22:0875(93)CA - HQ, Defense Logistics Agency, Washington, DC and AFGE Local 2449, and OPM; DOD Washington, DC and AFGE Local 2449, and OPM; Army Washington, DC and AFGE Local 2449, and OPM; Post Commander, Cameron Station and AFGE Local 2449, and OPM; HQ, Army Military District of Washington and AFGE Local 2449, and OPM -- 1986 FLRAdec CA



[ v22 p875 ]
22:0875(93)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:


 22 FLRA No. 93
 
                                       Case No. 3-CA-664
 
 HEADQUARTERS, DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY 
 WASHINGTON, D.C.
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT 
 EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 2449, AFL-CIO
 Charging Party
 
 and
 
 OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
 Intervenor
 
                                        Case No. 3-CA-1044
 
 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
 WASHINGTON, D.C.
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT 
 EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 2449, AFL-CIO
 Charging Party
 
 and
 
 OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
 Intervenor
 
                                     Case No. 3-CA-1089
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
 WASHINGTON, D.C.
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT 
 EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 2449, AFL-CIO
 Charging Party
 
 and
 
 OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
 Intervenor
 
                                      Case No. 3-CA-1090
 
 POST COMMANDER, CAMERON STATION
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT 
 EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 2449, ALF-CIO
 Charging Party
 
 and
 
 OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
 Intervenor
 
                                      Case No. 3-CA-1091
 
 HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY MILITARY 
 DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT 
 EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 2449, AFL-CIO
 Charging Party
 
 and
 
 OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
 Intervenor
 
                            DECISION AND ORDER
 
                         I.  Statement of the Case
 
    This unfair labor practice case is before the Authority on exceptions
 to the attached Administrative Law Judge's Decision filed by the General
 Counsel;  the Charging Party (Union);  Respondents Headquarters, U.S.
 Army Military District of Washington (MDW) and Cameron Station;  and the
 Intervenor, Office of Personnel Management.  The consolidated complaint,
 as amended, alleged that Respondent Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
 violated section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute by failing to bargain
 in good faith with the Union concerning the impact and implementation of
 a paid parking program at Cameron Station pursuant to a Government-wide
 policy to charge for employee parking.  It further alleged that the
 other named Respondents violated section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the
 Statute by their interference with the bargaining relationship between
 the Union and DLA which resulted in the Union being denied the
 opportunity to negotiate concerning the impact and implementation of the
 paid parking program prior to implementation at Cameron Station;  and
 that Cameron Station, MDW and Department of the Army (DOA) additionally
 interfered with the bargaining relationship between the Union and DLA by
 their acts and conduct in connection with the assessment of parking fees
 for two reserved parking spaces assigned to the Union pursuant to its
 contract with DLA.
 
                              II.  Background
 
    The facts are fully set forth in the Judge's Decision.  The Authority
 notes here, however, that the Union is the exclusive representative for
 a unit of DLA employees located at Cameron Station.  DLA is a primary
 national subdivision of the Department of Defense (DOD), and it is a
 tenant of Cameron Station.  DOA is a wholly distinct primary national
 sub-division of DOD, MDW is a subordinate command within DOA, and
 Cameron Station is an activity within, and subordinate to, MDW.  Thus,
 there is no command relationship between DOA, MDW, and Cameron Station
 on the one hand and DLA on the other.  Cameron Station, the host
 Activity, provides office and warehouse space and support services to
 DLA, but has no collective bargaining relationship with the Union.
 Similarly, no bargaining relationship exists between the Union and DOD,
 DOA or MDW.
 
                          III.  Judge's Decision
 
    The Judge found that Respondent DLA violated section 7116(a)(1) and
 (5) of the Statute by refusing to bargain with the Union concerning the
 impact and implementation of the paid parking program at Cameron
 Station.  The Judge further found that Respondent DOD had not violated
 the Statute and recommended dismissal of this portion of the complaint.
 As to Respondents DOA, MDW and Cameron Station, who were charged with
 violating the Statute by denying the Union an opportunity to negotiate
 prior to implementation of the paid parking program and by assessing
 parking fees for two reserved spaces assigned to the Union pursuant to
 an existing contract with DLA, the Judge found that they had not
 violated section 7116(a)(5) of the Statute.  However, the Judge
 concluded that Cameron Station had violated section 7116(a)(1) of the
 Statute by denying the Union an opportunity to negotiate, and that
 Cameron Station, MDW and DOA had all violated section 7116(a)(1) of the
 Statute for assessing fees.
 
                       IV.  Positions of the Parties
 
    The parties excepted to various legal conclusions made by the Judge.
 In their jointly filed exceptions, MDW and Cameron Station excepted to
 the Judge's findings that each had violated section 7116(a)(1) of the
 Statute.  The Intervenor, Office of Personnel Management, excepted to
 the finding of a violation against DLA.
 
    As to the above findings, the General Counsel excepted to the Judge's
 failure to find that Cameron Station had violated section 7116(a)(5) of
 the Statute by interfering with the bargaining relationship between DLA
 and the Union, and to the Judge's failure to conclude that DOD, DOA and
 MDW violated section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute based on their
 involvement in denying the Union an opportunity to bargain over the
 impact and implementation of the paid parking program.
 
    The only exception filed by the Charing Party was to the Judge's
 remedy.  The Charging Party urged the Authority to order that all
 employees who were charged fees for parking be reimbursed for such
 payments.
 
                               V.  Analysis
 
    The Authority will address the responsibility of each of the
 Respondents in turn.  First, as to DLA, it is well established that the
 duty of an agency under the Statute is to negotiate with an exclusive
 representative of an appropriate unit of its employees concerning
 conditions of employment affecting them, except as provided otherwise by
 Federal law or Government-wide rule or regulation or agency regulation
 for which a compelling need exists.  The Authority has concluded that
 the impact and implementation of a paid parking program concerns unit
 employees' "conditions of employment" and falls within the duty to
 bargain.  /1/ In this case, when the Union learned of the proposed
 parking requirements to be implemented at Cameron Station, it requested
 negotiations with DLA to resolve the alleged conflict with the parties'
 existing collective bargaining agreement and requested to bargain over
 matters left to agency discretion under the "Government-wide regulation"
 directing the implementation of paid parking programs.  In its response
 to the Union, DLA refused to negotiate on the ground that it lacked any
 authority with respect to the implementation of the paid parking program
 at Cameron Station and noted that the MDW Post Commander located at
 Cameron Station had the responsibility for implementing the program.
 However, the Authority has held that "the Statute clearly requires the
 parties to provide representatives who are empowered to negotiate and
 enter into agreements on all matters within the scope of negotiations in
 the bargaining unit." /2/ Thus, DLA failed to meet its bargaining
 obligation under the Statute by refusing to negotiate or to obtain duly
 authorized representatives of the Agency to negotiate on its behalf with
 the Union at the level of exclusive recognition as to matters within the
 scope of bargaining.  /3/
 
    As for the allegations against Respondent DOD, the Union is not the
 exclusive representative of a unit of employees at the DOD level, but
 rather is the exclusive representative of units of employees at a
 subordinate level within the Agency.  Thus, the Authority notes that DOD
 had no duty to bargain with the Union prior to issuing internal
 directives to subordinate elements concerning the paid parking program.
 See Boston District Recruiting Command, Boston, Massachusetts, 15 FLRA
 720 (1984), and cases cited therein.  Also, in the absence of any
 showing that DOD prevented DLA from fulfilling its duty to bargain with
 the Union at the level of exclusive recognition, the Authority finds
 that DOD has not violated the Statute as alleged.  It should be noted,
 however, that if DLA had requested DOD's assistance in resolving the
 matter and the latter had refused, DOD's conduct would have violated the
 Statute.  As indicated by the Judge, however, that is not the case here.
 
    We turn next to the allegation that DOA, MDW and Cameron Station
 violated section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute by their actions in
 implementing the paid parking program.  The Judge found that the only
 violation committed was by Cameron Station which interfered with the
 rights of DLA employees to exercise their statutory collective
 bargaining rights.  This conduct was found to be violative of section
 7116(a)(1) of the Statute.  The Judge found that neither DOA nor MDW had
 violated section 7116(a)(1) in this regard and, further, that no
 violation of section 7116(a)(5) had been committed by either DOA, MDW or
 Cameron Station.
 
    We agree with the Judge's conclusions that none of these Respondents
 violated section 7116(a)(5) of the Statute.  We note that these
 Respondents do not have a collective bargaining relationship with the
 Union and therefore could not have violated a nonexistent duty to
 bargain.  We also agree with the Judge's conclusion that neither DOA nor
 MDW engaged in conduct which was violative of Section 7116(a)(1) of the
 Statute.  However, we disagree with the Judge's finding that Cameron
 Station violated section 7116(a)(1).  We view Cameron Station's conduct
 in implementing the paid parking program as a proper exercise of its
 managerial prerogative and find that it has not been established how the
 act of implementing the program interfered with any protected rights
 under the Statute.  There is no showing, for example, that
 implementation of the program by Cameron Station prevented DLA from
 meeting its bargaining obligations and no showing that Cameron Station
 in any way instructed DLA not to meet those obligations.
 
    Finally, we address the allegation that Respondents DOA, MDW and
 Cameron Station violated section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute by
 assessing parking fees for two spaces used by the Union.  As the Judge
 noted in his decision, DLA and the Union had a contractual arrangement
 whereby the Union was provided two reserved spaces which it had used
 free of charge.  Although the contract did not specify that the spaces
 were to be used without charge, at the time the agreement was negotiated
 there was no question that the spaces were free of charge.  Also, OMB
 Circular A-118, one of the Government-wide parking regulations giving
 rise to the paid parking program, expressly provided that it was not to
 be interpreted as rendering null and void any valid negotiated
 agreements covering employee parking which were in effect on the
 effective date of the Circular, until such time as the agreements
 expired.  At some point, Cameron Station indicated that parking fees
 would have to be assessed for the two parking spaces.  The commander of
 DLA requested reconsideration of this decision, relying in part upon a
 proposed internal DOD directive on parking which provided that valid
 agreements were to remain in effect until their expiration, and further
 relying upon the agreement between DLA and the Union that the two
 reserved Union spaces were to be provided free of charge.  /4/ Cameron
 Station responded that the Union could retain the use of the two
 reserved spaces but that essentially it would have to pay the fees.  DLA
 repeated its request that Cameron Station reconsider its decision.
 Cameron Station then forwarded DLA's two requests to MDW which forwarded
 the requests to DOA.  In its response, DOA stated as follows:
 
          Any valid, negotiated agreement between installation/activity
       commanders and unions in effect on 13 August 1979, that
       specifically state(s) free parking will be provided will remain in
       effect until the expiration of the agreement . . . .  If free
       parking is not specifically provided for in the agreement, then it
       should not be provided.  Commanders may provide reserved parking
       spaces or passes that facilitate parking for union
       representatives;  however, fees should be collected for their use
       when the union representative is an official visitor parking over
       three hours.
 
    In the meantime, the Union had purchased permits for its two reserved
 spaces.
 
    The Judge found that neither DOA, MDW nor Cameron Station had
 violated section 7116(a)(5) of the Statute concerning the assessment of
 fees for the two spaces.  We agree for the reasons set forth in his
 decision.  We also agree with the Judge's conclusion that DOA and
 Cameron Station committed independent violations of section 7116(a)(1)
 of the Statute by interfering with the relationship between DLA and the
 Union but disagree with his finding as to Respondent MDW.  DLA and the
 Union had a collective bargaining agreement providing the Union with two
 free parking spaces, which agreement was made known to DOA and Cameron
 Station by DLA.  OMB Circular A-118 itself provided for the continuation
 of valid negotiated agreements covering employee parking.  Although
 aware of these facts, Cameron Station made the determination that fees
 would have to be imposed for the spaces in question.  Together with DOA,
 it subsequently denied requests for reconsideration of that decision and
 thereafter imposed such fees contrary to both the contractual commitment
 between DLA and the Union and the terms of the OMB Circular.  In our
 view, such conduct interfered with the Union's right to the use of two
 free parking spaces, as contractually agreed upon, thereby unlawfully
 interfering with the exclusive bargaining relationship between DLA and
 the Union in violation of section 7116(a)(1) of the Statute.  MDW, on
 the other hand, merely transmitted communications between Cameron
 Station and DOA.  There is no evidence that MDW itself was involved in
 the deliberative process.  Therefore, it did not engage in conduct which
 interfered with the relationship between DLA and the Union, and this
 allegation of the complaint shall be dismissed as to Respondent MDW.
 
    In concluding that DOA and Cameron Station violated section
 7116(a)(1) of the Statute by interfering with protected rights of DLA
 employees, the Authority has the opportunity for the first time under
 the Statute to decide that organizational entities of the same agency
 not in the same "chain of command" as the entity at the level of
 exclusive recognition may commit violations of section 7116(a)(1) of the
 Statute if they are found to have unlawfully interfered with the
 protected rights of employees other than their own by taking action
 which conflicts with the bargaining relationship between the parties at
 the level of exclusive recognition.  While this is a case of first
 impression under the Statute, such findings are supported by private
 sector precedent.  Thus, the National Labor Relations Board has decided
 with court approval that an employer as defined in the National Labor
 Relations Act may be found to have violated certain unfair labor
 practice sections of the NLRA with respect to employees other than its
 own.  /5/ There is nothing in the Statute or its legislative history
 which would preclude a similar finding when a component of an agency has
 interfered with the protected rights of employees employed by an entity
 within a different primary national subdivision of the same agency.
 
    Section 7116(a)(1) of the Statute makes it an unfair labor practice
 "for an agency . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee
 in the exercise by the employee of any right under this chapter(.)"
 (Emphasis added.) The term "agency" is defined in section 7103(a)(3) of
 the Statute as "an Executive agency" (with various inclusions and
 exclusions not here relevant) and, as relevant here, the term "employee"
 is defined in section 7103(a)(2) of the Statute as "an individual . . .
 employed in an agency(.)" A literal reading of these provisions supplies
 clear support for the conclusion that "an agency" which interferes with,
 restrains or coerces "any employee" in the exercise of that employee's
 protected rights commits a violation of section 7116(a)(1) of the
 Statute, even if the agency's actions are not directed at an employee
 for which it is the employer at the level of exclusive recognition, as
 in this case.
 
    Underlying our holding here is the policy consideration that in our
 judgment an agency should not be able to escape liability for conduct
 which has unlawfully interfered with, restrained or coerced employees in
 the exercise of their rights simply because it is not in the chain of
 command with the "employer" at the level of exclusive recognition.
 Particularly in this instance, where Cameron Station was responsible for
 providing and maintaining a variety of services to DLA and its
 employees, including parking facilities, Cameron Station's actions in
 assessing parking fees for the two spaces directly interfered with the
 contractually agreed upon provision between DLA and the Union, thereby
 unlawfully interfering with the rights of DLA employees.  The conduct of
 DOA similarly interfered with the rights of DLA employees because DOA
 was directly involved in the process of causing the fees to be assessed
 even though it knew that the collective bargaining agreement between DLA
 and the Union provided two free parking spaces to the Union.
 
    We wish to caution, however, that our decision should not be
 construed as implying that agencies -- even those with Government-wide
 responsibilities -- automatically run the risk of violating the Statute
 when regulations relating to conditions of employment of unit employees
 are simply promulgated.  Rather, our finding here is that when a
 component of an agency engages in conduct which unlawfully interferes
 with the protected rights of employees of another component, a violation
 of section 7116(a)(1) of the Statute will be found to have occurred.
 
    It should also be noted that the reasons leading to the finding of a
 violation of section 7116(a)(1) by Cameron Station and DOA would not
 apply to a section 7116(a)(5) allegation.  Thus, while a party outside
 of the chain of command could -- and in this case did -- interfere with
 employees' rights by disrupting an agreement between the employees'
 exclusive representative and the agency component at the level of
 exclusive recognition, that outside party cannot be found to have failed
 or refused to negotiate in good faith because, in the absence of a
 collective bargaining relationship, no duty to bargain exists and thus
 there can be no violation of section 7116(a)(5) of the Statute.  This is
 consistent with our findings above concerning all the named Respondents
 not party to the collective bargaining relationship with the Union.
 
                                VI.  Remedy
 
    With regard to an appropriate remedy, the Authority concludes that,
 inasmuch as there is no regulation in effect at this time requiring the
 collection of parking fees, /6/ it is unnecessary to order DLA to
 negotiate regarding this matter at the present time.  Moreover, the
 Union's request that employees be reimbursed for all parking fees
 collected pursuant to the regulation cannot be granted.  The mechanism
 for determining the amount of fees to be collected and the conditions
 for exemptions from such fees were specifically addressed in the
 regulation.  The regulation did not, therefore, leave the amount of the
 fees open to "implementation" negoations and the fees would have been
 collected regardless of the results of negotiations over implementation
 of the program.  However, as to the fees paid by the Union for the two
 reserved spaces, OMB Circular A-118 essentially permitted the
 continuation of valid negotiated agreements, until their expiration,
 and, as noted, the agreement between DLA and the Union allowed for two
 free spaces.  Therefore we find that it will effectuate the purposes and
 policies of the Statute to order that the Union be reimbursed for such
 fees paid, to the extent that such monies have not already been
 refunded.
 
                             VII.  Conclusion
 
    Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations
 and section 7118 of the Statute, the Authority has reviewed the rulings
 of the Judge made at the hearing, finds that no prejudicial error was
 committed, and thus affirms those rulings.  The Authority has considered
 the Judge's Decision and the entire record in this case, and adopts the
 Judge's findings, conclusions and recommended Order, as modified.
 
    We find in agreement with the Judge's conclusion, that Respondent DLA
 violated section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute.  /7/ We also agree
 with the Judge's conclusion that Respondent DOD did not violate the
 Statute.  As to the Judge's findings regarding DOA, MDW and Cameron
 Station, and their actions in implementing the paid parking program, we
 agree that none of these Respondents violated section 7116(a)(5) of the
 Statute and that neither DOA nor MDW violated section 7116(a)(1).
 However, we find, contrary to the Judge, that Cameron Station did not
 commit a violation of section 7116(a)(1) in this regard.
 
    As to the assessment of parking fees for two contractually reserved
 spaces, we agree that no violation of section 7116(a)(5) was committed
 by DOA, MDW or Cameron Station.  We further adopt the Judge's findings
 that DOA and Cameron Station violated section 7116(a)(1) of the Statute
 by requiring the payment of parking fees for those two spaces, but
 disagree with his finding that MDW also violated the Statute in this
 regard.
 
    Accordingly, we shall issue the following order for the conduct found
 to have violated the Statute and shall dismiss the complaint as to the
 matters found not to have violated the Statute.
 
                                   ORDER
 
    Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Federal Labor Relations
 Authority's Rules and Regulations and section 7118 of the Statute, IT IS
 HEREBY ORDERED that:
 
    A.  Headquarters, Defense Logistics Agency, shall:
 
    1.  Cease and desist from:
 
    (a) Failing or refusing to bargain, upon request, with the American
 Federation of Government Employees, Local 2449, AFL-CIO, the exclusive
 bargaining representative of its employees located at Cameron Station,
 Alexandria, Virginia, concerning the impact and implementation of any
 aspect of a paid parking program which may be established by
 Government-wide rule or regulation.
 
    (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining or
 coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights assured by the
 Statute.
 
    2.  Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the
 purpose and policies of the Statute:
 
    (a) Post at Cameron Station copies of the attached Notice on forms to
 be furnished by the Federal Labor Relations Authority.  Upon receipt of
 such forms they shall be signed by an authorized representative of
 Defense Logistics Agency, and shall be posted and maintained for 60
 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including bulletin
 boards and other places where notices to employees are customarily
 posted.  Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that such Notices are
 not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
 
    (b) Pursuant to section 2423.30 of the Authority's Rules and
 Regulations, notify the Regional Director, Region III, in writing,
 within 30 days from the date of this Order, as to what steps have been
 taken to comply with it.
 
    B.  Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. and Cameron Station
 shall:
 
    1.  Cease and desist from:
 
    (a) Assessing parking fees for two reserved spaces provided in the
 collective bargaining agreement between Headquarters, Defense Logistics
 Agency and the American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2449,
 AFL-CIO, thereby unlawfully interfering with the bargaining relationship
 between the parties.
 
    (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or
 coercing employees represented by the American Federation of Government
 Employees, Local 2449, AFL-CIO and employed by Headquarters, Defense
 Logistics Agency, in the exercise of their rights assured by the
 Statute.
 
    2.  Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the
 purpose and polciies of the Statute:
 
    (a) Reimburse the American Federation of Government Employees, Local
 2449, AFL-CIO, for the fees it paid for the two reserved parking spaces
 provided in the collective bargaining agreement with Headquarters,
 Defense Logistics Agency, to the extent that such monies have not
 already been refunded.
 
    (b) Post at Cameron Station copies of the attached Notice on forms to
 be furnished by the Federal Labor Relations Authority.  Upon receipt of
 such forms, they shall be signed by an authorized representative of both
 the Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. and Cameron Station, and
 shall be posted and maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
 conspicuous places, including bulletin boards and other places where
 notices to employees are customarily posted.  Reasonable steps shall be
 taken to ensure that such Notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
 by any other material.
 
    (c) Pursuant to section 2423.30 of the Authority's Rules and
 Regulations, notify the Regional Director, Region III, in writing,
 within 30 days from the date of this Order, as to what steps have been
 taken to comply with it.
 
    IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the remaining unfair labor practice
 allegations in the complaints against Respondents Department of Defense,
 Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Military District of
 Washington, and Cameron Station be, and they hereby are, dismissed.
 
    Issued, Washington, D.C., July 30, 1986.
 
                                       /s/ JERRY L. CALHOUN
                                       Jerry L. Calhoun, Chairman
                                       /s/ HENRY B. FRAZIER III
                                       Henry B. Frazier III, Member
                                       FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
 
 
 
 
 
 NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF
 THE FEDERAL
 LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE
 POLICIES OF
 CHAPTER 71 OF TITLE 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE
 LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES
 THAT:
 
    WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to give notice to and bargain, upon
 request, with the American Federation of Government Employees, Local
 2449, AFL-CIO, the exclusive representative of our employees located at
 Cameron Station, concerning the impact and implementation of any aspect
 of a paid parking program which may be established by Government-wide
 rule or regulation.
 
    WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain,
 or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights assured by the
 Statute.
 
                                       Headquarters,
                                       Defense Logistics Agency
 
    Dated:
                                       By:  (Signature) (Title)
 
    This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date
 of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other
 material.
 
    If employees have any questions concerning this Notice or compliance
 with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Regional
 Director, Region III, Federal Labor Relations Authority, whose address
 is:  1111 18th Street, N.W., 7th Floor (P.O. Box 33758), Washington,
 D.C. 20033-0758, and whose telephone number is:  (202) 653-8500.
 
 
 
 
 NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF
 THE FEDERAL
 LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE
 POLICIES OF
 CHAPTER 71 OF TITLE 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE
 LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS WE HEREBY NOTIFY EMPLOYEES THAT:
 
    WE WILL NOT assess parking fees for two reserved spaces provided in
 the collective bargaining agreement between Headquarters, Defense
 Logistics Agency and the American Federation of Government Employees,
 Local 2449, AFL-CIO, thereby unlawfully interfering with the bargaining
 relationship between the parties.
 
    WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain,
 or coerce employees represented by the American Federation of Government
 Employees, Local 2449, AFL-CIO and employed by Headquarters, Defense
 Logistics Agency, in the exercise of their rights assured by the
 Statute.
 
    WE WILL reimburse the American Federation of Government Employees,
 Local 2449, AFL-CIO, for the fees it paid for the two parking spaces
 provided in the collective bargaining agreement with Headquarters,
 Defense Logistics Agency, to the extent that such monies have not
 already been refunded.
                                       Department of the Army,
                                       Washington, D.C.
 
    Dated:
                                       By:  (Signature) (Title)
                                       Cameron Station
 
    Dated:
                                       By:  (Signature) (Title)
 
    This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date
 of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other
 material.
 
    If employees have any questions concerning this Notice or complaince
 with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Regional
 Director, Region III, Federal Labor Relations Authority, whose address
 is:  1111 18th Street, NW., 7th Floor (P.O. Box 33758), Washington, D.C.
 20033-0758, and whose telephone number is:  (202) 653-8500.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -------------------- ALJ$ DECISION FOLLOWS --------------------
 
    Case Nos. 3-CA-664
              3-CA-1044
              3-CA-1089
              3-CA-1090
              3-CA-1091
  
    HEADQUARTERS, DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
                                    and
    DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
                                    and
    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
                                    and
    CAMERON STATION
                                    and
    HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
    Respondent
 
                                    and
 
    AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, 
    LOCAL 2449, AFL-CIO
    Charging Party
 
                                    and
 
    OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
    Intervenor
 
 
    Erick J. Genser, Esq. and
    Peter B. Robb, Esq.
    For the General Counsel
 
    Doris O. Hildreth
    For the Charging Party
 
    Sam Horn, Esq.
    For the Department of Defense
    and Department of Army
 
    Capt. Helen Sharetts, Esq.
    For Cameron Station and Headquarters
    U.S. Army Military District of Washington
 
    Thomas P. Rhodes, Esq.
    For Headquarters, Defense
    Logistics Agency
 
    Stuart M. Foss, Esq.
    For the Intervenor,
    Office of Personnel Management
 
    Before:  FRANCIS E. DOWD
    Administrative Law Judge
 
                                 DECISION
 
                           Statement of the Case
 
    This is a proceeding under the Federal Labor Relations Statute (the
 Statute), 92 Stat. 1191, 5 U.S.C. Section 7101 et seq.  It was
 instituted by the filing of a Complaint and Notice of Hearing, and Order
 Consolidating Case Nos. 3-CA-664, 3-CA-1044, and 3-CA-1089 on April 30,
 1980.  A Complaint and Notice of Hearing, and Order Consolidating Cases
 3-CA-1090 and 1091 was issued on June 18, 1980.  As more specifically
 detailed in the Index and Description of Formal Documents to General
 Counsel Exhibits 7(a) to 7(bb), the Complaints were based on separate
 charges filed against each Respondent.  An Order Consolidating all the
 above mentioned cases and Rescheduling the Hearing was issued on June
 19, 1980.
 
    The General Counsel alleges that the Respondents, during the course
 of their implementation of President Carter's paid parking program,
 violated Section 7116(a)(1) and (5) as follows:
 
    1.  Respondent Defense Logistics Agency refused to negotiate with
 Local 2449 over the impact and implementation of paid parking at Cameron
 Station.
 
    2.  Respondent Cameron Station implemented a paid parking program
 without giving due consideration to Local 2449's right to negotiate over
 its impact and implementation.
 
    3.  Respondents Department of Defense, Department of the Army, and
 Military District of Washington curtailed Local 2449's statutory right
 to negotiate fully over the impact and implementation of the paid
 parking program at Cameron Station.
 
    4.  Respondents Department of the Army, Military District of
 Washington, and Cameron Station unilaterally assessed parking fees to
 Local 2449 for two parking spaces assigned to it.
 
    Respondents deny committing any unfair labor practices;  their
 specific defenses will be discussed later in this decision.
 
    It would also point that this is the sixth and last in a series of
 "parking" cases litigated by the General Counsel.  Decisions in the
 other cases have already been issued by the two Administrative Law
 Judges and are pending review by the Authority.  Those decisions
 rendered by Judge Salvatore Arrigo are as follows:  Defense Contract
 Administration Services Region, Boston, Massachusetts;  Commander, Fort
 Devens, Fort Devens, Massachusetts;  Defense Logistics Agency,
 Washington, D.C.; Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. and National
 Association of Government Employees, Local R1-210, Case Nos. 1-CA-212,
 1-CA-298, 1-CA-299, and 1-CA-300 (December 22, 1980) (hereinafter
 referred to as "DCASR");  Boston District Recruiting Command, Boston,
 Massachusetts;  96th U.S. Army Reserve Command, Hanscom Air Force Base,
 Massachuestts;  Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.; Department of
 Defense, Washington, D.C. and American Federation of Government
 Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1900, Case Nos. 1-CA-206, 1-CA-207, 1-CA-208,
 1-CA-209, 1-CA-303, 1-CA-304 (December 22, 1980) (hereinafter referred
 to as "Boston District");  and Department of the Army and American
 Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Case No. 3-CA-766 (December
 22, 1980) (hereinafter referred to as "Department of the Army").  Those
 decisions issued by Judge William Devaney are as follows:  Office of the
 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and Washington
 Headquarters Services and American Federation of Government Employees,
 AFL-CIO, Local 2, Case Nos. 3-CA-718 and 1026 (May 18, 1981)
 (hereinafter referred to as "PA");  and Harry Diamond Laboratories,
 Department of the Army, and Department of Defense, and American
 Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2, Case Nos.
 3-CA-719, 819, and 970 (May 18, 1981) (hereinafter referred to as
 "HDL").
 
    At the hearing in Washington, D.C. all parties were afforded full
 opportunity to be heard, adduce evidence, examine and cross-examine
 witnesses, and argue orally.  Thereafter, Respondents, the Intervenor,
 /8/ and the General Counsel filed briefs which have been duly
 considered.
 
    Upon consideration of the entire record /9/ in this case, from my
 observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, and from all of the
 testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, I make the following
 findings of fact, /10/ conclusions or law, and recommended order.
 
                             Findings of Fact
 
    1.  Respondent Department of Defense ("DOD") is an agency within the
 meaning of Section 7103(a)(3) of the Statute.  Respondents Department of
 the Army ("DA or DOA") and Headquarters, Defense Logistics Agency
 ("DLA") each are separate primary national subdivisions of the
 Department of Defense within the meaning of Section 2421.5 of the Rules
 and Regulations of the Authority.  Respondents Headquarters, U.S. Army
 Military District of Washington ("MDW") and Cameron Station are
 subordinate activities of the Department of the Army within the meaning
 of Section 2421.4 of the Rules and Regulations of the Authority.
 
    2.  Respondent Cameron Station is under the jurisdiction of MDW;
 that is, the Commanding Officer of Cameron Station reports directly to
 the Commander of MDW.  There is an organizational "chain of command"
 that exists from DOD at the top of the chain, to DA, then to MDW, and
 finally to Cameron Station.  Each "link" reports directly to the
 organizational entity immediately above it in the chain.
 
    3.  Respondent DLA's Director reports directly to DOD.  Respondents
 DLA and DA appear on the same level in an organizational chart.  DLA is
 located on the premises of Cameron Station in alexandria, Virginia and
 can be described as a "tenant" of Cameron Station.  As the "landlord" of
 DLA, Cameron Station provides office and warehouse space to DLA and
 customary support services that are normally provided by a landlord to a
 tenant.
 
    4.  The Charging Party/Union is the American Federation of Government
 Employees, Local 2449, AFL-CIO (hereinafter "Local 2449"), a labor
 organization within the meaning of Section 7103(a)(4).  At all times
 material herein, the American Federation of Government Employees,
 AFL-CIO has been certified as the exclusive representative of two
 separate consolidated units of professional and non-professional
 employees of DLA nationwide.  Local 2449 at all times material herein
 has been designated by the American Federation of Government Employees,
 AFL-CIO to act as the exclusive representative for those DLA bargaining
 unit employees located at Cameron Station.  Official notification of the
 delegation of authority authorizing local bargaining unit officials to
 act as the exclusive representative for employees in matters of local
 concern was transmitted to the Director of DLA on or about May 30, 1979.
 
    5.  The organizational relationship of the parties to this
 proceeding, as described above, may be summarized and perhaps better
 understood by the following chart:
 
       CHART OMITTED
 
    6.  The allegations in this case arise from the implementation of a
 paid parking program at Cameron Station in the Fall of 1979.  The
 implementation of the program was the result of government-wide
 regulations issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the
 General Services Administration (GSA) on August 17, 1979 and September
 13, 1979, respectively, directing Federal agencies to implement paid
 parking at non-exempt facilities (where free parking existed before), as
 a means of promoting certain policy goals, e.g., energy conservation and
 cleaner air.
 
    7.  As a result of orders received on or about October 29, 1979 from
 MDW, the Command Officer of Cameron Station proceeded to devise and
 implement a paid parking program at that facility.  All employees who
 worked on the premises of Cameron Station (regardless of the employer)
 and who were not exempted were required to pay a $10.00 parking fee for
 the month of November to park on the facility.  Those non-exempt
 employees who had not purchased parking permits by November 10, 1979
 were subject to penalties.
 
    8.  By letter dated October 9, 1979, DLA forwarded a copy of the GSA
 government-wide parking regulation to Local 2449.  Subsequent to the
 receipt of this letter, the President of Local 2449, Mr. Gus
 Apostalakis, sent a letter dated October 16, 1979 to Captain W. I.
 Starrett, Jr., Commander of the DLA Administrative Support Unit,
 requesting negotiations concerning the paid parking program to be
 implemented at Cameron Station.  After receiving the letter from Local
 2449 dated October 16, 1979, Captain Starrett spoke with Mr. Apostalakis
 over the telephone and informed him of his position that he (DLA) did
 not have authority to enter into negotiations over the matter.  Captain
 Starrett then put this position in writing to Mr. Apostalakis in a
 letter dated October 18, 1979.
 
    9.  After Mr. Apostalakis received this letter, Mr. Apostalakis and
 Captain Starrett had another discussion, and it was agreed that the
 parties would meet to discuss the matter.  Officials of Local 2449
 thereafter met with Captain Starrett and another DLA official on October
 19, 1979.  At this meeting, Local 2449 officials again requested to
 negotiate, but Captain Starrett refused, reiterating his position that
 he had no authority to negotiate the matter.  Captain Starrett explained
 that he wasn't in a position to negotiate because DLA was a tenant on a
 MDW post.  Throughout this meeting, Captain Starrett took the position
 that the purpose of the meeting was a consultation session rather than a
 negotiating session.
 
    10.  After this meeting, Captain Starrett sent a memo to the Post
 Commander of Cameron Station dated October 19, 1979 requesting a meeting
 and information regarding the paid parking program.  In his memo,
 Captain Starrett made reference to the contract between DLA and Local
 2449 and to "our obligations to our work force and the Union." Captain
 Starrett was uncertain as to whether he ever specifically communicated
 Local 2449's desire to negotiate to Cameron Station, but he was sure he
 had at least expressed the Union's concern during informal discussions.
 Accordingly, I find that Cameron Station was never presented with a
 specific request to bargain.
 
    11.  On November 11, 1979, Local 2449 filed an unfair labor practice
 charge against DLA alleging a refusal to bargain, copies of which were
 served on General Post, Captain Starrett and Mr. Frank Scutch.
 
    12.  On November 1, 1979, a meeting was held between Cameron Station
 and DLA officials at which time Cameron Station requested that DLA
 assist in the collection of parking fees from DLA employees.  DLA
 officials agreed to assist in collecting the fees for the month of
 November.  A memo was then issued by Captain Starrett to all DLA
 personnel at Cameron Station on or about November 2, 1979, detailing the
 DLA parking fee collection system for the month of November.  Actually,
 DLA had devised this plan prior to the meeting with Cameron Station
 officials on November 1, 1979.  Captain Starrett correctly had
 anticipated Cameron Station's request for assistance, and therefore
 asked the DLA Resource Management Officer to develop a fee collection
 system a few days prior to November 1, 1979.  DLA did not meet with
 Local 2449, however, prior to developing the fee collection procedures
 for November.  The fee collection method was determined without allowing
 Local 2449 to provide any input.
 
    13.  Captain Starrett did call Peter Morgus, (who was acting
 president of Local 2449 at the time) shortly after November 1 to inform
 Mr. Morgus that DLA would collect parking fees from employees for the
 month of November.  /11/ Mr. Morgus voiced his objection to Captain
 Starrett, noting that Local 2449 had attempted to negotiate the impact
 and implementation of paid parking at Cameron Station.  Captain Starrett
 responded by stating only that DLA had to do it;  he did not inform Mr.
 Morgus of the collection procedures that were to be used or provide an
 opportunity for Mr. Morgus to submit comments.  Mr. Morgus subsequently
 received the memo concerning the parking fee collection system on or
 about November 5, 1979 through the normal employee distribution system.
 
    14.  On or about November 8, 1979, Mr. Morgus, who was still acting
 as President of Local 2449, sent a letter to Captain Starrett regarding
 two parking spaces assigned to Local 2449 in accordance with Article
 XXXIX of the contract between DLA and Local 2449.  The letter expressed
 the opinion that the two spaces should not be subject to a parking fee
 and warned that imposition of a fee would be regarded as abrogation of
 the contract.  Captain Starrett agreed with Mr. Morgus that the two
 spaces assigned to Local 2449 pursuant to the contract were not to be
 charged a fee, and informed Mr. Morgus of his concurrence with this
 position by letter dated November 26, 1979.  In his deposition, Captain
 Starrett stated that he was only expressing his personal opinion.
 
    15.  Captain Starrett then wrote to Colonel Briggs, the Post
 Commander of Cameron Station, on or about November 26, 1979, requesting
 that Colonel Briggs reconsider his decision to assess parking fees to
 Local 2449 for these two spaces.  /12/ Captain Starrett's letter
 indicated that the bargaining history and intent of both Local 2449 and
 DLA was that these spaces were to be free spaces, and that OMB Circular
 A-118 stated that any contract provision covering employee parking in
 effect as of August 13, 1979 shall remain in effect until the expiration
 of the agreement (G.C. Exh. No. 5).  The Deputy Post Commander responded
 to Captain Starrett's letter, informing Captain Starrett that the two
 spaces assigned to Local 2449 were subject to the parking fees (G.C.
 Exh. No. 17).  Colonel Briggs made the determination of his own at this
 time that the spaces were not to be free spaces (Tr. 80).  Subsequently,
 on December 11, 1979 and again on December 12, 1979, Cameron Station
 Security Police issued a parking citation to an official of Local 2449
 who had parked in one of the two assigned spaces without a valid permit
 (G.C. Exh. No. 12).  Local 2449 officials thereafter purchased permits
 for the two assigned spaces.
 
    16.  Captain Starrett subsequently wrote another letter to Colonel
 Briggs on or about January 25, 1980, attempting once again to have
 Colonel Briggs reconsider his decision to assess fees for the two spaces
 assigned to Local 2449.  Sometime after receipt of this letter, Colonel
 Briggs transmitted both letters from Captain Starrett concerning the two
 spaces to MDW for a legal interpretation.  The request for a legal
 interpretation was then forwarded to the Department of the Army, who, in
 turn, responded on March 28 that the two spaces assigned to Local 2449
 pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement were not to be exempt
 from the parking fees (TR. 81, 82;  Resp. Cameron Station Exh. No. 1).
 Local 2449 has continued to purchase permits for the two spaces since
 receiving the parking tickets in December 1979.
 
                  (Involvement of DOD, DA, and MDW) /13/
 
    17.  Respondent DOD and Department of the Army's involvement with the
 implementation of the paid parking program dates back several months
 prior to October 29, 1979, when Cameron Station was directed to begin
 collecting parking fees.  Mr. Francis B. Roche of the Office of the
 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and
 Logistics chaired a DOD working group charged with the responsibility of
 working out the details of the program within DOD.  The Department of
 the Army had various individuals on this committee as representatives.
 
    18.  As early as April 1979, Mr. Roche sent a draft OMB circular to
 DOD components for comment.  Mr. Roche then consolidated the comments
 received from DOD components and forwarded them to OMB in June 1979.  By
 mid-July 1979, it was known to DOD (and to the Department of the Army
 through its representatives on the DOD working group) what direction the
 final parameters of the OMB circular would take.
 
    19.  Based on this knowledge, and its previous involvement, DOD
 approached OMB and reached an agreement with OMB whereby DOD real estate
 units would appraise the parking facilities at DOD component activities
 to arrive at a figure for parking charges at each facility.  Having
 reached this agreement to conduct its own appraisals, DOD then met with
 officials from OMB and GSA in late July 1979, at which time DOD was
 given four general guidelines to use in conducting the appraisals.
 Neither OMB nor GSA, however, gave DOD instructions on specific
 appraisal techniques to be used.
 
    20.  After receiving permission to conduct its own appraisals, DOD
 directed its real estate appraisers on or about August 3, 1979 to take
 immediate steps to determine the rates to be charged for
 Government-furnished employee parking at military installations (G.C.
 Exh. No. 28).  An appraiser from the Army Corps of Engineers then
 conducted an appraisal survey and, using his subjective judgment, based
 on nothing more definitive than "commonly accepted appraisal
 techniques", determined a value for parking at Cameron Station (G.C.
 Exh. No. 29).  The completed survey form indicates that the appraiser
 went outside the area surrounding Cameron Station as there are no known
 commercial parking facilities nearby.  At no time did DOD notify the
 Unions that it was carrying out the appraisal.
 
    21.  DOD (through the efforts of Mr. Roche) then developed draft
 parking regulations of its own which were sent to component activities
 for comment, including the Department of the Army, on or about September
 18, 1979 (G.C. Exh. No. 26).  Subsequently, on or about October 11, a
 DOD parking directive was issued to component activities (including the
 Department of the Army) which contained DOD procedures for implementing
 the Government-wide parking regulations (G.C. Exh. No. 27).  No
 substantive changes were made in the October 11, 1979 document from the
 September 18, 1979 draft.
 
    22.  The October 11, 1979, DOD parking directive did, however, go
 beyond the Government-wide regulations in certain significant respects.
 Beyond the paramount consideration of the fee, which was not contained
 in the OMB or GSA regulations, DOD made an administrative determination
 to limit free visitor parking to 3 hours which was then binding on
 subordinate activities.  Further, in a series of questions and answers
 which were attached to the DOD directive, a policy limiting rebates was
 outlined (G.C. Exh. No. 27).
 
    23.  The DOD parking directive was a regulation that directed, among
 others, the Department of the Army to implement the paid parking program
 at its installations.  In implementing the program, the Department of
 the Army, through Lt. Colonel Paul T. Gerard, Jr., devised its own set
 of implementing instructions to guide its subordinate activities.  These
 implementing instructions took the form of a revision to already
 existing Army Carpooling and Parking Regulations (G.C. Exh. Nos. 23, 24,
 25).
 
    24.  Colonel Gerard began working on the Department of the Army's
 revised parking regulations in September 1979.  Prior to this, however,
 Colonel Gerard was a Department of the Army representative on the DOD
 working group concerned with the paid parking program.  His involvement
 with the program included a review of the draft DOD directive sometime
 in August or the first part of September 1979 and a subsequent
 submission of comments upon the completion of this review.
 
    25.  Upon receipt of the DOD directive on October 12, 1979, a message
 was drafted and sent to affected Army installations on October 15, 1979.
  This message directed affected installations (including Cameron
 Station) to implement a paid parking program by November 1, 1979 and
 included the fee to be charged (G.C. Exh. No. 13).
 
    26.  Colonel Gerard then finalized the draft of the revised
 Department of the Army parking regulations he had been working on and
 sent a copy of the draft to MDW and Cameron Station on October 17, 1979
 (G.C. Exh. No. 21).  Two days later an advance copy of the revised
 parking regulation was forwarded to MDW and Cameron Station (G.C. Exh.
 22).  The Department of the Army's parking regulation contained
 provisions of the DOD directive which went beyond the contents of the
 Government-wide regulations, including the limitations on visitor
 parking and parking fee rebates.  There is no evidence, however, that
 the Department of the Army ever sent its parking regulation to Local
 2449 for review and/or discussion.
 
    27.  MDW thereafter drafted a Letter of Instruction (LOI) to guide
 installations within its jurisdiction in implementing the paid parking
 program (G.C. Exh. No. 19).  These instructions were developed pursuant
 to the DOD directive and the Department of the Army regulations and were
 then sent to Colonel Briggs at Cameron Station.  The MDW Letter of
 Instruction, like the DOD and Department of the Army regulations, was
 never submitted to Local 2449, nor did MDW conduct negotiations with
 Local 2449 concerning MDW's implementing instructions.  It should be
 noted, however, that MDW did provide copies of the LOI to Union
 representatives with which MDW holds exclusive recognition at a meeting
 on October 26, 1979.
 
                     Discussion and Conclusions of Law
 
         A.  The Effect of Government-wide and Agency Regulations
 
    In my judgment, no useful purpose would be served in exploring ab
 initio this particular subject which has already been treated fully by
 Judge Arrigo in DCASR Boston, supra., and adopted by Judge Devaney in
 HDL, supra.  Judge Arrigo's conclusions and reasoning, which I adopt,
 are as follows:
 
          "There is no contention that the OMB and GSA regulations on
       paid parking are negotiable matters.  Indeed, it is clear that
       these regulations are Government-wide regulations within the
       meaning of Section 7117(a)(1) of the Statute, and, as such, no
       duty to bargain is required regarding the subject matter contained
       therein.  However, the OMB parking regulation, while setting forth
       various specific instructions on paid parking, required GSA and
       all agencies to issue instructions relative to the implementation
       of the OMB regulation.  DOD was, therefore, obligated to adopt the
       specific requirements of OMB and GSA but, nevertheless, was left
       discretion as to various practices and procedures relating to the
       implementation of the OMB and GSA regulations.
 
          "Sections 7117(a)(2) and (3) of the Statute govern an agency's
       duty to bargain with a union with regard to matters encompassed by
       agency wide regulations.  Thus, under the Statute, an agency or a
       primary national subdivision of an agency is obligated to bargain
       with a union regarding matters encompassed by their regulations
       only where the union represents the majority of employees in the
       agency or primary national subdivision, or when the Authority has
       determined under 7117(b) of the Statute that no compelling need
       exists for the regulation . . .
 
          "In the case herein DOD's parking regulation of October 11,
       1979 and DOA's regulation of October 19, 1979 were applicable to
       all their subordinate bodies and I conclude the DOD regulation was
       an 'agency' regulation and the DOA regulation was a regulation
       issued by a 'primary national subdivision of such agency' within
       the meaning of Section 7117(a)(3) of the Statute.  Further, the
       Union herein does not represent a majority of the employees in DOD
       or DOA nor has the Authority determined that no compelling need
       exists for the DOD or DOA regulations in effect, the issue having
       never been presented to the Authority for such a determination.
       Accordingly, I conclude that prior to their issuance, neither DOD
       nor DA was obligated to bargain . . . regarding the matters which
       were the subject of the parking regulations referred to herein.
 
          "However, the DOD and DOA regulations were not self
       implementing.  Rather, in order to be effectuated, components
       subordinate to DOD and DOA were required to implement them as they
       would affect employees within their jurisdiction.  The regulations
       did not provide for all possible contingencies and, therefore,
       various area of discretion were left to the judgement of
       management at the level of actual employee location and union
       representation.
 
          "The Authority has held in National Treasury Employees Union,
       Chapter 6 and Internal Revenue Service, New Orleans District, 3
       FLRA No. 119, that 'to the extent that an agency has discretion
       with respect to a matter affecting conditions of employment of its
       employees, that matter is within the duty to bargain of the
       agency.' Clearly, the paid parking program at the Facility is a
       condition of employment.  Accordingly, I conclude that management
       was obligated under the Statute to negotiate . . . to whatever
       extent management had discretion under applicable Government-wide
       and agency regulations in the implementation of the paid parking
       at the Facility." (DCASR, supra, pp. 12-14) (footnotes omitted) To
       like effect, see, also, Boston District, supra;  Department of the
       Army, supra.)
 
    The effect of the foregoing, as applied to the instant case, is that
 the regulations issued by DOD and DA were agency regulations, and that
 MDW and Cameron Station had discretion in their implementation.
 
         B.  Whether the Compelling Need for an Agency Regulation
 
                May be Litigated in a Section 7116 Proceeding.
 
    The General Counsel asserts that Local 2449 may challenge the
 validity of agency regulations as a bar to negotiations in an unfair
 labor practice proceeding and it is not limited to raising such
 challenge in a negotiability proceeding.  I disagree.  This contention
 previously was rejected by Judge Arrigo in Boston District, supra, and
 by Judge Devaney in HDL, supra.  I also rejected this contention
 recently in Defense Logistics Agency et al, 1-CA-213, OALJ-81-131 (July
 7, 1981).  In reaching this conclusion I adopted Judge Arrigo's views
 and supplemented them with additional reasoning of my own.  Since these
 views are applicable herein, and are dispositive of General Counsel's
 contentions, I shall quote them as follows:
 
    Section 7117 of the Statute has the effect of removing from the ambit
 of collective bargaining those matters which are the subject of a
 government-wide or agency-wide rule or regulation under certain
 circumstances.  Thus, Section 7117 states as follows:
 
          "Section 7117.  Duty to bargain in good faith;  compelling
       need;  duty to consult
 
          "(a)(1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, the duty
       to bargain in good faith shall, to the extent not inconsistent
       with any Federal law or any Government-wide rule or regulation
       only if the rule or regulation is not a Government-wide rule or
       regulation.
 
          "(2) The duty to bargain in good faith shall, to the extent not
       inconsistent with Federal law or any Government-wide rule or
       regulation, extend to matters which are the subject of any agency
       rule or regulation referred to in paragraph (3) of this subsection
       only if the Authority has determined under subsection (b) of this
       section that no compelling need (as determined under regulations
       prescribed by the Authority) exists for the rule or regulation.
 
          "(3) Paragraph (2) of the subsection applies to any rule or
       regulation issued by any agency or issued by any primary national
       subdivision of such agency, unless an exclusive representative
       represents an appropriate unit including not less than a majority
       of the employees in the issuing agency or primary national
       subdivision, as the case may be, to whom the rule or regulation is
       applicable.
 
    The regulations prescribed by the Authority are set forth in Part
 2424 of the Rules and Regulations.  There is no dispute that the Unions
 herein failed to utilize the procedures established by the Board to
 resolve issues concerning "compelling need."
 
    Respondent contends that Section 7117 of the Statute is a bar to
 negotiations because DLAR 5500.1 is an agency-wide regulation and the
 Authority has not made a determination that "no compelling need" exists
 for the regulation.  I find merit to this defense. Indeed, I
 specifically find and conclude that Part 2424 of the Rules and
 Regulations is the exclusive procedure wherein the Authority may
 determine whether compelling need exists for an agency-wide regulation.
 
    To begin with, a literal reading of the statutory language makes
 clear that it is "only if the Authority has determined" (past tense)
 that no compelling need exists for an agency-wide regulation that the
 duty to bargain even arises.  Thus, an initial determination by the
 Authority pursuant to its prescribed procedures is a condition precedent
 which must be satisfied before a determination can be made that a duty
 to bargain in fact exists.  The Authority's function under Section 7117
 is to determine whether the agency-wide regulation is a bar to
 negotiations.  Stated differently, the Authority's role is to resolve a
 "negotiability" issue;  its role is not to resolve the underlying
 "obligation to bargain" in the same proceeding.
 
    The General Counsel contends, however, that the issue of "compelling
 need" may be resolved in an unfair labor practice proceeding.  I reject
 this contention for the same reasons stated by Judge Arrigo in Boston
 District Recruiting Command, Boston, Massachusetts, Case No. 1-CA-206
 et. al, OALJ-81-023, at pp. 13-15, (December 22, 1980).  In that case,
 Judge Arrigo concluded as follows:
 
          Counsel for the General Counsel also suggests . . . that if the
       agency regulation stands as a bar to negotiations, then the
       proceeding herein served to put the issue of compelling need
       before the Authority for determination.  In my view neither the
       Statute nor the Authority's regulations appear to envision this
       approach.  Indeed, section 7117(b)(3) of the Statute provides that
       where a hearing is held to make a determination of compelling
       need, it, ' . . . shall not include the General Cousnel as a
       party.' Accordingly, to combine a compelling need determination
       with an unfair labor practice proceeding, where the General
       Counsel has the responsibility of presenting the evidence in
       support of the complaint and carries the burden of proving the
       allegations of the complaint, would run contrary to Statutory
       prohibition.  Therefore, Counsel for General Counsel's contention
       is rejected." (footnote omitted).
 
    Therefore, based upon the foregoing reasoning, I conclude that the
 Authority does not even have the option of litigating the compelling
 need issue in a Section 7116 proceeding where the General Counsel is a
 party.
 
    When the Union first learned of the issuance of this agency-wide
 regulation, it could have sought a determination by the Authority on the
 compelling need issue.  Regardless of which way the Authority decided
 the case, it is my opinion that its decision would have removed an
 impediment to meaningful negotiations and may have assisted in paving
 the way to voluntary settlement of the unfair labor practice issues.
 Even if a Section 7116 proceeding could not be avoided altogether, the
 issues to be litigated might well be narrowed and simplified.  In short,
 the Statutory scheme of providing an expedited forum before the
 Authority, without the presence of the General Counsel, makes sense.
 
    In an excellent brief filed by Counsel for the General Counsel, the
 contention is made that the compelling need aspects of Section
 7116(a)(2) are only applicable in cases where an agency invokes an
 existing rule or regulation as a bar to negotiations.  It is argued that
 the present case should be viewed as a unilateral change (or revision)
 of an existing regulation.  Accordingly, it is argued that this issue
 may be litigated in a Section 7116 proceeding and that "the compelling
 need provisions of the Statute are in reality not applicable to the
 facts of this case." I disagree.  The problem with this theory is that
 its practical effect is to prevent an agency "from acting at all", that
 is, issuing a regulation containing a change in conditions of
 employment.  Moreover, under this theory, even if an agency informed a
 Union and proposed putting into effect an agency-wide regulation, and
 the Union failed to seek a compelling need determination from the
 Authority, the agency still would be required to act at its peril and
 risk the allegation that it violated the Act, if it decided to make the
 regulation effective notwithstanding the Union's inaction.  While it is
 true that the legislative history does not envision that an agency may
 unilaterally remove issues from the bargaining table merely by issuing
 regulations, it does not follow that an agency is prohibited from acting
 at all.  Section 7117(b)(1) and (2) clearly contemplate that agencies
 may issue regulations prior to their being put to a compelling need
 challenge.  Thus, Section 7117(b)(1) refers to an exclusive
 representative challenging a regulation "which is then in effect" and
 Section 7117(b)(2)(A) refers in the past tense to an agency "which
 issued" the rule or regulation.  It follows, therefore, that the
 Authority is not deprived of jurisdiction in a Part 2424 proceeding
 simply because the agency regulation involves a "unilateral" change.
 
    Furthermore, if a union were permitted to litigate compelling need
 issues in an unfair labor practice proceeding with the aid of the
 General Counsel, it would mean the union had a choice of forums and
 could choose to by-pass the expedited forum designated by the Authority
 in Part 2424 of the Rules and Regulations.  I concede that Sections
 2423.5 and 2426.5 of the Rules and Regulations may raise some doubt as
 to my interpretation.  However, I believe that the last sentence in
 those sections is intended to reserve to the Authority exclusive
 jurisdiction of (1) all compelling need issues and (2) those
 negotiability issues which, because no action has been taken, may not
 form the basis for a possible unfair labor practice and therefore may
 not be litigated in a Section 7116 proceeding.  I further note than even
 in cases where a party elects to file a negotiability petition and is
 referred by the Authority to a Section 7116 proceeding it is because (1)
 the Respondent denies any changes occurred or (2) resolution of the
 dispute is dependent upon the resolution of the dispute is dependent
 upon the resolution of factual issues related to the parties' conduct,
 both of which are more related to the underlying obligation to bargain.
 National Treasury Employees Union and NTEU Chapter 66, 6 FLRA No. 16.
 Since neither of these situations obtains here, I believe the Authority
 could have made a "compelling need" determination had the Union only
 invoked the expedited procedures of Part 2424.
 
    Finally, I would observe that, in the absence of a clear delegation
 from the Authority, I am reluctant to assume that I have the authority
 to make compelling need determinations in an unfair labor practice
 proceeding.  And, unless I have that authority, an agency will be
 foreclosed from ever obtaining such a determination since, as noted
 above, it cannot initiate a petition for review under Section 2424.2 of
 the Rules and Regulations.  The net result of this discussion is that
 the agency regulation is a bar to negotiations.
 
        C.  Respondent DLA's Obligation to Negotiate the Impact and
 
                Implementation of Paid Parking
 
    1.  As noted above, the DOD and DA regulations were not self
 implementing.  In order to be effectuated, components subordinate to DOD
 and DA were required to implement these as they would affect employees
 within their jurisdiction.  DLA had a duty to notify Local 2449 and
 bargain upon request concerning the impact and implementation of the
 paid parking program because DLA is the Activity with which Local 2449
 had a contract and for whose employees Local 2449 was the exclusive
 representative.
 
    2.  Local 2449, through its President, made a timely request to
 bargain which was refused by DLA through its agent, Captain Starrett.
 By such conduct, DLA violated Section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute.
 
    3.  Respondent DLA's principal defense is that it was only a tenant
 at Cameron Station and therefore lacked the authority to bargain about
 this particular subject matter.  There is a significant difference,
 however, between an agent lacking authority and an agent not having an
 obligation to bargain.  In a recent negotiability decision, /14/ the
 Authority rejected an Agency argument that it had no duty to bargain
 because it was inappropriate for negotiations to proceed at the local
 level since it intended to retain authority over such matters at the
 Agency level.  The Authority held that the Agency's allegations "does
 not relate to the bases for finding that a proposal is not within the
 duty to bargain under Section 7117" and, further, that Section
 7114(b)(2) includes the obligation for an agency to be represented at
 negotiations "by representatives who are empowered to negotiate and
 enter into agreements on all matters within the scope of negotiations"
 in the bargaining unit.  In other words, the Authority correctly pointed
 out the Agency that the obligation to bargain encompassed the obligation
 to appoint representatives who are empowered to negotiate.  Respondent's
 defense is accordingly rejected.  It was incumbent upon DLA to obtain
 the requisite authority for itself or arrange for bargaining between
 Local 2449 and an agency empowered to negotiate.  While it is not my
 responsibility to suggest how this could be accomplished I feel
 compelled to observe that a chain of command is a two-way street.  It
 can be utilized from top to bottom for issuance of circulars,
 regulations, directives, and LOI;  it can be used in reverse order for
 transmitting input to higher echelon and for obtaining advisory
 opinions, as was done in this case by Colonel Briggs who sought advice
 as to whether Local 2449's revised parking speces were "free." In like
 manner, why couldn't DLA request its immediately higher level
 organization DOD to ensure that DOD instructs its agent DA, to instruct
 its agent MDW, to instruct its agent Cameron Station, to make
 appropriate arrangements whereby another DOD agent (DLA) is not left
 holding the bag with no authority to negotiate on the subject of paid
 parking?  If the facts were different and it were shown that DOD refused
 a request from DLA to intervene for the purpose of resolving this
 conflict, I would agree that DOD should share liability for DLA's
 violation either as a joint tortfeasor or on a principal-agent theory.
 However, that does not appear to be the case.
 
        D.  Respondent Cameron Station's Implementation of the Paid
 
                Parking Program was a Violation of Section 7116(a)(1)
 
                but not Section 7116(a)(5).
 
    Respondent Cameron Station implemented the paid parking program at
 its facility through the issuance of formal memoranda to employees
 located at Cameron Station (G.C. Exh. Nos. 14, 15).  It is undisputed
 that these memoranda were issued without prior notice to the Union, but
 a legal issue which must be resolved is whether or not Cameron Station
 had any legal obligation to provide Local 2449 with such notice.  While
 the desire on the part of Local 2449 to bargain was not specifically
 made known to Cameron Station, the Post Commander was nevertheless aware
 of the fact that a labor organization represented a group of DLA
 employees located on his post that would be affected by paid parking.  A
 letter was sent to Colonel Briggs, the Post Commander, dated October 19,
 1979, which noted that paid parking would have implications for the
 contract between DLA and Local 2449 (G.C. Exh. No. 4).  Notwithstanding
 such knowledge, Cameron Station implemented the paid parking program
 which immediately affected DLA and its employees.
 
    The General Counsel contends that Cameron Station inhibited the
 collective bargaining process by acting without giving due consideration
 to Local 2449's right to negotiate over the impact and implementation of
 the paid parking program.  On the factual situation presented herein, I
 am constrained to find that Cameron Station violated Section 7116(a)(1)
 because its conduct did in fact, interfere with the rights of DLA
 employees to exercise their collective bargaining rights set forth in
 the Statute.  However, I am persuaded that this same conduct constitutes
 a violation of Section 7116(a)(5) which makes it an unfair labor
 practice for an agency "to refuse to consult or negotiate in good faith
 with a labor organization as required by this chapter." The principal
 reason for my reaching this conclusion is that Cameron Station does not
 owe any duty to bargain to Local 2449 since it does not have an
 exclusive representative relationship with Local 2449.  It is only when
 an agency has an obligation to bargain that it also has the concomitant
 obligation to provide a Union with adequate advance notice of a change
 in conditions of employment so that the Union has a reasonable
 opportunity to request negotiations.
 
       I agree with the position taken by Intervenor in its excellent
 
 brief in the HDL case that Naval Air Rework, as Executive Order case, is
 of doubtful validity by virtue of the enactment of the Statute.  In any
 event, it is not applicable herein because Cameron Station is not in the
 same chain of command and therefore is not a higher level part of
 "agency management" vis-a-vis DLA.  Nor can Naval Air Rework be relied
 upon as a defense to my finding of a Section 7116(a)(1) violation for
 even though it is a subordinate activity of DOD and therefore an agent
 of DOD, its conduct was not "ministerial" when it implemented the paid
 parking program.  Thus, close analysis discloses that Cameron Station
 simply does not occupy a position similar to either the agency or
 activity in Naval Air Rework. In fact, Cameron Station is a third party
 vis-a-vis its relationship to DLA and Local 2449 who have a contractual
 relationship.  Essentially what I am deciding is that a third party
 cannot stand in the shoes of a contractual party and be said to have
 violated Section 7116(a)(5) but this does not mean that its conduct
 cannot independently constitute interference with a contractual
 relationship in violation of Section 7116(a)(1).
 
         E.  Whether DOD, DA and/or MDW Share in Cameron Station's
 
                Liability for Violating Section 7116(a)(1).
 
    In my opinion, DOD and DA clearly are free of any liability.  There
 agency regulations were a bar to negotiations.  The responsibility for
 implementing these regulations was with subordinate activities like MDW
 and Cameron Station and it is their conduct which was at issue.  I agree
 with the General Counsel that MDW's regulation does not fall within the
 purview of an agency regulation within the meaning of Section 7117.  But
 I fail to see why MDW should be saddled with an unfair labor practice by
 virtue of Cameron Station's conduct simply because it is a higher level
 activity in that chain of command, unless the Authority decides to use
 the single employer theory.  I am not persuaded by the evidence that MDW
 required Cameron Station to act as it did in precipitously implementing
 the paid parking program.  In my view, Cameron Station had considerable
 discretion in implementing the program;  it was a free agent and is
 solely responsible for its conduct.  Indeed, the arguments in General
 Counsel's brief (at p. 15) explaining why Cameron Station's actions were
 not "ministerial" is precisely the reason why it alone is responsible
 and why MDW cannot be held to share liability.
 
    In concluding that DOD, DA, and MDW are free from liability, I would
 be remiss if I did not point out that a different conclusion was reached
 by Judge Arrigo in DCASR Boston, supra, a similar situation involving a
 landlord (Ft. Devens) and a tenant (DCASR), each in a different chain of
 command, but with each having DOD at the top of the chain.  Judge Arrigo
 concluded that "DOD, as the parent organization of all these subordinate
 activities and a moving party through the issuance of its parking
 regulations, was inextricably involved in the situation" and further,
 that only DOD "has the authority to resolve the predicament in which it
 was enmeshed" with its subordinate components which Judge Arrigo
 characterized as a "joint enterprise".
 
    While I do not disagree with Judge Arrigo's approach in DCASR, I
 reach a different conclusion because I feel compelled to do so by the
 Authority's continued adherence to the doctrine enumciated by the
 Federal Labor Relations Council's in Naval Air Rework which (1) did not
 consider utilizing a single employer concept and (2) did not treat the
 lower level activity as an agent/accomplice to the unfair labor practice
 committed by the parent agency at a higher organizational level.
 Instead, Naval Air Rework viewed the conduct of each activity in
 isolation from the other when the Council stated that the "acts and
 conduct of agency management at a higher level of an agency's
 organization may provide the basis for finding a violation of any part
 of Section 19(a) of the Order by 'agency management,' but may not,
 standing alone, provide the basis for finding a separate violation by
 'agency management' at a lower organizational level of the agency where
 a unit of exclusive recognition exist." (Emphasis in original).  In
 reaching my conclusions in the instant case concerning the respective
 liability of the named Respondents I have, in effect, followed the
 Council's "standing alone" test.
 
    These paid parking cases of Judges Arrigo, Devaney, and myself
 present novel legal issues and are significant in that they aptly
 illustrate what has been described as "the problem of identifying the
 proper respondent." /15/
 
        F.  Respondent Cameron Station Violated Section 7116(a)(1)
 
                By Unilaterally Assessing Parking Fees To Local 2449 For
 
                The Two Spaces Assigned To It
 
    Local 2449 had been assigned two parking spaces at Cameron Station
 pursuant to Article XXXIX of the contract between Local 2449 and DLA.
 Upon implementation of the paid parking program, and prior to November
 26, Colonel Briggs of Cameron Station assessed parking fees for these
 two spaces and officials of Local 2249 received parking tickets for
 parking in the spaces without having purchased a parking permit.
 Officials of Local 2449 have purchased monthly permits since receiving
 these tickets.  The General Counsel contends that assessment of these
 fees ignored the valid contractual agreement in effect between Local
 2449 and DLA and therefore violates the Statute.
 
    OMB Circular No. A-118 expressly states that the policy to institute
 parking fees was not to be interpreted to render null and void any valid
 negotiated agreement covering any provision of employee parking in
 effect on the effective date of the Circular (G.C. Exh. No. 8).  Article
 XXXIX of the contract thus remained in full force and effect upon the
 implementation of the paid parking program and Cameron Station could not
 change it anymore than DLA could.  Moreover, the contracting parties
 themselves -- DLA and Local 2449 -- both regarded Article XXXIX as
 providing two free spaces, (I need not decide whether their
 interpretation was correct).  This mutual interpretation of the
 agreement was communicated to Colonel Briggs by Captain Starrett in two
 different letters.  Notwithstanding the position of the two parties to
 the contract, Colonel Briggs unilaterally determined that Local 2449
 should pay for these spaces.  This action by Colonel Briggs is a blatant
 abrogation by an outside third party of a term and condition of
 employment agreed to between the two parties to a valid collective
 bargaining agreement.
 
    In my opinion, it would effectuate the purposes of the Federal
 Service Labor-Management Relations Statute to protect this collective
 bargaining relationship from interference by a third-party government
 agency.  Accordingly, I concluded that Cameron Station violated Section
 7116(a)(1) by interfering with the collective bargaining relationship of
 DLA and Local 2449.  However, I do not find this conduct also violated
 Section 7116(a)(5) for the same reasons discussed earlier.
 
    The foregoing unfair labor practice took place prior to the November
 26 letter from Captain Starrett requesting reconsideration by Colonel
 Briggs of his decision.  Thereafter, in January, Captain Starrett again
 wrote a letter requesting reconsideration. At the hearing, the General
 Counsel learned for the first time /16/ that Colonel Briggs -- after
 receiving Captain Starrett's second letter -- sent both of Captain
 Starrett's letters to MDW for a legal interpretation.  This request was
 in turn forwarded to DA which responded in March that the Union's
 reserved parking spaces were not free.  Thus, we have a situation where
 an unfair labor practice in November 1979 continued in effect through
 March 1980 at which time it could very well have ceased at the direction
 of higher authority had DA concluded that Cameron Station had acted
 improperly in the first instance.  Such a conclusion by DA surely would
 have permitted it to escape liability (1) by not joining in the unfair
 labor practice and (2) by ordering Cameron Station to cease requiring
 the Union to pay for the parking spaces.  Instead, DA (the principal)
 chose to place its stamp of approval on the conduct of Cameron Station
 (its agent) and by allowing the unlawful interference to continue, DA
 thereby condoned Cameron Station's unlawful conduct.  It follows from
 this that DA also violated Section 7116(a)(1) by interfering with the
 contractual relationship of DLA and Local 2449, by requiring Local 2449
 to continue paying for the reserved parking spaces.  Finally, turning
 now to MDW, I think it would ill behoove MDW to defend its role in this
 incident by asserting that it was merely a middleman or conduit between
 Cameron Station and DA.  It played a part in this process -- as
 principal or agent or both -- and should not be permitted to escape
 liability.  I find that MDW also violated Section 7116(a)(1).
 
                                G.  Summary
 
    Having found that Department of Defense did not violate the Statute I
 recommend that the Complaint be dismissed as to it.  Having found no
 violations of Section 7116(a)(5) against any Respondent, except DLA, I
 recommend dismissal of the allegations against all other Respondents.
 
    Having found that Headquarters, Defense Logistics Agency violated
 Section 7116(a)(1) and (5) by refusing to bargain with Local 2449 of
 AFGE, about implementation of the paid parking program I recommend the
 Authority issue a separate Order applicable to this Respondent, as set
 forth below.
 
    Having found that Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army
 Military District of Washington, and Cameron Station each violated
 Section 7116(a)(1) by interfering with the contractual relationship
 between Headquarters Defense Logistics Agency and AFGE Local 2449, and
 in the interest of not unduly complicated this decision with individual
 tailored orders and notices, I recommend that these Respondents only be
 required to sign one Notice to Employees, as set forth below.
 
                                   Order
 
    Pursuant to Section 2423.29 of the Federal Labor Relations
 Authority's Regulations and Section 7118 of the Federal Service
 Labor-Management Relations Statute, it is hereby ordered that
 Headquarters, Defense Logistics Agency shall:
 
    1.  Cease and desist from:
 
          (a) Refusing to negotiate in good faith with the American
       Federation of Government Employees, Local 2449, AFL-CIO, the
       exclusive representative of a bargaining unit of employees at
       Cameron Station, Alexandria, Virginia concerning the
       implementation of a paid parking program at Cameron Station to the
       extent consonant with government-wide and agency regulations.
 
          (b) Instituting changes in conditions of employment, including
       changes concerning a paid parking program, without negotiating in
       good faith with American Federation of Government Employees, Local
       2449, AFL-CIO.
 
          (c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
       restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
       assured by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.
 
    2.  Take the following affirmative action:
 
          (a) Upon request, meet and negotiate with the American
       Federation of Government Employees, Local 2449, AFL-CIO concerning
       the implementation of a paid parking program at Cameron Station,
       Alexandria, Virginia to the extent consonant with government-wide
       and agency regulations.
 
          (b) Post, at its Cameron Station, Alexandria, Virginia
       facility, copies of the attached Notice marked Appendix A on forms
       to be furnished by the Federal Labor Relations Authority.  Upon
       receipt of such forms they shall be signed by an appropriate
       official and be posted and maintained by him or her for 60
       consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
       bulletin boards and other places where notices are customarily
       posted.  Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that such
       Notice is not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
 
          (c) Notify the Federal Labor Relations Authority, in writing,
       within 30 days from the date of this Order as to what steps have
       been taken to comply herewith.
 
                                   Order
 
    Pursuant to Section 2423.29 of the Federal Labor Relations
 Authority's Regulations and Section 7118 of the Federal Service
 Labor-Management Relations Statute, it is hereby ordered that Department
 of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Military District Washington, and
 Cameron Station shall:
 
    1.  Cease and desist from:
 
          (a) Interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in
       the exercise of their rights under the Federal Service
       Labor-Management Relations Statute by implementing a paid parking
       program at Cameron Station in such a manner as to preclude
       American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2449, AFL-CIO
       from exercising its statutory right to negotiate the impact and
       implementation of such program with Headquarters, Defense
       Logistics Agency, prior to such implementation.
 
          (b) Interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in
       the exercise of their rights under the Federal Service
       Labor-Management Relations Statute by assessing parking fees for
       two parking spaces assigned to American Federation of Government
       Employees, Local 2449, AFL-CIO at Cameron Station in accordance
       with the collective bargaining agreement between said Union and
       Headqarters, Defense Logistics Agency.
 
          (c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
       restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights
       assured by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.
 
    2.  Take the following affirmative action:
 
          (1) Reimburse American Federation of Government Employees,
       Local 2449, AFL-CIO for all money paid since November 1, 1979 to
       purchase parking permits for two parking spaces assigned to it at
       Cameron Station in accordance with the collective bargaining
       agreement between American Federation of Government Employees,
       Local 2449, AFL-CIO and Headquarters, Defense Logistics Agency.
 
          (b) Post, at its Cameron Station, Alexandria, Virginia
       facility, copies of the attached Notice marked Appendix B on forms
       to be furnished by the Federal Labor Relations Authority.  Upon
       receipt of such forms they shall be signed by an appropriate
       official and be posted and maintained by him or her for 60
       consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
       bulletin boards and other places where such notices are
       customarily posted.  Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure
       that such Notice is not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
       material.
 
          (c) Notify the Federal Labor Relations Authority in writing,
       within 30 days from the date of this Order as to what steps have
       been taken to comply herewith.
 
                                       /s/ FRANCES E. DOWD
                                       FRANCIS E. DOWD
                                       Administrative Law Judge
 
    Dated:  July 10, 1981
    Washington, D.C.
 
 
 
 
                ---------------  FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
 
 
 
    (1) See, for example, Department of Housing and Urban Development, 9
 FLRA 136 (1982);  Veterans Administration Central Office, Veterans
 Administration Medical Center, Long Beach, 9 FLRA 325 (1982);  General
 Services Administration, Region 8, Denver, Colorado, 10 FLRA 257 (1982).
 
    (2) Boston District Recruiting Command, Boston, Massachusetts, 15
 FLRA 720, 724 n.6 (1984).  See also National Treasury Employees Union
 and Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, 13 FLRA 554
 (1983);  American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local
 3656 and Federal Trade Commission, Boston Regional Office,
 Massachusetts, 4 FLRA 702, 703 (1980).
 
    (3) Section 7114(b)(2) of the Statute provides:
 
          Section 7114.  Representation rights and duties
 
                       * * *
 
 
          (b) The duty of an agency and an exclusive representative to
       negotiate in good faith . . . shall include the obligation --
 
                       * * *
 
 
          (2) to be represented at the negotiations by duly authorized
       representatives prepared to discuss and negotiate on any condition
       of employment(.)
 
    (4) The Judge found it unnecessary to interpret the parties'
 agreement because DLA and the Union agreed that the two spaces were to
 be provided free of charge.  In view of the parties' agreed
 interpretation, we also find it unnecessary to interpret the contract
 provision.
 
    (5) See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 510 (1976).  See also
 Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 v. NLRB, 266 F.2d 905, 909 (D.C.
 Cir. 1959) and Austin Co., 101 NLRB 1257, 1258-1259 (1952).
 
    (6) During the pendency of the instant case before the Authority, the
 United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the
 paid parking plan, as embodied in OMB Circular A-118, was invalid, and
 ordered that the GSA regulation be set aside and its enforcement
 permanently enjoined.  American Federation of Government Employees,
 AFL-CIO, et al. v. Freeman, 510 F.Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1981).  Thereafter,
 GSA revised the regulation to suspend the collection of parking fees in
 accordance with the injunction (46 F.R. 40191 (1981)).  The District
 Court's decision was subsequently reversed.  American Federation of
 Government Employees, AFL-CIO, et al. v. Carmen, 669 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir.
 1981).  However, President Reagan has stated that the collection of
 parking fees will not be reinstated.  Statement by the President on
 Parking Fees for Federal Employees, Public Papers of the Presidents
 (Ronald Reagan) 1981, 1161.
 
    (7) See Defense Contract Administration Services Region, Boston,
 Massachusetts, 15 FLRA 750 (1984).
 
    (8) The Charging Party objected to intervention by the Office of
 Personnel Management (OPM) on the ground that OPM was not a party to the
 rule making involved herein.  The motion was denied at the hearing.
 
    (9) Counsel for the General Counsel and Counsel for the Department of
 Defense and Department of the Army filed Motions to Correct the
 Transcript.  The requested corrections being proper, the motions are
 hereby granted and the transcript is corrected as follows:
 
       (TABLE OMITTED)
 
    (10) There being no serious factual disputes, I have adopted, to the
 maximum extent possible, the findings of fact proposed by Counsel for
 the General Counsel, with appropriate deletions and additions of my own.
 
    (11) DLA asserts, and I agree, that Mr. Morgus did not thereafter
 make additional requests to bargain.  In my opinion, such requests were
 not necessary since DLA had already refused to negotiate and Local 2449
 had already filed an unfair labor practice charge.
 
    (12) It is not clear from the record precisely when that decision was
 made and communicated to DLA and Local 2449.
 
    (13) For the most part, the following facts in pargaraphs 17-27 are
 based upon Jt. Exh. No. 1, testimony from the Harry Diamond case which
 was stipulated as part of the present record.  Precise page references
 are contained in the General Counsel's brief pp. 6-9.
 
    (14) American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local
 3656, 4 FLRA No. 92.
 
    (15) Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D.C. and Internal Revenue
 Service, Hartford District Office, 4 FLRA No. 37 (1980).
 
    (16) At this juncture in the hearing, the General Counsel moved to
 amend the Complaint to add DA and MDW as Respondents for this additional
 alleged violation relating to the two parking spaces.  Since this
 evidence was not made available to the General Counsel during the
 investigation, and since it is related to the basic allegations in the
 charges, and since there appears to be no basis for claiming surprise,
 unfairness, or prejudice, the motion is hereby granted.
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                APPENDIX A
 
  NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF
 THE FEDERAL
 LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE
 POLICIES OF
 CHAPTER 71 OF TITLE 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE
 LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES
 THAT:
 
    WE WILL, upon request, negotiate in good faith with the American
 Federation of Government Employees, Local 2449, AFL-CIO, the exclusive
 representative of our bargaining unit employees at Cameron Station,
 Alexandria, Virginia concerning the implementation of a paid parking
 program at Cameron Station to the extent consonant with government-wide
 and agency regulations.
 
    WE WILL NOT institute changes in conditions of employment, including
 changes concerning a paid parking program, without negotiating in good
 faith with American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2449,
 AFL-CIO.
 
    WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain,
 or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed under the
 Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.
                                       Headquarters, Defense Logistics
                                       Agency
                                       (Agency or Activity)
 
    Dated:
                                       By:  (Signature)
 
    This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date
 of posting, and most be altered, defaced, or covered by any other
 material.
 
    If employees have any question concerning this Notice or compliance
 with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Regional
 Director, Region III for the Federal Labor Relations Authority whose
 address is:  1133 15th St., NW., Suite 300, Washington, DC 20005;
 Telephone No. (202) 653-8452.
 
 
 
 
 
                                APPENDIX B
 
 NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF
 THE FEDERAL
 LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE
 POLICIES OF
 CHAPTER 71 OF TITLE 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE
 LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES
 THAT:
 
    WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
 exercise of their rights under the Federal Service Labor-Management
 Relations Statute by implementing a paid parking program at Cameron
 Station in such a manner as to preclude American Federation of
 Government Employees, Local 2449, AFL-CIO from exercising its statutory
 right to negotiate the impact and implementation of such program with
 Headquarters, Defense Logistics Agency, prior to such implementation.
 
    WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
 exercise of their rights under the Federal Service Labor-Management
 Relations Statute by assessing parking fees for the two parking spaces
 assigned to the American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2449,
 AFL-CIO at Cameron Station in accordance with the collective-bargaining
 agreement between the American Federation of Government Employees, Local
 2449, AFL-CIO and Headquarters, Defense Logistics Agency.
 
    WE WILL reimburse the American Federation of Government Employees,
 Local 2449, AFL-CIO for all money paid since November 1, 1979 to
 purchase parking permits for the two parking spac