[ v23 p876 ]
23:0876(108)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:
23 FLRA No. 108
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, JACKSONVILLE DISTRICT
AND DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, SOUTHEAST
REGIONAL OFFICE OF INSPECTION
Respondent
and
NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION
Charging Party
Case No. 4-CA-40568
DECISION AND ORDER
I. Statement of the Case
This unfair labor practice case is before the Authority on exceptions
filed by the Respondent to the attached Decision of the Administrative
Law Judge. The Charging Party (the Union) filed an opposition to the
exceptions. The issue is whether the Respondent violated section
7116(a)(1) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute
(the Statute) by conducting an "examination" of an employee in conflict
with the employee's right to request union representation under section
7114(a)(2)(B) of the Statute. The Authority finds that the Respondent
did not commit an unfair labor practice as alleged.
II. Background and Judge's Decision
As part of an investigation into the manner in which a Revenue
Officer handled a tax collection manner, the Respondent's inspector
arranged to have the taxpayer discuss the issue with the Revenue Officer
in phone conversations initiated from the taxpayer's home. Unknown to
the Revenue Officer, the conversation was monitored and taped by the
Respondent. The information obtained from the phone conversations was
eventually used in disciplinary action brought against the Revenue
Officer.
The Judge decided that the phone conversations constituted an
"examination," that the Revenue Officer's right to request union
representation under section 7114(a)(2)(B) of the Statute had been
violated, and that the use of the investigative technique thus violated
section 7116(a)(1) of the Statute, as alleged. As a remedy, the Judge
recommended an order which would require the Respondent to rescind the
disciplinary action and to reconsider the basis for such action without
referring to the information obtained from the phone conversations.
III. Positions of the Parties
The Respondent argues that it did not commit the violation alleged in
the complaint because the investigation at issue was in connection with
a criminal matter and section 7114(a)(2)(B) was not intended to be
applicable to criminal investigations. As part of this argument, it
also implicitly argues that application of section 7114(a)(2)(B) to
preclude it from using such investigative techniques would interfere
with its right to determine its internal security practices under
section 7106(a)(1) of the Statute. The Respondent also disputes the
Judge's recommended remedy. The Union supports the Judge's Decision.
IV. Analysis and Discussion
A. Rights under Section 7114(a)(2)(B)
Section 7114(a)(2)(B) of the Statute provides that in any examination
of a unit employee by an agency representative in connection with an
investigation, the employee shall have the right to have a union
representative present if the employee reasonably believes that the
examination may result in disciplinary action and requests
representation.
The legislative history of this section discloses that Congress'
purpose in enacting section 7114(a)(2)(B) was to create representation
rights for Federal employees equivalent to the rights provided employees
by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in interpreting the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). See 124 Cong. Rec. 29184 (1978),
reprinted in Legislative History of the Federal Service Labor-Management
Relations Statute, H.R. Comm. Print 96-7, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 926
(1979), where Congressman Udall explained that the purpose of the House
bill provisions which led to enactment of section 7114(a)(2)(B) was to
reflect the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. J. Weingarten Inc., 420
U.S. 251 (1975), in which the Court deferred to the NLRB's
interpretation of the NLRA. See also Internal Revenue Service v. FLRA,
6711 F.2d 560, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1982), enforcing Internal Revenue Service,
Washington, D.C., 4 FLRA 237 (1980) (holding that under section
7114(a)(2)(B), whether an employee has a reasonable belief that
discipline may result from an examination is determined, as under
Weingarten, by an objective test).
The Senate/House conferees recognized, however, that the right might
evolve differently under the Statute than under the NLRA, and
accordingly stated their intent that the evolution of decisions
interpreting the right in the private sector would not necessarily be
determined for the Federal sector. Civil Service Reform Act:
Conference Report, H.R. Rep. No. 1717, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1978),
reprinted in Legislative History at 824.
B. Whether section 7114(a)(2)(B) is applicable to
examinations arising out of criminal investigations
Section 7114(a)(2)(B) refers to "any examination" of an employee . .
. in connection with "an investigation" (emphasis added). The
Conference Report essentially tracks the statutory language. Conference
Report, H.R. Rep. No. 1717, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1978) reprinted in
Legislative History at 824. Congress was undoubtedly aware that, unlike
the private sector, many Federal agencies (including the Respondent)
conduct criminal investigations that sometimes (as here) include their
own employees. Section 7114(a)(2)(B), however, does not exclude or
refer in any way to criminal investigations. Accordingly, it is our
view that Congress intended section 7114(a)(2)(B) to apply to all
examinations in connection with all investigations, not just to
examinations of employees in connection with non-criminal matters.
Our conclusion is buttressed by the practice in the Postal Service
wherein the NLRB has applied Weingarten rights to the examination of
postal employees, who are governed by private sector labor law, in
connection with criminal investigations. See United States Postal
Service, 241 NLRB 141 (1979); United States Postal Service, 254 NLRB
703 (1981). Further, Weingarten itself involved the investigation of an
employee accused of criminal acts.
Finally, we find that applying section 7114(a)(2)(B) rights to
examinations in connection with criminal investigations would not
interfere with the right of management to determine its internal
security practices under section 7106(a)(1) of the Statute. The
presence of a Union representative at an examination does not interfere
with management's right to insist that the employee be responsive, or
its right to decide the scope of the examination, or the extent of the
Union's legitimate role as a representative. See Weingarten, 420 U.S.
at 261; Office of Personnel Management, Washington, D.C. 17 FLRA 302
(1985); Norfolk Naval Shipyard, 9 FLRA 458 (1982).
We find that section 7114(a)(2)(B) applies to requests by an employee
for union representation at an examination by an agency representative
in connection with a criminal investigation. We conclude that this
result (1) comports with the language of section 7114(a)(2)(B) and the
intent of Congress, (2) is consistent with the Supreme Court's
explanation of the parameters of the right to representation in
Weingarten, /1/ and (3) does not conflict with management's legitimate
prerogatives or its right to determine its internal security practices.
C. Whether the Respondent interfered with the employee's
rights under section 7114(a)(2)(B) of the Statute
The Authority concludes that the telephone surveillance at issue
here, involving the agency's monitoring of phone calls of an employee
suspected of having engaged in improper or illegal conduct does not
constitute an examination within the meaning of section 7114(a)(2)(B).
As discussed above in section A, the legislative history of section
7114(a)(2)(B) establishes that its incorporation in our Statute was for
the purpose of granting to Federal employees the same rights to
representation in employer examinations held by private sector employees
set forth in the Supreme Court's Weingarten decision. The Court in
Weingarten was not addressing those facets of a criminal investigation
such as a telephone surveillance in which it is essential to the success
of the surveillance for the employee to be unaware that his conversation
is being monitored. In fact, the presence of a Union representative is
utterly incongruous with the surreptitious nature of the agency's
surveillance activities.
In contrast, in Weingarten, the Court was concerned with the right of
an employee to have "the assistance of his union representative in a
confrontgation with his employer" (emphasis added). Weingarten at 260.
In the Court's view, "(a) single employee confronted by an employer
investigating whether certain conduct deserves discipline may be too
fearful or inarticulate to relate accurately the incident being
investigated, or too ignorant to raise extenuating factors" (emphasis
added). Id. at 262-63. In these circumstances, the Court concluded
"(a) knowledgeable union representative could assist the employer by
eliciting favorable facts and save the employer production time by
getting to the bottom of the incident occasioning the interview. Id. at
263.
In this case, there was no direct questioning or examination of the
employee by agency management. Management's involvement was limited to
monitoring the conversation between a Revenue Officer and a taxpayer.
Moreover, the conversations took place without the employee being aware
that the questions and his answers were being monitored. Thus, at no
time during these conversations did the employee feel compelled to
respond to questions posed by the taxpayer. Although an officer of the
agency may have precipitated the taxpayer's action, there was no direct
interaction between the employee and agency management since it was the
taxpayer who initiated the talks and elicited information. Thus, we
find that the monitoring here, in which management played the passive
role of listening rather than participating in the conversations, does
not constitute an "examination of any employee . . . by a representative
of the agency in connection with an investigation" within the meaning of
the Statute but rather is a form of surveillance.
The General Counsel's allegation encompasses an expansion of employee
representational rights that is inconsistent with section 7114(a)(2)(B)
and unduly interferes with management's right under section 7106(a)(1)
of the Statute to investigate alleged wrongdoing by its employees and
determine internal security practices. It would produce the anomalous
prohibition that agencies could not engage in unannounced surveillance
of allegedly dishonest employees as an investigative technique without
first informing the employee of what was being done and providing an
opportunity to request representation. We do not believe that Congress
intended such an unlikely result.
Based on the analysis set forth above we conclude that the monitoring
of the conversation between the IRS agent and the taxpayer did not
constitute an "examination" within the meaning of section 7114(a)(2)(B)
of the Statute. Given this conclusion, there is no basis to find that
the agency violated section 7116(a)(1) of the Statute as alleged in the
complaint.
V. Conclusion
Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations
and section 7118 of the Statute, the Authority has reviewed the rulings
of the Judge made at the hearing, finds that no prejudicial error was
committed, and affirms those rulings. The Authority has considered the
Judge's Decision, the exceptions to that Decision, the opposition to the
exceptions, the positions of the parties, and the entire record, and
adopts the Judge's findings and conclusions only to the extent
consistent with this decision. We conclude that the Respondent, in the
circumstances of this case, did not interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employee Miller in the exercise of any of his rights under section
7114(a)(2)(B) of the Statute, and we shall dismiss the complaint. In
view of this conclusion, we do not pass upon the merits of the Judge's
recommended remedial order.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that the complaint in Case No. 4-CA-40568 be, and it
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
Issued, Washington, D.C., October 31, 1986.
/s/ Jerry L. Calhoun, Chairman
/s/ Henry B. Frazier III, Member
/s/ Jean McKee, Member
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
-------------------- ALJ$ DECISION FOLLOWS --------------------
Case No. 4-CA-40568
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, JACKSONVILLE DISTRICT AND DEPARTMENT OF
THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
SOUTHEAST REGIONAL OFFICE OF INSPECTION
Respondent
and
NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION
Charging Party
Regina N. Kane, Esquire
For the General Counsel
Robert M. Finer, Esquire
For the Respondent
Timothy C. Welsh, Esquire
For the Charging Party
Before: BURTON S. STERNBURG
Administrative Law Judge
DECISION
Statement of the Case
This is a proceeding under the Federal Service Labor-Management
Relations Statute, Chapter 71 of Title 5 of the U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C.
Section 7101 et seq. and the Rules and Regulations issued thereunder.
Pursuant to a charge filed on July 24, 1984, by the National Treasury
Employees Union (hereinafter called the NTEU or Union), a Complaint and
Notice of Hearing was issued on August 20, 1985, by the Regional
Director for Region IV, Federal Labor Relations Authority, Atlanta,
Georgia. The Complaint alleges that the Department of the Treasury,
Internal Revenue Service, Jacksonville District and the Department of
the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Southeast Regional Office of
Inspection (hereinafter called Respondent or IRS), violated Section
7116(a)(1) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute,
hereinafter called the Statute), by utilizing a third party to conduct a
wire tapped telephone examination of bargaining unit employee Steven W.
Miller in such a manner as to preclude Mr. Miller from exercising his
Section 7114(a)(2)(B) right to request the presence of a union
representative.
A hearing was held in the captioned matter on October 1, 1985 in
Daytona Beach, Florida. All parties were afforded the opportunity to be
heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence
bearing on the issues involved herein. The Charging Party, Respondent
and General Counsel submitted post-hearing briefs on December 2, 1985,
which have been duly considered. /2/
Upon the basis of the entire record, including my observation of the
witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following findings of fact, /3/
conclusions, and recommendations.
Findings of Fact
The NTEU is the exclusive representative "of certain employees of the
Department of the Treasury." Included in the unit are a number of
employees working in the IRS, Jacksonville, Florida, District Office,
which encompasses, among other areas, the Daytona Beach, Florida, Field
Office.
Mr. Steven W. Miller was employed as an Internal Revenue Officer in
Daytona Beach, Florida and as such was included in the unit represented
by the NTEU. Among Mr. Miller's duties as a Revenue Officer was the
collection of funds from delinquent taxpayers.
Sometime in April 1983, Mr. George Edwards, Mr. Miller's group
supervisor, contacted Mr. Robert Dan Clark, Jr. an inspector with the
IRS Internal Security Division /4/ in Jacksonville, Florida, and
informed him that he had reason to believe that Mr. Miller may have
mishandled a "collection" which had been assigned to him. Mr. Edwards
further informed Mr. Clark that he had also received information that
Mr. Miller might be "personally or socially acquainted with the
taxpayer." /5/
Mr. Clark subsequently initiated an investigation of the matter and
determined that the delay in the collection of delinquent taxes from
Taxpayer A was based on false information appearing on a certain form in
the taxpayer's file which indicated that Taxpayer A had been unemployed
at the time in question.
Inasmuch as Taxpayer A had in fact been employed at the time and
denied giving false information to the contrary to Mr. Miller, who was a
friend of a co-worker of Taxpayer A, it was incumbent on Mr. Clark to
determine who in fact was responsible for the false information on the
form, Mr. Miller or Taxpayer A.
Envisioning an "obvious response" from an inquiry to Mr. Miller, that
the document "truly reflects what she, Taxpayer A, told him," Mr. Clark
was of the opinion that the best way to resolve any credibility dispute
was to monitor a telephone conversation on the matter between Taxpayer A
and Mr. Miller.
On March 30, 1984, at 8:52 a.m. and 9:20 a.m. pursuant to
arrangements with Mr. Clark, Taxpayer A placed two telephone calls from
her residence to Mr. Miller at the Internal Revenue Office located in
Daytona Beach, Florida. Both the telephone calls were monitored and
recorded by Mr. Clark and fellow inspector Mailoux. Taxpayer A
consented to the wire taps.
The transcripts of the two telephone conversations reveal that
Taxpayer A discussed the subject matter of the investigation, namely the
false information concerning her work status and elicited damaging
testimony from Mr. Miller concerning the false information on the IRS
form.
At no time during the telephone conversations was Mr. Miller informed
that the conversations were being initiated by, and monitored by, IRS
representatives. Similarly, Mr. Miller was never informed of his right
to Union representation.
Mr. Clark testified that the use of wire taps was an extremely
valuable tool in which to resolve credibility both for and against IRS
agents who have been accused by taxpayers of various indiscretions etc.
He further testified that denying the IRS the use of such investigative
aids, would impede their work.
Discussion and Conclusions
The General Counsel and the Charging Party take the position that the
monitored telephone conversations constituted a Section 7114(a)(2)(B)
interview wherein Mr. Miller should have been provided the opportunity
to request representation. Inasmuch as Respondent's action in
surreptitiously monitoring the telephone conversation was designed to
interview Mr. Miller without his knowledge, Respondent knowingly and
intentionally deprived Mr. Miller of his Section 7114(a)(2)(B) right to
request representation. In such circumstances Respondent violated
Section 7116(a)(1) of the Statute.
Respondent urges dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there
is no evidence in the record indicating that Mr. Miller would have
requested representation if he had been made aware of the fact that his
conversations were being monitored. Additionally, Respondent urges
dismissal on the ground that the legislative history does not establish
that the so-called "Weingarten" rights to representation were intended
to apply to criminal investigations.'
Before Section 7114(a)(2)(B) of the Statute becomes applicable it
must be shown (1) that an examination is being conducted, (2) in
connection with an investigation, (3) that the employee involved
reasonably believes that the examination may result in discipline and
(4) the employee requests representation.
With respect to (1) and (2) above it is clear that the monitored
telephone calls from Taxpayer A to Mr. Miller were intended to be an
examination in connection with an investigation to determine who was
responsible for the false information appearing on the IRS form. If in
fact it could be determined from such telephone calls that Mr. Miller
was the guilty party there is no doubt that discipline would result.
/6/ In this latter connection the transcript of the telephone
conversation indicates that Mr. Miller was concerned about what action
would be taken by Respondent if it concluded that he was responsible for
the false information. Finally, with regard to the last element, i.e.
employee request for representation, while it is true as contended by
Respondent that the record is devoid of any evidence indicating that Mr.
Miller would have requested representation, I find that under all the
circumstances herein, Respondent is foreclosed from relying upon the
absence of such evidence. Having purposely deprived Mr. Miller of
knowledge of the examination, Respondent can hardly defend its actions
on the ground that there is no evidence of a request for representation
when, due to Respondent's surreptitious behavior, Mr. Miller was clearly
not aware of the fact that an examination was being conducted and as a
consequence was deprived of the opportunity to request representation.
To insist at this late date, i.e. subsequent to a notice of proposed
suspension based on damaging testimony elicited during the wiretapped
conversations, that Mr. Miller take the stand and attest to the fact
that he would have requested representation if he had known that an
examination was being conducted is absurd. This is particularly true
when one of the requested remedies is the suppression of the testimony
secured by Respondents through the wiretap.
Concerning Respondent's second ground for dismissal, i.e., that
Section 7114(a)(2)(B) of the Statute is not applicable to criminal
investigations, I find that the Authority has found to the contrary.
Thus, in Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, and American Federation of
Government Employees, Local 2911, AFL-CIO, 5 FLRA 473, 485, the
Authority affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that
employee was entitled to union representation during the course of an
examination to determine whether or not the employee was guilty of a
crime. The Administrative Law Judge noted that since the examination
was conducted jointly by the Respondent's managers and Respondent's
independent criminal investigative branch, the employee was entitled to
union representation at all interviews, criminal and administrative
alike.
While Respondent acknowledges the Authority's decision in Lackland
Air Force Base, supra, it takes the position that it is not controlling
since the issue of the applicability of Section 7114(a)(2)(B) to
criminal investigations was not specifically discussed. According to
Respondent, since the legislative history is silent on the matter, there
was no intention of Congress to include criminal investigations within
the representational rights accorded employees under Section
7114(a)(2)(B) of the Statute. Respondent's argument in this latter
regard was raised and thoroughly treated by Chief Administrative Law
Judge John H. Fenton in Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms, Southeaast Regional Office, Atlanta, Georgia, and
NTEU, Case No. 4-CA-1138, OALJ-84-03, October 21, 1983. To the extent
that Judge Fenton found after an exhaustive analysis of the legislative
history, that Section 7114(a)(2)(B) applies to any investigation which
may reasonably lead to discipline, I agree. In reaching this latter
conclusion I adopt, Judge Fenton's well reasoned analysis of the
legislative history.
Accordingly, having failed to allow Mr. Miller the opportunity to
exercise his Section 7114(a)(2)(B) rights, I find that the Respondent
has interfered with, restrained and coerced Mr. Miller in violation of
Section 7116(a)(1) of the Statute.
Having found that Respondent violated Section 7116(a)(1) of the
Statute by virtue of its action in depriving Mr. Miller of his Section
7114(a)(2)(B) rights to union representation, it is hereby recommended
that the Authority issue the following order designed to effectuate the
purposes and policies of the Statute. /7/
ORDER
Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Federal Labor Relations
Authority's Rules and Regulations and Section 7118 of the Statute, the
Authority hereby orders that Department of the Treasury, Internal
Revenue Service, Jacksonville District and Department of the Treasury,
Internal Revenue Service, Southeast Regional Office of Inspection shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Engaging in investigatory interviews of bargaining unit
employees, which may lead to disciplinary action, by means of
consensually monitored telephone calls which conceal the fact that
an investigation is underway, and thus operate to deprive
employees of the right to request and receive representation by
the National Treasury Employees Union, their exclusive collective
bargaining representative.
(b) Using or relying upon in any internal disciplinary
proceeding the transcript and/or information derived from, any
consensually monitored telephone call made by an undisclosed agent
of management which conceals the nature and purpose of the
telephonic investigation and/or examination and precludes the
affected employee from requesting Union representation.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their
rights assured by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
Statute.
2. Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the
purposes and policies of the Statute:
(a) To the extent that management may have relied upon
information derived from monitored telephone calls made by an
undisclosed agent of management which concealed the nature and
purpose of the telephonic investigation and/or examination,
reevaluate any internal discipline imposed, taking care to exclude
from such deliberations the information surreptitiously obtained
through the monitored telephonic investigation.
(b) Post at its Jacksonville, Florida, District Office and
Southeast Regional Office of Inspection facilities copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix" on forms to be furnished by the
Federal Labor Relations Authority. Upon receipt of such forms
they shall be signed by authorized representatives, and shall be
posted and maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all bulletin boards and other places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Pursuant to Section 2423.30 of the Authority's Rules and
Regulations, notify the Regional Director for Region IV, in
writing, within 30 days from the date of this order, as to what
steps have been taken to comply herewith.
/s/ BURTON S. STERNBURG
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: December 30, 1985
Washington, D.C.
--------------- FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
(1) For a discussion of extensions of Weingarten in the private
sector, see C. J. Morris (ed.), The Developing Labor Law: Vol. I,
151-54 (2d ed. 1983) and J. Harper II, S. Logothetis, & H. Datz (eds.),
The Developing Labor Law: Second Edition, First Supplement, 32-35
(1985).
(2) In the absence of any objection, Respondent's Motion To Correct
the Transcript, should be, and hereby is, granted.
(3) The facts, for the most part, are not in dispute.
(4) Mr. Clark described his duties as follows: "Conduct
investigations which may be either criminal or non-criminal. These
investigations generally impact upon the integrity of IRS, normally
concerning violations or suspected violations of U.S. Criminal Code or
the Internal Revenue Code, Title 18 and Title 26. Normally involving
suspected attempts to interfere with proper functioning by employees or
persons outside the service, by threats and assault, bribery,
impersonations, conflict of interest. We also conduct some
investigations of an administrative type nature or non-criminal type
cases involving suspected misconduct by IRS employees."
(5) The parties agreed that the taxpayer's name would not be
disclosed. Accordingly, the taxpayer will be referred to as "Taxpayer
A."
(6) In fact the telephone interview did lead to a proposed suspension
for Mr. Miller.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF
THE FEDERAL
LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE
POLICIES OF
CHAPTER 71 OF TITLE 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR
EMPLOYEES THAT:
WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain or coerce any bargaining unit
employee in the exercise of the Statutory right to be represented by the
National Treasury Employees Union during an investigatory interview
which may reasonably lead to discipline, by conducting a monitored
examination through another individual who is an undisclosed agent of
management, thus concealing the nature and purpose of the interrogation
and precluding the opportunity for Union representation.
WE WILL NOT use in any internal disciplinary proceedings transcripts,
and/or information derived from any consensually monitored telephone
calls made by an undisclosed agent of management which conceals the
nature and purpose of the telephonic investigation and/or examination
and precludes the affected employee from requesting union
representation.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain,
or coerce any employees in the exercise of their rights assured by the
Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.
WE WILL, to the extent that we have relied upon information derived
from telephone calls made by an undisclosed agent of management which
concealed the nature and purpose of the telephonic investigation and/or
examination, re-evaluate any internal discipline imposed, taking care to
exclude from such deliberations the information surreptitiously obtained
through the monitored telephonic investigation.
(Agency or Activity)
Dated: . . . By: (Signature)
This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date
of posting and must not be altered, defaced or covered by any other
material.
If employees have any questions concerning this Notice or compliance
with any of its provisions, they may communicate directly with the
Regional Director of the Federal Labor Relations Authority, Region IV,
whose address is: 1776 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 501, North Wing,
Atlanta, Georgia 30309 and whose telephone number is: (404) 881-2324.