24:0543(60)CA - HHS, SSA and AFGE -- 1986 FLRAdec CA



[ v24 p543 ]
24:0543(60)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:


 24 FLRA No. 60
 
 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT 
 EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO
 Charging Party
 
                                            Case No. 4-CA-40452
 
                            DECISION AND ORDER
 
                         I.  Statement of the Case
 
    This unfair labor practice case is before the Authority on exceptions
 filed by the Respondent (Agency).  The issue is whether it is an unfair
 labor practice under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
 Statute (the Statute) for the Respondent to refuse a request, made
 pursuant to section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute, to provide the Charging
 Party (Union) with the home addresses of employees of the Respondent's
 Atlanta Region who are represented by the Union's National Council of
 SSA Field Assessment Locals (AFGE FAO Council) as part of a national
 exclusive unit represented by the Union.
 
    In a recent Decision and Order on Remand, Farmers Home Administration
 Finance Office, St. Louis, Missouri, 23 FLRA No. 101 (1986) (FHAFO), we
 reviewed the Authority's previous decision concerning the release of the
 names and home addresses of bargaining unit employees to exclusive
 representatives.  We concluded that the release of the information is
 not prohibited by law, is necessary for unions to fulfill their duties
 under the Statute, and meets all of the other requirements established
 by section 7114(b)(4).  We also determined that the release of the
 information is generally required without regard to whether alternative
 means of communication are available.  Consistent with our decision on
 remand in FHAFO, we conclude that the Respondent's refusal to provide
 the Union with the home addresses of bargaining unit employees sought in
 this case violated section 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute.
 
                                II.  Facts
 
    The Union is the exclusive representative for many of the
 Respondent's employees, who are grouped in various nationwide bargaining
 units.  The Union requested the names and addresses of all bargaining
 unit employees in the Atlanta Region of the Respondent represented by
 the AFGE FAO Council.  The FAO Council acts as an agent for the Union in
 representing the Respondent's Field Assessment Office (FAO) employees.
 The Respondent provided the Union with the names and office addresses of
 the unit employees.  The Union then clarified its initial request by
 specifically requesting the home addresses of the employees.  The
 Respondent denied the request on the basis that:  "Providing such
 information would be an invasion of personal privacy and is withheld
 under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. Section 552a) and Exemption 6 (six) of
 the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. Section 552(b)(6))."
 
                 III.  Administrative Law Judge's Decision
 
    The Judge concluded that the Respondent failed to comply with the
 requirements of section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute in violation of
 section 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) when it refused to provide the Union,
 upon request, with the home addresses of the unit employees which it had
 sought.  In reaching that conclusion, the Judge found that the home
 addresses of the unit employees were reasonably available;  that the
 information was necessary for the Union to perform its representational
 obligations;  that the alternative means of communication available to
 the Union were not adequate for effectively communicating with the
 employees;  and that the Union's need to communicate effectively with
 the employees outweighed the minimal individual privacy interest in the
 home address information.
 
                     IV.  Positions of the Parties /1/
 
    In its exceptions, the Respondent contends that the Judge
 misinterpretated section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute, being under
 consideration.  The Union and the Respondent filed amicus briefs in
 response to the Authority's invitation.  The Union contends that the
 Respondent's submission the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information
 Act.  The Respondent also argues that the Judge exceeded his authority
 in deciding the dispute.  Finally, the Respondent contends that the
 disclosure of home addresses is contrary to section 7102 of the Statute.
 
                        V.  Analysis and Conclusion
 
    As noted above, in our decision of remand in FHAFO we concluded that
 the release of home addresses of bargaining unit employees to the
 exclusive representatives of those employees is not prohibited by law,
 is necessary for unions to fulfill their duties under the Statute, and
 meets the other requirements of section 7114(b)(4).  We also determined
 that agencies are required to furnish such information without regard to
 whether alternative means of communication are available.  Moreover, we
 further conclude that the disclosure of home addresses will not
 interfere with any employee's right, under section 7102 of the Statute,
 "to form, join, or assist any labor organization, or to refrain from any
 such activity, freely and without fear of penalty or reprisal." As we
 indicated in FHAFO, while a labor organization's desire to communicate
 with all the employees in its unit of recognition is consistent with its
 statutory responsibility to represent those employees, individual
 employees are free to ignore such communications if they so choose.
 Based on our decision on remand in the FHAFO case, we find that the
 Respondent in this case was required to furnish the Union with the home
 addresses of the unit employees.  Thus, we conclude that the
 Respondent's refusal to furnish the requested information in this case
 constituted a violation of section 7116(a)(1), (5), and (8) of the
 Statute.
 
                                   ORDER
 
    Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations
 and section 7118 of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
 Statute, it is ordered that the Department of Health and Human Services,
 Social Security Administration, shall:
 
    1.  Cease and desist from:
 
    (a) Refusing to furnish, upon request by the American Federation of
 Government Employees, AFL-CIO, National Council of SSA Field Assessment
 Locals, the exclusive representative of its employees, the home
 addresses of all Atlanta Region employees in the bargaining unit it
 represents.
 
    (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or
 coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights assured them by the
 Statute.
 
    2.  Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the
 purposes and policies of the Statute:
 
    (a) Upon request by the American Federation of Government Employees,
 AFL-CIO, National Council of SSA Field Assessment Locals, the exclusive
 representative of its employees, furnish it with the home addresses of
 all Atlanta Region employees in the bargaining unit it represents.
 
    (b) Post at all its facilities within the Atlanta Region where
 bargaining unit employees represented by the American Federation of
 Government Employees, AFL-CIO, National Council of SSA Field Assessment
 Locals are located, copies of the attached Notice on forms to be
 furnished by the Federal Labor Relations Authority.  Upon receipt of
 such forms, they shall be signed by the Regional Commissioner, Atlanta
 Region, Social Security Administration, Department of Health and Human
 Services, and shall be posted and maintained for 60 consecutive days
 thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all bulletin boards and
 other places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
 Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that such Notices are not
 altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
 
    (c) Pursuant to section 2423.30 of the Authority's Rules and
 Regulations, notify the Regional Director, Region IV, Federal Labor
 Relations Authority, in writing, within 30 days from the date of this
 Order, as to what steps have been taken to comply.
 
    Issued, Washington, D.C., December 18, 1986.
 
                                       /s/ Jerry L. Calhoun, Chairman
                                       /s/ Henry B. Frazier III, Member
                                       /s/ Jean McKee, Member
                                       FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
 
  PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR
 RELATIONS
 AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF CHAPTER 71
 OF TITLE
 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVIEC LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS
 
                   WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
 
    WE WILL NOT refuse to furnish, upon request by the American
 Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, National Council of SSA
 Field Assessment Locals, the exclusive representative of our employees,
 the home addresses of all Atlanta Region employees in the bargaining
 unit it represents.
 
    WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain,
 or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights assured them by
 the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.
 
    WE WILL, upon request by the American Federation of Government
 Employees, AFL-CIO, National Council of SSA Field Assessment Locals, the
 exclusive representative of our employees, furnish it with the home
 addresses of all Atlanta Region employees in the bargaining unit it
 represents.
 
    This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date
 of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other
 material.
 
    If employees have any questions concerning this Notice or compliance
 with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Regional
 Director, Region IV, Federal Labor Relations Authority, whose address
 is:  1370 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 736, Atlanta, GA 30367 and whose
 telephone number is:  (404) 347-2324.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -------------------- ALJ$ DECISION FOLLOWS --------------------
 
    Case No. 4-CA-40452
 
 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
 SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
    Respondent
 
                                    and
 
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO
    Charging Party
 
    Carl Clayton, Esquire
    For the Respondent
 
    Regina N. Kane, Esquire
    For the General Counsel
 
    Mr. Barry Nelson
    For the Charging Party
 
    Before:  WILLIAM B. DEVANEY
    Administrative Law Judge
 
                                 DECISION
 
                           Statement of the Case
 
    This proceeding, under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
 Statute, Chapter 71 of Title 5 of the United States Code, 5 U.S.C.
 Section 7101, et seq.  /2/ , and the Federal Rules and Regulations
 issued thereunder, 5 C.F.R. Section 2423.1, et seq., concerns a refusal
 to furnish home addresses of bargaining unit employees.  This proceeding
 was initiated by a charge filed on June 4, 1984 (G.C. Exh. 1(a)).  The
 Complaint and Notice of Hearing issued on December 19, 1984, and hearing
 was set for January 18, 1985 (G.C. Exh. 1(c)).  By Order dated January
 4, 1985 (G.C. Exh. 1(f)) the hearing was postponed indefinitely;  by
 Order dated January 8, 1985 (G.C. Exh. 1(g)) the hearing was rescheduled
 for February 21, 1985, at a place to be determined;  and by Order dated
 February 14, 1985 (G.C. Exh. 1(h)) the place of hearing was fixed,
 pursuant to which a hearing was duly held on February 21, 1985, in
 Birmingham, Alabama, before the undersigned.
 
    All parties were represented at the hearing, were afforded full
 opportunity to be heard, to introduce evidence bearing on the issues
 involved, and were afforded opportunity to present oral argument which
 each party waived.  At the close of the hearing, March 21, 1985, was
 fixed as the date for mailing post-hearing briefs which time was
 subsequently extended, initially upon timely motion of General Counsel,
 with which the other parties concurred, for good cause shown, to April
 22, 1985, and later, upon timely motion of Respondent, to which the
 other parties did not object, for good cause shown, to May 22, 1985.
 Respondent and General Counsel each timely mailed an excellent brief,
 received on, or before, May 22, 1985, which have been carefully
 considered.  Upon the basis of the entire record, including my
 observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following
 findings and conclusions:
 
                                 Findings
 
    1.  The American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO,
 (hereinafter, also referred to as "AFGE") is the exclusive
 representative of certain of Respondent's nonprofessional and
 professional employees as more fully set forth in the Agreement of the
 Parties (G.C. Exh. 5, Recognition and Coverage, p. 1).  AFGE, in turn,
 has various national councils including the AFGE National Council of SSA
 Field Assessment Locals (G.C. Exh. 5, Art. 4, Section 2 A, p. 7, Tr.
 12)(hereinafter referred to as the "Union").  Mr Barry Nelson is the
 Administrative Director of the Union;  a Regional Vice President for
 Field Assessment for the Atlanta Region;  and is a member of the AFGE
 General Committee representing the Social Security Administration (Tr.
 12).
 
    2.  By letter dated April 13, 1984 (G.C. Exh. 2), Mr. Nelson,
 pursuant to Section 14(b)(4) of the Statute, requests:
 
          "(1) The names of all bargaining unit employees in the Atlanta
       Region represented by the National Council
 
 of SSA Field Assessment Locals, and;
 
          "(2) The addresses of all unit employees identified
 
 above.
 
                         . . . ." (G.C. Exh. 2).
 
    3.  By letter dated April 27, 1984, Respondent supplied the names and
 addresses (office addresses) of all bargaining unit employees as
 requested (G.C. Exh. 3 and Enclosure 1).  As the Enclosure shows, there
 were 171 bargaining unit employees in various Branches or Sections at
 the following locations:
 
                            101 Marietta Tower
 
                             Atlanta, Georgia
 
    Special Studies and Analysis Branch
 
    (Suite 2510)
 
    ISI Analysis Branch
 
    (Suite 2626)
 
    Disability Analysis Branch
 
    (Suite 2609)
 
    Evaluation Staff
 
    (Suite 2608)
 
                       1776 Peachtree Street, N.W.
 
                             Atlanta, Georgia
 
    Atlanta Satellite Office
 
    (Suite 410 North)
 
                          330 Biscayne Boulevard
 
                              Miami, Florida
 
    Miami Field Station
 
                          2001 12th Avenue North
 
                            Birmingham, Alabama
 
    Birmingham Satellite Office
 
    RSI Analysis Branch
 
    There were 96 unit employees at 101 Marietta Tower Atlanta;  20 at
 1776 Peachtree Street, Atlanta;  4 at Miami;  and 51 at Birmingham.  Of
 the 171 unit employees, only 30 are members of the Union (Tr. 32).
 
    4.  By letter dated May 11, 1984, Mr. Nelson stated that what he
 really wanted was the home addresses of all unit employees, not their
 office addresses (G.C. Exh. 4).
 
    5.  By letter dated May 25, 1984, Ms. Maxine McNutt, Director, Field
 Assessment Office, declined to supply the home addresses of unit
 employees stating, in part, as follows:
 
          ". . . The request for home addresses . . . is denied.
       Providing such information would be an invasion of personal
       privacy and is withheld under the Privacy Act and Exemption 6(six)
       of the Freedom of Information Act." (G.C. Exh. 5).
 
    6.  The current National Agreement of the Parties (G.C. Exh. 6)
 provides, in part, as follows:
 
          Article 11, Section 4 - Public Address System "The
       Administration will continue to make the public address system
       available with extablished practices to those facilities where
       union use was in effect as of June 10, 1980."
 
          Article 11, Section 6 - Other Facilities and Services "The
       Administration agrees to furnish, where available, customary and
       routine services . . .  Such services include internal mail (for
       other than mass mailings) . . . ."
 
          Article 12, Section 1 - Bulletin Board (management must
       provide)
 
          Article 12, Section 2 - Distribution of Union Publications
 
          "A.  Official publications of the Union may be distributed on
       SSA property by union representatives during the non-duty time of
       the Union representatives who are distributing and the employees
       receiving the materials . . . .
 
          "B.  The Administration agrees to distribute officially
       designated union newsletters on a desk-to-desk basis in
       Headquarters, Program Service Centers and Data Operations Centers.
        This will not preclude employer distribution in other
       installations if mutually agreed to.
 
          "This distribution will be limited to four (4) times per year
       unless mutually agreed to . . .
 
          Article 6 - Addressing New Employees
 
          "Where such practices exist as of the effective date of the
       agreement (June 11, 1982), the Administration will continue to
       provide the Union an opportunity to address new employees during
       orientation sessions . . . ." (G.C. Exh. 6).
 
    7.  In his requests of April 13 (G.C. Exh. 2) and May 11 (G.C. Exh.
 4), Mr. Nelson stated no reason or justification for the addresses of
 unit employees, and Respondent's only stated reason for denying home
 addresses was, as set forth in General Counsel's Exhibit 5, Subsection
 (b)(6) of the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act (Tr. 17).
 
    8.  Mr. Nelson testified that he had several reasons for wanting the
 home addresses:  First, to get employee input in connection with the
 imminent negotiations of a supplemental agreement (authorized by Article
 5 of the National Agreement) (Tr. 17-18, 19-20, 21, 22-23, i.e.,
 solicitation of opinions (Tr. 56).  Second, to alert bargaining unit
 employees to office closings (Tr. 23-24;  25) and reorganizations (Tr.
 30-32).  Third, to advise unit employees of settlement agreements
 (unfair labor practice charge)(Tr. 28).  Fourth, to let employees know
 the type of activities the Union is conducting (Tr. 29).
 
    9.  The Union has a steward for unit employees at each building
 except at Miami (Tr. 37-38).
 
    10.  Mr. Nelson stated that the Union had never distributed material,
 pursuant to Article 12, Section 2 A, in the Atlanta Region (Tr. 39);
 nor had it ever used Respondent's internal mail system (Article 11,
 Section 6)(Tr. 39-40).  Mr. Nelson stated that the Union had no ". . .
 agreement with the FAO portion to do any distributing for us." (Article
 12, Section 2 B)(Tr. 40).
 
    11.  The Union has a publication, The Sentinel, which is issued
 sporadically (Tr. 42-43).  Copies are placed in racks at the Program
 Service Center in Birmingham from which employees may take a copy,
 copies are mailed "sometimes" to members, and management distributes
 copies desk-to-desk in the Program Service Center up to four times per
 year (Tr. 43).  The Sentinel is not distributed at Atlanta but copies
 are sent to stewards for posting on the bulletin boards (Tr. 44).
 
    12.  Mr. Nelson stated that he had not used the bulletin boards to
 solicit input because ". . . I don't necessarily want . . . management
 to know that (sic) I am asking employees" (Tr. 45).
 
    13.  Individual employee records (standard Form 7-B (G.C. Exh. 8) are
 retained by each employee's immediate supervisor (G.C. Exh. 9, Tr.
 47-48) and each card has a place for the employee's home address.  Home
 addresses also are shown on each employee's pay slip (Tr. 49).  A copy
 of each pay slip goes to the timekeeper who is located in the same
 office as the staff, i.e., each staff has its own timekeeper (Tr.
 49-50).  Personnel files for Field Assessment employees are maintained
 in the Atlanta Regional Office (Tr. 50) and home addresses are shown on
 the SF-171.  Although Regulations (G.C. Exh. 10) provide for locator
 files, Mr. Cannon Hassell, Manager of the RSI Analysis Branch,
 Birmingham, since January, 1983, and previously Director of the Division
 of Payment and Eligibility Quality, in FAO (Field Assessment Office),
 and, prior to that, Director of the Office of Quality Assurance for the
 Atlanta Region, Atlanta, Georgia, testified that neither the FAO Region
 in Atlanta nor Birmingham maintains locator cards either in individual
 offices or in a central file (Tr. 84, 86, 90, 91) and that the only
 place the home addresses are kept is on the B-7 and on the pay slip
 which is kept by the timekeeper (Tr. 84).  Mr. Hassell testified that to
 generate a list of names with home addresses of every FAO employee it
 would be necessary to go either to each supervisor and ask the
 supervisor to supply the data from the 7-B files which he maintains, or
 to go to each timekeeper and have each timekeeper pull the names and
 addresses from the pay slips /3/ (Tr. 84-85).
 
    14.  Mr. Grady K. Lancaster, a Quality Case Analyst, RSIAB,
 Birmingham, stated that he objected to his home address being given to
 the Union or anyone, ". . . unless I personally authorize it." (Tr.
 95-96).  He further stated, ". . . my privacy is my privacy, and I don't
 want anyone to infringe upon it." (Tr. 96).
 
    15.  Ms. Martha Foster, Secretary to the Branch Manager, RSI Analysis
 Branch, stated that she personally objected to delivery of her home
 address to the Union without her knowledge and consent (Tr. 97-98).  Ms.
 Foster stated that there had always been time enough on breaks and at
 lunch to talk about union matters (Tr. 98) and at no time had any Union
 representative asked for her home address so it could go on a Union
 mailing list (Tr. 98).  She stated that she received the Sentinel at
 work (Tr. 99).
 
    16.  Mr. Brack Hawkins, a Reviewer and Examiner in QA, RSIAB, stated
 that he preferred that his home address not be given to the Union;  that
 he found it objectionable that his home address be released to the Union
 without his knowledge and consent (Tr. 100).  Mr. Hawkins had joined the
 Union at one point but had ". . . got out" (Tr. 101).
 
                                Conclusions
 
    This case involves only the request for names and home addresses of
 bargaining unit employees in the Atlanta Region represented by the
 National Council of SSA Field Assessment Locals - a total of about 171
 employees.  It is clear that this request is only the beginning, as Mr.
 Nelson stated that "We were going to go to each region and ask for them
 individually . . . ." (Tr. 54-55).  No list exists in the Atlanta Region
 containing the collected names and home addresses of bargaining unit
 employees;  however, there is no dispute that the names and home
 addresses are maintained on individual employees, on the individual
 employee record (Standard Form 7-B) kept by the employee's immediate
 supervisor or on the individual employee's pay stub kept by the
 timekeeper.  The cost of preparing the requested list of names with home
 addresses was neither shown nor established.  The record shows only that
 in Birmingham if the 7-B files were used it would be necessary to obtain
 the data from 8 managers;  and if the payroll stubs were used the data
 would have to be obtained from three timekeepers.  The number of people
 that would be involved in Atlanta (101 Marietta Tower and 1776 Peachtree
 Street) was not shown.  Since there is one manager at Miami and only
 four unit employees, it is assumed that only one person would be
 involved at Miami.  Consequently, although Respondent would be required
 to copy names and addresses from individual employee records, either
 from for 7-B's or payroll stubs, such task is neither so burdensome nor
 costly as to warrant denial of the Union's request if the Union's
 request is consistent with Section 14(b)(4) of the Statute and is not
 prohibited by the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 552a.  Section 14(b)(4)
 of the Statute requires an agency to furnish to the exclusive
 representative, upon request, data;
 
          "(B) which is reasonably available and necessary for full and
       proper discussion, understanding and negotiation of subjects
       within the scope of collective bargaining . . . ." (5 U.S.C.
       Section 7114(b)(4)(B)).
 
    As noted above, the names and addresses of bargaining unit employees
 are reasonably available;  and the record shows that the Union sought
 the home addresses principally to get employee input in connection with
 negotiation of a supplemental agreement and to alert bargaining unit
 employees of office closings and reorganizations, although the Union
 stated that italso wanted the adresses to advise unit employees of
 settlement agreements and to let them know the type of activities the
 Union was conducting.  Is the desire to obtain input from non-members in
 connection with negotiation of a supplemental agreement necessary for
 full and proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation of subjects
 within the scope of collective bargaining?  While conceivably helpful,
 in all candor, I have always viewed such professed justification with
 great skepticism.  My skepticism stems, in part, from long recognition
 that views of non-members are not always received with enthusiasm by
 members, see, for example, American Federation of Government Employees,
 Local 2000, AFL-CIO, 14 FLRA No. 85 (1984);  and, in part, from the fact
 that unions through their members, even though membership may, as here,
 be small, and through their day-to-day confrontation with problems
 affecting the bargaining unit are well aware of areas where they desire
 changes in, or additional to, their collective bargaining agreements.
 Indeed, in Magma Copper Company, San Manuel Division, 208 NLRB 329
 (1974) the National Labor Relations Board stated:
 
          ". . . A list of employees' names and addresses is clearly not
       a matter pertaining to the negotiation of new 'rates of pay,
       wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employment . .
       .'" (208 NLRB at 329) (the Board held, however, that names and
       addresses were necessary to fulfill the union's statutory
       obligation to administer the agreement on behalf of all unit
       employees and, because alternate means of communicating with
       employees (bulletin boards, stewards, distribution of literature)
       were inadequate, ordered the names and addresses furnished).  /4/
 
    In Shell Oil Co. v. NLRB, 457 F. 2d. 615 (9th Cir. 1972) denying
 enf't of 190 NLRB 101 (1971) (because the Company's fear of harassment
 of non-union employees reasonable justified its refusal to supply names
 and addresses of all unit employees), the employer had offered to supply
 the Union names and addresses of all bargaining unit employees who
 consented or to furnish the names and addresses of all bargaining unit
 employees to an independent mailing service which, upon receipt of
 sealed and stamped envelopes, would adress the envelopes and mail them
 to employees at their home addresses, the employer to pay the full
 additional cost of the mailing service without limitation on the number
 or frequency of mailings desired by the union.  Notwithstanding the
 offer of a means to communicate freely with all employees at their home
 addresses, the union insisted upon it having the home addresses in
 order, as the union's district director testified, in part:
 
          ". . . that it was essential for the Union to be able not only
       to mail communications to the employees but also to have 'its
       leadership' make personal visits to employees' homes in order to
       organize them, 'close the ranks,' . . . ." (457 F. 2d at 617)
 
    I strongly suspect than in all requests for names and home addresses
 a primary objective, whether admitted or not, is organization.  (See,
 dissenting opinion of Judge Friendly, Prudential Insurance Company v.
 NLRB, 412 F. 2d at 85 (2d/Cir. 1969).  If proper for purposes of
 organization prior to a representation election, Wyman Gordon, supra;
 Exelsior Underwear, supra, coupled with a union's statutory obligation
 to administer the agreement, Magma Copper, supra, production of names
 and home addresses in non-representation election situations has,
 certainly, been upheld by the courts where there was no clear danger of
 harassment of non-union employees (e.g., following strikes) and
 alternate means of communication were inadequate.  United Air Craft
 Corp. v. NLRB, 434 F. 2d 1198 (2d/Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 993
 (1971);  Prudential Insurance Co. v. NLRB, 412 F. 2d 77 (2d/Cir. 1969),
 cert. denied, 396 U.S. 928 (1969);  Standard Oil Co. of California v.
 NLRB, 399 F. 2d 639 (9th Cir. 1968).  Indeed, in Prudential Insurance
 Co., supra, the Court stated, in part, as follows:
 
          ". . . In this instance it is urgent so that the exclusive
       bargaining representative of the employees may perform its broad
       range of statutory duties in a truly representative fashion and in
       harmony with the employees' desires and interests.  Because this
       information is therefore so basically related to the proper
       performance of the Union's statutory duties, we believe any
       special showing of specific relevance would be superfluous.
 
          "Prudential's complaint that the Union may use this information
       to solicit new members within the unit is simply of no moment.  As
       the Board has so appropriately indicated, there is no clear
       distinction between informing non-member agents about the benefits
       it has obtained and hopes in the future to secure for them and its
       solicitation of their support.  In any case, Union solicitation is
       itself hardly an evil - especially where, as here, the Union is
       already the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees
       it is soliciting . . . ." (412 F. 2d at 84-85).
 
    In Internal Revenue Service, Office of the District Director,
 Jacksonville District, Jacksonville, Florida, A/SLMR No. 214, 2 A/SLMR
 523 (1972), although the Hearing Examiner, whose recommended decision
 was adopted by the Assistant Secretary, cited with approval NLRB and
 court decisions that a collective bargaining representative is entitled,
 upon request, to receive from an employer the names and addresses of the
 employees in the bargaining unit if it has no other effective means of
 communicating with them, he recommended that the complaint be dismissed
 because Complainant had failed to show that it did not have other
 effective means of communicating with employees.  On appeal to the
 Federal Labor Relations Council, the Council sustained the Assistant
 Secretary's dismissal of the complaint;  however, the Council stated, in
 part, as follows:
 
          ". . . in our opinion, the implementation of the provisions of
       section 10(e) of the Order /5/ requires that the exclusive
       representative have effective means of communicating with unit
       employees.  Moreover, agencies, as part of their obligation to
       consult, confer, or negotiate with an exclusive representative,
       must where appropriate, provide an exclusive representative with
       means of communicating with unit employees and a failure to do so
       would constitute a violation of Section 19(a)(6).
 
          "A determination of whether an exclusive representative in fact
       has effective means of communicating with unit employees must be
       made on a case-by-case basis.  In many instances, little or no
       action by the agency would be necessary to supplement the means of
       communication readily available to the union on its own
       initiative.  On the other hand, in some instances where because of
       such factors as the size of unit, geographic dispersion of
       employees, isolated duty locations, etc., the union may not have
       effective means of communicating with unit employees.  In such
       situations, as stated above, the proper implementation of the
       Order might require that the agency assist the exclusive
       representative in facilitating such communication, consistent with
       law and regulation, e.g., by providing the union with the periodic
       use of the interagency mailing system or addressing envelopes
       containing union material and depositing those envelopes in the
       U.S. mail for delivery to employees at their home addresses.  A
       failure to provide the exclusive bargaining representative such
       access to employees in the unit, where required, would constitute
       a failure on the part of the agency to meet its obligation to
       consult, confer, or negotiate . . . in violation of section
       19(a)(6) of the Order.
 
          "In the instant case, applying the criteria that a union must
       have effective means of communicating with unit employees, the
       Assistant Secretary determined, on the basis of the record, that
       the union did in fact have effective means of communicating with
       the unit employees and, therefore, IRS had no obligation to
       provide the Union with additional such means of communication.
       Accordingly, the IRS's actions did not violate section 19(a)(6) of
       the Order.  The Assistant Secretary's decision is clearly
       supported by the record and consistent with the purposes of the
       Order.  6/
 
    6/ Like the Assistant Secretary, we find it unnecessary in this case
 to consider the propriety of the CSC regulation which prohibits an
 agency from furnishing a union with the home addresses of employees."
 (FLRC No. 72A-50, 2 FLRC 106, 109-110 (1974)).
 
    This remained the situation under Executive Order 11491, as amended.
 It must be noted that the Council did not suggest that an agency should
 give the Union the home addresses of bargaining unit employees.  To the
 contrary, the Council went no further than to suggest that where
 appropriate:  a) the agency permit periodic access to the interagency
 mailing system;  or b) the agency address envelopes containing union
 material and deposit those envelopes in the U.S. mail for delivery to
 employees at their home addresses.
 
    Two factors may bar applicability of private sector case law, or the
 decision of the Council under the Executive Order, to requests for names
 and home addresses under the Statute:  First, Section 14(b)(4) of the
 Statute which has no counterpart in either the National Labor Relations
 Act or Executive Order 11491, as amended.  As noted, Section 14
 (b)(4)(B) limits an agency's obligation to furnish data, including the
 names and home addresses involved herein, /6/ to such data as ". . .
 necessary for full and proper discussion, understanding, and
 negotiations of subjects within the scope of collective bargaining"
 (Emphasis supplied).  The Authority has held that there is no violation
 if the data, requested by, but not furnished to the Union, were not
 necessary and relevant to assist the union in fulfilling its
 responsibilities under the Statute, United States Environmental
 Protection Agency, Health Effects Research Laboratory, Cincinnati, Ohio,
 16 FLRA No. 16, 16 FLRA 52 (1984), and a complaint was dismissed where
 the request for names and home addresses was sought for lobbying
 purposes and Section 14(b)(4)(B) imposes no duty to furnish the home
 addresses for lobbying purposes.  Internal Revenue Service, Memphis
 Service Center and National Treasury Employees Union, Case No.
 4-CA-30371 (OALJ-84-66, May 17, 1984), Administrative Law Judge Decision
 Report No. 38 (July 5, 1984).  Second, the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. Section
 552a, enacted December 31, 1974, about eight months after the Counsel's
 decision in FLRC No. 72A-50, supra, which has no application to the
 private sector.  /7/ 5 U.S.C. Sections 552a(a)(1), 552(e).  Each of
 these factors as applicable to the present request for names and home
 addresses is considered hereinafter.
 
                                Privacy Act
 
    Three quite separate Acts, enacted at different times over a ten year
 period and reflecting different Congressional concerns, are codified as
 5 U.S.C. Sections 552, 552a, and 552b.  5 U.S.C. Section 552, P.L.
 89-554, is the Freedom of Information Act, was enacted September 6,
 1966, and, in essence, concerned disclosure of information to the public
 (although, as pertinent here, Section 552(b)(6) excluded from such
 disclosure "(6) personnel . . . files . . . the disclosure of which
 would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5
 U.S.C. Section 552a is the Privacy Act, P.L. 93-579, was enacted
 December 31, 1974, and, in essence, concerned information maintained by
 agencies on individuals and its disclosure.  5 U.S.C. Section 552b, P.L.
 94-409, is the Sunshine Act, was enacted September 13, 1976, and, in
 essence, concerns open meetings.
 
    Respondent denied the request for names and home addresses
 specifically because, "Providing such information would be an invasion
 of personal privacy and is withheld under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C.
 Section 552a) and Exemption 6(six) of the Freedom of Information Act (5
 U.S.C. Section 552(b)(6))" (G.C. Exh. 5).  At hearing, Respondent
 asserted the same defense, coupled with the further contentions that it
 had made a reasonable response to the request by supplying the names and
 office addresses of the bargaining unit employees requested;  /8/ that
 the Union has adequate means of communicating with bargaining unit
 employees through alternate means;  and that the data requested, i.e.
 home addresses, is not necessary or relevant within the meaning of
 Section 14(b)(B) of the Statute.
 
    5 U.S.C. Section 552a provides, in part, as follows:
 
                . . . .
 
 
          (4) the term 'record' means any item, collection, or grouping
       of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency
       . . .
 
                . . . .
 
 
          (7) the term 'routine use' means, with respect to the
       disclosure of a record, the use of such record for a purpose which
       is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected.
 
          "(b) CONDITIONS OF DISCLOSURE -- No agency shall disclose any
       record which is contained in a system of records by any means of
       communication to any person . . . except pursuant to a written
       request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual
       to whom the record pertains, unless disclosure of the record would
       be --
 
          (2) required under section 552 of this title;
 
          (3) for a routine use as defined in subsection (a)(7) of this
       section and described under subsection (e)(4)(D) of this section;
 
                . . . .
 
 
          "(e) AGENCY REQUIREMENTS -- Each agency that maintains a system
       of records shall --
 
          (4) subject to the provisions of paragraph 11 of this
       subsection, publish in the Federal Register at least annually a
       notice of the existence and character of the system of records,
       which notice shall include --
 
                . . . .
 
 
          (D) each routine use of the records contained in the system,
       including the categories of uses and the purpose of such use.
 
                . . . .
 
 
          (11) at least 30 days prior to publication of information under
       paragraph (4)(D) of this subsection, publish in the Federal
       Register notice of any new use or intended use of the information
       in the system, and provide an opportunity for interested persons
       to submit written data, views or arguments to the agency.
 
          "(n) MAILING LISTS. -- An individual's name and address may not
       be sold or rented by an agency unless such action is specifically
       authorized by law.  This provision shall not be construed to
       require the withholding of names and addresses otherwise permitted
       to be made public.
 
                . . . . "(5 U.S.C. Section 552a(a)(4), 7; (b)(3);
 
 
       (e)(4)(D), 11;  and (n)).  (Emphasis supplied).
 
    In addition to the foregoing provisions of the Privacy Act, the
 Freedom of Information Act excludes disclosure, inter alia, of:
 
          "(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the
       disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
       invasion of personal privacy." (5 U.S.C. Section 552(b)(6)).  /9/
 
    The legislative history of the Privacy Act makes it clear that
 employees' addresses were subject to the Act.  Thus, Senate Report No.
 93-1183, Government Operations Committee, September 26, 1974, to
 accompany S. 3418, which passed in lieu of H.R. 16373, states, in part,
 as follows:
 
          "The Committee has used the term 'personal information'
       throughout the bill . . .  Such definition includes the . . .
       address, by which the individual is indexed in a file or
       retrievable from it." (U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative
       News, 93d/Cong., 2d/Sen., 1974, at p. 6946)(hereinafter references
       to the Senate Report are referred to as "Legislative History",
       followed by the page reference in the U.S. Code Congressional and
       Administrative News).
 
    With regard to mailing lists (Section (n) of 5 U.S.C. Section 552a)
 the Senate Report states, in part, as follows:
 
          "The bill now prohibits Federal agencies from selling or
       renting mailing lists except as authorized by law, but does not
       require names and addresses to be kept confidential . . ."
       (Legislative History, p. 6946) /10/
 
    The Senate Report, in setting forth the purpose and intent of the
 bill, stated, in part:
 
          "Third, the bill establishes certain minimum standards for
       handling and processing personal information maintained in the
       data banks and systems . . . to this end, it requires every
       department and agency to insure, by whatever steps they deem
       necessary:
 
                . . . .
 
 
          "That they refrain from disclosing it unless necessary for
       employee duties, or from making it available outside the agency
       without the consent of the individual . . ." (Legislative History
       at pp. 6917-6918).
 
    However, the broad protection of privacy of "personal information,"
 recited as the purpose and object of the bill, was, and is, subject to
 two specific statutory exceptions as applicable herein, namely:
 disclosure "(2) required under section 552 . . ." and disclosure "(3)
 for a routine use . . .", which, in practical effect, render the broad
 protection of personal privacy more illusory than real;  and, with
 respect to names and addresses, the legislative history strongly
 suggests that Congress intended far less privacy to names and addresses
 than to data collected and maintained under other indicia, for example,
 specifically, by social security number.
 
                          Privacy Act Exemptions
 
    1.  Disclosure required under Section 552 (Freedom of Information
 Act).  In American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local
 1923 v. United States Department of Health and Human Services, 712 F. 2d
 931 (4th Cir. 1963), a panel majority (Circuit Judge Chapman and
 District Judge Turk), Chief Judge Winter dissenting, in denying home
 addresses requested by the union, concluded that home addresses were not
 agency records subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information
 Act because those addresses had nothing to do with the agency's work and
 disclosure would shed no significant light on the agency's inner
 workings, stating, in part, as follows:
 
          "Further, the records sought are not of the type that must be
       disclosed under Section 552(a)(3).  Only 'agency records' must be
       disclosed . . .  The purpose of the Act is 'to pierce the veil of
       administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of
       public scrutiny . . . .' . . .  The term 'agency records' includes
       only those created or complied by an agency 'in the course of
       doing its work . . . .' . . .  The home addresses sought by
       appellant have nothing to do with the agency's 'work,' and
       disclosure thereof would shed no significant light on the agency's
       inner workings." (712 F. 2d at 933).
 
    With all deference to the Court of Appeals, this view appears
 contrary to that stated by the Supreme Court in Department of the Air
 Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).  In Army and Air Force Exchange
 Service (AAFES), Fort Carson, Colorado, 17 FLRA No. 92 (1985), the
 Authority stated, ". . .  The theory of the FOIA, in contrast to the
 Privacy Act, is that all records in the possession of the agencies of
 the Federal Government must be disclosed upon request unless subject to
 a specific FOIA exemption." (Emphasis supplied).  This, of course, is
 fully considered with the decision of the Supreme Court in Rose, supra,
 where the Court stated, in part, as follows:
 
          ". . . the Act repeatedly states, 'h at official information
       shall be made available "to the public," "for public inspection"'
       . . .  There are, however, exemptions from compelled disclosure.
       They are nine in number and are set forth in Section 552(b).  But
       these limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that
       disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act.
       'These exemptions are explicitly made excluseve, 5 U.S.C. Section
       552(c) . . .' . . ., and must be narrowly construed . . . ." (425
       U.S. at 361).
 
    And with regard to exemption 6, which is the only exemption asserted
 in this case, the Court further stated, in part, as follows:
 
          ". . . we find nothing in the wording of Exemption 6 or its
       legislative history to support the Agency's claim that Congress
       created a blanket exemption for personnel files.  Judicial
       interpretation has uniformly reflected the view that no reason
       would exist for nondisclosure in absence of a showing of a clearly
       unwarranted invasion of privacy, whether the documents are filed
       in 'personnel' or 'similar' files . . .  Congressional concern for
       the protection of the kind of confidential personal data usually
       included in a personnel file is abundantly clear.  But Congress
       also made clear that nonconfidential matter was not to be
       insulated from disclosure merely because it was stored by an
       agency in its 'personnel' files.  Rather, Congress sought to
       construct an exemption that would require a balancing of the
       individual's right of privacy against the preservation of the
       basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act 'to open agency
       action to the light of public scrutiny.' The device adopted to
       achieve that balance was the limited exception, where privacy was
       threatened, for 'clearly unwarranted' invasions of personal
       privacy." (425 U.S. at 371-372).
 
    2.  For a routine use.  Subsection (a)(7) defines routine use as
 follows:
 
          "(7) the term 'routine use' means, with respect to the
       disclosure of a record, the use of such record for a purpose which
       is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected." (5
       U.S.C. Section 552a(a)(7)).
 
    Subsection (e)(4)(D) and (11) provide that,
 
          "(4) subject to the provisions of paragraph 11 of this
       subsection, publish in the Federal Register at least annually a
       notice of the existence and character of the system of records,
       which notice shall include -- (D) each routine use of the records
       contained in the system, including the categories of uses and the
       purpose of such use;
 
          "(11) at least 30 days prior to publication of information
       under paragraph (4)(D) of this subsection, publish in the Federal
       Register notice of any new use or intended us of the information
       in the system, and provide an opportunity for interested persons
       to submit written data, views, or arguments to the agency." (5
       U.S.C. Section 552a(e)(4)(D) and (11)).
 
    The source of the names and addresses relied upon by General Counsel
 in this case were either the form 7-B, maintained by each employee's
 immediate supervisor, or payroll stubs, maintained by timekeepers,
 appear to be "Personnel Records in Operating Offices, HHS/OS/ASPER."
 /11/ The text of the notices published by the Department of Health and
 Human Services (HHS) were not offered in evidence, although the Federal
 Register citation given to Mr. Nelson was introduced (G.C. Exh. 11).
 The HHS notice of October 13, 1982, states that:
 
          "These notices do not contain any new routine uses . . . ."
       (F.R. vol. 47, No. 198, p. 45402).
 
    The October 13, 1982, notice of the Office of the Secretary (Office
 of the Assistant Secretary for Personnel Administration (OASPEA), HHS,
 with regard to Personnel Records in Operating Offices, which includes:
 
          ". . . a variety of records relating to personnel actions and
       determinations made about an individual while employed.  These
       records may contain information about an individual relating to
       name;  birth date;  home address . . . pay and leave . . . ."
       (F.R. vol. 47, No. 198, pp. 45761-45762).
 
    This notice defines routine use to include, as pertinent,
 
          "(8) where a contract between a component of the Department and
       a labor organization recognized under E.O. 11491 or 5 U.S.C.
       Chapter 71 provides that the agency will disclose personal records
       relevant to the organization's mission, records in this system of
       records may be disclosed to such organization." (F.R. vol. 47, No.
       198, p. 45762),
 
    The office of the Assistant Secretary for Management and Budget
 (ASMB) notice of October 13, 1982, concerns "Telephone Directory/Locator
 System," located at "Operating Offices and Facility Complexes of the
 Department -- Employee Locators and Offices of Administrative of
 Management Services," does not provide for home address (see, Categories
 of Records in the September, F.R. vol. 47, No. 198 at p. 45517).  /12/
 
    The significance of the "routine use" exemption remains uncertain as
 its applicability as a vehicle for disclosure has been little explored.
 See, Parks v. United States Internal Revenue Service, 618 F. 2677 (10th
 Cir. 1980);  American Federation of Government Employees v. Defense
 General Supply Center, 423 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. VA. 1976), aff'd, 573 F.
 2d 184 (4th Cir. 1978).  In the present case, if HHS's notice applies,
 as it would appear it does to the particular records relied upon as the
 source of names and home addresses, disclosure would not be permitted as
 a routine use for the reason that no contract provides that Respondent
 will disclose personal records.  Cf. General Counsel Exh. 6 Art. 3,
 Secs, 4 and 5, pp. 4-5.  If the OPM notice were applicable, then
 disclosure, as a routine use, would be authorized if the names and home
 addresses were,
 
          ". . . relevant and necessary to their (officials of recognized
       bargaining representatives) duties of exclusive representation
       concerning personnel policies, practices, and matters affecting
       working conditions."
 
    The OPM standard for disclosure as a routine use, while different,
 nevertheless, closely approximates the standard of Section 14(b)(4)(B)
 of the Statute to furnish information, ". . . necessary for full and
 proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation of subjects within the
 scope of collective bargainings." 5 U.S.C. Section 7114(b)(4)(B).
 
                       Disclosure of Home Addresses
 
    In Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), Fort Carson,
 Colorado, supra, the Authority first held that,
 
          ". . . the restrictive language in Section 7114(b)(4) of the
       Statute, limiting an agency's duty to furnish data 'to the extent
       not prohibited by law,' incorporates the Privacy Act." (17 FLRA
       No. 92, p. 4).
 
    and then held that,
 
          ". . .  The exception set forth in 5 U.S.C. Section 552a(b)(2)
       permits disclosure of Privacy Act - protected information to the
       extent that such information is 'required' to be released under
       the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  (footnote omitted).  The
       theory of the FOIA, in contrast to the Privacy Act, is that all
       records in the possession of the agencies of the Federal
       Government must be disclosed upon request unless subject to a
       specific FOIA exemption.  (footnote omitted).  Under exemption
       (b)(6) of the FOIA, an agency is allowed to withhold personnel and
       medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
       constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.  (17 FLRA
       No. 92, p. 4).
 
          "The balance to be drawn under the FOIA's (b)(6) exemption is
       one between the protection of the individual's right to privacy
       and the promotion of important public interests.  (footnote
       omitted).  In determining whether 'necessary' data under section
       7114 (b)(4) of the Statute should be disclosed to the Union, the
       Authority will balance the necessity of the data for the Union's
       purposes against the degree of intrusion on the individual's
       privacy interests caused by disclosure of the data . . . ." (17
       FLRA No. 92, p. 5).
 
    The threshold question is whether home addresses are "necessary for
 full and proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation of subjects
 within the scope of collective bargaining" (Section 14(b)(4)(B)).  Read
 literally, it would be difficult to conclude that home addresses are
 necessary for collective bargaining;  but, as Army and Air Force
 Exchange Service (AAFES), Fort Carson, Colorado, supra, demonstrates,
 the language of Section 14(b)(4)(B) consistently has been given a much
 broader construction than merely negotiating collective bargaining
 agreements;  was directly held to encompass possible grievance
 proceedings;  and, although the Authority did have to go further, nor
 did it purport to do so, I conclude that Section 14(b)(4) reaches any
 data necessary for the Union "to pursue its representational duties" (17
 FLRA No. 92, p. 6).  Although, for reasons fully set forth above, I
 strongly question the necessity of home addresses for purposes of
 negotiating collective bargaining agreements, but fully recognized that
 home addresses may be helpful;  nevertheless, I fully agree with the
 statement of the Court in Prudential Insurance Co., supra, that the
 Union needs the home addresses of members of its bargaining unit,
 
          ". . . so that exclusive bargaining representative of the
       employees may perform its broad range of statutory duties in a
       truly representative fashion and in harmony with the employees'
       desires and interests.  Because this information is therefore so
       basically related to the proper performance of the union's
       statutory duties, we believe any special showing of specific
       relevance would be superfluous." (412 F. 2d at 84).
 
    Use of bulletin boards, stewards, and the Union's publication, The
 Sentinel, while important, do not afford effective means for a union to
 communicate directly with all members of its bargaining unit in
 performing the broad range of its statutory duties.  In considering like
 requests for names and home addresses, Administrative Law Judges have
 recommended production in the following cases:  Defense Mapping Agency
 Aerospace Center, St. Louis, Missouri and National Federation of Federal
 Employees, Local 1827, Case No. 7-CA-20482 (OALJ-83-85, Judge Cappello,
 May 12, 1983);  Philadelphia Naval Shipyard and Philadelphia Metal
 Trades Council, Case No. 2-CA-40243 (OALJ-84-114, Judge Sternburg,
 September 24, 1984);  Social Security Administration, Northeastern
 Program Service Center and American Federation of Government Employees,
 Local 1760, AFL-CIO, Case No. 2-CA-30643 (OALJ-85-024, Judge Naimark,
 November 30, 1984);  and Department of the Navy, Portsmouth Naval
 Shipyard (Portsmouth, New Hampshire) and Federal Employees Metal Trades
 Council, AFL-CIO, Case No. 1-CA-40290 (OALJ-85-80, Judge Oliver, April
 25, 1985), and have denied production in the following cases:
 Department of the Air Force, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois and National
 Association of Government Employees, Local R7-23, Case No. 5-CA-40232
 (OALJ-85-72, Judge Oliver, April 9, 1985);  Farmers Home Administration
 Finance Office, St. Louis, Missouri and American Federation of
 Government Employees, Local 3354, AFL-CIO, Case No. 7-CA-30560
 (OALJ-84-109, Judge Scalzo, September 24, 1984).  In the two cases
 denying production of names and home addresses, it was found that
 alternate means of communication provided effective means of
 communicating with bargaining unit employees and, therefore, that the
 General Counsel had not established that names and home addresses were
 necessary for the purpose of Section 14(b)(4)(B).  As stated above, I
 conclude that the Union here does not have adequate alternate means of
 communicating with bargaining unit employees and that the names and home
 addresses are necessary for the Union's performance of the broad range
 of its statutory duties, and I specifically endorse and adopt the
 further statement of the Court in Prudential Insurance Co., supra, that,
 even if the Union may use the information to solicit new members,
 
          ". . . union solicitation is itself hardly an evil --
       especially where, as here, the union is already the exclusive
       bargaining representative of the employees it is soliciting" (412
       F. 2d at 85).
 
    As the Authority stated in Army and Air Force Exchange Service
 (AAFES), Fort Carson, Colorado, supra, "In determining whether
 'necessary' data under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute should be
 disclosed to the Union, the Authority will balance the necessity of the
 data for the Union's purposes against the degree of intrusion on the
 individual's privacy interests caused by disclosure of that data." I am
 well aware that three employees testified that they strongly objected to
 their home addresses being given to the Union.  The right to personal
 privacy is certainly a right deserving of scrupulous protection, but I
 do not believe the right to privacy in one's home address, in the total
 absence of any evidence of possible harassment, is a right of privacy
 entitled to protection against disclosure to the exclusive bargaining
 representative.  At the outset, I am mindful that the legislative
 history of the Privacy Act states that "The bill now prohibits Federal
 agencies from selling or renting mailing lists . . . but does not
 require names and addresses to be kept confidential . . . ."
 (Legislative History, p. 6946) (Emphasis supplied.  As Judge Oliver
 noted in Department of the Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (Portsmouth,
 New Hampshire), supra,
 
          ". . . The daily personal mail of most persons brings a steady
       barrage of unsolicited flyers, advertisements, and solicitations.
       Employees may have to spend a moment or two deciding whether to
       read the Union's newsletter or to toss it out with other unwanted
       mail.  Considering the needs of the Union to effectively
       communicate with unit employees, any intrusion on employees'
       personal privacy caused by the furnishing of home addresses to the
       Union for representational purposes is minimal and not
       unwarranted."
 
    Finally, I fully adopt the cogent, well reasoned, and wholly
 persuasive analysis of Chief Judge Winter in his dissenting opinion in
 American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1923, supra,
 where he stated, in part, as follows:
 
          The right to privacy in one's home address is an interest of
       little value.  We held in Robles v. Environmental Protection
       Agency, 484 F.2d 843 (4 Cir. 1973), that while Exemption 6 of 5
       U.S.C. Section 552(b) encompassed the names and addresses of
       homeowners residing in dwellings where uranium tailings were used
       as fill dirt, the trust of Exemption 6 was to protect things that
       'contain "intimate details of a highly personal nature.'" Id. at
       845.  Thus, although protected to some extent, disclosure of the
       names and addresses should therefore be denied only when
       disclosure would constitute a "'clearly unwarranted invasion of
       personal privacy.'" Id.  Reliance was placed on Getman v. NLRB,
       450 F.2d 670, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1971).  In Getman. law professors
       engaged in a labor voting study sought to compel the Board to
       provide them with the names and addresses of employees eligible to
       vote in certain elections.  They wished to request such employees
       to accede to an interview.  Their right to obtain the requested
       information was upheld, the court saying:
 
          (A)lthough a limited number of employees will suffer an
       invasion of privacy in losing their anonymity and in being asked
       over the telephone if they would be willing to be interviewed in
       connection with the voting study, the loss of privacy resulting
       from this particular disclosure should be characterized as
       relatively minor.  Id. at 674-75 (footnote eliminated).
 
          The commn sense of the decisions in Robles and Getman is
       readily apparent.  With rare exception, there is little privacy in
       one's name and home address.  Such information is a matter of
       public record in motor vehicle registration and licensing records,
       voting lists, and real property records.  Other sources from which
       it may often be obtained are telephone directories and city
       directories.  In short, it is the rare individual who has any real
       privacy interest in the identity of his residence.
 
                . . . .
 
 
          The union is not a mere interloper in the Social Security
       Administration Headquarters.  By the enactment of 5 U.S.C. Section
       7101, Congress has determined that labor organizations and
       collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public
       interest.' As I previously stated, this union is the certified
       collective bargaining agent.  As such, it is under a duty to
       represent all employees in the unit whether they are union members
       or not.  5 U.S.C. Section 7114(a)(1).  The necessity of direct
       communication with those it is statutorily obligated to represent
       is to me apparent.  I think it has a duty to advise its
       constituents of its activities, and it may wish to seek an
       expression of their views, by soliciting them as members or
       otherwise.  Thus I would conclude that disclosure of the addresses
       of employees it represents to the union is in the interest of the
       union and in turn in the public interest.
 
          In summary, I perceive the balance between the competing
       interests in this case to be in favor of disclosure . . . ." (712
       F. 2d at 933-934).
 
    Respondent's conduct in refusing to grant the Union's request for the
 names and home addresses of bargaining unit employees, contrary to the
 requirements of Section 14(b)(4) of the Statute, violated sections
 16(a)(1) and (8) of the Statute and further constituted a refusal to
 bargain in good faith in violation of Sections 16(a)(1) and (5) of the
 Statute.  It is, therefore, recommended that the Authority adopt the
 following:
 
                                   ORDER
 
    Pursuant to Section 2423.29 of the Rules and Regulations of the
 Federal Labor Relations Authority, 5 C.F.R. Section 2423.29, and Section
 18 of the Statute, 5 U.S.C. Section 7118, it is hereby ordered that the
 Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration,
 shall:
 
    1.  Cease and desist from:
 
          (a) Refusing and failing to furnish, upon request of American
       Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, the names and home
       addresses of all unit employees in the Atlanta Region represented
       by the National Council of SSA Field Assessment Locals.
 
          (b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
       restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise or their
       rights assured by the Statute.
 
    2.  Take the following affirmative actions in order to effectuate the
 pruposes and policies of the Statute:
 
          (a) Upon request of the American Federation of Government
       Employees, AFL-CIO, furnish it with the names and home addresses
       of all unit employees in the Atlanta Region represented by the
       National Council of SSA Field Assessment Locals.
 
          (b) Post at its facilities, in each branch or section of the
       Atlanta Region employing Field Assessment employees constituting
       the bargaining unit represented by the National Counsel of SSA
       Field Assessment Locals, copies of the attached notice of forms to
       be furnished by the Federal Labor Relations Authority. Upon
       receipt of such forms, they shall be signed by the Director of the
       Field Assessment Office, Atlanta Region, and shall be posted and
       maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous
       places, including bulletin boards and other places where notices
       to employees are customarily posted.  Reasonable steps shall be
       taken to insure that such Notices are not altered, defaced, or
       covered by any other material.
 
          (c) Pursuant to Section 2423.30 of the Authority's Rules and
       Regulations, notify the Regional Director, Region IV, Federal
       Labor Relations Authority, Suite 501, North Wing, 1776 Peachtree
       Street, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30309, in writing, within 30 days
       from the date of this Order as to what steps have been taken to
       comply herewith.
 
                                       /s/ WILLIAM B. DEVANEY
                                       Administrative Law Judge
 
    Dated:  May 31, 1985
    Washington, D.C.
 
 
 
 
                ---------------  FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
 
 
    (1) When the Authority decided, for reasons discussed more fully in
 FHAFO, to review the entire issue of the release of employees' names and
 home addresses and invited agencies, union, and interested persons to
 submit amicus briefs addressing the issue, this case was one of those
 listed as should not be accepted because it was filed one day late.  The
 Authority accepted and considered some amicus submissions that were
 received shortly after the date set in the Authority's Federal Register
 notice, including the Respondent's amicus brief.  However, we note that
 there is nothing in the disputed submission that would alter our
 decision in this matter.
 
    (2) For convenience of reference, sections of the Statute hereinafter
 are, also, referred to without inclusion of the initial "71" of the
 Statute reference, e.g., Section 7114(b)(4) will be referred to, simply
 as "Section 14(b)(4)."
 
    (3) Mr. Hassell stated that central Payroll Records on home addresses
 are not always current.  For example, he stated that when he moved from
 Atlanta to Birmingham it was 7 or 8 months before his address was
 changed on his pay slip (Tr. 85) and 1984 state taxes were still charged
 to him in Georgia (Tr. 85).
 
    (4) In NLRB v. Wyman Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969), the Supreme
 Court ordered enforced the Board's order directing the employer to
 furnish names and addresses prior to a representation election, although
 the Court severely criticized the Board's failure to follow the
 Administrative Procedures Act in issuing a legislative rule in Excelsior
 Underwear, In., 156 NLRB 1236 (1966) in total disregard for the
 requirements of the Rule making Provisions of the APA.
 
    (5) Section 10(e) provided that a labor organization which has been
 selected as the exclusive bargaining representative is entitled to act
 for and to negotiate agreements covering all employees in the unit and
 it is responsible for representing the interests of all employees in the
 unit without discrimination and without regard to labor organization
 membership.
 
    (6) See, Paragraphs 8 and 10 of the Complaint (G.C. Exh. 1(c)).
 
    (7) The only exception is "when an agency provides by a contract for
 the operation by or on behalf of the agency of a system of records to
 accomplish an agency function, the agency shall . . . cause the
 requirements of this section to be applied to such system.  For purposes
 of subsection (i) of this section any such contractor and any employee
 of such contractor . . . shall be considered to be an employee of an
 agency." 5 U.S.C. Section 552a(m).
 
    (8) It is clear that Respondent's furnishings of the names and office
 addresses had been fully consistent with the Union's initial request
 which had not specified home addresses;  however, the Union then
 clarified, or amended, its request and asked for home addresses which
 Respondent denied, as noted, pursuant to the Privacy Act and Section
 (b)(6) of the Freedom of Information Act.
 
    (9) Although this case does not involve meetings, it is interesting
 to note that the Sunshine Act provides that at meetings the agency shall
 not:  "(6) disclose information of a personal nature where disclosure
 would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." (5
 U.S.C. Section 552b(c)(6)).
 
    (10) Section 206(a) of the Senate Bill is Section (n) of the Act.
 Section 206(b) of the Senate Bill, which required removal of individual
 names and addresses upon written request, was deleted from the
 legislation as enacted.
 
    (11) It is possible that these records are covered by OPM's Notice
 (G.C. Exh. 11) which provides, in part,
 
          "Records on current Federal employees are located in the
       ?Personnel Office or other designated office of the local
       installation of the Department of Agency which currently employs
       the individual.  Where agencies determine that duplicates of these
       records need to be located in a second office, e.g., an
       administrative office closer to where the employee actually works,
       such copies are copies are covered by this system . . . ." (G.C.
       Exh. 11, Systems Location).  (Emphasis supplied).
 
    The difference, i.e., whether the HHS notices apply or whether the
 OPM notice applies, concerns the respective definitions of "routine use"
 which are not at all the same. OPM's routine uses provides, inter alia:
 
          "(j) To disclose information to officials of labor
       organizations recognized under 5 U.S.C. chapter 71 when relevant
       and necessary to their duties of exclusive representation
       concerning personnel policies, practices, and matters affecting
       working conditions." (G.C. Exh. 11, Routine Uses of Records
       Maintained in the System, Including Categories of Uses and the
       Purposes of Such Uses) (Emphases supplied).
 
    (12) Routine uses for records maintained in this system are:
 
          In the event of litigation where the defendant is (a) the
       Department, any component of the Department, or any employee of
       the Department in his or her official capacity;  (b) the United
       States where the Department determines that the claim, if
       successful, is likely to directly affect the operations of the
       Department or any of its components;  or (c) any Department
       employee in his or her individual capacity where the Justice
       Department has agreed to represent such employee, the Department
       may disclose such records as it deems desirable or necessary to
       the Department of Justice to enable that Department to present an
       effective defense, provided such disclosure is compatible with the
       purpose for which the records were collected.  (F.R. vol. 47, No.
       198, p. 45517).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 APPENDIX
 
  NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF
 THE FEDERAL
 LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE
 POLICIES OF
 CHAPTER 71 OF TITLE 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE
 LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE
 
                   WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
 
    WE WILL NOT refuse or fail to furnish, upon request of the American
 Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, the names and home
 addresses of all unit employees in the Atlanta Region represented by the
 National Council of SSA Field Assessment Locals.
 
    WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain,
 or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights assured by the
 Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.
 
    WE WILL, upon request of the American Federation of Government
 Employees, AFL-CIO, furnish it with the names and home addresses of all
 unit employees in the Atlanta Region represented by the National Council
 of SSA Field Assessment Locals.