31:0904(68)CA - DOD, Army, Army Air Defense Center and Fort Bliss, Fort Bliss, TX and NFFE Local 2068 and NAGE Local R14-89 -- 1988 FLRAdec CA
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The decision of the Authority follows:
31 FLRA No. 68 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES ARMY AIR DEFENSE CENTER AND FORT BLISS FORT BLISS, TEXAS Respondent and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 2068, INDEPENDENT Charging Party and NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL R14-89 Party in Interest Case No. 6-CA-60020 (29 FLRA 362)
This case is before us on the General Counsel's motion for reconsideration of our September 30, 1987, decision in the above-cited case. For the reasons set forth below, we deny the motion for reconsideration.
In our decision, we found that the Respondent did not violate section 7116(a)(1) and (3) of the Statute by refusing to provide the National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 2068, Independent (NFFE) with a building for use during a representation election campaign. NFFE had requested a building similar to the one the National Association of Government Employees, Local R14-89 (NAGE) had acquired for [PAGE] use as a union hall under Article IV, Section II of the collective bargain agreement entered into by the Respondent and NAGE before NFFE became a union "having equivalent status." We found that the Respondent had satisfied the requirement of section 7116(a)(3) of the Statute by offering NFFE the use of customary and routine facilities for use in the campaign. We noted that the Respondent had offered NFFE the use of various meeting facilities, including a theater and conference rooms to use in its campaign effort.
We concluded that section 7116(a)(3) did not require an agency to furnish a labor organization that has achieved equivalent status with an incumbent Union in a representation proceeding with the exact same services and facilities that the incumbent obtained through collective bargaining before the proceeding. Further, we stated that it was our belief that a building was not the kind of "customary and routine" facility contemplated by Congress in fashioning section 7116(a)(3). Nevertheless, we found that even if it was a "customary and routine" facility, NAGE had not requested the facility nor did the Respondent provide the facility to NAGE during the representation proceeding. Therefore, we concluded that the Respondent had satisfied its obligation by offering NFFE various meeting facilities and was not required to provide NFFE's with a building similar to that provided to NAGE under t