24:0037(4)CA - Philadelphia Naval Shipyard and Philadelphia Metal Trades Council -- 1986 FLRAdec CA
[ v24 p37 ]
The decision of the Authority follows:
24 FLRA No. 4 PHILADELPHIA NAVAL SHIPYARD Respondent and PHILADELPHIA METAL TRADES COUNCIL Charging Party Case No. 2-CA-40243 (19 FLRA No. 107) DECISION AND ORDER ON REMAND I. Statement of the Case This case is before the Authority pursuant to a remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The question before the Authority is whether it is an unfair labor practice under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) for the Respondent (Agency) to refuse a request, made pursuant to section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute, to provide the Charging Party (Union) with the names and home addresses of employees in a bargaining unit which the Union exclusively represents. In a recent Decision and Order on Remand in another case, Farmers Home Administration Finance Office, St. Louis, Missouri, 23 FLRA No. 101 (1986) (FHAFO), we reviewed the Authority's previous decision concerning the release of the names and home addresses of bargaining unit employees to exclusive representatives. We concluded that the release of the information is not prohibited by law, is necessary for unions to fulfill their duties under the Statute, and meets all of the other requirements established by section 7114(b)(4). We also determined that the release of the information is generally required without regard to whether alternative means of communication are available. Consistent with our decision on remand in FHAFO, we conclude that Respondent's refusal to provide the Union with the names and home addresses sought in this case violated section 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute. We therefore vacate the Authority's previous decision in this case. II. Facts The Union requested the names and home addresses of the unit employees it represents. The Respondent denied the request. The Respondent took the position that release of the information was not necessary because the Union had adequate alternative means available for communicating with the unit employees through Union stewards, bulletin boards, publication of items in the Respondent's newspaper, and distribution of literature within the Shipyard. III. Administrative Law Judge's Decision The Judge concluded that the Respondent failed to comply with the requirements of section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute in violation of section 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute when it refused to provide the Union, upon request, with the names and home addresses of all unit employees represented by the exclusive representative. The Judge found that an exclusive representative must be able to communicate effectively with its constituency; that the exclusive representative's access to the addresses of unit employees was necessary for it to carry out its representational responsibilities in collective bargaining because it had no other effective means of communication with the employees; and that the Privacy Act /*/ was not a bar to disclosure of the information. IV. Positions of the Parties The parties' positions were set forth in the Respondent's exceptions and the General Counsel's response in the original case. The Respondent contended that it acted properly in denying the Union's request for the names and home addresses of employees because the Union's request did not specify why home addresses were necessary within the meaning of section 7114(b)(4). The Respondent maintained that a request which states that home addresses are necessary because such information will enable the Union to better perform its general representational responsibilities is not specific enough to warrant the release of home addresses. The Respondent also contended that the Union had other appropriate means available for communicating with unit employees, and it excepted to the Judge's conclusion that the alternative means were inadequate. Finally, the Respondent argued that the disclosure of home addresses would constitute an invasion of employee privacy in violation of the Privacy Act. The Counsel for the General Counsel argued that the factual and legal conclusions of the Judge were correct and urged the Authority to affirm the Judge's decision. V. Previous Decision of the Authority In its previous decision in this case, Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, 19 FLRA No. 107 (1985), the Authority followed the precedent established in the original FHAFO case, 19 FLRA No. 21 (1985). The Authority concluded that the release of home addresses was not required pursuant to section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute because the disclosure of such information was "prohibited by law," specifically the Privacy Act. The Union appealed. Philadelphia Metal Trades Council v. FLRA, No. 85-1625 (D.C. Cir.). The Authority requested that the court remand the case. The Authority also sought remand from the courts in FHAFO and two other cases which had been appealed and presented substantially identical issues. The courts granted the Authority's requests in the FHAFO case, American Federation of Government Employees, Local 3354 v. FLRA, No. 85-1493 (D.C. Cir.) (reviewing 19 FLRA No. 21); in National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1827 v. FLRA, No. 2202 (8th Cir.) (reviewing 19 FLRA No. 85); and in this case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, denied the Authority's remand request in one case, Social Security Administration Northeastern Program Service Center, 19 FLRA No. 108 (1985), and issued a decision. The Second Circuit reversed the Authority's holding that the release of names and home addresses was "prohibited by law," i.e., the Privacy Act, under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute. American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1760 v. FLRA, 786 F.2d 554 (2nd Cir. 1986). The Authority then decided to review the entire issue of the release of employees' names and home addresses and invited agencies, unions, and interested persons to submit amicus briefs addressing the issue. A number of amicus submissions were received. Although the parties in this case did not submit amicus briefs, the Navy Department and the American Federation of Government Employees did file amicus briefs outlining their positions. VI. Analysis and Conclusions As noted above, the Authority in the decision on remand in FHAFO concluded that the release of the names and home addresses of bargaining unit employees to the exclusive representative of those employees is not prohibited by law, is necessary for unions to fulfill their duties under the Statute and meets the other requirements of section 7114(b)(4). We also determined that agencies are required to furnish such information without regard to whether alternative means of communication are available or adequate. Based on our decision on remand in the FHAFO case, we find that the Respondent in this case was required to furnish the Union with the names and home addresses of the employees in the bargaining unit. We conclude that the Respondent's refusal to furnish the requested information constituted a violation of section 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute. ORDER Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations and section 7118 of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, it is ordered that the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to furnish, upon request by the Philadelphia Metal Trades Council, the exclusive representative of its employees, the names and home addresses of all employees in the bargaining unit it represents. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights assured them by the Statute. 2. Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Statute: (a) Upon request by the Philadelphia Metal Trades Council, the exclusive representative of its employees, furnish it with the names and home addresses of employees in the bargaining unit it represents. (b) Post at all its facilities where bargaining unit employees represented by the Philadelphia Metal Trades Council are located, copies of the attached Notice on forms to be furnished by the Federal Labor Relations Authority. Upon receipt of such forms, they shall be signed by a senior official of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and shall be posted and maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all bulletin boards and other places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that such Notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Pursuant to section 2423.30 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations, notify the Regional Director, Region II, Federal Labor Relations Authority, in writing, within 30 days from the date of this Order, as to what steps have been taken to comply. Issued, Washington, D.C., November 13, 1986.