26:0890(104)CA - Justice, Marshals Service and Marshals Service District of New Jersey and AFGE, International Council of U.S. Marshals Service Locals -- 1987 FLRAdec CA



[ v26 p890 ]
26:0890(104)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:


 26 FLRA No. 104
 
 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
 U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE AND 
 U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, 
 DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT 
 EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, INTERNATIONAL
 COUNCIL OF U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE LOCALS
 Charging Party
 
                                            Case No. 2-CA-60107
 
                            DECISION AND ORDER
 
    The Administrative Law Judge issued the attached Decision in the
 above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in
 the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, and recommending
 that the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from those practices
 and take certain affirmative action.  The Respondent filed exceptions to
 the Judge's Decision and a supporting brief.  The General Counsel filed
 an opposition to the exceptions of the Respondent.
 
    Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations
 and section 7118 of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
 Statute (the Statute), we have reviewed the rulings of the Judge made at
 the hearing and find that no prejudicial error was committed.  The
 rulings are affirmed.  In finding that no prejudicial error was
 committed by the Judge, we do not pass upon the Judge's specific
 rationale for refusing to admit into evidence the result of the
 polygraph examination proffered by the Respondent.  Upon consideration
 of the Judge's Decision, and the entire record, we adopt the Judge's
 findings, conclusions, and recommended Order.
 
                                   ORDER
 
    The U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Marshals Service and U.S.
 Marshal Service, District of New Jersey, shall:
 
    1.  Cease and desist from:
 
    (a) Preventing representatives of American Federation of Government
 Employees, AFL-CIO, International Council of U.S. Marshals Service
 Locals, the exclusive representative of its employees, from meeting with
 unit employees to confer about a grievance prior to arbitration, or
 about other representational matters.
 
    (b) Physically assaulting any representatives of American Federation
 of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, International Council of U.S. Marshals
 Service, Locals, the exclusive representative of its employees, who are
 present to meet with unit employees in order to confer about a grievance
 prior to arbitration, or about other representational matters.
 
    (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or
 coercing employees in the exercise of their rights assured by the
 Statute.
 
    2.  Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the
 purposes and policies of the Statute:
 
    (a) Post at its facilities throughout the U.S. Marshals Service,
 District of New Jersey, copies of the attached Notice on forms to be
 furnished by the Federal Labor Relations Authority.  Upon receipt of
 such forms, they shall be signed by the U.S. Marshal of the U.S.
 Marshals Service, District of New Jersey, and shall be posted and
 maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
 including bulletin boards and other places where notices to employees
 are customarily posted.  Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that
 such Notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
 
    (b) Pursuant to section 2423.30 of the Authority's Rules and
 Reulgations, notify the Regional Director, Region II, Federal Labor
 Relations Authority, in writing, within 30 days from the date of this
 Order, as to what steps have been taken to comply with this Order.
 
    Issued, Washington, D.C., April 30, 1987.
 
                                       /s/ Jerry L. Calhoun, Chairman
                                       /s/ Henry B. Frazier III, Member
                                       /s/ Jean McKee, Member
                                       FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
 
 
 
 
 
                          NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
 
  AS ORDERED BY THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND TO
 EFFECTUATE
 THE POLICIES OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS STATUTE
 
                   WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
 
    WE WILL NOT prevent representatives of American Federation of
 Government Employees, AFL-CIO, International Council of U.S. Marshals
 Service Locals, the exclusive representative of our employees, from
 meeting with unit employees to confer about a grievance prior to
 arbitration, or about other representational matters.
 
    WE WILL NOT physically assault any representatives of American
 Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, International Council of
 U.S. Marshals Service Locals, the exclusive representative of our
 employees, who are present to meet with unit employees in order to
 confer about a grievance prior to arbitration, or about other
 representation matters.
 
    WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain,
 or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights assured by the
 Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.
                                       . . . (Activity)
 
    Dated:  . . . By:  . . . (Signature) . . . (Title)
 
    This Notice must remained posted for 60 consecutive days from the
 date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any
 other material.
 
    If employees have any question concerning this Notice or compliance
 with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Regional
 Director, Region II, Federal Labor Relations Authority, whose address
 is:  26 Federal Plaza, Room 3700, New York, NY 10278, and whose
 telephone number is:  (212) 264-4934.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -------------------- ALJ$ DECISION FOLLOWS --------------------
 
    Case No. 2-CA-60107
 
 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
 U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE AND U.S. MARSHALS
 SERVICE, DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
    Respondent
 
                                    and
 
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, 
 AFL-CIO, INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF U.S. 
 MARSHAL SERVICE LOCALS
    Charging Party
 
    Ted Farfaglia, Esq.
    For the Respondent
 
    Allan W. Stadtmauer, Esq.
    For the General Counsel
 
    Wallace Roney
    For the Charging Party
 
    Before:  WILLIAM NAIMARK
    Administrative Law Judge
 
                                 DECISION
 
                           Statement of the Case
 
    Pursuant to a Complaint and Notice of Hearing issued on February 28,
 1986 by the Regional Director for the Federal Labor Relations Authority,
 Region II, a hearing was held before the undersigned on April 15, 1986
 at New York, New York.
 
    This case arose under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
 Statute, 5 U.S.C. 7101 et seq. (herein called the Statute).  It is based
 on a first Amended charge filed on February 7, 1986 by the American
 Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, International Council of
 U.S. Marshal Service Locals (herein called the Union) against U.S.
 Department of Justice, U.S. Marshals Service and U.S. Marshals Service,
 District of New Jersey (herein called Respondent).
 
    The Complaint alleged, in substance, that on or about September 26,
 1985 Respondent, by its agent Eugene Liss, without provocation,
 physically and verbally interfered with a representative of the Union
 while he was engaged in protected activity on behalf of the Union -- all
 in violation of Section 7116(a)(1) of the Statute.
 
    Respondent's Answer, dated March 24, 1986, denied the aforesaid
 allegations as well as the commission of any unfair labor practices.
 
    Both parties were represented at the hearing.  Each was afforded full
 opportunity to be heard, to adduce evidence, and to examine as well as
 cross-examine witnesses.  Thereafter, briefs were filed which have been
 duly considered.
 
    Subsequent to the filing of briefs the General Counsel filed on June
 30, 1986 a motion to strike portions of Respondent's brief referring to
 facts not contained therein.  A response to said motion was filed on
 July 3, 1986 by Respondent.
 
    General Counsel moves to strike from Respondent's brief three
 assertions of fact on the ground that no testimony or documents supports
 them.  In respect to the assertion that "Deputy Baptiste and Mr. Lazar
 had already arrived and were at the hearing room waiting for Messrs.
 Roney and Pickett," /1/ the record contains no such factual statement.
 Accordingly, the motion to strike such quoted assertion is granted and
 it is stricken from Respondent's brief.  In respect to the statement in
 Respondent's brief that "In fact, Liss on his own informed Roney the
 hearing was on the fourth floor," /2/ the record likewise does not
 support such assertion.  Accordingly, the motion to strike this quoted
 statement is granted and it is stricken from Respondent's brief.  In
 respect to the assertion in Respondent's brief that "At all pertinent
 times, Baptiste was on the fourth floor," /3/ the motion to strike is
 denied.  Record testimony reflects Baptiste was on the fourth floor on
 the morning of September 26, 1986 (ranscript, pages 31 and 77).  Whether
 his presence thereat was at "pertinent" times in arguable and
 conclusionary in nature.  It does not necessarily amount to an
 uncontroverted factual assertion.
 
    General Counsel also moves to strike from Respondent's brief all
 references to two decisions:  (a) Raymond J. Miller, Department of
 Justice, MSPB, No. DL07528210416, April 9, 1982, 83 FMSR 1475, wherein
 the presiding official made a determination as to the credibility in
 that proceeding of Wallace Roney;  (b) U.S. Department of Justice, U.S.
 Marshal Service, and International Council of U.S. Marshals Service
 Locals, AFGE, wherein an Arbitration Opinion and Award was rendered,
 FMCS 84K/19897, April 17, 1983, 85 FLRRz-409, LAIRS 16654.  The
 arbitrator therein, as recited in Respondent's brief, found that
 Starlord Pickett made statements which, though due to exuberance, were
 false.
 
    Respondent insists that, since credibility is an issue herein and
 involves both Roney and Pickett who were also witnesses in the cited
 cases, judicial notice should be taken of those decisions and the
 findings with respect to those individuals' credibility.  I disagree.
 While it may be appropriate to take judicial notice of a published
 decision in respect to the law, I do not consider it proper to take such
 notice of this type of factual findings made in cases involving
 different issues.  This is especially true of credibility findings made
 by other officials.  In Paridy, Caterpillar Traitor Co., 48 F.2d 166,
 169 the court stated that a decision in a particular case must depend
 upon the evidence introduced thereat.  Further, that if the courts
 should recognize judicially facts adjudicated in another case, it makes
 those facts, though unsupported by the evidence in the case at hand,
 conclusive evidence against the opposing party.  /4/
 
    The undersigned would agree that judicial notice could be taken of
 facts concerning which there is universal agreement, i.e. the existence
 of a country, state, or other well known entities, as well as the
 existence of matters that are of common knowledge.  Credibility findings
 in other cases are not traditional matters that, under Section 2423.19
 of the Rules and Regulations, should be judically noticed.  Accordingly,
 I shall grant General Counsel's motion to strike references to the
 credibility findings and testimonies of both Roney and Pickett in the
 aforesaid decisions.  /5/
 
    Upon the entire record herein, from my observation of the witnesses
 and their demeanor, and from all of the testimony and evidence adduce at
 the hearing, I make the following findings and conclusions:
 
                             Findings of Fact
 
    1.  At all times material herein the Union has been, and still is,
 the exclusive bargaining representative of all nonprofessional employees
 of the United States Marshals Service, including intermittent and term
 deputies with specific exclusions from said unit.
 
    2.  Included within the aforesaid unit of exclusive recognition are
 those employees who work in the District of New Jersey.  /6/
 
    3.  At all times material the Union and Respondent have been, and
 still are, parties to a national collective bargaining agreement
 governing employees of the District of New Jersey.  Article 21 of said
 agreement provides, in substance, that, upon request, employees acting
 as an AFGE Union representative requiring his absence from the job, will
 be granted annual and/or leave without pay up to 3 years.  Article 25 of
 the agreement, Section 3, deals with Arbirtration.  It provides that a
 grievant and employees called as witnesses shall be excused from their
 duties to the extent necessary to participate in the arbitration without
 loss of pay or charge to leave.
 
    4.  Under date of August 30, 1985 Wallace Roney, President of the
 Union, wrote a letter to Joseph Lazar, Associate Legal Counsel for
 Respondent.  In said letter Roney informed Lazar that the witnesses for
 the Union in the arbitration hearing set for September 26-27, 1985 would
 be Ivan Baptiste /7/ and Starlord Pickett.  /8/ He also requested that
 said witnesses be placed on official time and be available for the
 hearing.  Roney stated he would like to see the witnesses prior to the
 arbitration, and he asked Lazar to arrange privacy therefore.
 
    5.  In mid-September, 1985 Pickett was granted annual leave by his
 supervisor to attend the arbitration hearing in Newark, New Jersey.
 Both Pickett and Roney arrived at the District Office at about 10:25
 A.M. on September 26, 1985.  It was expected that Pickett would assist
 the Union president at the hearing which was scheduled to begin at 10:00
 A.M. on that date.  Both men went to the fifth floor in order to confer
 with Chief Deputy Marshal, Lonnie Harris re the location of the hearing
 room.  They also wanted to have Harris arrange a meeting between the
 union representatives and Baptiste prior to the arbitration.  Pickett
 and Roney entered the office into the reception area, and they
 approached the counter which separates that area from the Civil Section.
  Assigned to the Civil Section, which is adjacent to Harris' office, are
 Selma R. Edwards, Administrative Clerk, and Ezra Nolan, who performs
 certain clerical duties.  Both individuals have desks in this Section,
 and Edwards' desk is just outside Harris' office.  /9/
 
    6.  The Union officials spoke to Edwards and were overheard by Chief
 Deputy Harris who greeted and escorted them into his office.  Harris
 mentioned he was sorry they had to meet on such an occasion.  Pickett
 then left the office in order to submit a travel voucher to Joan Cobb, a
 Supervisory Administrative Clerk.  Harris conferred with Roney and
 agreed to get Baptiste as well as provide a room whereat Roney could
 speak to the grievant.
 
    7.  Pickett returned shortly and started to enter Harris' office.  He
 was met at the door by Eugene Liss, U.S. Marshal for the District of New
 Jersey, at which time an incident occurred between them during their
 encounter.  /10/ As Pickett attempted to enter the office, Liss
 confronted him and asked why Pickett was there and whether he was on
 annual leave.  The Union president said he had a right to be there and
 that the Chief Deputy invited him in.  Liss pushed and shoved Pickett
 out of the doorway.  Whereupon Pickett asked Selma Edwards if she had
 seen Liss push him, and the Administrative Clerk replied that she did
 see it.  Liss then opened Harris' door, which he had just closed, and
 said he didn't want Pickett in that area.  He then pushed and shoved
 Pickett toward the counter and to the other side of the public area.
 The marshal tried to force Pickett physically into a chair, but the
 latter resisted and finally stated, "Enough is enough." Pickett then
 went out into the hall.
 
    8.  After the foregoing incident Harris arranged for Baptiste to be
 brought to the fifth floor.  Both individuals along with Pickett
 proceeded to the fourth floor where the arbitration hearing took place.
 Pickett testified at the hearing and also acted as a Union
 representative.  Management granted Pickett official leave for the time
 spent testifying as a witness, and he was accorded annual leave for the
 period he performed as Union representative.
 
                                Conclusion
 
    There are two primary issues for consideration herein:  (1) whether
 Deputy Marshal Starlord Pickett, while acting as Union representative,
 was engaged in protected activity when he visited the District office on
 September 26, 1985 to attend and participate in the arbitration hearing
 involving Deputy Marshal Ivan Baptiste;  (2) if so, whether the conduct
 of Marshal Liss, Respondent's representative, in denying employee
 Pickett access to the office of Chief Deputy Lonnie Harris prior to the
 hearing on September 26, 1985, as well as physically abusing Pickett,
 constituted interference under Sections 7116(a)(1) of the Statute.
 
    (1) Certain fundamental rights are accorded employees under Section
 7102 of the Statute.  An employee is granted protection thereunder to
 form, join, or assist a labor organization.  Moreover, he may act for a
 labor organization as a representative in presenting views of that body
 to agencies and proper authorities.  Included within this protection is
 the right to process and pursue grievances on behalf of any unit
 employees.  Federal Election Commission, 6 FLRA No. 59.  An infringement
 of those rights will constitute interference under Section 7116(a)(1) of
 the Statute.
 
    While not disputing the general principle of law, as aforesaid,
 Respondent contends that Pickett was not engaged in protected activity
 while on the fourth floor in the U.S. Marshal's office area on September
 26.  It is argued that his protected activity occurred at the
 arbitration hearing after the incident in the office;  that there was no
 discussion of any union protected matter before the arbitration hearing.
  Thus, Respondent insists any action taken by Liss in respect to Pickett
 prior to the arbitration did not interfere, restrain or coerce employees
 in violation of 7116(a)(1).
 
    Respondent's contention in this regard is too simplistic and
 misconceives the concept of protected activity.  The right to represeent
 employees concerning grievances includes the presentation and processing
 thereof.  In coming to Chief Deputy Harris' office on September 26 just
 before attending the arbitration hearing, Pickett was engaged in his
 representational duty to act on behalf of employee Baptiste.  Liss
 admits he knew that Pickett and Roney were there for the arbitration.
 Further, management had been advised in writing that Pickett would be a
 witness thereat.  It is scarcely logical to conclude that Pickett was
 acting on behalf of Baptiste on the fourth floor at the hearing, but not
 representing the employee when the union officials came to the office
 just beforehand.  Such a conclusion would leave one pondering whether
 Pickett was representing Baptiste as he opened the door of the hearing
 room.  In my opinion Pickett was performing his representational
 function in the pursuance of the grievance to arbitration when he was
 confronted by Marshal Liss in the office before meeting with Chief
 Deputy Harris.  As such, Pickett was engaged in protected activity.  See
 Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Louisville
 District, 11 FLRA No. 64.
 
    (2) Respondent takes the position that Marshal Liss acted properly
 when he restricted Pickett's access at the office area.  Further, that
 such restriction did not interfere with Pickett attendance and
 representation at the arbitration hearing.  Record facts reflect,
 however, that when Roney and Pickett arrived at the District on
 September 26, Chief Deputy Harris invited them into his office.  Apart
 from not intruding himself at the time, Pickett neither provoked any
 harsh action by Liss nor did his behavior warrant any physical reaction
 by the Marshal.
 
    The Authority has taken a dim view of physical assaults upon
 employees engaged in fulfilling their union representational function.
 A physical response, in the context of a labor-management dispute, by
 either the union representative or a manager is deemed beyond the limits
 of acceptable behavior.  See and Compare U.S. Department of Labor,
 Employment and Training Administration, 20 FLRA No. 69.  In the cited
 case, however, the physical contact was not only found to be spontaneous
 but was provided by the union representative.  Accordingly, the reaction
 by management did not rise to the level of an unfair labor practice.
 
    In the case at bar the record reflects that Pickett neither provoked
 Liss nor conducted himself in any manner which warranted physical
 assault.  Moreover, I am persuaded that, in pushing and shoving Pickett
 out of the office area and physically attempting to force the union
 representative to sit in the reception area, the marshal was engaged in
 behavior not condoned.  The actions taken by Liss resulted in excluding
 Pickett from the office and preventing the pre-arbitration meeting with
 Chief Deputy Harris, Roney and Baptiste.  Such conduct clearly
 interfered with rights protected under the Statute.  Social Security
 Administration, Baltimore, Maryland, 14 FLRA No. 80.  Further, although
 it may not have been the intent of Marshal Liss to coerce Pickett, but
 merely to secure the Civil Section area, the standard by which one
 determines interference, restraint or coercion is not a subjective one.
 The text is whether, under the circumstances, an employer's conduct may
 reasonably tend to intimidate employees.  Department of the Treasury,
 United States Customs Service, Region IV, Miami, Florida, 19 FLRA No.
 114.  I am satisfied, based on the evidence herein, that the action by
 Liss in pushing and shoving Pickett out of the office area in the
 presence of another employee, and at a time when Pickett had appeared to
 attend an arbitration hearing as a witness and union representative, was
 intimidatory in nature.  As such, it constituted interference, restraint
 and coercion in violation of Section 7116(a)(1) of the Statute.
 
    Having concluded that Respondent violated Section 7116(a)(1) of the
 Statute, it is recommended that the Authority issue the following Order:
 
                                   ORDER
 
    Pursuant to Section 2423.29 of the Federal Labor Relations
 Authority's Rules and Regulations and Section 7118 of the Statute, the
 Authority hereby orders that the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S.
 Marshals Service and U.S. Marshals Service, District of New Jersey,
 shall
 
    1.  Cease and desist from:
 
          (a) Preventing representatives of American Federation of
       Government Employees, AFL-CIO, International Council of U.S.
       Marshal Service Locals, the exclusive representative of its
       employees, or any representatives of a designated agent, from
       meeting with unit employees to confer about a grievance, prior to
       arbitration, or about other representational matters.
 
          (b) Physically assaulting any representatives of American
       Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, International Council
       of U.S. Marshal Service Locals, the exclusive represetnative of
       its employees, or any representatives of a designated agent, who
       are present to meet with unit employees in order to confer about a
       grievance, prior to arbitration, or about other representational
       matters.
 
    (c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
 
       restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights
       assured by the Statute.
 
    2.  Take the following affirmative action:
 
          (a) Post at its facilities throughout the U.S. Marshals
       Service, District of New Jersey, copies of the attached Notice on
       forms to be furnished by the Authority.  Upon receipt of such
       forms, they shall be signed by an appropriate official, and shall
       be posted for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
       places, including all places where notices to employees are
       customarily posted.  Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure
       that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
       other material.
 
          (b) Pursuant to Section 2423.30 of the Authority's Rules and
       Regulations, notify the Regional Director, Region II, Federal
       Labor Relations Authority, in writing, within 30 days from the
       date of this Order, as to what steps have been taken to comply
       herewith.
 
                                       /s/ WILLIAM NAIMARK
                                       Administrative Law Judge
 
    Dated:  October 8, 1986
    Washington, D.C.
 
 
 
 
 
                ---------------  FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
 
 
    (1) Page 3, lines 10-12 of Respondent's brief.
 
    (2) Page 8, lines 22-23 of Respondent's brief.
 
    (3) Page 8, lines 23-24 of Respondent's brief.
 
    (4) See also Wilson v. Volkswagon of America, Inc., 561 F.2d 494 (5th
 Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 744 (1978).
 
    (5) Respondent's request to reopen the record is also denied.  Apart
 from the issue as to the admissibility of the two decisions at the
 hearing herein, both decisions pre-dated this hearing and were available
 for presentation thereat.  No attempt to do so was made by Respondent.
 
    (6) The delegated representative of the employees of the Respondent's
 District of New Jersey is American Federation of Government Employees,
 AFL-CIO, Lcoal 2837.
 
    (7) The arbitration hearing involved disciplinary action taken by
 Respondent against Baptiste, a Deputy U.S. Marshal assigned to Trenton,
 New Jersey, but working at Newark, New Jersey.
 
    (8) Pickett is a Deputy U.S. Marshal at Camden, New Jersey.  He is
 President of AFGE Local 2837, as well as Regional Vice-President of the
 Union herein.
 
    (9) A diagram of the reception area, counter, Civil Section and
 offices is found in Joint Exhibit 1.
 
    (10) The facts as set forth by the undersigned, though in dispute,
 represent the credited version of what occurred.  The essential details
 in regard to the physical contact by Liss of Pickett -- as testified to
 by Pickett -- were corroborated by Roney and Selma Edwards.  Record
 facts disclose Ezra Nolan was not at his desk all of the time between
 10:00 A.M.-10:45 A.M. on September 26, and he does not recall seeing
 Roney at all.
 
    In respect to the denial by Liss that he physically abused or
 assaulted Pickett, Respondent's counsel called Michael J. Parker, a
 polygraphist, as a witness.  Parker administered a polygraph test to
 Liss, and Respondent attempted to introduce the results thereof to
 support the Marshal's credibility.  This exhibit was rejected.  In
 exercising my discretion not to admit the results of this test, in
 accordance with the decisions of several Circuit Courts, I note Parker
 testified that if a polygraph was taken of Pickett in regard to the same
 events, it could also be concluded that the latter was telling the truth
 if the test were not administered properly.  Apart from the fact that no
 polygraph tests were given to Edwards and Roney, who confirmed that
 physical encounter, I do not deem such tests so scientifically
 acceptable as to be beyond question.
 
 
 
 
 
                                 APPENDIX
 
                          NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
 
  PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR
 RELATIONS
 AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF CHAPTER 71
 OF TITLE
 5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
 RELATIONS
 STATUTE
 
                   WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
 
    WE WILL NOT prevent representatives of American Federation of
 Government Employees, AFL-CIO, International Council of U.S. Marshal
 Service Locals, the exclusive representative of its employees, or any
 representatives of a designated agent, from meeting with unit employees
 to confer about a grievance, prior to arbitration, or about other
 representational matters.
 
    WE WILL NOT physically assault any representative of American
 Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, International Cou