21:0870(104)NG - AFGE, Local 3804 and FDIC, Madison Region -- 1986 FLRAdec NG



[ v21 p870 ]
21:0870(104)NG
The decision of the Authority follows:


 21 FLRA No. 104
 
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF 
 GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, 
 AFL-CIO, LOCAL 3804
 Union
 
 and
 
 FEDERAL DEPOSIT 
 INSURANCE CORPORATION, 
 MADISON REGION
 Agency
 
                                            Case No. 0-NG-655
 
                DECISION AND ORDER ON NEGOTIABILITY ISSUES
 
                         I.  Statement of the Case
 
    This case is before the Authority because of a negotiability appeal
 filed under section 7105(a)(2)(D) and (E) of the Federal Service
 Labor-Management Relations Statute and raises issues concerning the
 negotiability of fourteen Union proposals.  /1/
 
                           II.  Union Proposal 1
 
                          Article 1, Section 4.
 
          In the interest of the employee's health, the Employer agrees
       to pay all costs associated with annual eye examinations, physical
       examinations and all devices associated with job-related better
       health, such as eye glasses, hearing aids, etc.  In addition, the
       Employer agrees to pay on an annual basis, the deductible cost
       associated with most medical insurance programs.
 
                       A.  Positions of the Parties
 
    The Agency contends that the proposal is nonnegotiable under section
 7117(a)(1) of the Statute because it is inconsistent with law, 5 U.S.C.
 Section 8906, and applicable Government-wide regulation, 5 C.F.R.
 Section 890.501.  The Agency also contends that the proposal is
 nonnegotiable under section 7117(a)(2) because it conflicts with an
 Agency regulation for which a compelling need exists.  Finally, the
 Agency contends that the proposal violates its right to determine its
 organization under section 7106(a)(1).  The Union disputes each of the
 Agency's contentions.
 
                        B.  Analysis and Conclusion
 
    Under existing Authority precedent, we find that the proposal is
 nonnegotiable for reasons other than those alleged by the Agency.  In
 particular, Union Proposal 1 would require the Agency to pay the cost of
 various medical expenses, including but not limited to medical, eye, and
 dental examinations which would also be covered by medical insurance
 provided employees under chapter 89 of title 5 of the United States
 Code.
 
    Under chapter 89 of title 5 of the U.S. Code, almost all Federal
 employees are eligible for health insurance, a portion of the cost of
 which is paid by the Federal Government.  /2/ The term "employee" as
 used in chapter 89 is defined in 5 U.S.C. Section 8901 /3/ to include,
 under 5 U.S.C. Section 2105, /4/ persons "appointed in the civil
 service" by "the head of a Government controlled corporation." See
 American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3804 and
 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Chicago Region, Illinois, 7 FLRA
 217, 218 (1981) (FDIC is a "Government corporation").  "Government
 controlled corporation" is defined as a Government corporation which is
 not a Government owned corporation.  5 U.S.C. Section 103(2).  /5/ Under
 31 U.S.C. Section 9101, the FDIC is a "mixed-ownership corporation" and
 not a "wholly owned Government corporation." /6/ Therefore, the FDIC is
 not a Government owned corporation, but, in terms of 5 U.S.C. Section
 103, a "Governemnt controlled corporation." Compare National Treasury
 Employees Union and Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 9 FLRA 692
 (1982), aff'd mem. sub nom. National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal
 Labor Relations Authority, 711 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Pension
 Benefit Guaranty Corporation is a corporation owned by the Government
 under 5 U.S.C. Section 103 because it is a wholly owned Government
 corporation under 31 U.S.C. Section 9101).  Employees of the FDIC are
 thus "employees" within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. Section 8901 who are
 covered by the health insurance provisions of chapter 89.  More
 specifically, they are covered by the limitations in that chapter on
 Government contributions to the costs of such insurance.
 
    So interpreted, Union Proposal 1 has the same effect as Union
 Proposal 17 in Fort Bragg Unit of North Carolina Association of
 Educators, National Education Association and Fort Bragg Dependents
 Schools, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 12 FLRA 519, 523-26 (1983), which
 would have required the agency to provide "employer-paid" medical and
 dental insurance.  In that case, the Authority held that the amount
 which a Federal Government agency must contribute to the cost of
 employee health insurance is set forth in 5 U.S.C. Section 8906 and,
 therefore, is a matter which is "specifically provided for by Federal
 statute" under section 7103(a)(14)(C) so as to be excluded from those
 "conditions of employment" over which an agency can be required to
 bargain under the Statute.
 
    For the reasons set forth in Fort Bragg Dependents Schools, Union
 Proposal 1 in this case, which similarly requires Agency contributions
 to the costs of employee health insurance, is excluded from the
 definition of "conditions of employment." Therefore, the proposal is
 outside the duty to bargain.  In view of our decision, we do not need to
 decide whether the proposal is inconsistent with law, 5 U.S.C. Section
 8906, whether it violates management's rights under section 7106(a)(1),
 or whether the Agency has shown that it is barred from negotiation by an
 Agency regulation for which a compelling need exists.
 
                          III.  Union Proposal 2
 
                         Article 29, Section 30.
 
          Personnel taking maternity leave will be allowed to take all
       available leave accrued and then begin a period of up to six
       months leave without pay.
 
                       A.  Positions of the Parties
 
    The Agency contends that Union Proposal 2 is nonnegotiable because it
 interferes with management's right under section 7106(a)(2)(B) to assign
 work and because it conflicts with an Agency regulation for which a
 compelling need exists.  The Union disputes the Agency's contentions.
 
                        B.  Analysis and Conclusion
 
    Federal personnel laws and regulations contain no provision for
 maternity leave as a separate type of leave.  Absence from duty for
 maternity reasons is a combination of sick leave, annual leave, and
 leave without pay.  See Federal Personnel Manual (FPM) Supplement 990-2,
 chapter 630, subchapter S13-2 and 3.
 
    Union Proposal 2 requires the Agency to grant an employee's request
 for up to six months of leave without pay for maternity reasons after
 such employee has used all avaialble sick and annual leave.  As such,
 the proposal precludes the Agency from requiring the employee to return
 to work at any point during the period covered by the request, even if
 the employee is able to do so and the Agency determines it has need of
 the employee's services.  /7/ Union Proposal 2 in this case has the same
 effect as Union Proposal 4 in American Federation of Government
 Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2263 and Department of the Air Force,
 Headquarters, 1606th Air Base Wing (MAC), Kirtland Air Force Base, New
 Mexico, 15 FLRA 580 (1984).  The proposal at issue in that case required
 that supervisors grant leave in all cases where the need is clearly
 documented on thge request for leave.  The Authority held, relying on
 its decision in National Treasury Employees Union and Department of the
 Treasury, Bureau of the Public Debt, 3 FLRA 769 (1980), affirmed sub
 nom.  National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations
 Authority, 691 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1982), that the proposal nullified
 management's ability to determine when assigned work will be performed.
 The Authority found, therefore, that the proposal directly interfered
 with management's right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) of
 the Statute.
 
    For the reasons set forth in the Bureau of the Public Debt and
 Kirtland Air Force Base decisions, Union Proposal 2 directly interferes
 with management's right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) and
 is outiside the Agency's duty to bargain.  /8/ In view of our decision,
 we do not have to decide whether the Agency has shown that the proposal
 is barred from negotiation by an Agency regulation for which a
 compelling need exists.
 
                           IV.  Union Proposal 3
 
                         Article 29, Section 42.
 
       If the FOS (Field Office Supervisor) is to justify why specific
       examiners are or are not to write certain jobs to the Regional
       Office, the FOS is to notify the prospective EIC (Examiner In
       Charge) concerned.
 
                       A.  Positions of the Parties
 
    The Agency contends that the proposal does not concern a matter
 affecting conditions of employment of unit employees because it relates
 to matters wholly internal to management.  The Agency also contends that
 the proposal violates management's right to assign work under section
 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute.  The Union disputes the Agency's
 contentions and argues that the proposal is procedural in nature and
 negotiable under section 7106(b)(2) and (3).
 
                               B.  Analysis
 
                        1. Conditions of Employment
 
    Contrary to the Agency's contention, we find that the proposal
 concerns management's decision to assign or not assign work to
 employees, which is a matter affecting conditions of employment.
 
                           2.  Management Rights
 
    Union Proposal 3 requries that an employee be notified by the field
 office supervisor (FOS) whenever higher level management makes an
 inquiry regarding the assignment of work to a particular employee.  The
 proposal, therefore, would provide an employee with information as to
 internal management discussions and deliberations concerning its work
 assignments.
 
    The Authority has consistently held that the management rights
 enumerated in section 7106 of the Statute encompass not only the right
 to act but also the right to discuss and deliberate concerning the
 relevant factors upon which decisons as to the exercise of those rights
 will be made.  /9/ Moreover, the Authority has held that proposals which
 require union participation in such discussions and deliberations
 pertaining to the exercise of management's rights are not procedures but
 are a part of management's substantive decision-making process.  They
 would have the effect of directly interfering in management's statutory
 right to make the decisions involved.  See, for example, Homestead Air
 Force Base, (union observers at management conferences regarding
 decisions to contract out work nonnegotiable);  VA Medical Center,
 (union participation on committees which decide, among other things,
 whether to remove probationary employees nonnegotiable);  National
 Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1497 and Headquarters, Lowry
 Technical Training Center (ATC), Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado, 11 FLRA
 565, 566-68 (1983) (Union Proposal 1) (union Participation on panel to
 determine selective factors nonnegotiable).
 
    While the cited cases concern union involvement in internal
 management discussions and deliberations, and the proposal here concerns
 access to those deliberations by an employee, the substantive impact on
 management's decision-making is the same.  In both instances, an outside
 party is interjected into, and acquires knowledge of, management's
 internal decision-making process.  Union Proposal 3 directly interferes
 with the deliberative process associated with management's right to
 assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute.  In so holding,
 we note that the Union provides no support for the conclusion, nor is it
 otherwise apparent, that the proposal constitutes an "appropriate
 arrangement" within the meaning of section 7106(b)(3).  See National
 Association of Government Employees, Local R14-87 and Kansas Army
 National Guard, 21 FLRA NO. 4 (1986), in which the Authority discussed
 the approach it will take in deciding cases involving section 7106(b)(3)
 of the Statute.
 
                              C.  Conclusion
 
    Union Proposal 3 directly interferes with management's right to
 assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) and is outside the Agency's duty
 to bargain.
 
                           V.  Union Proposal 4
 
                         Article 29, Section 49.
 
          Transferees should have the option of temporarily performing in
       their new field office prior to making a final decision to move.
 
                       A.  Positions of the Parties
 
    The Agency contends that the proposal interferes with management's
 right to assign employees under section 7106(a)(2)(A) of the Statute.
 The Union contends that the proposal is a negotiable procedure under
 section 7106(b)(2).
 
                        B.  Analysis and Conclusion
 
    Union Proposal 4 would provide an employee with the option of a
 temporary reassignment prior to a transfer or permanent reassignment to
 a different field office.  Union Proposal 4 in this case has the same
 effect as Union Proposal 3 in American Federation of Government
 Employees, Local 1395 and Social Security Administration, Great Lakes
 Program Center, Chicago, Illinois, 14 FLRA 408, 411-12 (1984).  The
 proposal at issue in that case provided that employees who were
 performing unsatisfactorily had the option of reassignment to another
 position of the same grade.  The Authority held, relying on its decision
 in International Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots and Panama
 Canal Commission, 11 FLRA 115, 119-20 (1983), that by subjecting
 management's decision concerning reassignment of an employee to the
 control of that employee's decision to seek reassignment, the proposal
 directly interfered with management's right to assign employees under
 section 7106(a)(2)(A) of the Statute.  Similarly, Union Proposal 4
 provides employees with the right to determine whether or not they will
 be transferred.  The proposal, therefore, directly interferes with
 management's right to assign employees under section 7106(a)(2)(A) and
 is not a negotiable procedure under section 7106(b)(2).
 
    For the reasons more fully set forth in the Authority's Panama Canal
 Commission and Great Lakes Program Center decisions, Union Proposal 4 is
 outside the Agency's duty to bargain.  See also National Treasury
 Employees Union and Internal Revenue Service, San Francisco, California,
 14 FLRA 65, 71-72 (1984).
 
                           VI.  Union Proposal 5
 
                         Article 29, Section 55.
 
          It is agreed to allow travel time on Monday and Friday to
       include carry over assignments.
 
                       A.  Positions of the Parties
 
    The Agency contends that the proposal is barred from negotiation by
 the Agency's travel regulations, for which a compelling need exists
 under section 7117(a)(2) of the Statute.  The Union disputes the
 Agency's contention.
 
                        B.  Analysis and Conclusion
 
    Under existing Authority precedent, we find the proposal
 nonnegotiable for reasons other than those alleged by the Agency.  It
 appears that Union Proposal 5 is intended to permit employees an
 unlimited amount of travel time to return to their residences on Friday
 from a temporary assignment which is outside their normal commuting area
 and, on Monday, to return to that assignment, if it has not been
 completed.  The proposal would grant an unlimited amount of time,
 normally spent performing work, for purposes of travel.
 
    5 U.S.C. Section 6101(b)(2) requires agencies to schedule, to the
 maximum extent practicable, time spent in travel status during regularly
 scheduled duty time.  /10/ However, the proposal, by granting employees
 a right to unlimited travel time, would prevent the Agency from
 requiring employees to travel during nonduty time in those circumstances
 where it was determined that travel during duty time was not
 practicable, that is, where other alternatives to accomplishing a work
 assignment and still scheduling travel during a portion of the workday
 were not practicable.
 
    Interpreted in this way, the proposal has the same effect as the
 proposals at issue in American Federation of Government Employees,
 AFL-CIO, Local 3424 and Federal Home Loan Bank Board, San Francisco,
 California, 14 FLRA 79 (1984) and American Federation of Government
 Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3483 and Federal Home Loan Bank Board, New
 York District Office, 13 FLRA 446 (1983).  In those decisions, the
 Authority held that, by precluding management from requiring employees
 to work a full workday and to travel on nonduty time where other
 alternatives were not practicable, the disputed proposals directly
 interfered with management's right to assign work under section
 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute.
 
    For the reasons set forth more fully in the Federal Home Loan Bank
 Board decisions, Union Proposal 5 directly interferes with management's
 right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) and is outside the
 Agency's duty to bargain.  In view of our decision, we do not have to
 decide whether the Agency has shown that the proposal is barred from
 negotiation by an Agency regulation for which a compelling need exists.
 
                          VII.  Union Proposal 7
 
                         Article 29, Section 67.
 
          When employees commute to and from their residence and are out
       over 10-hours they will receive $8.00 plus mileage and other
       expenses.
 
                       A.  Positions of the Parties
 
    The AgencyS sole contention is that the proposal is barred from
 negotiation by a provision of its travel regulations for which a
 compelling need exists.  The Union disputes the Agency's contention.
 
                        B.  Analysis and Conclusion
 
    As a "Government controlled corporation" the FDIC is not subject to
 statutory and regulatory provisions governing travel on official
 business for the Government.  5 U.S.C. Section 5701.  Consequently,
 Agency policies regarding such travel are established by internal
 regulations.  The internal regulation relied on by the Agency to bar
 Union Proposal 7 is Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation General Travel
 Regulations (FDIC GTRs), paragraph 1205(a).  /11/ The regulation
 establishes the criteria which the Agency uses to determine whether to
 compensate employees whose duties on any given day require a commute
 which is significantly longer than normal.  The Agency argues that the
 proposal, by shortening the time period to an amount close to that which
 would be required for commuting to and from work, negates the intent of
 its regulation to compensate employees whose commute, due to unusual
 circumstances, requires an inordinate amount of time.  In support for
 this regulatory policy, the Agency contends that it is essential for
 there to be Agency-wide uniformity on this matter so as to provide
 equitable treatment for its employees.
 
    The compelling need provisions of the Statute are meant to insure
 that otherwise negotiable bargaining proposals are taken outside the
 duty to bargain only if the agency involved demonstrates and justifies
 an overriding need for the policies reflected in the rules or
 regulations to be uniformly applied throughout the agency.  American
 Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3804 and Federal
 Deposit Insurance Corporation, Chicago Region, Illinois, 7 FLRA 217, 220
 (1981).  Therefore, an agency must (1) identify a specific agency-wide
 regulation;  (2) show that there is a conflict between its regulation
 and the proposal;  and (3) demonstrate that its regulation is supported
 by a compelling need with reference to the Authority's standards set
 forth in section 2424.11 of its Regulations.  See American Federation of
 Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1928 and Department of the Navy,
 Naval Air Development Center, Warminster, Pennsylvania, 2 FLRA 451, 454
 (1980).  Generalized and conclusionary reasoning is not enough to
 support a finding of compelling need.  The Authority is not in a
 position on its own to determine the purposes Agency regulations are
 designed to achieve or the importance the Agency attaches to those
 regulations.  Unless the Agency provides us with facts and arguments
 bearing on each of these questions, we cannot judge the validity of the
 Agency's contentions.  /12/
 
    In this case, the Agency has failed to indicate on which of the
 Authority's compelling need criteria it relies and makes no attempt to
 demonstrate that the cited regulation meets the requirements of those
 criteria.  The Agency has merely made general statements as to how
 important its regulation is.  The Authority does not have in the record
 before it, therefore, the facts and arguments which permit it to make a
 reasoned judgment on the Agency's claims.  The Agency has not met its
 burden and its claim of compelling need cannot be sustained.
 
    The Agency has not shown that Union Proposal 7 is barred by an Agency
 regulation for which a compelling need exists and, therefore, the
 proposal is within the Agency's duty to bargain.  /13/
 
                          VIII.  Union Proposal 8
 
                         Article 29, Section 66.
 
          In order to bring the employees on an equal basis with the
       employees of the U.S. Postal Service, the Employer agrees that all
       within grade increases will be on an annual basis and the present
       practice of 2 and 3 year intervals be discontinued.
 
                      A.  Positions of the Parties.
 
    The Agency contends that the proposal is nonnegotiable under section
 7117(a)(1) of the Statute because it is inconsistent with a
 Government-wide regulation, Federal Personnel Manual, chapter 531,
 subchapter 4, paragraph 4-7.  The Agency also contends that the proposal
 is barred from negotiation by an Agency regulation for which a
 compelling need exists.  The Union disputes the Agency's contentions.
 
                               B.  Analysis
 
             1.  Inconsistent with Government-wide Regulation
 
    Union Proposal 8 would eliminate the waiting period for within-grade
 increases at steps 5 through 10 of each grade of the Federal Deposit
 Insurance Corporation pay schedule.  For employees covered by the
 Federal General Schedule pay system the waiting periods for within-grade
 increases of steps 5 through 10 of each grade are mandated by law, 5
 U.S.C. Section 5335(a) /14/ and Government-wide regulation, 5 C.F.R.
 Section 531.405.  /15/ The FDIC, however, is a "Government controlled
 corporation" within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. Section 103(2).  See Union
 Proposal 1 above.  Under 5 U.S.C. Section 5331(a) /16/ and 5 U.S.C.
 Section 5102(a)(1)(i), /17/ therefore, employees of the FDIC are not
 covered by the General Schedule pay system and, in particular, are not
 subject to the statutory and regulatory provisions as to waiting periods
 for within-grade increases.  See National Treasury Employees Union,
 Chapter 207 and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Washington, D.C.,
 14 FLRA 598, 610 (1984) (Member Haughton dissenting), appeal docketed
 sub nom. National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations
 Authority, No. 84-1286 (D.C. Cir. July 6, 1984) (Decision on Remand, 21
 FLRA No. 36 (1986).  Thus, the proposal is not outside the duty to
 bargain because it is inconsistent with a Government-wide regulation.
 The regulation in question does not apply to FDIC employees and the
 decision of the FDIC to follow the regulatory provisions establishing
 waiting periods for within-grade increases does not bring its employees
 within the coverage of those regulations.
 
                            2.  Compelling Need
 
    Based on the record, it appears that the Agency, in its own internal
 regulations, has promulgated the same requirements as to waiting periods
 for a within-grade increase as are set forth in 5 C.F.R. Section
 531.405.  /18/ The Agency claims that a "compelling need" exists for
 this regulation specifically citing only section 2424.11(c) of the
 Authority's Rules and Regulations.  /19/ As indicated above, the FDIC
 employees are not subject to statutory and regulatory requirements as to
 waiting periods for within-grade increases.  The Agency's internal
 regulation, therefore, does not implement a nondiscretionary mandate of
 that law or regulatory authority, as the Agency claims.  For this
 reason, the Agency regulation cannot serve as a bar to negotiation on
 the disputed proposal under section 2424.11(c) of the Authority's Rules
 and Regulations.
 
    The Agency also contends that a compelling need exists for the cited
 regulation because it establishes a uniform policy regarding
 within-grade increases which is essential for fairness and the
 maintenance of employee morale.  However, the Agency does not
 specifically reference either one of the other compelling need criteria
 set forth in section 2424.11(a) and (b) of the Authority's Rules and
 Regulations.  Nor does the Agency advance any specific arguments as to
 how the cited Agency regulation meets the requirements of those
 criteria.  The Agency has provided none of the facts and arguments which
 we would need in order to judge the validity of its contentions.  See
 our discussion of Union Proposal 7 in this case.  Since the Agency has
 provided no support for this additional compelling need contention, that
 contention cannot be sustained, and the cited Agency regulation does not
 provide a bar to negotiation on Union Proposal 8 herein.  See American
 Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1928 and Department
 of the Navy, Naval Air Development Center, Warminster, Pennsylvania, 2
 FLRA 451 (1980).  Compare National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 207
 and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Washington, D.C., 14 FLRA
 598, 610-12 (1984) (Member Haughton dissenting), appeal docketed sub
 nom. National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations
 Authority, No. 84-1286 (D.C. Cir. July 6, 1984), (Decision on Remand, 21
 FLRA No. 36 (1986)) (the Authority found that the agency had
 demonstrated that its regulation established uniform pay practices which
 were essential to the accomplishment of the Agency's mission in a manner
 consistent with the requirements of an effective and efficient
 government).
 
                              C.  Conclusion
 
    Union Proposal 8 is not inconsistent with an applicable
 Government-wide regulation.  Nor has the Agency shown that the proposal
 is barred from negotiation by an Agency regulation for which a
 compelling need exists.  The proposal, therefore, is within the Agency's
 duty to bargain.
 
    In reaching this conclusion we note that the proposal does not
 concern the amount of the increase in salary which an employee will
 receive with each step increase.  Rather, the proposal only concerns the
 timing of an employee's step increase.  For this reason, the proposal
 does not involve issues concerning the negotiability of wages in the
 Federal sector.
 
                           IX.  Union Proposal 9
 
                          Article 27, Section 1.
 
          Management adopt a work schedule which incorporates the
       principle of flexitime which would provide for a nine hour work
       day for eight (8) days.  The ninth work day would consist of an
       eight (8) hour work day.
 
                          Article 27, Section 2.
 
          By providing for a nine-hour work day as set forth in Section 1
       of this Article, every other week would consist of a four day work
       week.
 
                        A.  Position of the Parties
 
    The Agency contends that the proposal is nonnegotiable under section
 7117(a)(1) because it is inconsistent with law.  The Agency also
 contends that the proposal is barred from negotiation by Agency
 regulations for which a compelling need exists.  Finally, the Agency
 argues that the proposal concerns the methods and means of performing
 its work and is negotiable only at its election under section
 7106(b)(1).  The Union disputes the Agency's contentions.
 
                               B.  Analysis
 
                     1.  Inconsistent with Federal Law
 
    Union Proposal 9 concerns the compressed work schedule know as
 "5-4-9", that is, a 9-hour, 5-day workweek followed by an approximately
 9-hour day, 4-day workweek.  During the pendency of the appeal in this
 case, the Federal Employees Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act
 of 1982, Pub. L. 97-221, 96 Stat. 227, took effect.  /20/ That Act, as
 indicated both by its terms /21/ and by its legislative history, /22/
 clearly contemplates the negotiation of such compressed work schedules.
 
                            2.  Compelling Need
 
    The Agency contends that its regulation pertaining to hours of work
 and tours of duty, and a related statement of policy which precludes
 alternative work schedules such as flexitime, are essential to the
 accomplishment of the mission or the execution of the functions of the
 Agency in a manner which is consistent with the requirements of an
 effective and efficient government within the meaning of section
 2424.11(a) of the Authority's Rules and Regulations.  Specifically, the
 Agency argues that its regulation setting specific limits on hours and
 tours of duty, /23/ which is reinforced by its policy disfavoring
 alternate work schedules, /24/ is essential to the accomplishment of the
 Agency's bank examining function because it facilitates the access of
 examiners to member banks during the operating hours of those banks.
 
    However, the Agency has produced no evidence that its employees are
 unable to have access to bank offices for more than eight hours a day.
 Moreover, the Agency has not shown that the work of all, or even a
 significant portion, of unit employees requires that they have such
 access to banks, or that all their work, or a significant part thereof,
 must be performed on site in the banks.  Even assuming employees have
 limited access to banks, the Agency has not shown that it would be
 prevented from accomplishing its mission in an efficient and effective
 manner if it were unable to require unit employees to work five 8-hour
 days per workweek, since it has not shown what portion of the unit would
 be subject to such limited access or what portion of unit employees'
 work is constituted of on-site examination of bank records.  There is
 thus no basis in the record for concluding that, should the Agency agree
 to afford unit employees the opportunity to participate in an
 alternative work schedule such as the "5-4-9," it would have any
 detrimental effect on the Agency's productivity.  We also find that
 neither the language of the proposal nor the record in the case suggest
 that the proposal is intended to require that unit employees work a
 "5-4-9" compressed schedule.  Nor is the proposal intended to preclude
 the Agency from requiring employees to work five 8-hour days when that
 is necessary to accomplish the Agency's mission, or to give employees
 the right to refuse to appear for work when ordered to do so.  See
 American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 32 and
 Office of Personnel Management, Washington, D.C., 14 FLRA 6, 7-8 (1984);
  American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2875 and
 Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
 National Marine Fisheries Service, Southeast Fisheries Center, Miami
 Laboratory, Florida, 5 FLRA 441, 447-49 (1981).  It must be determined,
 therefore, that the Agency has not shown that the cited regulations and
 policy are supported by a compelling need.
 
    Under the Federal Employees Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules
 Act of 1982, 5 U.S.C. Section 6131, the Federal Service Impasses Panel
 (FSIP) has the responsibility of settling impasses with respect to
 agency claims that proposed alternate work schedules would have an
 "adverse agency impact." In subsequent negotiations on Union Proposal 9
 the Agency may decide not to establish the proposed "5-4-9" compressed
 schedule because it would have such an adverse impact.  We express no
 opinion as to whether, should the matter be referred to the FSIP, a
 finding of an "adverse agency impact" would be justified so as to
 preclude adoption of Union Proposal 9.  We decide only that the Agency
 has not shown that a compelling need exists for its regulation
 establishing hours and tours of duty to bar negotiation on the proposal.
 
                           3.  Management Rights
 
    For the reasons stated in National Marine Fisheries Service, cited
 above, we hold that the proposal for a compressed work schedule does not
 concern the methods and means of performing work within the meaning of
 section 7106(b)(1).
 
                              C.  Conclusion
 
    Union Proposal 9 is not inconsistent with Federal law or management's
 rights under section 7106(b)(1) of the Statute.  Nor has the Agency
 shown that the proposal is barred from negotiation by an Agency
 regulation for which a compelling need exists.  The proposal, therefore,
 is within the Agency's duty to bargain.
 
                           X.  Union Proposal 10
 
                          Article 29, Section 1.
 
          Each employee be given the option of having the Employer
       provide leased automobiles for their business use.
 
                       A.  Positions of the Parties
 
    The Agency contends that the proposal violates its right to determine
 its budget under section 7106(a)(1) and its right to determine the
 methods and means of performing its work under section 7106(b)(1).  The
 Agency also contends that the proposal is barred from negotiation by its
 internal regulations concerning delegations of authority for which a
 compelling need exists.  The Union disputes the Agency's contentions.
 
                        B.  Analysis and Conclusion
 
    Union Proposal 10 requires the Agency to lease automobiles for
 employees to use, primarily for transportation to bank examining
 assignments.  As a necessary part of carrying out its mission to protect
 the deposits made by the public in member banks, the FDIC undertakes
 periodic examinations of the financial status of those banks.  Many of
 the banks are outside the commuting area of examiners' duty stations and
 residences.  Frequent travel is thus a necessary aspect of accomplishing
 examining assignments.  The decision regarding transportation to and
 from such assignments concerns the means to be used to accomplish the
 Agency's work.  National Treasury Employees Union and U.S. Customs
 Service, Region VIII, San Francisco, California, 2 FLRA 255 (1979).
 Management is not required to bargain over a particular "means" of
 performing its examining assignments.  See also American Federation of
 Government Employees, AFL-CIO, International Council of U.S. Marshals
 Service Locals and Department of Justice, U.S. Marshals Service, 4 FLRA
 384 (1980) (Union Proposal I);  American Federation of Government
 Employees, AFL-CIO, National Immigration & Naturalization Service
 Council and U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration & Naturalization
 Service, 8 FLRA 347, 349-51 (1982) (Union Proposal 2).
 
    Union Proposal 10 concerns a matter which is subject to bargaining at
 the election of the Agency under section 7106(b)(1).  Since the Agency
 has elected not to bargain, it is not within its duty to bargain under
 the Statute.  In view of our decision, we do not have to decied whether
 the proposal violates management's right to determine its budget or
 whether the Agency has shown that the proposal is barred by an Agency
 regulation for which a compelling need exists.
 
                          XI.  Union Proposal 11
 
                          Article 29, Section 2.
 
          Any and all changes, proposed or otherwise, to the Travel
       Regulations is (sic) subject to collective bargaining between the
       Employer and the Union.
 
                       A.  Positions of the Parties
 
    The Agency contends that the proposal is nonnegotiable because it
 conflicts with an Agency regulation concerning approval of changes in
 travel regulations for which a comprelling need exists.  The Agency also
 contends that the proposal concerns the technology, methods and means of
 performing its work, a matter which is negotiable only at its election
 under section 7106(b)(1).  The Union disputes the Agency's contentions,
 arguing that the proposal requires nothing which is not already provided
 for under the Statute.
 
                               B.  Analysis
 
                            1.  Compelling Need
 
    As a "Government controlled corporation" the FDIC is not subject to
 the statutory and regulatory provisions governing travel on official
 business for the Government.  5 U.S.C. Section 5701.  See also Union
 Proposal 7 above.  Consequently, Agency policies regarding such travel
 are established by internal Agency regulation.  Compare American
 Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3483 and Federal Home
 Loan Bank Board, New York District Office, 13 FLRA 446 (1983) (Union
 Proposal 1) (where employees covered under Federal Travel Regulations,
 proposal designating employee's residence as his or her official duty
 station inconsistent with those Government-wide regulations).
 
    Union Proposal 11 requires that the Agency notify the Union when it
 decides to change its travel regulations and provide the Union an
 opportunity to negotiate on the application of those regulations to the
 bargaining unit.  The proposal constitutes a procedure which has the
 effect of reopening the parties' negotiated agreement to allow for
 limited bargaining.  Nothing in the language of the proposal or the
 record of this case suggests that the proposal is intended to authorize
 the exclusive representative at the local level to negotiate over the
 substance of Agency-wide travel policy.  /25/
 
    In requiring the Agency to negotiate on the application of proposed
 changes in internal travel regulations to bargaining unit employees the
 proposal requires nothing which is not also required by law.  Under
 section 7117, matters covered by agency regulations are subject to the
 duty to bargain unless the regulations are supported by a compelling
 need.  Of course, any negotiation on proposed changes in such
 regulations must concern matters which affect the conditions of
 employment of unit employees and are otherwise consistent with law and
 regulation.  Compare American Federation of Government Employees,
 AFL-CIO, International Counsil of U.S. Marshals Service Locals and
 Department of Justice, U.S. Marshals Service, 11 FLRA 672 (1983) (Union
 Proposal 5) (proposal to negotiate supplemental agreements at the local
 level concerning specific matters not inconsistent with law).  The
 record does not indicate that the Union proposed a blanket waiver of the
 Agency's right to assert a compelling need in connection with any
 proposed changes in its travel regulations.  The Union states, in this
 regard, that the "appropriate time" to raise questions of compelling
 need "is during individual negotiations on specific changes." The
 proposal here would not foreclose the Agency from contesting the
 negotiability of any Union proposal during future negotiations relating
 to specific changes in the Agency's travel regulations.
 
    As to the Agency's allegation that a compelling need exists for its
 regulation regarding the delegation of authority to change the Agency's
 travel regulations, the proposal, as discussed above, does not authorize
 the Union to negotiate changes in these travel regulations.  Moreover,
 as stated with respect to Proposal 1, an agency cannot restrict
 bargaining on an otherwise negotiable matter by refusing to delegate
 authority over the matter to the level of recognition.
 
    Further, the Agency's claim that a compelling need exists for
 uniformity in its travel regulations because such uniformity is
 "essential" to prevent "administrative chaos" is wholly unsupported in
 the record.  The Agency has provided none of the facts and arguments
 which we would need in order to judge the validity of its contentions.
 See our discussion of Union Proposal 7 in this case.  Consequently, the
 Agency has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that its travel
 regulations meet any of the criteria set forth in section 2424.11 of the
 Authority's Rules and Regulations.  None of those regulations can,
 therefore, in the circumstances of this case, bar negotiation of the
 Union proposal.  See American Federation of Government Employees,
 AFL-CIO, Local 1928 and Department of the Navy, Naval Air Development
 Center, Warminster, Pennsylvania, 2 FLRA 451 (1980).  See also American
 Federation of Government Employees, Local 3488 and Federal Deposit
 Insurance Corporation, 12 FLRA 532 (1983) (Union Proposal 4).
 
                           2.  Management Rights
 
    The Agency's allegation that Union Proposal 11 concerns matters
 pertaining to the "technology, methods, and means" of performing the
 Agency's work is without any support whatsoever in the record.  The
 Agency has not established that merely providing for a contract reopener
 as to travel regulations in and of itself has any technological
 realtionship to accomplishing or furthering the Agency's work or
 involves the methods and means of such work performance.  The mere
 possibility that Union Proposal 5 might concern such matters is not
 enough to render this proposal nonnegotiable.  See American Federation
 of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, International Council of U.S. Marshals
 Service Locals and Department of Justice, U.S. Marshals Service, 11 FLRA
 672 (1983) (Union Proposal 5).  Thus, there is no basis upon which to
 conclude that the proposal concerns the technology, methods and means of
 performing work, which are negotiable only at the election of the Agency
 under section 7106(b)(1).  See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
 supra.
 
                              C.  Conclusion
 
    The Agency has not shown that Union Proposal 11 is barred from
 negotiations by an Agency regulation for which a compelling need exists.
  Nor does the proposal concern a matter which is negotiable only at the
 election of the Agency under section 7106(b)(1).  The proposal is
 therefore within the Agency's duty to bargain.
 
                          XII.  Union Proposal 13
 
                         Article 29, Section 27.
 
          Regional staffing of teaching assignments at the FDIC training
       center shall be for a period not to exceed two years in duration
       to enable those desiring to teach the opportunity to do so.
 
                       A.  Positions of the Parties
 
    The Agency contends that the proposal violates management's right to
 assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B).  The Union claims that the
 proposal is a negotiable procedure under section 7106(b)(2) and (3).
 
                        B.  Analysis and Conclusion
 
    The record in this case is unclear as to whether the proposal
 involves the assignment of unit employees to teaching positions at the
 FDIC Training Center or concerns the assignment to employees of teaching
 duties at the Center.  However, regardless of whether the proposal
 concerns assignment of employees to teaching positions and thus involves
 management's right to assign employees to positions in the Agency under
 section 7106(a)(2)(A), or concerns the assignment of teaching duties and
 thus involves management's right to assign work under section
 7106(a)(2)(B), it in either instance restricts management's
 determination of the duration of such assignments.  The proposal
 prescribes a maximum length for such assignments of two years.  If the
 proposal concerns the assignment of employees to positions, it has the
 same effect as Paragraph (3) of Union Provision II in American
 Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 916 and Tinker Air
 Force Base, Oklahoma, 7 FLRA 292 (1981).  In that case, the Authority
 held that a proposal restricting certain temporary assignments to a
 maximum of 60 days directly interfered with management's right, under
 section 7106(a)(2)(A), to assign employees in the agency by restricting
 management's right to determine the duration of an assignment.  On the
 other hand, if the proposal concerns work assignments, it has the same
 effect as Union Proposals I and II in National Association of Air
 Traffic Specialists and Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation
 Administration, 6 FLRA 588 (1981).  In that case, the Authority held,
 relying on its decision in International Association of Fire Fighters,
 Local F-61 and Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, 3 FLRA 437 (1980), that a
 proposal limiting the duration of assigned training directly interfered
 with management's right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) of
 the Statute.  Therefore, whether Union Proposal 13 concerns assignment
 to teaching positions or assignment of teaching duties, for the reasons
 set forth in the Tinker Air Force Base, Federal Aviation Administration,
 and Philadelphia Naval Shipyard decisions, it directly interferes with
 the substantive exercise of management's rights under section 7106(a)(2)
 of the Statute.  In so holding, we note that the Union provides no
 support for its conclusion, nor is any otherwise apparent, that the
 proposal constitutes an "appropriate arrangement" within the meaning of
 section 7106(b)(3).
 
    Union Proposal 13 directly interferes with management's right to
 assign employees under section 7106(a)(2)(A) and to assign work under
 section 7106(a)(2)(B).  It is, therefore, outside the Agency's duty to
 bargain.
 
                         XIII.  Union Proposal 14
 
                         Article 29, Section 33.
 
          The part-time policy shall be extended to all personnel with a
       legitimate reason, including education, with no time limit
       constraints.
 
                       A.  Positions of the Parties
 
    The Agency contends only that a compelling need exists for its
 regulations concerning part-time employment to bar negotiations on the
 proposal.  The Union disputes the Agency's contention, contending that
 it does not intend its proposal to require the Agency to grant an
 employee's request.
 
                        B.  Analysis and Conclusion
 
    Under existing Authority precedent, we find the proposal
 nonnegotiable for reasons other than those alleged by the Agency.  The
 Agency's part-time policy is to make part-time positions available to
 employees under limited circumstances.  /26/ The proposal would extend
 the circumstances under which the policy would apply to any employee
 with a "legitimate reason." The Authority interprets the proposal as
 preventing the Agency from denying an employee's request if the employee
 has a legitimate reason.  The Agency would not have the authority to put
 any time limit constraints on its decision to grant an employee's
 request for part-time status.  As a result, the effect of the proposal
 would be to limit the Agency's ability to require an employee to return
 to work when it determines there is a need for the employee's services
 on a full-time basis.  The length of time an employee could remain in
 part-time status would depend on the decision of the employee without
 consideration of the Agency's need to perform its work.  The proposal,
 therefore, has the same effect as Union Proposal 1 in National
 Federation of Federal Employees, Local 15 and U.S. Army Armament
 Munitions and Chemical Command, Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, 19 FLRA
 No. 6 (1985).  The proposal in that case required the Agency to grant an
 employee's request for leave without pay (LWOP) if the employee met the
 criteria set forth in the proposal.  Relying on our decision in American
 Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2263 and Deaprtment
 of the Air Force, Headquarters, 160th Air Base Wing (MAC), Kirtland Air
 Force Base, New Mexico, 15 FLRA 580 (1984), we held the proposal
 nonnegotiable under section 7106(a)(2)(B) because it would require the
 agency to grant an employee's request for leave without pay regardless
 of the need for the employee's services during the period of the
 request.  The proposal in this case, involving requests for part-time
 status, as opposed to requests for leave without pay, restricts the
 Agency's ability to determine when assigned work will be performed.
 
    For the reason set forth in the Rock Island Arsenal and Kirtland Air
 Force Base decisions, we find that Union Proposal 14 directly interferes
 with management's right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) and
 is outside the AgencyS duty to bargain.  In view of our decision, we do
 not have to decide whether the Agency has shown that the proposal would
 be barred from negotiation by an Agency regulation for which a
 compelling need exists.
 
                          XIV.  Union Proposal 15
 
                         Article 29, Section 71.
 
          Each employee of the bargaining unit will receive eight (8)
       days (personal days) of official time to use at their discretion.
 
                        A. Positions of the Parties
 
    The Agency contends that the proposal is nonnegotiable under section
 7117(a)(1) of the Statute because it is inconsistent with a
 Government-wide regulation.  The Agency also argues that the proposal is
 barred from negotiation by the Agency's leave regulations for which a
 compelling need exists.  The Union disputes the Agency's contentions.
 
                        B.  Analysis and Conclusion
 
    Union Proposal 15 provides for eight (8) days of "official time" to
 be used for "personal" business which cannot be taken care of while an
 employee is in a travel status.  The proposal is stated in terms of
 "official time," a phrase employed in the Statute to mean absence from
 duty without charge to leave or loss of pay for employees performing
 union representational activities.  It is clear from the context and
 based on Union statements in the record that the proposal concerns
 "administrative leave," which is a term used to refer generally to
 absence from duty administratively authorized without charge to leave or
 loss of pay.  The Authority adopts this interpretation for purposes of
 this decision.
 
    It is well established that, under the Statute, an agency must
 negotiate with an exclusive representative on matters concerning
 conditions of employment of unit employees within its discretion to the
 extent consistent with law and regulation.  /27/ As to the subject
 matter of the instant proposal, the Authority has consistently construed
 those portions of the Federal Personnel Manual (FPM) concerned with
 "excused absence" or "administrative leave" /28/ as providing that "the
 head of an agency has discretion to grant administrative leave to
 employees of the agency in certain situations for brief periods of
 time."
 
    (Underscoring in original;  footnote omitted.) /29/ The first issue
 in this case is whether the administrative leave provided for in the
 Union's proposal exceeds the limitations on agency discretion imposed by
 the provisions of the FPM, so as to be inconsistent therewith.  The
 second issue is whether those provisions of the FPM constitute
 Government-wide regulations under section 7117(a)(1) of the Statute.
 
    We turn first to the issue of whether eight (8) days of
 administrative leave for personal business is outside the scope of an
 agency's permissible discretion under the FPM.  The Office of the
 Comptroller General has considered a variety of situations involving
 grants of administrative leave and, in determining whether such grants
 are appropriate, interprets the applicable provisions of the FPM as
 limiting an agency to authorizing only brief periods of absence from
 duty.  See, for example, 54 Comp. Gen. 706, 708 (1975).
 
    Moreover, the Comptroller General has emphasized that while it is not
 necessarily a determinative consideration in connection with most
 circumstances involving a brief absence, a grant of administrative leave
 for an extended period of time is not appropriate unless it is in
 furtherance of an agency function.  /30/ See, for example, 61 Comp. Gen.
 652 (1982).  As the Comptroller General interprets the FPM, therefore,
 in determining whether a grant of administrative leave is appropriate,
 the crucial considerations are, depending on the circumstances involved,
 the length of time authorized and the purpose for which that time is to
 be used.  In weighing those considerations in particular cases, the
 Comptroller General has approved agency grants of approximately five (5)
 hours of administrative leave for an employee to rest after prolonged
 and difficult travel, 55 Comp. Gen. 510 (1975), and eight (8) hours for
 an employee to locate suitable housing in connection with an extended
 temporary assignment, Comptroller General Decision B-192258 (September
 25, 1978), both of which were work-related situations.  The Authority
 has also found negotiable a proposal which would have required
 authorization of a maximum of thirty (30) minutes of administrative
 leave per pay period for tardiness (that is, a maximum of 13 hours a
 year).  /31/ National Labor Relations Board, Region 5, supra.
 
    Conversely, the Comptroller General has held that a grant of
 administrative leave for excess travel time is inappropriate where the
 excess time taken is attributable to an employee's delay for personal
 reasons or as a matter of personal convenience.  56 Comp. Gen. 865,
 868-69 (1977).  Moreover, the Comptroller General refused to question an
 agency's denial of eight (8) hours of administrative leave to an
 employee who, as the elected chief of a local all volunteer fire
 department, participated in fighting a fire and was absent from duty for
 that amount of time.  54 Comp. Gen. 706 (1974).  In another case, the
 Comptroller General refused to restore to an employee's annual leave
 account five (5) days of annual leave which was charged after a previous
 grant of administrative leave, to represent his installation in a chess
 tournament, was later denied.  Comptroller General Decision B-176020
 (August 4, 1972).  /32/
 
    Based upon the foregoing Comptroller General interpretations of FPM
 Supplement 990-2, chapter 630, subchapter S11-5, it does not appear that
 a blanket authorization of eight (8) days for personal business, without
 consideration of the specific circumstances of each case, constitutes a
 brief period of absence from duty for appropriate reasons which is
 within the Agency's discretion to grant.  In thus exceeding the limits
 of an appropriate exercise of discretion under the FPM, Union Proposal
 15 is inconsistent therewith within the meaning of section 7117(a)(1).
 
    The remaining issue is whether the provisions of FPM Supplement
 990-2, chapter 630, subchapter S11-5 constitute Government-wide rules or
 regulations within the meaning of the Statute.  If so, those provisions
 would bar negotiations of Union Proposal 15.  In National Federation of
 Federal Employees, Local 1497 and Department of the Air Force, Lowry Air
 Force Base, Colorado, 9 FLRA 151, 154-5 (1982), the Authority, relying
 on its decision in National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 6 and
 Internal Revenue Service, New Orleans District, 3 FLRA 748 (1980),
 determined that chapter 511, subchapter 4-3.b. of the FPM was a
 Government-wide regulation within the meaning of section 7117(a)(1)
 because it applies to Federal civilian employees in the executive,
 legislative and judicial branches of the Government and thus is
 generally applicable to the Federal civilian work force.  The provisions
 of FPM Supplement 990-2, chapter 630, subchapter S11-5 at issue in this
 case apply to a substantial portion of the civilian employees of the
 executive and judicial branches of the Federal Government.  5 U.S.C.
 Sections 6301(2)(A), 6311.  5 C.F.R. Section 630.201(b)(4).  See also
 Crain v. U.S., 77 F. Supp. 505 (D.C. Ill. 1948).  Those provisions are
 likewise generally applicable to the Federal civilian work force so as
 to be "Government-wide" within the meaning of section 7117(a)(1).
 
    As to whether FPM Supplement 990-2, chapter 630, subchapter S11-5
 constitutes a "rule or regulation" within the meaning of section
 7117(a)(1), the Authority determined in Lowry Ari Force Base that the
 term was not intended to refer only to those rules and regulations which
 met formal requirements as to notice and comment, see, for example, 5
 U.S.C. Section 553.  The term also includes official declarations of
 policy which are binding on the officials and agencies to which they
 apply.  Concerning FPM Supplement 990-2, chapter 630, subchapter S11-5,
 which is issued by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), OPM is
 statutorily empowered to regulate the leave system governing Federal
 employment, 5 U.S.C. Section 6311.  The requirements as to excused
 absence which are set forth in subchapter S11-5 constitute its
 determination of the policies necessary to implement that system.
 Moreover, the fact that the provisions of subchapter S11-5 are
 enforceable by the Comptroller General against the officials and
 agencies to which they apply leads us to conclude that they are binding
 on those officials and agencies.  The Authority finds, therefore, that
 FPM Supplement 990-2, chapter 630, subchapter S11-5 regarding an
 agency's limited discretion to authorize administrative leave is a
 Government-wide rule or regulation.
 
    Union Proposal 15 is outside the Agency's duty to bargain under
 section 7117(a)(1) because it is inconsistent with an applicable
 Government-wide regulation.  In view of our decision, we do not have to
 decide whether the Agency has shown that the proposal is barred from
 negotiation by an Agency regulation for which a compelling need exists.
 
                          XV.  Union Proposal 16
 
                           Article 3, Section 7
 
          Only officers of the Union will be granted official time and
       expenses per the Employer's General Travel Regulations to
       participate in all business (excluding internal union business) in
       the Union's other bargaining unit (Chicago Region of the
       Employer).
 
                       A.  Positions of the Parties
 
    The Agency contends that the proposal is nonnegotiable under section
 7117(a)(1) because it is inconsistent with Federal law.  The Union
 disputes the Agency's contention.
 
                        B.  Analysis and Conclusion
 
    Union Proposal 16 requires the Agency to negotiate on official time
 for Union officers who are members of the Madison Region to represent
 the Union in the separate Chicago Region unit.  On May 31, 1985, another
 union was certified as exclusive representative for the employees in the
 Chicago Region.  Consequently, the Union which is party to the petition
 herein is no longer the exclusive representative of the Chicago unit.
 /33/ There is no bargaining relationship between the Agency and the
 Union with respect to the Chicago Region unit and no obligation on the
 part of the Agency to bargain with the Union which filed the petition in
 this case with respect to its representation of the Chicago Region unit.
  Therefore, issues as to the scope of bargaining as it pertains to that
 unit are not appropriate for resolution by the Authority.  See Overseas
 Education Association and Department of Defense, Office of Dependents
 Schools, Alexandria, Virginia, 7 FLRA 84 (9181).
 
    We conclude that the negotiability issues raised by Union Proposal
 16, insofar as they relate to the Chicago Region unit, have been
 rendered moot by the issuance of the certification of exclusive
 representation in Case No. 5-RO-50005.  See American Federation of
 Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3804 and Federal Deposit Insurance
 Corporation, Chicago Region, 18 FLRA NO. 90 (1985).
 
                                XVI.  Order
 
    Accordingly, pursuant to section 2424.10 of the Authority's Rules and
 Regulations, IT IS ORDERED that the appeal as to Union Proposals 1-5,
 10, and 13-16 be, and it hereby is, dismissed.  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED
 that the Agency shall upon request, or as otherwise agreed to by the
 parties, bargain on Union Proposals 7, 8, 9, and 11.  /34/
 
    Issued, Washington, D.C., May 19, 1986.
                                       /s/Jerry L. Calhoun, Chairman
                                       /s/Henry B. Frazier III, Member
                                       FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
 
 
                ---------------  FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
 
 
 
    (1) The Union has withdrawn two proposals from its appeal in this
 case:  Proposal 6, concerning the filing of financial statements by
 employees' spouses, and Proposal 12, concerning employees' evaluations
 of their supervisors.  Union Reply to Agency Statement of Position at 4.
  These proposals will not be considered further here.
 
    (2) For the text of 5 U.S.C. Section 8906 see the Appendix to this
 decision.
 
    (3) For the text of 5 U.S.C. Section 8901(1)(A) see the Appendix.
 
    (4) For the text of 5 U.S.C. Section 2105(a)(1)(E) see the Appendix.
 
    (5) For the text of 5 U.S.C. Section 103 see the Appendix.
 
    (6) For the text of 31 U.S.C. Section 9101 see the Appendix.
 
    (7) For policies governing employee requests for, and employee return
 to work following, maternity leave, see FPM Supplement 990-2, chap. 630,
 subchap. S13-4.a. and 5.a.
 
    (8) An agency's determination as to the amount of leave to grant an
 employee for maternity reasons is subject to applicable law and
 regulation.  See FPM Supplement 990-2, chap. 630, subchap. S13-3 and 6.
 
    (9) National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1167 and
 Department of the Air Force, Headquarters, 31st Combat Support Group
 (TAC), Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, 6 FLRA 574, 579-81 (1981),
 enforced sub nom. National Federation of Federal Employees v. Federal
 Labor Relations Authority, 681 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1982);  National
 Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1431 and Veterans Administration
 Medical Center, East Orange, New Jersey, 9 FLRA 998 (1982).
 
    (10) 5 U.S.C. Section 6101(b)(2) provides:
 
    Section 6101.  Basic 40-hour workweek;  work schedules;  regulations
 
    (b)(2) To the maximum extent practicable, the head of an agency shall
 schedule the time to be spent by an employee in a travel status away
 from his official duty station within the regularly scheduled workweek
 of the employee.
 
    See also 5 C.F.R. Section 610.123 and Federal Deposit Insurance
 Corporation General Travel Regulations, paragraph 1208(a), which
 authorizes up to two hours for travel on Friday and Monday in
 circumstances involving "carry over assignments."
 
    (11) FDIC GTRs, paragraph 1205(a) provides in part:
 
          a.  Commuting.  Reimbursement in connection with travel of 24
       hours or less, when lodging is not required, will be claimed on
       the basis of subsistence plus transportation.  Subsistence is
       reimbursable at $8.00 for any day on which official duty requires
       both of the following:
 
          (1) Absence from residence exceeding 11 hours
 
          (2) Return to residence after 6:00 p.m.
 
          Transportation includes actual cost of public transportation
       and/or mileage at the prescribed rate, tolls, and parking costs.
       (Emphasis in original.)
 
    (12) See also National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1167 v.
 Federal Labor Relations Authority, 681 F.2d 886, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
 affirming National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1167 and
 Department of the Air Force, Headquarters, 31st Combat Support Group
 (TAC), Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, 6 FLRA 574 (1981).
 
    (13) Our decision with respect to Union Proposal 7 does not mean that
 we would not, in different circumstances, find that a compelling need
 exists for this regulation.  Of course, at the Authority has
 consistently stated, see note 34 infra, our determination that a
 proposal is negotiable is not a judgment on the merits of that proposal.
 
    (14) For the text of 5 U.S.C. Section 5335(a) see the Appendix.
 
    (15) For the text of 5 C.F.R. Section 531.405(a)(1) see the Appendix.
 
    (16) For the text of 5 U.S.C. Section 5331(a) see the Appendix.
 
    (17) For the text of 5 U.S.C. Section 5102(a)(1)(i) see the Appendix.
 
    (18) FDIC Within-Grade Increases Policy, subchapter 1-4.  See Agency
 Statement of Position at Exhibit M.
 
    (19) For the text of section 2424.11(c) of the Authority's Rules and
 Regulations see the Appendix.
 
    (20) The Federal Employees Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act
 of 1982 applies to employees of FDIC.  See 5 U.S.C. Section 6121(2) and
 5 U.S.C. Section 2105.  See also the discussion of Union Proposal 1
 above at note 3 and following.  As originally enacted into law, the Act
 provided only temporary authority for the establishment of flexible and
 compressed work schedules.  That authority was to have expired in July
 1985.  Since that date, Pub. L. 99-196 Stat. 1350 was enacted, which
 made the authority permanent.
 
    (21) 5 U.S.C. Section 6127 provides:
 
    Section 6127.  Compressed schedules;  agencies authorized to use
 
    (a) Notwithstanding section 6101 of this title, each agency may
 establish programs which use a 4-day workweek or other compressed
 schedule.
 
    See also 5 U.S.C. Sections 6121(5), 6130.
 
    (22) For the text of S. REP. No. 97-365 see the Appendix.
 
    (23) FDIC Circular 2100.1 (April 3, 1978) ("FDIC Hours and Tours of
 Duty"), paragraph 2.B. states, in part, as to Regional Office employees,
 that "(t)ours of duty for full-time employees will consist of an eight
 hour work day, exclusive of the lunch period." See also Agency Statement
 of Position at 22 and Exhibit N.
 
    (24) FDIC Memorandum (May 31, 1979) ("Flextime").  Agency Statement
 of Position at Exhibit O.
 
    (25) Even absent a contractual reopener such as is proposed here, the
 Agency would be obligated to notify the Union and Provide the Union an
 opportunity to negotiate as appropriate regarding any proposed
 mid-contract changes in travel regulations which affect employee working
 conditions.  See Department of the Air Force, Scott Air Force Base,
 Illinois and National Association of Government Employees, Local R7-23,
 5 FLRA 9 (1981).
 
    (26) Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Memorandum on Part-Time
 Employment Policy, EX-02-80 (August 7, 1980).  See Agency Statement of
 Position at Exhibit R.
 
    (27) International Federation of Professional and Technical
 Engineers, AFL-CIO, NASA Headquarters Professional Association and
 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Headquarters, Washington,
 D.C., 8 FLRA 212, 215 (1982);  National Treasury Employees Union,
 Chapter 6 and Internal Revenue Service, New Orleans District, 3 FLRA
 748, 759-62 (1980).
 
    (28) Federal Personnel Manual, Chap. 630, subchap. 11-5.  FPM
 Supplement 990-2, chap. 630, subchap. S11-5.
 
    (29) Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, California and
 International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, Local
 174, AFL-CIO and American Federation of Government Employees, Local
 2237, AFL-CIO and Federal Employees' Metal Trades Council, Long Beach,
 California, 7 FLRA 362, 367 (1981).  See also National Labor Relations
 Board, Region 5 and National Labor Relations Board Union, Local 5, 2
 FLRA 327 (1979).
 
    (30) The Comptroller General also stresses as important
 considerations whether the grant of administrative leave is for some
 purpose connected to the employee's work and, relying on references in
 the FPM to voting and blood donations, for some "civic" purpose.  See,
 for example, Comptroller General Decision B-156287 (February 5, 1975).
 
    (31) The circumstances involved in the Long Beach Naval Shipyard
 case, note 30, supra, wherein the proposal involved, at most, an
 authorization of 4 to 5 days, are distinguishable.  That case involved a
 group dismissal due to a shut-down of the shipyard for retooling and is
 a circumstance specifically referenced in the part of the FPM covering
 such dismissals.  The proposal in this case concerns only individual
 instances of administrative leave and is covered by a different part of
 the FPM.
 
    (32) The Comptroller General has also held that grants of
 administrative leave for 14 days, 28 days, and 31 days, to prepare for a
 bar examination are inappropriate, Comptroller General Decision B-156287
 (February 5, 1975);  that a grant of 23 days to participate in the Pan
 American Games as a member of the United States field hockey team is
 inappropriate, Comptroller General Decision B-185128 (December 3, 1975);
  that a grant of six weeks for voluntary, humanitarian service with
 Africare is inappropriate, Comptroller General Decision B-156287 (June
 26, 1974).
 
    (33) An election had been conducted pursuant to a representation
 petition filed in Case No. 5-RO-50005.
 
    (34) In finding that Union Proposals 7, 8, 9 and 11 are negotiable,
 we express no opinion as to their merits.
 
 
                                 APPENDIX
 
    (2) 5 U.S.C. Section 8906 provides, in pertinent part:
 
                       Section 8906.  Contributions
 
    (b)(1) Except as provided by paragraphs (2) and (3) (relating to
 contributions for part-time employees) of this subsection, the biweekly
 Government contribution for health benefits for an employee or annuitant
 enrolled in a health benefits plan under this chapter is adjusted to an
 amount equal to 60 percent of the average subscription charge determined
 under subsection (a) of this section . . . .
 
    (2) The biweekly Government contribution for an employee or annuitant
 enrolled in a plan under this chapter shall not exceed 75 percent of the
 subscription charge.
 
    (3) 5 U.S.C. Section 8901(1)(A) provides:
 
                        Section 8901.  Definitions
 
    For the purpose of this chapter --
 
    (1) "employee" means --
 
    (A) an employee as defined by section 2105 of this title(.)
 
    (4) 5 U.S.C. Section 2105(a)(1)(E) provides:
 
                          Section 2105.  Employee
 
    (a) For the purpose of this title, "employee", except as otherwise
 provided by this section or when specifically modified, means an officer
 and an individual who is --
 
    (1) appointed in the civil service by one of the following acting in
 an official capacity --
 
    (E) the head of a Government controlled corporation(.)
 
    (5) 5 U.S.C. Section 103 provides:
 
                   Section 103.  Government corporation
 
    For the purpose of this title --
 
    (1) "Government corporation" means a corporation owned or controlled
 by the Government of the United States;  and
 
    (2) "government controlled corporation" does not include a
 corporation owened by the Government of the United States.
 
    (6) 31 U.S.C. Section 9101 provides, in pertinent part:
 
                        Section 9101.  Definitions
 
    In this chapter --
 
    (1) "Government corporation" means a mixed-ownership Government
 corporation and a wholly owned Government corporation.
 
    (2) "mixed-ownership Government corporation" means --
 
    (C) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
 
    (14) 5 U.S.C. Section 5335(a) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
 
                  Section 5335.  Periodic step-increases
 
    (a) An employee paid on an annual basis, and occupying a permanent
 position within the scope of the General Schedule, who has not reached
 the maximum rate of pay for the grade in which his position is placed,
 shall be advanced in pay successively to the next higher rate within the
 grade at the beginning of the next pay period