19:0899(107)CA - Philadelphia Naval Shipyard and Philadelphia Metal Trades Council -- 1985 FLRAdec CA



[ v19 p899 ]
19:0899(107)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:


 19 FLRA No. 107
 
 PHILADELPHIA NAVAL SHIPYARD
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 PHILADELPHIA METAL TRADES COUNCIL
 Charging Party
 
                                            Case No. 2-CA-40243
 
                            DECISION AND ORDER
 
    The Administrative Law Judge issued the attached Decision in the
 above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in
 certain unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, and
 recommending that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take
 certain affirmative action.  Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions
 to the Judge's Decision and the General Counsel filed an opposition to
 the Respondent's exceptions.
 
    Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations
 and section 7118 of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
 Statute (the Statute), the Authority has reviewed the rulings made at
 the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.  The
 rulings are hereby affirmed.  Upon consideration of the Judge's Decision
 and the entire record, the Authority hereby adopts the Judge's findings,
 conclusions and recommendations only to the extent consistent herewith.
 
    The Judge concluded that the Respondent failed to comply with the
 requirements of section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute /1/ in violation of
 section 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute when it refused to
 provide the Union, upon request, with the names and home addresses of
 all unit employees represented by the exclusive representative.  In this
 regard, the Judge, inter alia, found that:  an exclusive representative
 must be able to communicate effectively with its constituency;  that the
 exclusive representative's access to the addresses of unit employees was
 necessary for it to carry out its representational responsibilities in
 the area of collective bargaining because it had no other effective
 means of communication with unit employees;  and that the Privacy Act
 /2/ was not a bar to such disclosure.
 
    The Authority disagrees.  In a recent decision, Farmers Home
 Administration Finance Office, St. Louis, Missouri, 19 FLRA No. 21
 (1985), petition for review filed sub nom. American Federation of
 Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3354 v. FLRA, No. 85-1493 (D.C.
 Cir. Aug. 6, 1985) (hereinafter Farmers Home Administration) the
 Authority, relying on its prior decision in Army and Air Force Exchange
 Service (AAFES), Fort Carson, Colorado, 17 FLRA No. 92 (1985), petition
 for review filed sub nom. American Federation of Government Employees,
 Local 1345 v. FLRA, No. 85-1378 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 1985) (hereinafter
 AAFES), stated that the disclosure of unit employees' names and home
 addresses, like the disclosure of other data sought pursuant to section
 7114(b)(4) of the Statute, requires not only a case by case
 determination as to whether the data has been requested, whether it is
 normally maintained, whether it is reasonably available, and whether it
 is necessary to enable the exclusive representative to fulfill its
 representational obligations, but also requires a determination that the
 disclosure of the data sought would not be prohibited by law, including
 the Privacy Act.  In AAFES, the Authority decided that, in determining
 whether the disclosure of any data sought pursuant to section 7114(b)(4)
 of the Statute is or is not otherwise "prohibited by law," i.e., the
 Privacy Act, it will use the same balancing test applied by the courts
 in evaluating whether information sought under the Freedom of
 Information Act (FOIA) /3/ should be disclosed or should be protected
 from disclosure as a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy under the
 FOIA exemption set forth at 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6).  The application of the
 (b)(6) balancing test requires weighing the necessity of the data for
 the union's purposes against the degree of intrusion on the individuals'
 privacy interests caused by disclosure of the data.  /4/
 
    Guided particularly by the decision of the Fourth Circuit in American
 Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1923 v. United States
 Department of Health and Human Services, 712 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1983),
 wherein the Court adopted the lower court's determination that the
 balance of all factors led to the conclusion that an exclusive
 representative was not entitled to the home addresses of unit employees
 which it had sought pursuant to the FOIA, the Authority in Farmers Home
 Administration applied the foregoing balancing test and concluded that
 the exclusive representative there was not entitled to the names and
 home addresses of unit employees under section 7114(b)(4) of the
 Statute.
 
    As in Farmers Home Administration, the Authority finds that the same
 findings and conclusions flow from the similar facts of the present
 case.  Thus, for the reasons stated in Farmers Home Administration, we
 find that the employees' strong privacy interest in their home addresses
 outweighs the necessity of the data for the Union's purposes in the
 circumstances of this case.  Moreover, the record in this case clearly
 establishes that alternative means of communication with unit employees
 were available to the Union herein.  /5/ Further, we find that the
 records sought by the Union herein, as in Farmers Home Administration,
 i.e., the names and addresses of unit employees, are not of the type
 that generally must be disclosed pursuant to the FOIA's (b)(6) exemption
 for the purposes for which they were sought herein.  Thus, the Authority
 finds that the disclosure of unit employees' names and home addresses
 for the purposes for which they were sought herein was "prohibited by
 law" and that their release by the Respondent therefore was not required
 pursuant to section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute.  Therefore, the Authority
 concludes that the Respondent did not fail to comply with section
 7114(b)(4) of the Statute in violation of section 7116(a)(1), (5) or (8)
 of the Statute when it refused to provide the exclusive representative
 with the names and home addresses of unit employees.  /6/ Accordingly,
 the Authority shall order that the complaint be dismissed.
 
                                   ORDER
 
    IT IS ORDERED that the complaint in Case No. 2-CA-40243 be, and it
 hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.  
 
 Issued, Washington, D.C., August 22, 1985
 
                                       Henry B. Frazier III, Acting
                                       Chairman
                                       William J. McGinnis, Jr., Member
                                       FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -------------------- ALJ$ DECISION FOLLOWS --------------------
 
                                       Case No. 2-CA-40243
 
    Barbara S. Liggett, Esquire
    E. A. Jones, Esquire
       For the General Counsel
 
    Elizabeth A. Martinez, Esquire
       For the Respondent
 
    Before:  BURTON S. STERNBURG
       Administrative Law Judge
 
                                 DECISION
 
                           Statement of the Case
 
    This is a proceeding under the Federal Service Labor-Management
 Relations Statute, Chapter 71 of Title 5 of the U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C.
 7101, et seq. and the Rules and Regulations issued thereunder.
 
    Pursuant to a charge filed on March 6, 1984, by the Philadelphia
 Metal Trades Council (hereinafter called the Union), a Complaint and
 Notice of Hearing was issued on May 29, 1984, by the Regional Director
 for Region II, Federal Labor Relations Authority, New York, N.Y.  The
 Complaint alleges that the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard (hereinafter
 called the Shipyard or Respondent), violated Sections 7116(a)(1), (5)
 and (8) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute,
 (hereinafter called the Statute), by refusing to honor the Union's
 request for the home addresses of the employees working in a unit
 represented by the Union.
 
    A hearing was held in the captioned matter on July 9, 1984, in
 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  All parties were afforded the full
 opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to
 introduce evidence bearing on the issues involved herein.  The General
 Counsel and the Respondent submitted post hearing briefs on August 30,
 1984, which have been duly considered.
 
    Upon the basis of the entire record, including my observation of the
 witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following findings of fact,
 conclusions, and recommendations.
 
                             Findings of Fact
 
    The Union is the exclusive representative "of all non-supervisory
 ungraded employees of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, excluding
 ungraded employees in units where other labor organizations have been
 granted exclusive recognition." Of the approximately 7000 employees
 included in the unit, only about 4400 are dues paying members of the
 Union.  The Union and the Respondent are parties to a collective
 bargaining agreement which became effective on March 12, 1982.  The
 contract is for a three year period, "and from year to year thereafter",
 in the absence of a notice from either party to the contrary.
 
    On February 16, 1984, Union President Bill Reil wrote a letter to the
 Commander of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard which reads in pertinent
 part as follows:
 
          As provided for by public law, the Philadelphia Metal Trades
       Council is the official bargaining and employee representational
       organization for all non-supervisory ungraded employees of the
       Philadelphia Naval Shipyard excluding ungraded employees in units
       where other labor organizations have been granted exclusive
       recognition.  In order for this organization to carry out it's
       entitled responsibilities, within the scope of collective
       bargaining, it is necessary that this Council have the opportunity
       to carry out full and proper discussions and likewise receive
       information from all bargaining unit employees.  This Council
       requires feedback from employees of this bargaining unit in order
       to frame bargaining proposals and to undertake it's multi-faceted
       representational obligations.
 
          Accordingly, we do request that name and address information on
       all bargaining unit employees be made available to this Council so
       that we can proceed to fulfill our obligations as provided for
       under labor statute.  Precedent for this request has been
       determined by the FLRA (reference Defense Mapping Agency Center,
       St. Louis, Missouri;  7-CA-20482, OALJ No. 83-85).
 
    On March 5, 1984, the Commander of the Naval Shipyard replied by
 memorandum to the Union President's letter of February 16, 1984.  The
 memorandum reads in pertinent part as follows:
 
          1.  By reference (a), you requested the home addresses of all
       employees in the Shipyard who fall within the scope of the
       bargaining unit represented.  You state that you need to receive
       information from "all" bargaining unit employees in order to frame
       bargaining proposals and to otherwise undertake your
       representational obligations.  You assert that the Federal Labor
       Relations Authority has set precedent on this issue in favor of
       your request, and provided the reference applicable.
 
          2.  Although I agree that the union has responsibility to
       represent the interests of all bargaining unit employees and
       therefore having access to the employees represented is necessary,
       the question to resolve is whether or not the union already has
       such access in order to receive the "feedback" you require.  Under
       the provisions of reference (b), the union has been granted four
       (4) means of access to and communication with all bargaining unit
       employees.
 
          3.  Article VIII, section 1 of reference (b) provides for the
       union's designation of one steward for every eighty-five
       employees, excluding chief stewards.  The union is free to
       designate stewards in such a way as to provide representation in
       virtually all areas of the Shipyard where bargaining unit
       employees exist.  These stewards are most certainly in a position
       to have access to and communication with employees in their
       respective areas.  Section 16 of this same article provides that
       your representatives may distribute union literature to employees
       in the Shipyard.  Surely any polling on questions of concern may
       be accomplished via this means.
 
          4.  Article XXXV, section 1 of reference (b) provides for the
       union's use of one-half of all unofficial bulletin boards within
       the bargaining unit.  This section also provides for the union's
       recommendations for the location of such bulletin boards in order
       to satisfy any inadequacies of access to employees.  Section 2 of
       this same article grants the union the opportunity to publish
       notices or other appropriate news items of general interest or
       concern in the Shipyard newspaper which is issued weekly.  Once
       again, this means of communication can be effective in order to
       receive feedback from employees.
 
          5.  In regards to the case reference you provided, I note that
       it does not represent a case decided by the Authority as you
       suggest.  Instead, the case (decided by an administrative law
       judge) is pending decision by the Authority.  In any event a
       review of that case reveals dissimilar circumstances between that
       agency and union, and ourselves.  The Shipyard (and it's
       employees) is situated at one facility, as opposed to being
       geographically dispersed.  Union representatives by and large
       possess the security clearance necessary to facilitate access to
       virtually all areas.  You publish a monthly news bulletin that
       your representatives distribute which does not require prior
       review by management.  You maintain an office here on site with
       both shipyard and commercial telephone lines.
 
          6.  In consideration of the foregoing, I have concluded that
       you have adequate, effective means already available to you in
       order to accomplish the objective of communication and feedback.
       Accordingly, your request is denied."
 
    With respect to the physical layout of the Philadelphia Naval
 Shipyard and the Union's avenues of access to the unit employees, the
 record discloses that some 11,000 individuals are employed at the
 Shipyard which is approximately three and one-half by two miles in area.
 
    The employees work in many buildings, on ships and in outside field
 areas operating cranes and servicing fuel depots.  The employees arrive
 by ferry from New Jersey, on mass transit buses, private automobiles,
 walking and bicycles.  The shipyard is entered by four gates.  The buses
 do not drop their passengers at such gates, but proceed through the
 gates and drop their passengers at various locations throughout the
 Shipyard.
 
    The employees composing the work force commute from New York, New
 Jersey, Delaware and Pennsylvania, an area of approximately 90 miles
 from the Shipyard.
 
    The Union has access to half the 35 unofficial bulletin boards at the
 Shipyard.  However, according to Mr. John Meyer, Vice-President of the
 Machinists Union and a member of the Metal Trades Council's negotiation
 team, the bulletin boards are not an effective means of communication
 because of their location and the fact that there is no way to prevent
 notices from being ripped off the bulletin boards.  There are no
 bulletin boards on the ships where a majority of the unit employees
 work.  At the time of the hearing, some 2500 of the 7000 unit employees
 were working on the U.S. Forrestal.
 
    The Union has no access to the Shipyard's internal mailing system.
 
    The collective bargaining agreement gives the Union access to the
 Shipyard's weekly newspaper.  However, the Shipyard reserves editing
 control over the Shipyard newspaper.  The record is barren of any
 evidence indicating that the Union has ever been denied the right to
 publish anything in the Shipyard newspaper.  The Shipyard's newspaper is
 distributed at various drop-off points throughout the Shipyard.
 
    The Union publishes a monthly newspaper which is also distributed at
 various drop-off points throughout the Shipyard.
 
    The Union holds monthly meetings both on and off the base.  The
 meetings are generally attended by not more than thirty-five of the unit
 employees.
 
    While the Union has two telephones in its office at the Shipyard, it
 finds that the telephones are an ineffective means of communication
 because the telephones in the work areas are too remote from the
 employees' respective duty stations.  Few telephones are located on the
 ships and the employees do not, in any event, have ready access to such
 telephones.
 
    The Union does not have the right to official time for purposes of
 soliciting employees' views on working conditions.
 
    While the Union is entitled in accordance with the collective
 bargaining agreement to one steward for every 85 employees, according to
 the Union, only about twenty-five of such stewards are considered
 "active".  The Union does not have control over where stewards are
 placed.  The Union currently has approximately 124 designated
 representatives.
 
    The unit employees have no break periods during their respective
 shifts and are entitled to only thirty minutes for lunch.
 
    The unit employees work on three shifts.  In emergency situations the
 employees are assigned to "12's", where they "might work from six in the
 morning to six at night, or six at night to six in the morning."
 
    While there are "musters" at the beginning and end of the shifts for
 about three minutes, the "musters" are generally supervisors' time.
 Each work gang musters separately.
 
    The Union has in the past attempted to reach the unit employees by
 means of handbilling.  However, the handbilling proved unsuccessful due
 to traffic problems.
 
    The Shipyard employees all park in designated parking lots.
 
    The Union has the right to distribute literature on the Shipyard
 premises during non-working time.
 
                        Discussion and Conclusions
 
    Section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute obligates an agency to furnish to
 the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees, upon request,
 data which is reasonably available and necessary for free and proper
 discussion, understanding, and negotiation of subjects within the scope
 of collective bargaining.
 
    Predicated upon the above cited provision of the Statute the Union
 requested the addresses of all unit employees for purposes of soliciting
 their views with respect to possible contractual proposals to be
 included in the Union's presentation to management in future
 negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement.  Respondent
 refused to give the Union the addresses of the unit employees on the
 sole ground that the addresses of the employees were not necessary since
 the Union had other effective avenues of communication with the unit
 employees such as bulletin boards, newspapers, telephone, stewards, etc.
 
    In both the private and public sector, it has been recognized that in
 order for a union to carry out its representational responsibilities
 flowing from its selection as an exclusive bargaining representative,
 the union must be able to communicate effectively with its constituency
 and obtain their respective views with respect to what proposals should
 be included in any prospective collective bargaining agreement.
 Internal Revenue Service, Office of the District Director, Jacksonville,
 Florida, A/SLMR No. 214, Aff'd. FLRC No. 72A-50;  United Aircraft v.
 NLRB, 434 F.2d 1198;  Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. NLRB, 412
 F.2d 77.
 
    The above cited cases, in addition to acknowledging a union's
 representational responsibility to contact unit members for purposes of
 ascertaining their comments and desires in order to frame meaningful
 collective bargaining proposals, make it clear that to the extent that a
 union is unable through the available channels of communication to
 effectively reach its constituency and solicit proposals, the union is
 then entitled to the home addresses of the unit employees for purposes
 of effectively carrying out its representational responsibilities.
 
    According to both the Federal Labor Relations Council, the
 Authority's predecessor, and the Circuit Courts of Appeal, a
 determination of whether an exclusive representative has in fact
 effective means of communication with unit employees, absent their
 respective addresses, must be made solely on a case-by-case basis.  Only
 after a finding is made that a union lacks an effective means of
 communication with unit employees is the Union entitled to the addresses
 of unit employees.  If on the other hand a contrary determination is
 made, i.e. that the union does have an effective means of communication
 with unit employees, then the union is not entitled to the addresses of
 unit employees, since such data would not be necessary for purposes of
 negotiation of subjects within the scope of collective bargaining.
 
    While both the General Counsel and the Respondent appear to
 acknowledge the above conclusions with respect to the state of the law,
 both urge contrary findings predicated upon their respective analysis of
 the facts underlying the instant complaint.  Thus, the General Counsel
 would find that the requested information is relevant to the Union's
 representational responsibilities and necessary since without same the
 Union has no effective means of communication with unit personnel.
 Respondent, on the other hand, takes the position (1) that the requested
 information is not relevant since the collective bargaining contract was
 some fourteen or fifteen months away from expiration;  and (2) even
 assuming a contrary conclusion with respect to relevance, the requested
 information is not necessary since the Union has other effective means
 of communication with unit personnel.  Finally, Respondent raises for
 the first time in its post-hearing brief the Privacy Act as a defense to
 its failure to make the requested addresses available to the Union.  /7/
 
    Contrary to the Respondent and in agreement with the General Counsel,
 I find that the requested information was indeed relevant to the Union's
 collective bargaining needs.  As noted above, once certified as an
 exclusive bargaining representative a Union has a responsibility to
 represent all unit personnel.  Such representational responsibility
 includes, among other things, solicitation of bargaining proposals,
 etc., sensitive to the unit personnel's respective desires and problems.
  Without same, a union would be frustrated in its attempt to frame
 meaningful bargaining proposals for inclusion into any prospective
 contract.  The fact that a collective bargaining contract reopener may
 be some fourteen or fifteen months away does not serve to diminish the
 Union's representational responsibilities.  It is not for the Respondent
 to decide when the Union should embark on a course of action designed to
 serve its unit members and fulfill its representational
 responsibilities.  In the instant case there are some seven thousand
 employees in the unit.  Assuming that each and every employee had a
 different view on what subjects etc., should be addressed in any final
 collective bargaining agreement, it can hardly be argued that fourteen
 months is too long a period to allow for the synthesis of such numerous
 proposals and/or comments.  According to a literal reading of Section
 7114(b)(4), if the requested information is relevant to the collective
 bargaining process, the Union is entitled to the information.
 
    Again, contrary to the Respondent, I find, predicated on the facts of
 the instant case, that union access to the addresses of the unit
 employees is necessary to carry out its representational
 responsibilities in the area of collective bargaining, since without
 same it has no effective means of communication with the unit employees.
 
    In reaching this conclusion I rely on the fact that the unit
 employees are spread out over a vast area working on cranes, in fuel
 depots, on ships and in a multitude of other buildings, many of which
 locations do not possess bulletin boards or readily accessible
 telephones;  employees enter the shipyard through four gates and
 handbilling on the streets leading up to the gates has proven in the
 past to be an ineffective means of communication;  while there are
 designated parking lots on the premises for unit employees, many of the
 employees arrive at work by bus, foot or bicycles;  the buses do not
 drop their passengers at one location, but rather proceed through the
 base and drop off the employees along their respective routes;  while
 the Union possesses the names of unit employees, telephone contact with
 such employees would be an insurmountable task since the unit employees
 live in New York, New Jersey, Delaware and Pennsylvania, an area of
 approximately 90 miles in area;  Union access to half of the thirty-five
 unofficial bulletin boards at the Shipyard is an insufficient means of
 communication since such bulletin boards are not located at each and
 every work area and there is no way to prevent notices from being
 removed from the bulletin boards;  there are no bulletin boards on the
 ships where a majority of the employees work;  while the Union is
 entitled to a steward for every eighty-five employees, the stewards are
 not allowed official time for purposes of soliciting employees' views on
 conditions of employment;  while both the Union and Respondent publish
 monthly and weekly newspapers, respectively, such newspapers are not
 delivered directly to the unit employees but rather are left at various
 drop off points throughout the base;  the unit employees generally work
 on three shifts and in emergency situations are assigned to shifts of
 "12's" where they "might work from six in the morning to six at night or
 six at night to six in the morning."
 
    In sum, I find the facts of the instant case to be essentially
 similar to those appearing in United Aircraft Corporation, supra,
 Prudential Insurance Company of America, supra, and Magma Copper Co.,
 208 NLRB 329, wherein the National Labor Relations Board, with Court
 approval, determined that the Unions involved therein were entitled to
 have the addresses of unit employees in order to carry out their
 respective representational responsibilities.
 
    Having concluded that Union access to the home addresses of the unit
 employees is necessary in order for the Union to carry out its
 representational responsibilities, I find that Respondent's refusal to
 acquiesce in the Union's request for the home addresses of unit
 employees violated Sections 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute.
 Accordingly, it is recommended that the Federal Labor Relations
 Authority issue the following:
 
                                   ORDER
 
    Pursuant to Section 2423.29 of the Federal Labor Relations
 Authority's Rules and Regulations and Section 7118 of the Federal
 Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, the Authority hereby orders
 that the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, shall:
 
          1.  Cease and desist from:
 
          (a) Refusing or failing to furnish upon request of the
       Philadelphia Metal Trades Council the addresses of all unit
       employees.
 
          (b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
       restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their
       rights assured by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
       Statute.
 
          2.  Take the following affirmative action in order to
       effectuate the purposes and policies of the Statute.
 
          (a) Upon request, make available to the Philadelphia Metal
       Trades Council, addresses of all unit employees.
 
          (b) Post at its facilities at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard,
       Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, copies of the Notice To All Employees,
       attached hereto as Appendix A, on forms to be furnished by the
       Regional Director, Region II, Federal Labor Relations Authority.
       Upon receipt of such forms they shall be signed by the Commander,
       Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, and shall be posted and maintained by
       him for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
       places, including all bulletin boards and other places where
       notices to employees are customarily posted.  The Commander shall
       take all reasonable steps to insure that such Notices are not
       altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
 
          (c) Pursuant to Section 2423.30 of the Authority's Rules and
       Regulations, notify the Regional Director, Region II, Federal
       Labor Relations Authority, in writing within 30 days from the date
       of this Order, as to what steps have been taken to comply
       herewith.
 
                                       BURTON S. STERNBURG
                                       Administrative Law Judge
 
 Dated:  September 24, 1984
         Washington, D.C.
 
                                APPENDIX A
 
                          NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
 
  PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR
 RELATIONS
 AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF CHAPTER 71
 OF TITLE
 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS
 STATUTE WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
 
 WE WILL NOT refuse or fail to furnish, upon request, to the Philadelphia
 Metal Trades Council the addresses of all unit employees.  WE WILL, upon
 request, furnish to the Philadelphia Metal Trades Council addresses of
 all unit employees.  WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner,
 interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise of
 rights assured by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
 Statute.
                                       (Agency or Activity)
 
 Dated:  . . .  By:  (Signature) This Notice must remain posted for sixty
 (60) consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
 defaced or covered by any other material.  If employees have any
 questions concerning this Notice or compliance with any of its
 provisions, they may communicate directly with the Regional Director of
 the Federal Labor Relations Authority, Region II, whose address is:  26
 Federal Plaza, Room 24-102, New York, New York 10278 and whose telephone
 number is:  (212) 264-4934.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 --------------- FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
 
 
    /1/ Section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute provides:
 
          Sec. 7114.  Representation rights and duties
 
                                .  .  .  .
 
          (b) The duty of an agency and an exclusive representative to
       negotiate in good faith under subsection (a) of this section shall
       include the obligation--
 
                                .  .  .  .
 
          (4) in the case of an agency, to furnish to the exclusive
       representative involved, or its authorized representative, upon
       request and, to the extent not prohibited by law, data--
 
          (A) which is normally maintained by the agency in the regular
       course of business;  (and)
 
          (B) which is reasonably available and necessary for full and
       proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation of subjects
       within the scope of collective bargaining(.)
 
 
    /2/ Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 83-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified
 as amended at 5 U.S.C. 552a (1982)).
 
 
    /3/ Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 256
 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 552 (1982)).
 
 
    /4/ The interrelationship of the Privacy Act and the FOIA exemption
 are set forth more fully in AAFES.
 
 
    /5/ In this regard, the Union could have communicated with unit
 employees, e.g., through the use of its right, pursuant to the parties'
 collective bargaining agreement, to one steward for every 85 employees;
 through access to one-half of all unofficial bulletin boards, which are
 placed in accordance with Union recommendations;  through access to the
 Respondent's weekly newspaper;  through its own monthly newspaper and
 other literat