25:0843(70)CA - Treasury, IRS and Treasury, IRS Houston District and NTEU and NTEU Chapter 222 -- 1987 FLRAdec CA



[ v25 p843 ]
25:0843(70)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:


 25 FLRA No. 70
 
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE 
 TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
 AND UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE 
 TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
 HOUSTON DISTRICT
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION 
 AND NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION, 
 CHAPTER 222
 Charging Party
 
                                            Case No. 6-CA-30144
 
                            DECISION AND ORDER
 
                         I.  Statement of the Case
 
    This unfair labor practice case is before the Authority on exceptions
 to the attached Administrative Law Judge's Decision filed by both the
 Respondent and the Charging Party.  The General Counsel and the Charging
 Party filed oppositions to the Respondent's exceptions and the
 Respondent filed an opposition to the Charging Party's exceptions.  The
 complaint in this case alleged that the Respondent violated section
 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
 Statute (the Statute) by failing and refusing to negotiate in good faith
 regarding employee parking at the Respondent's Briarpark facility and by
 refusing to negotiate concerning the payment by employees for parking
 and the reservation of parking spaces.
 
                              II.  BACKGROUND
 
    The facts are set out in the Judge's Decision.  Briefly, they
 indicate that the Respondent notified the Charging Party of a planned
 relocation of employees of the Houston District Office.  As relevant to
 this case, the relocation involved moving approximately 750 employees
 working at two separate locations to a third location, known as the
 Briarpark Office.  Following notification to the Charging Party and
 receipt of its proposals, the parties bargained and reached agreement on
 various issues pertaining to the relocation.  A separate interim
 agreement was later reached regarding employee parking at the Briarpark
 Office.  Subsequent negotiations on the parking issue resulted in
 agreement being reached on all but two of the Charging Party's
 proposals.  In their final form, these proposals provided as follows:
 
          Section 2
 
          To the extent it has legal authority to do so the Agency will
       provide these rental spaces to employees at a cost not to exceed
       the amount charged by Allright (or other parking management
       company) to administer the parking facility. To the extent the
       Agency has no legal authority to provide parking in the above
       manner the rental cost of the parking to employees will not exceed
       the cost to the Agency for securing such parking.
 
          Section 4
 
          All parking spaces not reserved for visitors parking or
       government vehicles parking will be available to bargaining unit
       employees on a first come first serve basis, except that the
       Agency may reserve spaces for the District Director and the
       Assistant District Director.
 
    The Respondent argued with regard to Section 2 that no change in
 working conditions of employees relocating to the Briarpark Office had
 occurred since the Respondent had not previously undertaken to pay for
 employee parking at the locations from which the employees moved.
 Additionally, the Respondent argued that although there are limited
 circumstances in which employee parking can be paid by virtue of an
 agency regulation, the authority to authorize such payment rests with
 the Regional Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and not
 at the district level.  Therefore, the Respondent maintained that this
 matter could not be locally negotiated.  As to Section 4, the Respondent
 essentially argued that reservation of parking spaces was outside its
 control.
 
                 III.  Administrative Law Judge's Decision
 
    The Judge found first that the Respondent was obligated to bargain
 over parking arrangements for employees since parking was a matter that
 was substantially affected by the relocation of employees to the
 Briarpark Office.  He noted that the relocation of employees was a
 change in conditions of employment that had "foreseeable and real impact
 on employees" and that the impact "was clearly more than de minimis."
 The Judge rejected the arguments made by the Respondent and found that
 the Respondent was obligated to bargain over both of the Charging
 Party's proposals.  The Judge concluded that the Respondent's failure to
 do so constituted a violation of section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the
 Statute.
 
    As a remedy, the Judge recommended that the Authority order the
 Respondent, among other things, to bargain upon request and to reach
 agreement with the Union concerning the impact of the move and office
 consolidation including, to the extent permitted by law and regulation,
 the Union's proposals concerning payment for parking and parking space
 allocation.
 
                       IV.  Positions of the Parties
 
    In its exceptions to the Judge's Decision, the Respondent argues
 that:  (1) it did not fail to bargain in good faith;  (2) the proposals
 did not concern conditions of employment of unit employees;  (3) no
 change occurred giving rise to a bargaining obligation;  (4) even if a
 change occurred, there was no impact or the impact was de minimis;  (5)
 the payment for employee parking is contrary to Federal statute;  (6)
 such payment along with the reservation of parking spaces is
 inconsistent with Government-wide regulations;  (7) payment for employee
 parking violates the agency's right to determine its budget;  and (8)
 such payment is inconsistent with the statutory requirement for an
 efficient Government.  The Respondent also excepts to the Judge's
 failure to pass on its assertion that the Charging Party's attorney
 acted improperly under the Texas Code of Professional Responsibility by
 appearing both as a witness at the unfair labor practice hearing and as
 a signatory to the post-hearing brief.  The Respondent has therefore
 requested that the Authority reverse the unfair labor practice findings
 of the Judge on this basis or, alternatively, to remand the case to the
 Judge for a redetermination of his factual findings, while discounting
 the attorney's testimony.
 
    The Charging Party excepts to the Judge's remedy.  /1/ The Charging
 Party argues that the only appropriate remedy is one which directs the
 parties to negotiate an agreement that will be given retroactive effect.
  The Respondent opposed the Charging Party's request and noted also that
 if a violation is found, the Judge's remedy should be affirmed except
 for that portion which requires the parties to reach agreement.
 
                               V.  Analysis
 
    We agree with the Judge's conclusion that the Respondent unlawfully
 refused to bargain concerning Sections 2 and 4.  We wish, however, to
 comment more specifically on certain of the Judge's findings and on
 several of the arguments raised by the Respondent.
 
    First, we find that the relocation of employees to the Briarpark
 Office constituted a change in conditions of employment of unit
 employees which gave rise to a bargaining obligation.  The Judge found
 that the impact of the relocation was clearly more than de minimis.  He
 noted in this connection that the relocation affected the transportation
 and parking facilities of employees and therefore had an impact and a
 foreseeable impact on the employees' travel arrangements to their place
 of employment.  The Respondent argues, contrary to the Judge, that
 Section 4 did not have an impact on unit employees or, if it did, the
 impact was de minimis and did not give rise to a bargaining obligation.
 
    We have recently reassessed and modified the de minimis standard
 previously used in determining whether a change in conditions of
 employment requires bargaining.  In Department of Health and Human
 Services, Social Security Administration, 24 FLRA No. 42 (1986),
 petition for review filed sub nom. American Federation of Government
 Employees, Local 1760 v. FLRA, No. 86-1702 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 17, 1986), we
 held that the facts and circumstances presented in each case will be
 carefully considered and principal emphasis will be placed on the nature
 and extent of the effect or reasonably foreseeable effect of the change
 on unit employees' conditions of employment.  We also noted that
 equitable considerations will be taken into account in balancing the
 various interests involved.
 
    The thrust of the Respondent's argument here is that the reservation
 of spaces for the director and his staff does not have an impact on
 bargaining unit employees.  However, the question is whether the effect
 or reasonably foreseeable effect of the change on unit employees was
 such as to create a bargaining obligation.  The change in this case was
 the relocation of unit employees to a new facility.  In determining that
 this change gave rise to a bargaining obligation, we note, as did the
 Judge, that the relocation was a permanent change which involved a move
 from locations where parking had been provided free of charge or, where
 a variety of parking arrangements and modes of public transportation had
 been available, to a location where such was not the case.  Unit
 employees were therefore required to adopt new transportation and/or
 parking arrangements.  Clearly, there was a concern about preserving as
 many parking spaces as possible for use by unit employees.  We therefore
 find that the effect and reasonably foreseeable effect of the change was
 such as to give rise to an obligation on the Respondent to bargain.
 
    The Respondent also argues that Sections 2 and 4 are contrary to
 Federal law and Government-wide rules and regulations.  As to Section 2,
 the Respondent claims that payment for employee parking constitutes
 reimbursement for employee commuting expenses which is inconsistent with
 5 U.S.C. Section 5704.  The Respondent also argues that such payment
 violates General Services Administration (GSA) Government-wide
 regulations in that neither the IRS nor the Department of Treasury had
 the authority to procure parking.
 
    The Judge correctly ruled that the proposal was within the duty to
 bargain.  He found, and we agree, that the Charging Party was not
 seeking to have the Respondent reimburse the employees' commuting costs.
  Rather, the Charging Party was seeking to have the Respondent provide
 free or low cost parking.  The Respondent conceded during bargaining
 with the Charging Party that there are limited circumstances in which
 the cost of employee parking can be paid as outlined in Internal Revenue
 Manual 1(14)(50).  While the Respondent argued that the authorization of
 such payment rests with IRS' Regional Commissioner, a level above the
 Houston District which itself did not have discretion to negotiate for
 payment of parking, the Judge rejected such assertion as a basis for
 refusing to bargain.  We agree. Notwithstanding any delegation of
 bargaining to parties at the local level, section 7114(b)(2) of the
 Statute provides that "(t)he duty of an agency and an exclusive
 representative to negotiate in good faith . . . shall include the
 obligation . . . to be represented at the negotiations by duly
 authorized representatives prepared to discuss and negotiate on any
 condition of employment(.)" See, for example, Department of the Army,
 Fort Greely, Alaska, 23 FLRA No. 105 (1986).
 
    As to the Respondent's assertion that it lacked authority to procure
 parking, it is noted that parking had already been procured by GSA.  The
 Charging Party's proposals concerned the payment for such spaces and a
 determination as to the number of spaces that would be available for
 bargaining unit employees.  We note, moreover, that the Comptroller
 General has determined that in certain circumstances, agencies may
 request GSA to procure space for employee parking;  further, where such
 space is procured, agencies can use appropriated funds to reimburse GSA
 for the cost of leased parking accommodations.  /2/
 
    The Respondent also argues that Section 4 is inconsistent with 41 CFR
 101.20-117-2, which the Respondent argues concerns assignment of carpool
 parking.  More particularly, the Respondent argues that the proposal
 would circumvent priority requirements for handicapped persons and those
 in carpools.  The Judge noted that this argument had not been raised
 earlier and there was no evidence to establish that there was a need for
 such priority parking at the Briarpark Office or that the Charging Party
 would have refused to set aside parking spaces for such employees.  In
 our view, the proposal, on its face, is not inconsistent with the cited
 regulation.  There is no indication in the record that the Charging
 Party intended to interfere with the application of the regulation or
 that the proposal was in any way designed to deny priority consideration
 to such groups of employees.
 
    Next, the Respondent argues that the proposal concerning paid parking
 violated management's right to determine its budget.  More particularly,
 the Respondent maintains that the proposal would prescribe the program
 and cost to be inserted in its budget and that neither the General
 Counsel nor the Charging Party offered any evidence that paying for
 parking would have the benefits needed to outweigh the increase in
 costs.
 
    In our view, the proposal does not directly interfere with the
 agency's right to determine its budget.  Under the test set forth in
 American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO and Air Force
 Logistics Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 2 FLRA 604
 (1980), enforced as to other matters sub nom. Department of Defense v.
 Federal Labor Relations Authority, 659 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
 denied sub nom. AFGE v. FLRA, 455 U.S. 995 (1982), we find that the
 proposal does not require the Respondent to include a particular program
 or operation in its budget since the Respondent had already procured
 parking spaces for use by unit employees.  Moreover, the proposal does
 not specify the dollar amount that would be absorbed by the Respondent
 and it would be impossible to determine this amount since:  (1) the
 proposal contains several options by which the cost of parking will be
 offset by the Respondent, and (2) it is not known what costs are already
 being absorbed by the Respondent for the 650 spaces which had already
 been leased by GSA.  Moreover, the Respondent's assertion that no
 compensating benefits have been demonstrated misconceives the test to be
 applied.  As the Authority stated in Wright-Patterson, supra at 608:
 "Only where an agency makes a substantial demonstration that an increase
 in costs is significant and unavoidable and is not offset by
 compensating benefits can an otherwise negotiable proposal be found to
 violate the agency's right to determine its budget under section 7106(a)
 of the Statute." The Respondent has not made such a demonstration here.
 See also Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO and Department
 of the Navy, Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, California, 25 FLRA
 No. 31 (1987), slip op. at 8.
 
    Likewise, we reject the Respondent's assertion that payment for
 parking would be inconsistent with the statutory requirement for an
 efficient Government.  The Respondent's contention does not take into
 account such considerations as attracting and maintaining a workforce
 where public transportation is not readily available and where parking
 represents costs to employees.  While it is certainly not the
 responsibility of the Respondent to transport employees to and from the
 workplace, the proposal on payment for parking is merely designed to
 offset some of the costs connected with the relocation of employees to
 the Briarpark Office.  There is no obligation to agree to the proposal;
 the obligation is to bargain, which the Respondent failed to do.
 
    Finally, regarding the Respondent's arguments concerning the conduct
 of the Charging Party's attorney under the Texas Code of Professional
 Responsibility, we note first that nothing contained in our Rules and
 Regulations operates to preclude the attorney in question from appearing
 as a witness and testifying in the instant unfair labor practice
 proceeding.  Further, our Rules and Regulations operates to preclude the
 attorney in question from appearing as a witness and testifying in the
 instant unfair labor practice proceeding.  Further, our Rules and
 Regulations grant wide discretion to Administrative Law Judges to
 determine who may testify or participate in a hearing, as well as the
 extent of such participation.  See section 2423.16 relating to the
 "Rights of Parties" at hearings and section 2423.19 concerning the
 "Duties and Powers of the Administrative Law Judge." Under the
 circumstances presented in this case, there is no basis on which to
 conclude that the Judge's determination to allow the attorney to testify
 was improper.  Moreover, the Authority is empowered to enforce the
 provisions of the Statute, not a State Code of Professional
 Responsibility.  Therefore, the Authority finds that the relief
 requested by the Respondent is not warranted.
 
                                VI.  Remedy
 
    To remedy the unlawful refusal to bargain, the Judge recommended that
 the Respondent be ordered to bargain and reach agreement concerning the
 two proposals.  The Charging Party has also requested that whatever
 agreement is reached be given retroactive effect.
 
    We find for the reasons stated in Environmental Protection Agency and
 American Federation of Government Employees, 21 FLRA No. 98 (1986), that
 a prospective bargaining order will best effectuate the purposes and
 policies of the Statute.  Such an order is an adequate remedy and does
 not restrict the parties' ability to address the effects on unit
 employees of changes already made.  Rather, such an order best affords
 the parties the flexibility to bargain freely with regard to how the
 Respondent's actions have affected unit employees, and the opportunity
 to provide retroactive application of any agreement.  See Veterans
 Administration, Washington, D.C. and Veterans Administration Medical and
 Regional Office Center, Fargo, North Dakota, 24 FLRA No. 3 (1986).
 
    As to that portion of the Judge's remedy which would order the
 parties to reach agreement, we find that such an order is inconsistent
 with section 7103(a)(12) of the Statute.  That section provides, in
 pertinent part, that collective bargaining means "the performance of the
 mutual obligation . . . to . . . bargain in a good-faith effort to reach
 agreement . . .but the obligation does not compel either party to agree
 to a proposal or to make a concession(.)" See U.S. Department of Labor,
 Washington, D.C. and U.S. Department of Labor, Region VII, Occupational
 Safety and Health Administration and Office of the Assistant Secretary
 for Administration and Management, Kansas City, Missouri, 19 FLRA No.
 102 (1985).  In the absence of agreement, either party may request
 assistance from the Federal Service Impasses Panel.
 
                             VII.  Conclusion
 
    Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations
 and section 7118 of the Statute, we have reviewed the rulings of the
 Judge made at the hearing and find that no prejudicial error was
 committed, and affirm those rulings.  We have considered the Judge's
 Decision, the positions of the parties and the entire record, and adopt
 the Judge's findings, conclusions, and recommended order as modified
 above.
 
    Therefore, we conclude that the Respondent violated section
 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute by failing to bargain with the
 Charging Party concerning its proposals related to the relocation of
 employees.
 
                                   ORDER
 
    The United States Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue
 Service and United States Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue
 Service, Houston District shall:
 
    1.  Cease and desist from:
 
    (a) Refusing to bargain with the National Treasury Employees Union
 and National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 222, the exclusive
 representative of its employees, concerning the proposals on payment for
 employee parking and reserved parking spaces, which relate to the
 relocation of employees to the Briarpark Office.
 
    (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or
 coercing employees in the exercise of their rights assured by the
 Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.
 
    2.  Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the
 purposes and policies of the Statute:
 
    (a) Upon request, bargain with the National Treasury Employees Union
 and National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 222, concerning the
 proposals on payment for employee parking and reserved parking spaces.
 
    (b) Post at its facilities at the Houston District copies of the
 attached Notice on forms to be furnished by the Federal Labor Relations
 Authority.  Upon receipt of such forms, they shall be signed by the
 District Director and shall be posted and maintained for 60 consecutive
 days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including bulletin boards and
 other places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
 Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that such Notices are not
 altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
 
    (c) Pursuant to section 2423.30 of the Authority's Rules and
 Regulations, notify the Regional Director, Region VI, Federal Labor
 Relations Authority, in writing, within 30 days from the date of this
 Order, as to what steps have been taken to comply with it.
 
    Dated, Washington, D.C., February 20, 1987.
 
                                       /s/ Jerry L. Calhoun, Chairman
                                       /s/ Henry B. Frazier III, Member
                                       /s/ Jean McKee, Member
                                       FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
 
  PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR
 RELATIONS
 AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF CHAPTER 71
 OF TITLE
 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE
 
                FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
 
                   WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
 
    WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with the National Treasury Employees
 Union and National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 222, the exclusive
 representative of our employees, concerning the proposals on payment for
 employee parking and reserved parking spaces, which relate to the
 relocation of employees to the Briarpark Office.
 
    WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain,
 or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights assured by the
 Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.
 
    WE WILL, upon request, bargain with the National Treasury Employees
 Union and National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 222, concerning the
 proposals on payment for employee parking and reserved parking spaces.
                                       (Activity)
 
    Dated:  . . .  By:  (Signature) (Title)
 
    This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date
 of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other
 material.
 
    If employees have any questions concerning this Notice or compliance
 with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Regional
 Director for the Federal Labor Relations Authority whose address is:
 Federal Office Building, 525 Griffin Street, Suite 926, Dallas, TX
 75202, and whose telephone number is:  (214) 767-4996.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -------------------- ALJ$ DECISION FOLLOWS --------------------
 
    Case No.: 6-CA-30144
 
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 
 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE and UNITED STATES 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY INTERNAL 
 REVENUE SERVICE, HOUSTON DISTRICT
    Respondents
 
                                    and
 
 NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION and 
 NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION, Chapter 222
    Charging Party
 
    William F. Burbach, Esq.
       For Respondents
 
    Robert V. Robertson, Esq.
       For Charging Party
 
    John M. Bates, Esq.
       For General Counsel, FLRA
 
    Before:  SAMUEL A. CHAITOVITZ
       Administrative Law Judge
 
                                 DECISION
 
                           Statement of the Case
 
    This is a proceeding under the Federal Service Labor-Management
 Relations Statute, 92 Stat. 1191, 5 U.S.C. Section 7101 et seq.
 (hereinafter referred to as the Statute), and the Rules and Regulations
 of the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), 5 C.F.R. Chapter XIV,
 Section 2410, et seq.
 
    An unfair labor charge was filed on February 28, 1983 and Amended on
 August 15, 1983 by National Treasury Employees Union (hereinafter called
 NTEU) and NTEU Chapter 222 alleging that U.S. Treasury Department,
 Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter called IRS) and IRS Houston
 District Office /3/ violated Sections 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute
 by failing and refusing to negotiate in good faith concerning employee
 parking at the new Briarpark Office.  Based upon the foregoing, on
 August 23, 1983, the General Counsel of the FLRA, by the Director of
 Region 6, issued a Complaint and Notice of Hearing.  Respondents filed a
 timely Answer denying that they had violated the Statute.
 
    A hearing was held before the undersigned in Houston, Texas.
 Respondents, Charging Party and General Counsel of the FLRA were
 represented and afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and
 cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence and to argue orally.  The
 parties entered into stipulations and entered joint exhibits into
 evidence.  Post hearing briefs were filed and have been fully
 considered.
 
    Based upon the entire record in this matter, the stipulations, my
 observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, and from my evaluation
 of the evidence, I make the following:
 
                             Findings of Facts
 
    At all times material herein NTEU has been the collective bargaining
 representative for a nationwide unit of IRS' professional and
 non-professional employees located in the IRS District Offices, Regional
 Offices and National Office, with certain exceptions not here relevant.
 At all times material herein, IRS and NTEU have been parties to a
 national collective bargaining agreement, herein called the NORAD,
 covering IRS' national office, and Regional and District Offices. The
 employees of the IRS Houston District Office are included within the
 nationwide collective bargaining unit and are covered by the NORAD.
 NTEU Chapter 222 is the local representative for NTEU for representing
 employees located in the IRS Houston District Office.
 
    In October, 1981, the IRS Houston District Office submitted to the
 General Services Administration (GSA) specifications for a new
 headquarters office, consolidating IRS Houston District Office
 headquarters.  A facility was located at the corner of Briarpark and
 Richmond Streets, hereinafter called the Briarpark office.
 
    In September 1982, IRS Houston District Office notified NTEU Chapter
 222 of the planned relocation of employees.  The consolidation was to
 take place in two steps.  First, about 400 employees of IRS Houston
 District Office located in the downtown Federal Building and all 350
 employees located in a second office, known as the Westpart office, were
 to be moved to the Briarpark office.  Secondly the remaining employees
 at the Federal Building were to be relocated to the Westpark office.
 /4/
 
    On September 23, 1982, NTEU Chapter 222's attorney, B. Craig Deats,
 wrote IRS Houston District Office Director Arturo Jacobs a letter
 informing him that NTEU Chapter 222 wished to negotiate regarding the
 impact and implementation of the relocation and also requesting certain
 information relating to the relocation.  On October 12, 1982, Jacobs
 responded with a letter which supplied some of the requested
 information.  With respect to parking at the Briarpark office, IRS
 Houston District Office's letter indicated that there would be parking
 for 100 vehicles for official use and visitors at the facility and that
 an additional 550 parking spaces would be available to employees on a
 rental basis with a charge of $10 to $15 per month for uncovered spaces
 and $20 to $25 per month for covered spaces.  The letter also indicated
 that a parking survey was planned to determine the demand for available
 parking spots.  With respect to bus service, the letter indicated that
 bus service was available from the downtown terminal only, with a one
 way trip taking between 45-60 minutes.
 
    After receiving the letter from IRS Houston District, on November 3,
 1982 NTEU Chapter 222 submitted 26 proposals including two, Articles 20
 and 21, which dealt with parking at the Briarpark office.  NTEU Chapter
 222's cover letter stated that the proposals were not meant "in any way
 to limit the union's ability to submit additional different proposals at
 the bargaining table (NORAD, Article 39, Section 3.C.2.e.)." /5/
 
    Representatives of NTEU Chapter 222 and IRS Houston District met on
 November 8, 1982 regarding the relocation.  The NTEU Chapter 222
 representatives asked numerous questions regarding how the Briarpark
 parking facility was going to operate since the information with respect
 to parking supplied by Respondent in its October 12, 1982 response to
 the union's request for information was incomplete.  Since the
 information supplied by IRS Houston District indicated that there would
 be a range in the rental fees charged employees for both covered and
 uncovered parking spaces, the union asked what the exact fees would be
 and whether or not they would escalate.  NTEU Chapter 222 also inquired
 as to what would happen if more employees wanted uncovered parking than
 was available, or whether there would be enough parking of any kind
 available for those employees who wanted to avail themselves of it.
 Another item of information which was requested by NTEU Chapter 222 was
 a copy of the lease between the landlord and GSA.  In addition, NTEU
 Chapter 222 requested that it be provided with the results of the
 parking survey of employees which was mentioned in IRS Houston
 District's October 12 letter. IRS Houston District's representatives
 responded that they did not have the requested information.  Therefore,
 since IRS Houston District was unable to supply the information
 requested by NTRU Chapter 222 regarding parking at Briarpark, NTEU
 Chapter 222 requested that the issue of parking be deferred until Harold
 Crowley, IRS Houston District's Facilities Management Director and a
 member of the negotiating team, briefed NTEU Chapter 222 regarding
 exactly how the parking arrangement at Briarpark would work.  IRS
 Houston District office agreed to defer the negotiation of the parking
 issue until the requested information was supplied.
 
    The parties then negotiated with respect to all other aspects of the
 relocation. Additional negotiating sessions were held on November 15 and
 16, 1982.  By the conclusion of the session on November 16, 1982,
 agreement had been reached on all issues pertaining to the relocation,
 except for the parking issues, which had been deferred.  The parties
 then agreed to execute an agreement regarding the relocation which would
 include all issues with the exception of parking.  The parties further
 agreed that after Crowley briefed NTEU Chapter 222 regarding the parking
 arrangements NTEU Chapter 222 would submit additional proposals
 regarding parking and negotiate this item as a separate issue.  Craig
 Deats, who was NTEU Chapter 222's chief spokesman, stated during the
 session that it was the union position that the entire issue of parking
 was open, including the issue of payment for parking.  Chuck Peterson,
 IRS Houston District's chief spokesman, acknowledged Deat's remark and
 agreed to follow that procedure.
 
    On November 15, 1982, Crowley in his capacity as Acting Chairman of
 the Internal Revenue Employees Association, executed a temporary
 agreement with Allright Parking, which included a fifteen-day
 termination clause.  This agreement was entered into so that the
 employees starting work at Briarpark would have on-site parking
 available.  /6/
 
    On December 6, 1982, Jacobs sent Deats the Memorandum of Agreement
 regarding the relocation of employees to the Briarpark office which
 embodied the agreements reached during the November 15th and 16th
 meetings.  Thereafter, on December 9, 1982, Deats signed the Memorandum
 of Agreement and returned it to Jacobs.  With the agreement Deats
 enclosed a cover letter which stated that he wished to emphasize that
 the parties agreed during negotiations to table all articles pertaining
 to parking at the Briarpark office with the understanding that NTEU
 Chapter 222 would submit parking proposals after receiving a briefing
 from Crowley detailing the manner in which management proposed to handle
 the parking situation.  Deats pointed out that at the time of the
 negotiations many details of the parking situation had yet to be
 resolved.  Furthermore, Deats stated that NTEU Chapter 222 still wished
 to negotiate concerning the parking arrangement prior to implementation
 of the office relocation.
 
    Thereafter, on or about January 5, 1983, Jacobs contacted Ovalle and
 asked him if he could get the union's negotiating team together.  Jacobs
 explained that IRS Houston District urgently needed to deal with
 Allright Auto Parking to manage the parking facility at Briarpark.  The
 parties then met on January 6, 1983.  At this session, IRS Houston
 District provided some incomplete data pertaining to the employee
 parking survey.  The results of this survey indicated that the demand
 for parking spaces at Briarpark far exceeded the spaces that were going
 to be available, particularly with respect to uncovered parking.  The
 parties then proceeded to negotiate regarding parking proposals which
 IRS Houston District presented.  Eventually, the negotiators reached an
 interim agreement regarding parking at Briarpark.  The interim agreement
 provided that one flat rate fee would be charged for all parking spaces,
 both covered and uncovered.  It was further agreed that the amount of
 the fee would be $20 and that $15 of this amount would go to the
 landlord and $5 would go to Allright.  The agreement also provided that
 all parking would be on a first come first serve basis, except for 14
 parking spaces which would be reserved for the District Director and his
 staff.  Finally, Respondent agreed to provide a policeman at starting
 and quitting time in order to alleviate traffic problems.  The agreement
 was interim in nature.  NTEU Chapter 222 made it clear that it intended
 to submit proposals for a permanent parking arrangement very shortly,
 and the District Director assured NTEU Chapter 222 that there was an
 urgent need for the interim agreement so that IRS Houston District could
 contract with Allright.  Ovalle made it clear that the agreement was
 interim in nature and that NTEU Chapter 222 would submit proposals for a
 permanent agreement shortly.  IRS Houston District agreed that the
 agreement was an interim one /7/ and would only remain in effect until a
 permanent parking agreement was arrived at.
 
    On January 17, 1983, Ovalle gave Labor Relations Specialist Dick
 Wallace 11 parking proposals.  On January 26, 1983, the parties met to
 negotiate a permanent parking agreement for the Briarpark office.  At
 this session, agreement was reached regarding all of the NTEU Chapter
 222's proposals except for articles two, four, and seven.  Article two
 provided as follows:
 
          Parking space will be provided to employees at Briarpark on a
       rental basis.  The cost to employees for rental of parking spaces
       at the Briarpark facility will not exceed the amount charged by
       All-Rite (or other parking management company) to administer the
       parking facility.
 
    Article four provided as follows:
 
          No employee, whether within or without the bargaining unit will
       be provided with free or reduced-rate parking, nor with a reserved
       space, unless all employees are provided with same.
 
    IRS Houston District took the position at the January 26, 1983
 bargaining session with respect to the proposed article two that it
 could not agree because under General Service Administration regulations
 it could not pay for employee parking.  With respect to article four it
 took the position that a section of the space handbook portion of the
 Internal Revenue Manual provided that Respondent could reserve up to 10
 percent of available parking spaces for management.  IRS Houston
 District proposed that in this instance it reserve 14 spaces for the
 District Director and his staff rather than the entire 10 percent.  NTEU
 Chapter 222 did not agree.  On January 27, 1983, Ovalle had a
 conversation with Wallace during which Wallace again reiterated the
 position, regarding union proposal number two, that IRS Houston District
 could not pay for employee parking under GSA regulations.  In regard to
 proposal number four pertaining to the reservation of spaces, Wallace
 stated that it was nonnegotiable the way it was written.  During this
 conversation, Ovalle also again requested a copy of the lease agreement
 between GSA and the landlord for the Briarpark facility.  On or about
 January 31, 1983, Deats also called Wallace in an effort to clarify
 management's position regarding the parking issues.  In regard to the
 payment for employee parking issue, Wallace stated that he knew of no
 specific authority that allowed Respondent to pay for employee parking.
 In regard to the reservation of spaces issue, Wallace stated that the
 NTEU Chapter 222 proposal was of questionable negotiability since
 management had the right under the Internal Revenue Manual to reserve up
 to 10 percent of the spaces for managers and that he felt that IRS had a
 management right to reserve spaces for managers.  However, when Deats
 inquired as to whether IRS Houston District was declaring the proposal
 to be nonnegotiable Wallace declared that this was not the case and he
 was just saying there was some question.  Deats indicated that he felt
 that article four could be redrafted to meet some of Wallace's
 objections.
 
    Thereafter, on or about February 2, 1983, Ovalle presented Wallace
 with new proposals regarding union proposals two, four, and seven.
 Ovalle also indicated to Wallace that he wished to schedule another
 negotiating session as soon as possible in order to bring the
 negotiations to a conclusion.  The new proposal regarding the payment
 for employee parking provided:
 
          To the extent it has legal authority to do so the agency will
       provide these rental spaces to employees at a cost not to exceed
       the amount charged by Allright (or other parking management
       company) to administer the parking facility.  To the extent the
       agency has no legal authority to provide parking in the above
       manner the rental cost of parking to employees will not exceed the
       cost to the agency for securing such parking.
 
    The new proposal regarding the reservation of spaces provided:
 
          All parking spaces not reserved for visitors parking or
       government vehicles parking will be available to bargaining unit
       employees on a first come first serve basis, except that the
       agency may reserve spaces for the District Director and the
       Assistant District Director.
 
    A second negotiating session regarding the issue of parking at
 Briarpark was then scheduled for February 10, 1983.  At the opening of
 the session, Respondent's negotiators presented the union with the
 portion of the Briarpark lease agreement which pertained to parking.
 /8/ Ovalle recognized after examination of the portion of the lease
 which related to parking that some of the information regarding parking
 which had been submitted in IRS Houston District's October 12, 1982
 response to NTEU Chapter 222's request for information was inconsistent
 with the terms of the lease, such as the amount of rental fees to be
 charged.  Ovalle also observed that certain other items of information
 which NTEU Chapter 222 had requested and which IRS Houston District had
 claimed it did not possess at the time of the relocation negotiations in
 November 1982, such as escalation of the rental fees, were covered in
 the lease.  During the negotiating session, IRS Houston District took
 the position, with respect to the union's new proposal relating to
 payment for employee parking, that under GSA regulations IRS could not
 pay for employee parking.  With respect to the new proposal regarding
 reservation of spaces, IRS Houston District stated that it could not
 agree to the proposal because this was a matter which was reserved to
 the landlord and was therefore a matter outside of IRS Houston
 District's control.  Also at this session NTEU Chapter 222 submitted a
 written request for six items of information relating to the parking
 situation at Briarpark.  The first item requested was a copy of the
 specific law or statute which prohibits GSA or any other Federal agency
 from paying for employee parking.  In response to this question, IRS
 Houston District's representatives admitted that a section of the
 Internal Revenue Manual gave the IRS Regional Commissioner the power to
 pay for employee parking.  However, IRS Houston District's negotiators
 stated that the Regional Commissioner would not pay for employee
 parking.  The second item of information which was requested was a copy
 of the tentative agreement between IRS Houston District and Allright
 parking.  IRS Houston District's representatives replied that as soon as
 they obtained a copy of the agreement they would provide it.  The third
 item of information requested IRS Houston District to clarify what
 responsibility it had or GSA had for parking spaces which were not
 rented.  Crowley responded that if spaces were not rented they would
 revert to the landlord.  The fourth item requested that IRS Houston
 District provide a copy of any agreement whereby the landlord granted to
 an employee the right to solicit or reserve a parking space.  IRS
 Houston District's representatives answered this question by stating
 that there was no agreement regarding this matter and that the right
 rested with the landlord.  The fifth item of information requested a
 copy of the agreement between GSA and the landlord whereby GSA agreed to
 pay for the 100 visitor and official vehicle spaces.  IRS Houston
 District agreed to provide a copy of the agreement if it succeeded in
 obtaining one.  Item number six asked if the NTEU Chapter 222 could
 negotiate directly with the landlord to administer the 550 employee
 parking spaces.  IRS Houston District's negotiators indicated they would
 get back to NTEU Chapter 222 regarding this item of information.
 Following the negotiating session, Ovalle called Douglas Tollett, one of
 the owners of the Briarpark office, and during this conversation Tollett
 informed Ovalle that contrary to the information he had been given
 during the negotiating session if parking spaces were not rented they
 would not revert to the landlord.
 
    On February 16, 1983, Ovalle called Wallace to arrange for another
 negotiating session for February 22, 1983.  Following Ovalle's call to
 Wallace, Deats received a phone call from IRS Houston District's chief
 spokesman, Peterson.  In this conversation, Peterson stated that IRS
 Houston District was more or less set in its position on the remaining
 proposals and he was not sure there would be much movement at another
 negotiating session.  Peterson reaffirmed that IRS did have the
 discretion at the regional level to authorize payment for employee
 parking but that such authority existed at the regional level and so IRS
 Houston District lacked the discretion to negotiate at the district
 level.  Deats replied that there was a national bargaining agreement and
 a national unit and that Peterson was negotiating for IRS.  He pointed
 out that the only reason they were negotiating at the local level was
 that the collective bargaining agreement set up that procedure.  /9/ In
 regard to the reservation of spaces issue, Peterson stated that IRS
 Houston District had no discretion to negotiate regarding this issue
 because the landlord had ultimate control over whether or not spaces
 would be reserved.  Deats replied that IRS Houston District had
 discretion to ask the landlord to reserve spaces and that he did not
 believe the landlord would reserve any spaces unless so requested.
 Deats then stated that he felt there was room for movement and suggested
 that the parties meet again.  Peterson replied once again that he felt
 the positions were firmly fixed.  Thereupon Deats indicated that even if
 the positions were fixed as long as IRS Houston District was not
 declaring the union's proposals to be nonnegotiable the parties had to
 meet again for the purpose of getting mediation and arranging impasse
 procedures.  At that point, Deats and Peterson agreed to hold another
 negotiating session on February 22, 1983.  At the start of the February
 22, 1983 negotiating session some remaining problems with respect to
 articles five and seven were resolved.  The parties then turned their
 attention to resolution of article two, payment for employee parking,
 and article four, reservation of parking spaces.  With respect to
 article two, IRS Houston District adopted the position initially that it
 had no discretion to negotiate the payment of employee parking at the
 district level since that authority rested at the regional level.  Deats
 reiterated the NTEU Chapter 222 position that there was a national
 bargaining unit and that IRS was obligated to have negotiators at the
 bargaining table who could negotiate for it.  At that point, Wallace
 articulated a new position which had not been raised in any previous
 bargaining session.  He stated that he thought there might not be an
 obligation to negotiate concerning the payment of parking because there
 had been no change as to paid parking.  Wallace explained that this
 position was based upon the fact that IRS Houston District had never
 undertaken the obligation to pay for employee parking at the downtown
 office or at the Westpark office.  Deats replied that there were
 definitely changes regarding the employment conditions of bargaining
 unit employees.  With respect to article four, IRS Houston District took
 the position that it needed to reserve spaces for the District
 Director's staff so that if the District Director wanted to meet with
 his Division Chief and that Division Chief was in another office he
 could find a parking space without any difficulty.  Deats responded by
 saying that he was not sure that need outweighed the need of employees
 to have parking spaces available.  At that point, IRS Houston District
 took the position that in any event since the building owner controlled
 the parking lot and made the decision regarding whether or not to
 reserve spaces that IRS Houston District did not have the discretion to
 negotiate regarding article four.  Deats replied that it was his
 understanding of the law that IRS Houston District was obligated to
 negotiate if it had discretion to do so, and in this instance Respondent
 had the discretion to request the landlord to reserve spaces or not to
 reserve spaces.  The parties then recessed the negotiating session while
 they took a lunch break.  When the negotiators returned, Wallace
 informed the NTEU Chapter 222 negotiators that after much soul searching
 they had decided that there had been no change regarding the payment of
 parking and therefore they would not negotiate regarding the NTEU
 Chapter 222's proposal.  IRS Houston District negotiators also took the
 position that they were not going to negotiate regarding the issue of
 reservation of spaces.  Also, at this negotiating session, at Deats'
 request, IRS Houston District provided the NTRU Chapter 222 with a copy
 of the Internal Revenue Manual, section 482(2)(a), which authorized IRS
 to pay for employee parking at the level of the Regional Commissioner.
 This section provides as follows:
 
          Vehicle parking may be provided for employee use only after
       official use requirements have been met and when it is determined
       by the Regional Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner (RM) for
       National Office installations, to be necessary to the operational
       effectiveness of the Service.  This includes necessary parking
       requirements for executive personnel and persons who are assigned
       unusual hours as authorized in Temporary FPMR P-65.  This
       determination may be designated to District Directors and Service
       Center Directors.
 
    In addition, at this session, IRS Houston District provided the NTEU
 Chapter 222 with a copy of the agreement between the Internal Revenue
 Employees Association and Allright Auto Parks, Inc.  The date on the
 agreement was November 15, 1982, and the agreement was signed by
 Crowley, as Acting Chairman of the Association. Deats pointed out that
 the date on the agreement indicated that it had been entered into prior
 to January 6, 1983, when NTEU Chapter 222 agreed to the interim parking
 agreement on the basis of the District Director's assurance to Ovalle
 that such an agreement was necessary in order to allow IRS Houston
 District to contract with Allright.
 
    Following the conclusion of the February 22, 1983 negotiating
 session, the union and Respondent exchanged position letters regarding
 their respective versions of what had taken place during the
 negotiations.  NTEU Chapter 222's letter, dated February 23, 1983 stated
 that at the last negotiation session IRS Houston District "declared that
 it had no obligation to negotiate the remaining two proposals placed on
 the table by NTEU . . . " The letter asserted that management had stated
 that it had no obligation to negotiate concerning payment of employee
 parking because the agency "is not altering that practice with regard to
 parking at Briarpark . . . " Further, the letter asserts, that IRS
 Houston District's team stated that "it had no obligation to negotiate
 the second union proposal, dealing with the agency's reservation of 14
 spaces for upper level managers, because the agency cannot control the
 reservation of spaces at the facility since such control is left with
 the lessor . . . . " The letter advised to IRS Houston District that an
 unfair labor practice had been filed and that if IRS feels the letter
 mistates its position, it should so advise NTEU Chapter 222.
 
    By letter Dated March 16, 1983, IRS Houston District responded to the
 February 23, 1983 letter.  The letter states in part:
 
          The position of the Agency regarding NTEU proposals on
       Briarpark Office parking was misstated in your February 23,
       letter. To clarify the matter, the Agency's position regarding its
       bargaining obligation is summaried below:
 
          NTEU Proposal:  "To the extent it has legal authority to do so,
       the Agency will provide these rental spaces at a cost not to
       exceed the amount charged by Allright (or other parking management
       company) to administer the parking facility.  To the extent the
       Agency has no legal authority to provide parking in the above
       manner the rental cost of the parking to employees will not exceed
       the cost to the Agency for securing such parking."
 
          Agency Position:  (1) The Agency does not currently pay nor has
       it previously undertaken the financial obligation of paying for
       employee parking at its Downtown and Westpark Offices.  Therefore,
       no change in working conditions has occurred or is proposed for
       those employees relocating to the Briarpark Office.  (2) There
       arelimited circumstances in which the cost of employee parking can
       be paid by the Agency as outoined in Internal Revenue Manual (IRM)
       1(14)50.  A copy of this provision was furnished to NTEU during
       negotiations. The authority to authorize such payment rests with
       the IRS Regional Commissioner.
 
          It is our position that the delegated authority to negotiate a
       local agreement does not supersede this delegation of authority,
       and therefore, the Houston District cannot locally negotiate such
       payment.
 
          NTEU Proposal:  "All parking spaces not reserved for visitors
       parking or government vehicles parking will be available to
       bargaining unit employees on a first come first-serve basis,
       except that the Agency may reserve spaces for the District
       Director and the Assistant District Director."
 
          Agency Position:  This proposal deals with a matter outside of
       the control of the Agency.  The lease agreement between General
       Services Administration (GSA) and Berne Associates clearly
       specifies the retained right of the lessor to designate employee
       and guest parking.
 
                     Discussion and Conclusions of Law
 
    When an employer makes a change in conditions of employment, even
 when it need not bargain about the change itself, it must bargain about
 the means for implementing the change and the reasonably foreseeable
 impact upon the employees, so long as any such impact is more than de
 minimis.  Cf. United States Department of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol,
 Tobacco, and Firearms, Washington, D.C. and Central Region, 16 FLRA No.
 73 (1984).  In the subject case the consolidation of the IRS District
 Office and the relocation of the facilities and employees from the
 downtown Federal Building and Westpark to Briarpark, was such a change
 in employment conditions that had foreseeable and real impact on
 employees.  This impact was clearly more than de minimis.  Those
 employees moving from Westpark were moving from a facility where they
 had parking provided at no expense to them and those moving from the
 Federal Building were moving from a facility that had extensive bus
 service and a variety of daily, weekly and monthly parking facilities
 available in the area.  The Briarpark office was a substantial distance
 from both the Federal Building and Westpark offices, had only bus
 transportation from downtown Houston and had a very limited variety of
 parking arrangements available in the vicinity of the Briarpark office.
 Thus the moving of employees to the new facility would foreseeably, and
 in fact did, have an impact on the employees' travel arrangements to
 their place of employment.  In these circumstances I conclude that the
 parking arrangement that is available to the employees is a matter about
 which IRS Houston District was obliged to bargain.  It was a matter that
 was substantially affected by the move of the employees.
 
    NTEU Chapter 222 made a number of proposals concerning the impact of
 the move and the parties reached agreement on all but two.  These two
 are the subject of this proceeding and in the final form, as submitted
 by the NTEU Chapter 222, were:  /10/
 
          Section 2
 
          To the extent it has legal authority to do so the Agency will
       provide these rental spaces to employees at a cost not to exceed
       the amount charged by Allright (or other parking management
       company) to administer the parking facility.  To the extent the
       Agency has no legal authority to provide parking in the above
       manner the rental cost of the parking to employees will not exceed
       the cost to the Agency for securing such parking.
 
          Section 4
 
          All parking spaces not reserved for visitors parking or
       government vehicles parking will be available to bargaining unit
       employees on a first come first serve basis, except that the
       agency may reserve spaces for the District Director and the
       Assistant District Director.
 
    During this course of bargaining concerning Section 2 and its
 predecessors, /11/ IRS Houston District first contended that it would
 violate GSA or other regulations for IRS Houston District to pay for
 employee parking spaces.  Only after repeated requests from NTEU Chapter
 222 did IRS Houston District at the February 10, 1983 meeting, refer the
 union to Internal Revenue Manual, which authorizes the Regional
 Commissioner to determine whether to pay for the employee parking.  In
 its final response to the proposal IRS Houston District, in its March
 16, 1983 letter, explained that it would not bargain because the
 "agency" had not paid for employee parking and therefore there had been
 no change in working conditions when the employees were relocated to the
 Briarpark office.  Further the IRS Houston District Office contended
 that the IRM only authorized payment for employee parking in limited
 circumstances, that this determination rests with the IRS Regional
 Commissioner and that the "delegated authority to negotiate a local
 agreement does not supersede this delegation . . . and therefore the
 Houston District cannot locally negotiate such payment."
 
    It is concluded that IRS Houston District failed and refused to
 bargain in good faith with NTEU Chapter 222 concerning the provision of
 paid parking for employees transferred to the Briarpark Office.  In this
 regard I rely inter alia, upon the fact that initially IRS Houston
 District originally took the position that it was not able to agree to
 the proposal because IRS could not lawfully pay for employee parking and
 then, later during bargaining, switched reasons and stated that it would
 not bargain about paying for employee parking spaces because there had
 been no change in working conditions with respect to paying for employee
 parking and because IRS Houston District did not have authority to agree
 to pay for such parking, that such authority lay with the Regional
 Commissioner.  /12/
 
    These final reasons relied upon by IRS Houston District did not
 justify its refusal to bargain concerning the NTEU Chapter 222 proposal
 concerning the payment for employee parking.  As discussed above, as a
 result of the transferring of employees from the two offices to the
 Briarpark Office there was a substantial impact on the employees.  They
 were affected by the move with respect to the availability of parking
 and public transportation.  The test is the impact upon the employees,
 not whether the employer who effected the underlying change subsequently
 does anything differently.  Thus it is irrelevant that IRS Houston
 District had never paid for employee parking.  The determining factor is
 that the change, the move, had impact on employees, or would foreseeably
 have an impact on employees.  However, it is noted, IRS Houston District
 was, through GSA, etc., setting new parking arrangements.  Thus it is
 clear, as a result of the move, the employees were affected and the
 provision of paid parking facilities was one way of softening the impact
 of the move on the employees.  /13/
 
    Similarly, the IRS Houston District contention that it could not
 bargain about the paid parking proposal because the discretion to pay
 for employee parking was placed with the Regional Commissioner and that
 is a level above the IRS Houston District Office, does not justify its
 refusal to negotiate.  The NTEU recognition is for a nationwide unit,
 but NTEU and IRS, agreed in Article 39 Section 3 of the NORAD that where
 there is a change affecting one location, the parties will bargain at
 the local level concerning the change.  Both parties, at the national
 level, agreed to delegate to their local representatives the authority
 to bargain concerning the local changes.  Such an arrangement is common
 and sensible because it permits both sides to delegate the authority to
 bargain to representatives that have the most knowledge and
 understanding of the local office and changes.  However, it is clear
 that the negotiators are bargaining as representatives of their
 respective national organizations.  Both sides, by the NORAD, therefore
 agree to delegate to their local representatives adequate authority to
 negotiate concerning all relevant matters.  In such circumstances IRS
 can not, after agreeing to local negotiations for local changes,
 delegate the necessary authority to its local representatives.
 Similarly it can not require the local NTEU representative to locate and
 identify the appropriate level at which to bargain concerning each
 different proposal depending upon the level at which IRS, internally,
 delegated the discretion to negotiate the matters involved.  Such an
 arrangement not only clearly violates the IRS' contractual undertaking,
 but it would totally frustrate any reasonable collective bargaining
 relationship.  IRS Houston District, as the local representative, was
 responsible for either making sure that either it had the delegated
 authority from the Regional Commissioner to negotiate concerning the
 payment for employment parking or that the Regional Commissioner was
 represented at the bargaining.  Accordingly IRS Houston District is not
 permitted to refuse to bargain about payment for employee parking
 because the discretion to pay lies with Regional Commissioner.
 
    Respondents contend that the payment for employee parking by IRS is
 nonnegotiable because it would obligate the IRS to reimburse employees
 for increased commuting costs.  See American Federation of Government
 Employees, AFL-CIO and General Services Administration, 9 FLRA No. 108
 (1982) and National Treasury Employees Union and Department of the
 Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, 9 FLRA No. 88 (1982) and National
 Federation of Federal Employees, Local 29 and U.S. Army Engineer
 District, Kansas City, Missouri, 13 FLRA No. 4 (1983).  These cases are
 inapposite with respect to the subject case.  NTEU Chapter 222 is
 requesting that management provide free or low priced parking for
 employees, not that it reimburse employees for commuting costs.  The IRM
 specifically recognized that IRS can, in certain situations provide free
 or reduced rate parking.  Further the final proposal was phrased in
 terms that IRS will provide the parking spaces to the extent permitted
 by law or at a cost not to exceed the amount charged by the management
 company, to the extent IRS has the authority to do so.  Thus both the
 subject of the proposal and the language of the proposal were negotiable
 and IRS Houston District was obligated under the Statute to bargain with
 NTEU Chapter 222 concerning its pay parking proposal.  Cf. United States
 Department of Labor, Case No. 7-CA-40017(1)(2)(3) and (4), OALJ 85-011
 (November 14, 1984) and the cases cited therein.
 
    Respondents' further contention that the pay parking proposal was
 nonnegotiable because GSA regulations provided that only GSA could
 secure parking and IRS had no such authority, is rejected.  The proposal
 did not involve IRS securing or going out and leasing space, but rather
 that IRS pay for the spaces already leased by GSA.  Hence the proposal
 sought IRS' agreement to pay (in whole or in part) for spaces already
 leased by GSA.  /14/ Similarly I reject the contention that this subject
 proposal was nonnegotiable because it interfered with the IRS' right to
 determine its own budget.  In effect it is contended that because the
 proposal would cost money, it inters with the budget determination.
 /15/ A great many proposals that unions traditionally make agencies
 agree to cost money.  Cf. American Federation of Government Employees,
 AFL-CIO and Air Force Logistics Command Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
 Ohio, 2 FLRA 604 (1980).  Finally all the other various arguments made
 Respondents to justify its refusal to bargain about the pay parking
 proposal are rejected.
 
    With respect to the proposal concerning assignment of parking spaces,
 NTEU Chapter 222 had a real interest in assuring that the maximum number
 of spaces were available for employees.  Thus for all the reasons set
 forth in connection with the pay parking proposal it is concluded that
 the assignment of parking spaces proposal deals with conditions of
 employment and deals with an appropriate subject of bargaining.  See
 Veterans Administration Medical Center, Northport, N.Y., Case No.
 2-CA-793, OALJ 82-63 (1982) and the analysis therein.  Respondents
 contend that the parking assignment proposal violates 41 C.F.R.
 101-20.117-2 which sets forth parking priorities for the handicapped and
 to encourage car pools.  The record fails to establish that these
 matters were even raised, that there were in fact handicapped employees
 or car pools or that NTEU Chapter 222 would not have agreed to setting
 aside parking spaces for such employees.  In the absence of any showing
 that there were any employees in the priority categories, it can not be
 concluded that the proposal violated any government wide regulation.
 
    Finally IRS Houston District contends that the reservation of parking
 spaces was solely within the control of the lessor and that therefore
 IRS Houston District did not have the authority to agree to the
 proposal.  During negotiations NTEU Chapter 222 representative Deats
 specifically proposed that the proposal could be changed to provide IRS
 Houston District would ask to have the parking places not be assigned.
 Further whether the 10 or 14 or none of the 550 spaces were specifically
 assigned would be of no real interest to the lessor, rather it appears
 that the spaces that were assigned, were assigned at the request of IRS
 Houston District.  Thus it is clear that IRS Houston District was being
 asked to agree only to what it could agree to and to use its best
 efforts to achieve what was agreed to.
 
    Finally Respondents contend that NTEU Chapter 222 did not, in light
 of its overall conduct, bargain in good faith and therefore relieved IRS
 Houston District from its obligation to bargain in good faith.  The
 record establishes just the contrary.  NTEU Chapter 222 appeared eager
 to negotiate and bargain concerning the impact and implementation of the
 move.  It tried to cooperate and meet when convenient for IRS Houston
 District.  NTEU Chapter 222 made proposals and new proposals and agreed
 to a long number of items.  However, it was continually frustrated in
 its attempts to obtain from IRS Houston District various information and
 documents relating to the parking arrangements and needs.  NTEU Chapter
 222 agreed to meet and agreed to an interim arrangement concerning
 parking because IRS Houston District stated it needed such an agreement.
  Nevertheless NTEU Chapter 222 continued to be frustrated in obtaining
 information and in getting IRS Houston District to bargain about the two
 outstanding parking proposals.  Instead IRS Houston District had
 continued to change its reasons for refusing to negotiate concerning the
 two parking proposals in question.
 
    In light of all of the foregoing, I conclude that Respondents failed
 and refused to bargain in good faith with NTEU Chapter 222 concerning
 the two parking proposals, and thereby violated Sections 7116(a)(1) and
 (5) of the Statute.
 
    Because the changes affecting employees were the result of the move
 and involved the establishment of a new parking system, rather than the
 changing of an existing system, I conclude that neither a status quo
 ante nor a reimbursement remedy would be appropriate.  Cf.  United
 States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
 Firearms, Washington, D.C. and the Central Region, 16 FLRA No. 74
 (1984).
 
    Having concluded that Respondents violated Sections 7116(a)(1) and
 (5) of the Statute, I recommend that the Authority issue the following:
 
                                   ORDER
 
    Pursuant to Section 2423.29 of the Federal Labor Relations
 Authority's Rules and Regulations and Section 7118 of the Statute, the
 Authority hereby Orders, that the United States Department of the
 Treasury, Internal Revenue Service and United States Department of the
 Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Houston District, shall:
 
    1.  Cease and desist from:
 
          (a) Failing and refusing, upon request, to bargain with
       National Treasury Employees Union and National Treasury Employees
       Union Chapter 222, the exclusive collective bargaining
       representatives of its employees, concerning the impact and
       implementation of the consolidation and move of the Houston
       District, including, to the extent permitted by law and
       regulation, National Treasury Employees Union Chapter 222's
       proposals involving payment for parking and parking space
       allocations.
 
          (b) In any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or
       coerce any employee in the exercise of rights assured by the
       Statute.
 
    2.  Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the
 purpose and policies by the Statute.
 
          (a) Upon request bargain and reach agreement with National
       Treasury Employees Union and National Treasury Employees Union
       Chapter 222, concerning the impact of the move and consolidation
       of the Houston District, including, to the extent permitted by law
       and regulation, National Treasury Employees Union Chapter 222's
       proposals involving payment for parking and parking space
       allocations.
 
          (b) Post at its facilities in the Houston District copies of
       the attached Notice on forms to be furnished by the Federal Labor
       Relations Authority.  Upon receiving such forms, they shall be
       signed by an appropriate official of the Respondents and shall be
       posted and maintained by such official for 60 consecutive days
       thereafter, in conspicuous places, including bulletin boards and
       all other places where notices to employees are customarily
       posted.  Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that such
       notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by other material.
 
          (c) Pursuant to Section 2423.30 of the Authority's Rules and
       Regulations, notify the Regional Director, Region VI, in writing,
       within 30 days from the date of this Order, as to what steps are
       being taken to comply herewith.
 
                                       /s/ SAMUEL A. CHAITOVITZ
                                       Administrative Law Judge
 
    Dated:  December 24, 1984
    Washington, DC
 
 
 
 
 
                ---------------  FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
 
 
 
    (1) In both its post-hearing brief and its Opposition to Respondent's
 Exceptions, the Charging Party requested that it be awarded attorney
 fees and costs in accordance with the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5
 U.S.C. Section 504 (EAJA), and the Authority's Rules and Regulations.
 The Judge did not rule upon this request, and his failure to do so was
 not excepted to.  Therefore, this issue is not properly before us in
 this proceeding.  We do note, however, that our regulations provide that
 awards of attorney fees under the EAJA are available only to a
 respondent, other than the United States, who prevails against the
 General Counsel in an unfair labor practice proceeding.  The Charging
 Party in this case clearly was not the respondent.  See United States
 Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service and Internal
 Revenue Service, Austin District, 23 FLRA No. 100 (1986), petition for
 review filed, No. 86-1712 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 1986).
 
    (2) See unpublished Comptroller General Decision B-162021 (July 6,
 1977);  55 Comp. Gen. 1197 (1976);  and 49 Comp. Gen. 476 (1970).
 
    (3) IRS and IRS Houston District will hereinafter be referred to,
 collectively, as Respondents.
 
    (4) On or about October 14, 1982 GSA signed a lease with the owners
 of the Briarpark office, which provided that the landlord would make 650
 parking spaces available for official, guest and employee use.  514
 spaces were to be provided at the Briarpark office and 136 were to be
 within 3 blocks of the office.  The lease provided that the spaces for
 employees was to be paid through an employee association and, for the
 first two years, covered spaces were to cost $20 per month and uncovered
 spaces were to cost $10 per month.  For the second five years covered
 spaces were to cost $30 per month and uncovered spaces were to cost $20
 per month.
 
    (5) Article 39, Section 3.C.2.e. provides:
 
          No new proposals nor changes in the substance of the original
       proposals shall be submitted by either party after the first day
       of negotiations;
 
    (6) Crowley contends that he informed Union President Tony Ovalle of
 the arrangements with Allright during a November 15, 1982 meeting of
 employees.  Ovalle denies this information was disseminated at the
 November 15 meeting.  In this regard I credit Ovalle because his version
 is more consistent with the surrounding circumstances and subsequent
 events than is Crowley's.
 
    (7) Although Respondents' witnesses at hearing confirmed that the
 agreement reached on January 6 was an interim agreement, they testified
 that they did not expect to receive additional proposals from the union
 at a later date.  Rather, they apparently thought that the union team
 merely wanted to get the "approval" of Deats, the union attorney, before
 formalizing the agreement -- i.e., reducing it to writing.  At the same
 time, however, the Respondents' witnesses admitted that the union did
 not in any way indicate during the session that the terms of the interim
 agreement would bind them, or that final negotiations would be limited
 to topics not covered by the interim agreement.  Respondents' witnesses
 admitted that there were in fact no limits on the union's rights in
 negotiating a final parking agreement.  It is thus unclear upon what the
 IRS Houston District's team based its assumption that the negotiations
 were more or less completed, especially since it had not yet provided
 NTRU Chapter 222 with all the requested information concerning parking.
 In this regard it is noted that the parties subsequently met to discuss
 Union proposals concerning parking, with no apparent protest by IRS
 Houston District that the parking issues had been settled.
 
    (8) Ovalle had already obtained a copy of that portion of the lease
 several days earlier from GSA because his previous requests that
 Respondent submit the lease to the union had not resulted in production
 of the document.
 
    (9) Article 39 of the NORAD provides, in part:
 
          Section 3
 
          A.  The Employer will give the NTEU National President advance
       notice of any proposed changes in the conditions of bargaining
       unit employees employment.  Normally the Employer will provide
       three weeks notice of such changes and the Union will make any
       proposals it intends to make before the end of the notice period.
       The Employer will furnish notice to the National President either
       by certified mail or by hand delivery.
 
          B.  1.  Where the Employer proposes to make a change in the
       conditions of employment that is limited just to one appointing
       office, (e.g., district, region, headquarters) the notice
       described in Section 3A above may be given to the local chapter
       president or joint council chairperson.  This does not include the
       right to give the local offices notice of region-wide changes or
       changes implemented locally, but on a varied basis because the
       local management officials were given discretion to make changes
       within certain boundaries.  Furthermore, this right to give local
       notice does not apply to any pilot projects or studies being
       conducted in just one appointing office.
 
    (10) These are the proposals in their final forms.  During the course
 of negotiations the proposals changed in form and substance.
 
    (11) In its earlier forms Section 2 provided that IRS Houston
 District will provide the parking spaces at no substantial charge to the
 employees.
 
    (12) It must be noted that after NTEU Chapter 222 changed the pay
 parking proposal to meet the objection that it would be unlawful for the
 agency to pay for employee parking, by adding that any such payment
 would be to the extent permitted by law, IRS Houston District changed
 the grounds for its refusal to bargain concerning the proposal.
 
    (13) Respondents contend that paid parking is not a working condition
 and hence there is no obligation to bargain about it.  However, this
 misconstrues the law.  The obligation to bargain arises from the change
 in the condition of employment, i.e. the move, and the parking proposals
 involve minimizing the impact of the change on the employees.  The
 impact itself, however, need not be a condition of employment.  However,
 in the subject case parking is in fact a condition of employment.  Any
 change in the manner in which parking was provided to unit employees is
 a condition of employment and therefore is negotiable.  See e.g. United
 States Department of Labor, Case No. 7-CA-40017(1)(2)(3)(4), OALJ 85-011
 (1984) and the cases cited therein;  and Veterans Administration Medical
 Center, Northport, NY, Case No. 2-CA-793, OALJ 82-63 (1982).
 
    (14) 41 C.F.R. Section 101-17.101-6 relied upon by Respondents deal
 with the authority to procure space not the authority to pay for space.
 
    (15) I reject Respondents factual allegation that Deats asked for a
 line item in the IRS budget specifically referring to this parking.
 Such allegation is totally inconsistent with all the surrounding
 circumstances and discussions and makes no real sense.
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 APPENDIX
 
                          NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
 
  PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR
 RELATIONS
 AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF CHAPTER 71
 OF TITLE
 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE
 
            FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE
 
                   We hereby notify our employees that:
 
    WE WILL NOT fail and refuse, upon request, to bargain with National
 Treasury Employees Union and National Treasury Employees Union Chapter
 222, the exclusive collective bargaining representatives of our
 employees, concerning the impact and implementation of the consolidation
 and move of the IRS Houston District, including, to the extent permitted
 by law and regulation, National Treasury Employees Union Chapter 222's
 proposals concerning payment for parking and parking space allocations.
 
    WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain,
 or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights assured by the
 Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.
 
    WE WILL bargain, upon request, with National Treasury Employees Union
 and National Treasury Employees Union Chapter 222, concerning the impact
 and implementation of the consolidation and move of the IRS Houston
 District, including, to the extent permitted by law and regulation,
 National Treasury Employees Union Chapter 222's proposals concerning
 payment for parking and parking space allocations.
                                       (Agency or Activity)
 
    Dated:  . . .  By:  (Signature)
 
    This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date
 of posting and must not be altered, defaced or covered by any other
 material.
 
    If employees have any questions concerning this Notice or compliance
 with any of its provisions, they may communicate directly with the
 Regional Director of the Federal Labor Rel