39:1238(106)AR - - Navy, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Virginia and NAGE Local R4-19 - - 1991 FLRAdec AR - - v39 p1238
[ v39 p1238 ]
The decision of the Authority follows:
39 FLRA No. 106
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
(39 FLRA No. 56 (1991))
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
March 15, 1991
Before Chairman McKee and Members Talkin and Armendariz.
I. Statement of the Case
This case is before the Authority on the Union's motion for reconsideration of the Authority's decision in 39 FLRA No. 56 (1991). The Activity did not file an opposition to the request. Because the Union fails to establish that extraordinary circumstances exist which would warrant reconsideration of our decision, we will deny the request.
II. The Decision in 39 FLRA No. 56
In 39 FLRA No. 56, we set aside the Arbitrator's amended award that reduced the grievant's suspension to a written warning and awarded backpay. In his original award in U.S. Department of the Navy, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Virginia and National Association of Government Employees, Local R4-19, 36 FLRA 304 (1990) (Norfolk Naval Shipyard), the Arbitrator sustained the grievance over a 14-day suspension and awarded backpay to the grievant only if the grievant met certain conditions. After we set aside the award, the Union unilaterally requested the Arbitrator to issue a new decision in Norfolk Naval Shipyard. The Arbitrator issued an amended award that reduced the grievant's suspension to a written warning and awarded backpay.
In 39 FLRA No. 56, we found that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority because he had no jurisdiction to amend the award. We concluded, based on our decisions in Social Security Administration and American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, 32 FLRA 806, 808 (1988) and Health Care Financing Administration, Department of Health and Human Services and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1923, 35 FLRA 274, 281-82 (1990), that, unless both parties request an arbitrator to reopen the matter, an arbitrator is precluded from reopening and modifying an award which the Authority has set aside. Therefore, we concluded that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority by issuing an amended award, and we set aside the amended award.
III. The Union's Motion for Reconsideration
The Union contends that there are extraordinary circumstances warranting reconsideration. The Union maintains that the Authority's decision to set aside the Arbitrator's award appears to leave the grievant without a decision on the merits or a remedy. The Union states that "[s]uch a consequence could not be intended by the Authority, and would clearly be inequitable." Motion for reconsideration at 1.
The Union also maintains that it has "unilateral authority pursuant to Article 20, Section 1 of the [n]egotiated [a]greement to proceed to arbitration without the [A]gency's concurrence." Id. Therefore, the Union argues that, once the Agency refused to jointly request arbitration, it was permissible for the Union to unilaterally proceed to arbitration in this case.
IV. Analysis and Conclusion
Section 2429.17 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations permits a party that can establish the existence of "extraordinary circumstances" to request reconsideration of a decision of the Authority. We conclude that the Union has not established extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of section 2419.17 to warrant reconsideration of our decision in 39 FLRA No. 56.
The Union's arguments constitute nothing more than disagreement with and an a