revoke his dues.  According to Mr. Cochrane,
 Mr. O'Brien also mentioned something about "ten days", but he, Mr.
 Cochrane did not remember whether the "ten days" was prior to, or after,
 his anniversary date.
 
    Mr. Cochrane made no further attempts to revoke his membership in the
 FEMTC until February 24, 1982, when he again called Mr. O'Brien and
 informed him that he, Mr. Cochrane, wanted to get out of the FEMTC.  Mr.
 O'Brien informed Mr. Cochrane that he had missed the period for revoking
 his dues since he was seven days past his anniversary date.  When Mr.
 Cochrane continued to press the matter, Mr. O'Brien referred him to the
 Industrial Relations Office at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
 Thereafter, Mr. Cochrane telephoned the Industrial Relations Office,
 told a woman about his problem and the fact that the FEMTC would not
 give him a "revocation".  The Industrial Relations Office told Mr.
 Cochrane to go to the FEMTC office on his off time and obtain the
 necessary revocation form.  Subsequently, during his lunch-hour on
 February 24, 1982, Mr. Cochrane went to the FEMTC office and asked Mr.
 O'Brien for a revocation form.  Mr. O'Brien refused to give Mr. Cochrane
 the revocation form "because the rules are already stated".  Mr.
 Cochrane then went back across the street to the Industrial Relations
 Office and spoke to Ms. Marcia Pogar a Labor Relations Specialist about
 his problem.  Ms. Pogar showed Mr. Cochrane the rules about revocation
 and also spoke with Mr. O'Brien, who expressed regret that there was no
 way that he could help Mr. Cochrane since his anniversary date had past.
 
    Mr. Cochrane was not allowed to revoke his due assignment and he
 involuntarily remained on checkoff.
 
                        Discussion and Conclusions
 
    The General Counsel takes the position that the requirement that dues
 revocation forms may only be obtained, executed and submitted at the
 FEMTC office on the anniversary date of an employee's dues assignment or
 during a ten (10) day period immediately preceding such date is
 inconsistent with, and unreasonably restrictive of, employee rights
 under Section 7115(a) of the Statute to revoke a dues assignment after
 one year and that by maintaining and enforcing such a requirement the
 Naval Shipyard and the FEMTC violated Sections 7116(a)(1), (2), (3) and
 (8), and Sections 7116(b)(1), (2) and (8), respectively, of the Statute.
  In support of the above position, the General Counsel relies, in the
 main, upon the Supreme Court's decision in Felter v. Southern Pacific
 Co., 359 U.S. 26, 43 LRRM 2876, and the National Labor Relations Board
 and Circuit Court decisions in Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock
 Company, 253 NLRB No. 96, enforced 663 F.2d 488, 108 LRRM 2400.  The
 General Counsel who acknowledges that the Southern Pacific and Newport
 News Shipbuilding cases, supra, did not address the 10 day window
 period, takes the position that the 10-day window period is unreasonable
 on its face and inconsistent with employees Section 7115(a) revocation
 rights.
 
    Additionally, the General Counsel contends that the Charging Party
 has standing to attack any and all aspects of the revocation procedure,
 irrespective of the fact that such other aspects were not used as a
 basis for denying Mr. Cochrane's request to revoke his union dues
 withholding authorization.
 
    The respective counsel for the FEMTC and the Naval Shipyard take the
 position that the requirements set forth in the collective bargaining
 contracts, published memoranda and dues withholding authorization forms
 with respect to the 10-day window period and other required steps or
 procedures necessary for the perfection of a dues revocation are not
 unreasonably restrictive of employees rights under Section 7115(a) to
 revoke dues assignments after one year.  It is the further position of
 respective counsel for the FEMTC and the Naval Shipyard that the Felter
 v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, and the Newport News Shipbuilding,
 supra, cases are inapposite and distinguishable.  Additionally, they
 rely on a number of District Court cases involving Section 302 suits
 under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 186(c)(4), and an
 outstanding Justice Department Opinion on Checkoff dated May 13, 1948,
 22 LRRM 46, finding a 10-day window period to be lawful.  Finally, the
 respective counsel for the FEMTC and the Naval Shipyard challenge the
 status of Mr. Cochrane to attack various requirements of the revocation
 procedure which were not relied upon or utilized as a ground for denying
 Mr. Cochrane's request for the revocation of dues withholding.
 
    With regard to the procedural issue, namely Mr. Cochrane's standing
 to challenge those requirements of the revocation procedure which were
 not applied to him, I find, in agreement with the position of the
 General Counsel, that Mr. Cochrane does have standing to challenge all
 the requirements of the revocation procedure, irrespective of the fact
 that some of the requirements were not applied to him personally.
 National Army and Technicians Assoc., Local 371, 7 FLRA No. 22, wherein
 the Authority found that "the person filing a charge need not be the
 alleged aggrieved party".
 
    With regard to the remaining issues in the captioned matter, all
 parties agree that the case is one of first impression and that the
 Authority has not had the opportunity to rule on the issues included
 herein.
 
    Other than making it clear that the decision to pay, or not to pay,
 dues is solely that of the affected employee, /12/ the legislative
 history of the Statute provides little help with the issues involved
 herein, namely, the meaning of the language contained in Section 7115(a)
 that "any such (dues) assignment may not be revoked for a period of one
 year".
 
    However, similar language dealing with dues assignments and
 revocation of same, has been considered by the Courts under other
 statutes, namely, the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151, et seq. and the
 Labor-Management Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 151, et seq.
 
    In Felter v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, the Supreme Court was
 called upon to interpret Section 45 U.S.C. 152 Eleventh (b) /13/ of the
 Railway Labor Act which provided for dues checkoff through a written
 assignment "which shall be revocable in writing after the expiration of
 one year or upon the termination date of the applicable collective
 bargaining agreement, whichever occurs sooner".  Specifically, the Court
 was called upon to determine what restrictions, if any, could be imposed
 upon the statutory right given an employee to revoke his authorization
 after one year.  The case arose, when an employee unsuccessfully sought
 to revoke his assignment of dues withholding more than one year after
 its execution.
 
    The Dues Deduction Agreement between the carrier and the union
 required that there be used, as a necessary form for revoking an
 assignment, nothing other than a writing executed on a form furnished by
 the union and forwarded by the union to the carrier.  When the affected
 employee sought to revoke his dues assignment by means of a written
 letter, which was identical in substance to the required form printed by
 the union, the union and the employer refused to honor such revocation
 until such time as the employee executed the forms required by the Dues
 Deduction Agreement then in effect.  /14/ By virtue of the actions of
 the union and the employer in refusing to accept a written instrument of
 revocation other than that provided for in the Dues Deduction Agreement,
 the affected employee was involuntarily subjected to additional monthly
 dues deductions from his wages.
 
    In finding that the requirement, i.e. written revocation be on a form
 furnished by the union, to be an unlawful restriction on the right given
 to an employee by Congress to freely opt for dues withholding, or to
 revoke any dues authorization in writing after one year, the Court
 summarized the defenses put forth in support of the restriction, i.e.
 minimize procedural problems, prevention of forgery, prevention of
 impulsive or impetuous revocations, reasonableness, etc, and concluded
 as follows:
 
          We do not say whether the "cooling off" period which the
       procedure insisted upon here creates would be wise or unwise as a
       matter of policy.  It is enough to say that we believe the Act has
       not left place for it.  We think the added requirement involved
       here is meaningfully burdensome when considered in context;  but
       in any event, we do not think the Act empowered carriers and labor
       organizations to bargain for any restrictions on the individual's
       right to revoke his assignment, even if later, while insisting on
       them, they choose to describe them as petty.
 
    The Court also noted in its decision as follows:
 
          There is some suggestion that, possibly apart from the
       provisions of the Act, because petitioner was a member of the
       Trainmen and represented by them in the negotiation of the
       bargaining agreement, he is bound here by the action of his agent,
       as it were, in establishing this provision.  But the short answer
       is that the proviso makes it clear that the organization was not
       to function as its members' agent in waiving their statutory
       revocation rights;  we doubt whether the right to revoke could be
       waived at all in advance of the time for its exercise, but in any
       event, a waiver through the collective agreement would under the
       statute, be the last conceivably permissible.
 
    Additionally, the Court stated in connection with the application and
 interpretation of the dues deduction and withholding provisions of the
 Railway Labor Act as follows:
 
          Carriers and labor organizations are authorized to bargain for
       arrangements for a checkoff by the employer on behalf of the
       organization.  Latitude is allowed in terms of such arrangements,
       but not past the point such terms impinge upon the freedom
       expressly reserved to the individual employee to decide whether he
       will authorize checkoff in his case.  Similarly Congress
       consciously and deliberately chose to deny carriers and labor
       organizations authority to reach terms which would restrict the
       employee's complete freedom to revoke an assignment by a writing
       directed to the employer after one year.  Congress was
       specifically concerned with keeping these areas of individual
       choice off the bargaining table.  It is plainly our duty to
       effectuate this obvious intention of Congress, and we must
       therefore be careful not to allow the employee's freedom of
       decision to be eroded in the name of procedure, or otherwise.  We
       see no authority given by the Act to carriers and labor
       organizations to restrict the employee's individual freedom of
       decision by such regulations as were agreed upon in the Dues
       Deduction Agreement.  The question is not whether these
       restrictions might abstractly be called "reasonable" or not.
 
    In Newport News Shipbuilding, supra, the National Labor Relations
 Board found that an employer and a union violated Sections 8(a)(1) and
 (3) and 8(b)(1)(A) and (2), respectively of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158,
 when they refused to honor written dues revocation requests from a
 number of employees because the revocation requests were not on specific
 forms furnished by the union.  /15/ The actions of the union and the
 employer were in compliance with a provision of the existing collective
 bargaining agreement which provided that "revocation of such
 authorization (for dues deductions) shall be by use of the form
 furnished by" the union.
 
    The Administrative Law Judge, whose decision was adopted in pertinent
 part by the Board, found that the restrictions imposed "engrafted an
 additional condition on revocation beyond that specified in the original
 delegation of authority" to make the dues deduction.  /16/ Additionally,
 the Administrative Law Judge found that the impediment to the
 statutorily guaranteed right of free choice with respect to revoking
 checkoff was aggravated by three additional elements, namely, no general
 distribution or convenient access to the required forms, no prior formal
 notification of the required procedures to be followed, and the
 requirement that the affected employee present himself at the union
 office and execute the required revocation form at such location.
 
    In view of the foregoing and in reliance upon the Supreme Court's
 decision in Felter v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, which he found
 controlling and applicable on all grounds, the Administrative Law Judge
 concluded that the union and the employer had violated the NLRA.  It
 should be noted, however, that although the NLRB did not express any
 significant disagreement with the Administrative Law Judges decision, it
 did tailor its order to provide that the restrictions should not be
 applied where the restrictions were "not set forth in the dues checkoff
 signed by the employee".  In the absence of any comment from the NLRB,
 it could be argued that the NLRB might well have reached a different
 conclusion than that of the Administrative Law Judge if, as here, the
 restrictions on revocation had been in place at the time the employee
 signed his dues withholding authorization.
 
    On appeal the Fourth Circuit in Peninsula Shipbuilders' Ass'n., v.
 NLRB, 633 F.2d 488 (1981) upheld and enforced the National Labor
 Relations Board's order.  The Court found that there was substantial
 evidence to support the Board's finding that the revocation procedure
 was applied unlawfully, but declined to reach the question of whether
 the Dues Deduction Agreement in effect between the union and the
 employer was on its face a per se violation under the rationale of
 Felter v. Southern Pacific Co., supra.
 
    A reading of the above cited cases indicates that the Courts and the
 NLRB have recognized the intent of Congress to insure that an employee's
 right to opt for the withholding of dues or to revoke an authorization
 for same shall be unencumbered.  To this end both the Courts and the
 NLRB have been reluctant to approve any restrictions on the exercise of
 the right of revocation.
 
    Here, however, as noted by the respective counsel for the Respondents
 we have a situation wherein the restrictions on revocation, i.e. use of
 a special revocation form to be obtained and filled out in the FEMTC
 office within a 10-day period preceding the employees anniversary date,
 appear on the Dues Withholding Authorization signed by Mr. Cochrane.
 Thus, unlike the situation facing the NLRB in Newport News Shipbuilding,
 supra, where the employee had no knowledge of the restrictions prior to
 executing the dues withholding authorization, we must now decide whether
 an employee's prior acknowledgement of existing restrictions on the
 right and manner of revocation mandates a different conclusion that that
 reached in Newport News Shipbuilding and Felter v. Southern Pacific Co.,
 supra.
 
    Aside from the 10-day period restriction, which will be discussed
 infra, I believe that under the circumstances present herein the
 question must be answered in the negative.
 
    As noted above, the meager legislative history of the Statute
 indicates that the decision to have dues withholding or to cease having
 dues withholding is solely that of the employee.  Accordingly, any
 restrictions on the exercise of such right would be violative of Section
 7115(a) of the Statute.  Here the record evidence establishes that
 pursuant to agreements between the Shipyard and the FEMTC the only way
 that an employee may obtain dues withholding or revoke same is through
 certain prescribed forms obtained and executed at the FEMTC office.
 Inasmuch as the restrictions imposed by such agreements are similar in
 many respects to those disapproved by the Courts and Board in Newport
 News Shipbuilding and Felter v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, I find such
 restrictions to be an unreasonable and unjustifiable burden on the
 employee's rights to freely revoke dues withholding authorizations.
 Further, contrary to the contention of the Respondents, I do not believe
 that a different conclusion is in order by virtue of the fact that the
 restrictions were in place and known to Mr. Cochrane at the time he
 executed his dues withholding authorization.
 
    While it is true that the restrictions found to be an unreasonable
 impediment to the exercise of the rights accorded employees to freely
 revoke dues withholding authorizations were enacted subsequent to the
 employee's execution of his dues withholding authorization in Newport
 News Shipbuilding, supra, such was not the case in Felter v. Southern
 Pacific Co., supra, wherein the Supreme Court emphasized that the right
 of revocation runs solely to the employee and could not be curtailed by
 any agreement between the union and the employer.  Here, like the
 situation in Felter v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, we have an agreement
 between the FEMTC and the Naval Shipyard that provides that dues
 withholding revocations could only be effected by a certain prescribed
 procedure which not only tracks, but adds additional burdens to, the
 procedure found to be an unreasonable impediment to the employee's right
 of revocation in Felter v. Southern Pacific Co., supra.  The only
 distinction appears to be that the restrictions here involved were set
 forth on the dues withholding authorization.  If the restrictions are
 bad standing alone, I can not see how their inclusion on the dues
 withholding authorization should alter or add validity to their status.
 It is not the place or manner of publication but rather the impact on
 the employee's statutory rights which controls.
 
    The Statute does not give the employer any discretion with respect to
 dues withholding but rather makes it mandatory upon the receipt of a
 written assignment.  Thus the form of the written authorization is then
 the choice of the affected employee.  Similarly, the unfettered right of
 revocation after one year runs only to the employee.  To the extent an
 employer, pursuant to an agreement with a union, insists on the use of a
 specific form, obtained and executed at the union's premises, such
 action runs contra to a literal reading of Section 7115(a) of the
 Statute and accordingly impinges on the employees' statutory rights to
 freely opt for dues withholding and revocation of same after the
 expiration of one year.
 
    Moreover, while it is recognized that a person and/or a union may
 waive various statutory rights, I can not conclude that under all the
 circumstances present herein Mr. Cochrane's action in executing the dues
 withholding authorization which contained an acknowledgement of the
 existing restrictions on the manner of revocation, amounted to a waiver
 of his statutory rights.  In the absence of any evidence that the Naval
 Shipyard would have accepted any writing, other than the specified form,
 which was a product of the Naval Shipyard and the FEMTC agreement, as a
 valid dues withholding authorization, it can hardly be argued that Mr.
 Cochrane's action in executing same amounted to a voluntary
 relinquishment of a known right.  In this connection it is noted that
 the Supreme Court in Felter v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, while
 considering the suggestion that the affected employee might be bound by
 the actions of the union as his agent in executing the restrictive dues
 withholding agreement, stated, among other things, that it "doubt(ed)
 whether the right to revoke could be waived at all in advance of the
 time for its exercise".
 
    Additionally, it is noted that in the dues withholding authorization
 executed by Mr. Cochrane he did not specifically agree to follow the
 revocation procedure but merely acknowledged the existence of the
 required revocation procedure.  To hold in such circumstances that Mr.
 Cochrane waived his Section 7115(a) rights would unfairly attribute to
 Mr. Cochrane a greater degree of legal sophistication than normally
 found in a rank and file employee.
 
    In sum, I find, based primarily on the legislative history of the
 Statute and the Supreme Courts decision in Felter v. Southern Pacific
 Co., supra, that it was the intent of Congress to give employees the
 unfettered right to revoke their respective dues withholding
 authorizations after the expiration of one year and that any
 unreasonable impediment to the exercise of such right, be it by a
 unilateral regulation of the employer, a joint agreement between the
 employer and a union or inclusion of same on a dues withholding
 authorization, is violative of Section 7115(a) of the Statute.
 Accordingly, having forced and/or required Mr. Cochrane to submit a
 specific form obtained and executed at the FEMTC office before his
 revocation would be valid, the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and the FEMTC
 impinged upon the unfettered right of revocation accorded Mr. Cochrane
 by Section 7115(a) of the Statute.
 
    With respect to the remaining issue, i.e. the so-called 10-day window
 period during which an employee must request, execute and submit a dues
 revocation form, the General Counsel takes the position that such
 restriction on revocation "is unreasonable on its face and, therefore,
 inconsistent with employees' Section 7115(a) revocation rights".  Other
 than the aforementioned quoted statement, the General Counsel offers no
 further elucidation of his position.  The Respondents, on the other
 hand, take the position that the 10-day window period for revocation is
 not inconsistent with Section 7115(a) of the Statute since the employees
 are given the opportunity to revoke after the expiration of each year
 from the date of the anniversary of their respective dues withholding
 authorizations.  In support of their position they rely upon a number of
 District Court decisions involving Section 301 of the Labor-Management
 Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, in the private sector.  Additionally they
 rely on a Justice Department Opinion issued in 1948 with respect to
 subsection (c)(4) of Section 302 of the Labor-Management Relations Act
 which provides, in pertinent part, that an employer may deduct union
 dues from an employee's wages if the employer has received "a written
 assignment which shall not be irrevocable for a period of more than one
 year . . . " .
 
    The Justice Department Opinion was in response to a question raised
 by the Solicitor of Labor as to the legality of a dues checkoff
 authorization which read in pertinent part as follows:
 
          This assignment, authorization and directive shall be
       irrevocable for the period of one (1) year . . . and I agree and
       direct that this assignment, authorization and direction shall be
       automatically renewed, and shall be irrevocable for successive
       periods of one (1) year each . . . unless written notice is given
       by me to the Employer and the Union not more than twenty (20) days
       and not less than ten (10) days prior to the expiration of each
       period of one (1) year . . . .
 
    The Justice Department concluded that "Even with the automatic
 renewal provision, the proposed form of authorization does not appear to
 be 'irrevocable' for a period of more than one year".  In view of such
 conclusion it was the opinion of the Justice Department that the dues
 checkoff authorization "would not appear to constitute a willful
 violation of subsection (c)(4)."
 
    In Shen-Mar Food Products, Inc., 221 NLRB 1331, the National Labor
 Relations Board found an 8(a)(5) violation predicated upon the
 employer's action in honoring revocations of dues checkoff
 authorizations which were submitted outside the period specified for
 same in the checkoff authorizations.  The checkoff authorizations
 provided that they should be effective for successive one year periods
 absent notice of revocation given by the employees "not more than twenty
 (20) days and not less than ten (10) days prior to the renewal date".
 
    Although the National Labor Relations Board did not go into a
 discussion of the validity of the checkoff authorizations, it found that
 the employer's action was contrary to the checkoff provision of the
 collective bargaining contract and hence a violation of the Statute.
 Member Murphy, who concurred in the result, relied solely on the terms
 of the checkoff authorization, and found a violation predicated on the
 employer's action in honoring the untimely revocations which were not
 within the time constraints set forth in the checkoff authorizations.
 
    A similar result was reached by the District Court on October 14,
 1975 in a separate 301 suit involving the same parties.  Meat Cutters,
 Local 593 v. Shen-Mar Food Products, 91 LRRM 2907.
 
    In Trico-Products Corp. 238 NLRB 1309, the NLRB concluded that a
 checkoff authorization is a contract between the employer and the
 employees and that a checkoff which did not contain any limitation of
 revocation is revocable at will.  The checkoff read as follows:
 
          I hereby authorize Trico-Products Corp. to deduct dues and
       assessments from my wages.
 
    In Brooks v. Continental Can Corp., 59 LRRM 2779, a case involving
 the LMRA, the District Court was faced with the validity of a dues
 withholding authorization which provided for year to year renewal absent
 notice of revocation given "not more than 30 days or less than 10 days
 prior to the expiration of each period of one year".  After discussing
 the Supreme Court's decision in Felter v. Southern Pacific Co., supra,
 the Court found the checkoff to be valid and concluded that the employer
 did not violate the LMRA in refusing to honor a revocation made outside
 the time limits set forth in the dues withholding authorization.  In
 reaching its conclusion to this effect, the Court stated "It is felt
 that where, as here, the parties have all agreed upon a procedure which
 protects the individual right of the employee to choose and which at the
 same time is consistent with the plain words of the Statute and the
 legislative intent, this Court ought not disturb such procedure".
 
    In Monroe Lodge v. Litton Business Systems, 80 LRRM 2379, the Circuit
 Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court holding, 80 LRRM 2374, that a
 dues withholding authorization providing for automatic yearly renewal
 absent notice of revocation during a 15-day period after the expiration
 of each year was valid and not violative of Section 302(c)(4) of the
 LMRA.  The District Court, which was affirmed in toto by the Circuit
 Court, found, however, that while an employee was bound by the year to
 year renewal set forth in his dues withholding authorization, he was not
 obligated to exercise his revocation rights solely within the 15-day
 period provided in his dues withholding authorization in order for such
 revocation to be effective.  Thus, the Court concluded that a revocation
 notice given during any year at any time within such year was sufficient
 notice to remove the employee from dues withholding immediately upon
 reaching the anniversary date of his dues withholding authorization.  In
 support of its position to this effect the District Court relied upon
 the Supreme Court's decision in Felter v. Southern Pacific Co., supra.
 In sum, the Court found that irrespective of the time limits set forth
 in the dues withholding authorization, an employee could give notice of
 revocation at any time during any succeeding year and such revocation
 would be effective at the end of such year.
 
    An analysis of the above decisions of the Courts, NLRB and the
 opinion of the Justice Department with respect to the validity of dues
 withholding authorizations which continue from year to year absent
 revocation during specific time or window periods, indicates that such
 dues withholding authorizations are valid under the LMRA.  Accordingly,
 inasmuch as the wording of the dues checkoff provisions of the LMRA and
 the Statute are similar and predicated on the identical Congressional
 intent to insure that employees will have freedom of choice with respect
 to revocation of dues withholding authorizations, I find that dues
 withholding authorizations which continue from year to year absent
 timely notice of revocation are not violative of Section 7115(a) of the
 Statute.
 
    However, in view of the Congressional intent to give employees the
 sole right to determine his or her destiny with respect to continued
 dues withholding, I further find that in order for such dues withholding
 authorizations to be legally effective they must be of such a nature to
 indicate that the employees involved clearly and unambiguously waived
 their statutory rights to revoke same after the expiration of a period
 of time not to exceed one year from the date of execution.  In this
 latter context, I can not find that the dues withholding authorization
 executed by Mr. Cochrane was of such nature.
 
    Contrary to the dues withholding authorizations involved in the cited
 cases and considered by the Justice Department in its opinion, Mr.
 Cochrane's dues withholding authorization made no mention that in the
 absence of a revocation during the 10-day period preceding the
 anniversary date of the execution of his dues withholding authorization
 the authorization would continue for the succeeding or subsequent year.
 Moreover, the dues withholding authorization did not specifically
 mention that the dues withholding authorization was to be good for a
 period exceeding one year.  Thus, in order to find that Mr. Cochrane's
 dues withholding authorization to be effective for more than one year
 one must add an implication to a literal reading of the dues withholding
 authorization and conclude that there was no other reason for the 10-day
 window period for revocations but for the parties intent that the dues
 withholding authorization was for at least one year and succeeding one
 year periods thereafter unless a timely revocation was made.  In such
 circumstances it can hardly be argued that the dues withholding
 authorization was for at least one year and succeeding one year periods
 thereafter unless a timely revocation was made.  In such circumstances
 it can hardly be argued that the dues withholding authorization amounts
 to, or qualifies as, a clear and unambiguous waiver of Mr. Cochrane's
 Section 7115(a) rights to revoke after the expiration of one year.  /17/
 
    Accordingly, I find that Mr. Cochrane could revoke his dues
 withholding authorization, effective after his one year anniversary
 date, at any time.  Cf. Trico Products, Supra.  Having given oral notice
 of his decision to revoke his dues authorization to the FEMTC in October
 1981, Mr. Cochrane was entitled to have his dues withholding terminated
 as of his anniversary date.  Monroe Lodge v. Litton Business Systems,
 supra.  Moreover, even if it can be concluded that Mr. Cochrane's dues
 withholding authorization was from year to year, absent notice to the
 contrary, the Circuit Court decision upholding the District Court in
 Monroe Lodge, supra, makes it clear that an employee need not wait until
 the window period to give notice of revocation to be effective at the
 end of his anniversary year.
 
    Accordingly, upon the basis of the above analysis, findings and
 conclusions, I further conclude that the Department of the Navy,
 Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, by imposing and
 adhering to the restrictions on revocation, issued pursuant to its
 agreement with the FEMTC, and withholding dues from the wages of Mr.
 Cochrane after the expiration of his anniversary year, violated Section
 7116(a)(1) since such action interfered with, restrained and coerced Mr.
 Cochrane in the exercise of the rights accorded him by Section 7115(a)
 of the Statute.  Further, it is concluded that by such action Portsmouth
 Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, also encouraged membership in
 the FEMTC and assisted the FEMTC in violation of Sections 7116(a)(2),
 (3) and (8), respectively, of the Statute.  /18/
 
    With respect to Respondent, Portsmouth Federal Employees Metal Trades
 Council, AFL-CIO, it is concluded that by insisting on enforcement of
 the restrictions on revocation, which were a product of its agreements
 with the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, the Portsmouth Federal Employees
 Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, violated Sections 7116(b)(1), (2) and (8)
 of the Statute.
 
    Based upon the above findings and conclusions, it is hereby
 recommended that the Authority issue the following order designed to
 effectuate the purposes and policies of the Statute.
 
                                   ORDER
 
    Pursuant to Section 2423.29 of the Federal Labor Relations
 Authority's Rules and Regulations and Section 7118 of the Statute:
 
    A. Respondent Department of the Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard,
 Portsmouth, New Hampshire, shall:
 
    1.  Cease and desist from:
 
    (a) Encouraging membership in the Portsmouth Federal Employees Metal
 Trades Council, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization by:
 
          (1) Continuing to deduct union dues from the wages of Lloyd C.
       Cochrane, or any other employee, and transmitting such dues to the
       Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, or any other
       labor organization, after Mr. Cochrane or any other employee has
       effectively sought to revoke such dues checkoff authorizations.
 
          (2) Maintaining and enforcing a provision in a collective
       bargaining agreement which requires that Lloyd C. Cochrane or any
       other employee use a particular form obtained and executed at the
       offices of the Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, in
       order to timely revoke dues checkoff authorizations.
 
    (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining or
 coercing employees in the exercise of any right under the Federal
 Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.
 
    (c) In any like or related manner, failing or refusing to comply with
 any provisions of the Federal Labor-Management Relations Statute.
 
    2.  Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the
 purposes and policies of the Statute:
 
    (a) Jointly and severally with Respondent Federal Employees Metal
 Trades Council, AFL-CIO, reimburse Mr. Lloyd C. Cochrane with interest
 for any dues deducted from his wages after February 17, 1982, the one
 year anniversary date of the execution of his dues withholding
 authorization.
 
    (b) Post at its facilities copies of the attached Notice marked
 Appendix A on forms to be furnished by the Federal Labor Relations
 Authority.  Upon receipt of such forms, they shall be signed by the
 Commander of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire,
 and shall be posted and maintained by him for 60 consecutive days
 thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all bulletin boards and
 other places where notices to employees are customarily posted.  The
 Commander shall take reasonable steps to insure that such Notices are
 not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
 
    (c) Notify the Federal Labor Relations Authority in writing, within
 30 days from the date of this Order, as to what steps have been taken to
 comply herewith.
 
    B.  Respondent Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO,
 shall:
 
    1.  Cease and desist from:
 
          (a) Causing or attempting to cause Department of the Navy,
       Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to deduct
       union dues from the wages of Mr. Lloyd C. Cochrane, or any other
       employee, pursuant to dues withholding authorizations which are no
       longer valid because Mr. Lloyd C. Cochrane, or any other employee,
       has effectively sought to revoke such authorizations.
 
          (b) Maintaining or enforcing any provision of a collective
       bargaining agreement which impedes Mr. Cochrane or any other
       employee, from revoking dues withholding authorizations by their
       clear and unambiguous declaration of such intent.
 
          (c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
       restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of any right
       under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.
 
    2.  Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the
 purposes and policies of the Statute:
 
          (a) Jointly and severally with Respondent Department of the
       Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire,
       reimburse Mr. Lloyd C. Cochrane with interest for any dues
       deducted from his wages after February 17, 1982, the one year
       anniversary date of the execution of his dues withholding
       authorization.
 
          (b) Post at its facilities in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, copies
       of the attached Notice marked Appendix B on forms to be furnished
       by the Federal Labor Relations Authority.  Upon receipt of such
       forms, they shall be signed by the President of the Federal
       Employees Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, and shall be posted and
       maintained by him for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
       conspicuous places, including all bulletin boards and other places
       where notices to employees are customarily posted.  The President
       shall take reasonable steps to insure that such Notices are not
       altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
 
          (c) Notify the Federal Labor Relations Authority in writing,
       within 30 days from the date of this Order, as to what steps have
       been taken to comply herewith.
 
                                       BURTON S. STERNBURG
                                       Administrative Law Judge
 
 Dated:  April 13, 1983
         Washington, D.C.
 
 
 
 
                                APPENDIX A
 
                          NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
 
  PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR
 RELATIONS
 AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF CHAPTER 71
 OF TITLE
 5 OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE
 We Hereby
 Notify Our Employees That:
 
 WE WILL NOT continue to deduct union dues from the wages of Mr.  Lloyd
 C. Cochrane, or any other employee, and transmit such dues to the
 Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
 organization, after Mr. Cochrane, or any other employee, has effectively
 sought to timely revoke his dues withholding authorization.  WE WILL NOT
 maintain and enforce a provision in a collective bargaining agreement
 which requires that Mr. Lloyd C. Cochrane, or any other employee, use a
 particular form obtained and executed at the offices of the Federal
 Employees Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
 organization, in order to timely revoke dues withholding authorizations.
  WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or
 coerce our employees in the exercise of any right under the Federal
 Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.  WE WILL NOT in any like or
 related manner, fail or refuse to comply with any of the provisions of
 the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.  WE WILL jointly
 and severally with the Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO,
 reimburse Mr. Lloyd C. Cochrane for any dues deducted from his wages,
 with interest, after February 17, 1982, the one year anniversary date of
 his execution of a dues withholding authorization.
                                       (Agency or Activity)
 
 Dated:  . . .  By:  (Signature) This Notice must remain posted for 60
 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
 defaced or covered by any other material.  If employees have any
 questions concerning this Notice or compliance with any of its
 provisions, they may communicate directly with the Regional Director of
 the Federal Labor Relations Authority, Region One, whose address is:
 441 Stuart Street, Ninth Floor, Boston, Massachusetts, and whose
 telephone number is:  (617) 223-0920.
 
 
 
 
                                APPENDIX B
 
                          NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
 
  PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR
 RELATIONS
 AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF CHAPTER 71
 OF TITLE
 5 OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE
 We Hereby
 Notify Our Employees That:
 
 WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Department of the Navy, Portsmouth
 Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to deduct union dues from the
 wages of Mr. Lloyd C. Cochrane, or any other employee, pursuant to a
 dues withholding authorizations which are no longer valid because Mr.
 Lloyd C. Cochrane, or any other employee, has effectively sought to
 revoke such authorizations.  WE WILL NOT maintain or enforce any
 provision of a collective bargaining agreement which impedes Mr. Lloyd
 C. Cochrane, or any other employee, from revoking dues withholding
 authorizations by a clear and unambiguous declaration of such intent.
 WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or
 coerce employees in the exercise of any right under the Federal Service
 Labor-Management Relations Statute.  WE WILL NOT in any like or related
 manner, fail or refuse to comply with any provisions of the Federal
 Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.  WE WILL jointly and
 severally with Department of the Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard,
 Portsmouth, New Hampshire, reimburse Mr. Lloyd C. Cochrane for any dues
 deducted from his wages, with interest, after February 17, 1982, the one
 year anniversary date of his execution of a dues withholding
 authorization.
                                       (Union or Labor Organization)
 
 Dated:  . . .  By:  (Signature) This Notice must remain posted for 60
 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
 defaced or covered by any other material.  If employees have any
 questions concerning this Notice or compliance with any of its
 provisions, they may communicate directly with the Regional Director of
 the Federal Labor Relations Authority, Region One, whose address is:
 441 Stuart Street, Ninth Floor, Boston, Massachusetts, and whose
 telephone number is:  (617) 223-0920.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 --------------- FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
 
 
    /1/ Pursuant to section 2429.9 of the Authority's Rules and
 Regulations, the American Federation of Government Employees and the
 International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO,
 each were granted permission to file a brief as an amicus curiae in this
 proceeding.
 
 
    /2/ Sec. 7115.  Allotments to representatives
 
          (a) If an agency has received from an employee in an
       appropriate unit a written assignment which authorizes the agency
       to deduct from the pay of the employee amounts for the payment of
       regular and periodic dues of the exclusive representative of the
       unit, the agency shall honor the assignment and make an
       appropriate allotment pursuant to the assignment.  Any such
       allotment shall be made at no cost to the exclusive representative
       or the employee.  Except as provided under subsection (b) of this
       section, any such assignment may not be revoked for a period of 1
       year.
 
 
    /3/ Sec. 7116.  Unfair labor practices
 
          (a) For the purpose of this chapter, it shall be an unfair
       labor practice for an agency--
 
          (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee in the
       exercise by the employee of any right under this chapter;
 
          (2) to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
       organization by discrimination in connection with hiring, tenure,
       promotion, or other conditions of employment;
 
          (3) to sponsor, control, or otherwise assist any labor
       organization, other than to furnish, upon request, customary and
       routine services and facilities if the services and facilities are
       also furnished on an impartial basis to other labor organizations
       having equivalent status;
 
                                .  .  .  .
 
          (8) to otherwise fail or refuse to comply with any provision of
       this chapter.
 
 
    /4/ Sec. 7116.  Unfair labor practices
 
                                .  .  .  .
 
          (b) For the purpose of this chapter, it shall be an unfair
       labor practice for a labor organization--
 
          (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee in the
       exercise by the employee of any right under this chapter;
 
          (2) to cause or attempt to cause an agency to discriminate
       against any employee in the exercise by the employee of any right
       under this chapter;
 
                                .  .  .  .
 
          (8) to otherwise fail or refuse to comply with any provision of
       this chapter.
 
 
    /5/ Accordingly, the Authority does not adopt the Judge's statement
 at n.8 of his Decision.
 
 
    /6/ See generally Felter v. Southern Pacific Co. et al., 359 U.S. 326
 (1959), decided under the Railway Labor Act, and Newport News
 Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, 253 NLRB 721, enforced sub nom.
 Peninsula Shipbuilders Association v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 488 (4th Cir.
 1980), decided under the National Labor Relations Act, cited by the
 Judge.  In Felter the court concluded that the Railway Labor Act
 contained no statutory authorization for a requirement that dues
 revocations could be effectuated only on forms furnished and forwarded
 to the employer by the union, and that Congress had consciously and
 deliberately chosen to deny employers and unions the authority to
 restrict an employee's right to revoke in such a manner.  In Newport
 News, the court concluded that refusal to honor written dues revocation
 requests because the requests were not on specific forms furnished by
 the union as required by the collective bargaining agreement constituted
 an unlawful restriction since it was an additional condition not
 specified in the employees' dues withholding authorizations.
 
 
    /7/ Although the Charging Party's attempts to revoke his dues
 withholding authorization were rejected because of their untimeliness
 and not because he refused to obtain, execute and submit the withdrawal
 form at the Union office, he was required to comply with those
 procedures, and they were properly alleged as unfair labor practices in
 the complaint.
 
 
    /8/ In concluding that the Respondents violated the Statute as set
 forth above, the Authority does not find and should not be construed as
 holding that dues revocation forms provided by an exclusive
 representative are per se unlawful, but rather that the Union's control
 of the forms in the circumstances of this case was unlawfully coercive.
 
 
    /9/ As the Charging Party was untimely in his attempt to revoke his
 dues withholding authorization, reimbursement of dues paid since that
 time shall not be required.
 
 
    /10/ Article 36, Section 11, reads as follows:
 
    No unit employee covered by the terms of this Agreement or any
 representative of the Employer shall be permitted to fill out a Dues
 Revocation Form (SF-1188) during working hours.  Unit employees shall
 obtain a copy of the Dues Revocation Form (SF-1188) from the Council
 office during nonwork hours.  The Council shall immediately forward a
 copy of such form to Comptroller.
 
 
    /11/ The first paragraph of the dues withholding authorization merely
 stated in pertinent part as follows:  "I hereby authorize the above
 named agency to deduct from my pay each pay period the amount verified
 above . . . "
 
 
    /12/ Legislative History Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
 Statute, Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 96th
 Congress, 1st Sess., Committee print 110.96-7 (1979) at 694.
 
 
    /13/ 45 U.S.C. 152 Eleventh (b) permits a labor organization and the
 carrier:
 
          (b) to make agreements providing for the deduction by such
       carrier or carriers from the wages of its or their employees . . .
       and payment to the labor organization representing . . . such
       employees, of any periodic dues. . . . :  Provided, That no such
       agreement shall be effective with respect to any individual
       employee until he shall have furnished the employer with a written
       assignment to the labor organization of such membership dues. . .
       . , which shall be revocable in writing after the expiration of
       one year or upon the termination date of the applicable collective
       agreement, whichever occurs sooner.
 
 
    /14/ The dues withholding authorization executed by Felter, the
 affected employee, was on a form printed by the Union pursuant to the
 Dues Deduction Agreement.  The decisions of the District Court, Circuit
 Court and the Supreme Court do not contain the substance of the dues
 withholding authorization nor do they indicate whether or not the
 employee was aware of the content of the Dues Deduction Agreement which
 also provided for the use of a specific form for revocation.
 
 
    /15/ Section 320(c)(4) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29
 U.S.C. 186(c)(4), which amended the NLRA, provides that an employer may
 withhold dues and remit same to a labor organization if,
 
          That employer has received from each employee, on whose account
       such deductions are made, a written assignment which shall not be
       irrevocable for a period of more than one year, or beyond the
       termination date of the applicable collective bargaining
       agreement, whichever occurs sooner.
 
 
    /16/ The dues deduction assignments stated as follows:
 
          Your authority to make the above-mentioned deductions shall
       remain in force and effect until revoked by me in writing.
 
 
    /17/ The Statute merely states that any dues authorization "may not
 be revoked for a period of one year".  It does not state that after the
 expiration of one year it shall be effective from year to year absent
 timely notice to the contrary.  In such circumstances, absent an
 agreement to the contrary, it would appear that an employee would be
 free to revoke his dues authorization any time after the expiration of
 one year.
 
 
    /18/ In finding that the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard violated the
 Statute by continuing to withhold union dues from the wages of Mr.
 Cochrane's wa