40:0775(63)CA - - FDIC and NTEU - - 1991 FLRAdec CA - - v40 p775



[ v40 p775 ]
40:0775(63)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:


40 FLRA No. 63

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

(Respondent)

and

NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION

(Charging Party/Union)

3-CA-10255

DECISION AND ORDER

May 6, 1991

Before Chairman McKee and Members Talkin and Armendariz.

I. Statement of the Case

This unfair labor practice case is before the Authority in accordance with section 2429.1(a) of the Authority Rules and Regulations, based on a stipulation of facts by the parties. The parties have agreed to waive a hearing before an administrative law judge, including the presentation of any evidence other than that contained in the stipulation and the exhibits. The General Counsel, the Union and the Respondent filed briefs with the Authority.

The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) by refusing the Union's requests to negotiate groundrules for the negotiations of a term contract and a dues withholding procedure for employees in the exclusive bargaining units certified on December 28, 1990, and by refusing to accord the Union its statutory status as exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in those bargaining units.

The Respondent admits that it denied the Union's requests to negotiate, and that, since December 28, 1990, it has refused to recognize the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative as certified and has not provided the Union or affected employees with any rights or entitlements provided for in the Statute "if the certification were valid." Stipulation, Paragraphs 10 and 12.

For the following reasons, we conclude that the Respondent violated the Statute, as alleged.

II. Background

A representation election was conducted among certain employees of the Respondent in two voting groups. Of the 76 valid ballots counted in the voting group of professional employees, the employees voted, 45 to 31, not to be included in a mixed unit with nonprofessional employees. Of the 76 valid votes counted in the voting group of professional employees, 46 votes were cast for the Union and 30 votes were cast against exclusive representation. Of the 1,848 valid ballots counted in the voting group of nonprofessional employees, 1,273 votes were cast for the Union and 575 votes were cast against exclusive recognition. There were 53 challenged ballots, which were not sufficient in number to affect the outcome of the election. Thus, a majority of the valid votes were cast for the Union in each of the voting groups.

Immediately after the election, the Respondent filed two objections with the Regional Director (RD), alleging that the Union had engaged in improper conduct affecting the election. Specifically, the Respondent objected to the Union's promise to temporary employees it sought to represent that, if successful in the election, it would file a lawsuit challenging their temporary status. The Respondent also complained that the Union had provided free legal assistance prior to the election to five temporary employees who had been terminated or whose employment contracts had not been renewed. In his Decision and Order on Objections to Election, the RD concluded that no objectionable conduct had occurred that warranted setting aside the election.

The Respondent sought review of the RD's decision with the Authority. On December 14, 1990, we denied the Respondent's application for review. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Washington, D.C., 38 FLRA 952 (1990) (FDIC). With regard to the Respondent's first objection, we concluded that the Union's preelection promise to file a lawsuit if it won the election did not improperly interfere with the employees' freedom of choice in the election because that promise was not tantamount to a monetary inducement to vote for the Union. Id. at 963.

We further concluded that the Respondent had not demonstrated that the RD's factual findings concerning the Respondent's second objection were clearly erroneous. Without deciding whether the Union's conduct of providing free legal assistance to the five individuals could have interfered with voter choice, we concluded that the conduct did not, in the circumstances in this case, materially affect the results of, or warrant setting aside, the election. Id. at 964. We found that the Respondent had presented no evidence as to the possible influence of the Union's conduct on other employees. For example, no evidence was presented that the Union or the terminated employees had publicized the Union's representation of the employees in question during the election campaign. The Respondent had argued that requiring it to present material evidence on this fact placed too great an onus on it. We rejected that contention, citing to section 2422.21(b) of our Rules and Regulations, which provides that "[t]he objecting party shall bear the burden of proof at all stages of the proceeding regarding all matters raised in its objections." We further noted that the Respondent was able to provide considerable evidence with regard to the Union's publicizing of its promise to file a lawsuit if it won the election.

Accordingly, we found that only a small number of the eligible voters were directly affected by the Union's preelection conduct. In our view, the assistance provided to five individuals would not affect the results of a nationwide election in which over 1,800 ballots were cast, where there was a lack of evidence that anyone knew of the Union's preelection conduct, and where the margin of the Union's victory was substantial. Moreover, we found that of the four unit employees and one supervisor directly affected by the Union's conduct, only one had voted, and it was clear that one vote could not have been determinative of the election outcome. Therefore, we concluded that the Union's preelection conduct of providing free legal assistance to five employees did not materially affect the results of the election nor warrant the setting aside of the election, citing NLRB v. Golden Age Beverage Company, 415 F.2d 26, 30 (5th Cir. 1969).

As to the Respondent's request that a hearing be held on its second objection in order to provide it with an opportunity to explore the matter, we found that the decision to hold a hearing is within the RD's discretion, citing section 2422.21(g) of our Rules and Regulations. In reviewing the RD's decision, we concluded that there had been no abuse of that discretion and that the decision was correct. 38 FLRA at 963-64.

On December 28, 1990, the RD certified the Union as the exclusive representative of the following two bargaining units:

All professional employees of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Division of Liquidation, Division of Accounting and Corporate Services and Legal Division (DOL) who are employed at Division of Liquidation Regional Offices, Consolidated offices and Liquidation sites nationwide, excluding all management officials, supervisors and employees described in 5 USC 7112(b)(2)(3)(4)(6) and (7).

All nonprofessional employees of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Division of Liquidation, Division of Accounting and Corporate Services and Legal Division (DOL) who are employed at Division of Liquidation Regional Offices, Consolidated offices and Liquidation sites nationwide, excluding all management officials, supervisors and employees described in 5 USC 7112(b)(2)(3)(4)(6) and (7).

Stipulation, Joint Exhibit 1.

On December 18, 1990, the Respondent's Director of Personnel had issued a memorandum to the Respondent's managers and supervisors which provided, in part, that the Respondent intended to contest the validity of the certifications and that "you should not recognize [the Union] in any manner as the representative of the employees under your supervision." Id., Joint Exhibit 5 (emphasis in original). In early January 1991, the Union sought to negotiate groundrules for a term contract and a dues withholding procedure with the Respondent on behalf of the bargaining unit employees. In a letter dated January 25, 1991, the Respondent's Chairman responded, stating that the Respondent would not comply with the bargaining requests because it challenged the Union's certification. Since December 28, 1990, the Respondent has refused to recognize the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the two units and has not provided the Union or affected employees with any of the rights or entitlements provided for in the Statute.

At the General Counsel's request, under section 7123(d) of the Statute, a temporary injunction was granted by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, enjoining the Respondent from (1) continuing to refuse to recognize the Union as the exclusive representative of the bargaining units; and (2) continuing to refuse to accord to the Union all rights and entitlements to which such exclusive bargaining representatives are entitled under the Statute. S. Jesse Reuben v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, No. 91-372 (D.D.C. April 10, 1991), appeal filed, No. 91-5111 (D.C. Cir. April 24, 1991).

III. Positions of the Parties

A. The General Counsel

The General Counsel contends that the Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute by refusing to recognize the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative for certified units of Respondent's employees and by denying to the Union and unit employees all rights and entitlements provided for in the Statute. The General Counsel argues that the stipulation establishes that the Respondent desires to test in the U.S. Court of Appeals the certification issued by the RD in this matter. The General Counsel contends that the stipulation "clearly shows that Respondent has been and is in flagrant violation of the Statute." General Counsel's Brief at 4.

The General Counsel maintains that as the stipulation raises no claim of newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence or special circumstances, the Authority should expeditiously find a violation of the Statute. The General Counsel argues that "[i]t is by now well established in the private and Federal sectors that only in certain circumstances can a respondent relitigate issues resolved during the representation case process in the unfair labor practice procedure." Id. In support, the General Counsel relies on Texas Industries, Inc., 199 NLRB 671, 672 (1972) (Texas Industries), in which the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) cited Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 162 (1941) (Pittsburgh Plate Glass); and Defense Logistics Agency, 5 FLRA 126 (1981).

The General Counsel contends that the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices under the Statute and requests that the Authority issue "an appropriate order" fully remedying all of the Respondent's unlawful conduct. General Counsel's Brief at 6.

B. The Union

The Union contends that the Respondent has violated and continues to violate the Statute by refusing to accord the Union its rights as the certified bargaining representative. It argues that "it is patently clear that [the Respondent] is in blatant violation of the [Statute]." Union's Brief at 12.

The Union notes that the Respondent is testing the certification by committing an unfair labor practice in order to seek review in the Court of Appeals. The Union argues that because the record does not contain new facts or issues regarding the underlying election challenge, there is no issue as to the Respondent's commission of the unfair labor practices, citing Texas Industries. In this regard, the Union contends that the only argument available to the Respondent is that the Authority's decision in FDIC was wrongly decided. It asserts that there is no reason to disturb that decision.

The Union contends that the Authority correctly found that the RD's decision not to hold a hearing was within his discretion. The Union notes that the Respondent's claim that it was denied an evidentiary hearing before the RD "is most disingenuous." Id. at 18. In this regard, it claims that the Respondent never requested a hearing in any of its submissions before the RD, even though the Respondent retained the burden of establishing its objections at all times. The Union asserts that the Authority correctly ruled that the conduct of providing legal services to the five employees was not determinative of the outcome of the election, given the facts and circumstances of the case. In support, the Union cites Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 424 F.2d 818, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

As a remedy, the Union requests "a cease and desist order, attorney fees, and extraordinary relief consistent with [the Respondent's] frontal assault on the statutory scheme and the [Authority's] mission." Union's Brief at 20. In this regard, it requests a retroactive bargaining order and the payment to the Union of all moneys that should have been withheld pursuant to dues withholding.

C. The Respondent

The Respondent contends that the Authority is empowered to re-examine the merits of the Respondent's election objections, and that the Authority should exercise this power to find that the Union engaged in unlawful campaign conduct. First, it argues that the Union's promise to file a lawsuit on behalf of the temporary employees "irreparably tainted the laboratory conditions surrounding the holding of fair and free elections." Respondent's Brief at 8. In this regard, it cites National Labor Relations Board v. Savair Manufacturing Company, 414 U.S. 270 (1973) and Molded Acoustical Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 815 F.2d 934 (3rd Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987), cases that were addressed in FDIC. In addition, the Respondent argues that the decision in NLRB v. Tio Pepe, 629 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1980), a case not previously brought to our attention, requires a finding of improper interference with the election because the Union, like the union in that case, retained sole and exclusive control over its campaign pledge.

The Respondent also asserts that it "has previously presented sufficient evidence on its direct conferral of benefits objection [second objection] to warrant the holding of an evidentiary hearing." Respondent's brief at 1-2. In this regard, it argues that "[i]t is well settled that the failure to hold such a hearing presents serious due process problems." Id. at 2. The Respondent maintains that without a hearing it could not ascertain the extent to which news of the Union's conduct was disseminated. Thus, it contends that, in light of the fact that the Respondent was not afforded such an opportunity, the objection should be remanded and an evidentiary hearing held. In support, the Respondent cites various private sector cases, including: NLRB v. Shrader's Inc., No. 90-5205 (6th Cir. Mar. 15, 1991); Bauer Welding and Metal Fabricators v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1982) (Bauer); NLRB v. Winburn Tile Mfg. Co., 663 F.2d 44 (8th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Nixon Gear, Inc., 649 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1981); Linn Gear Co. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 1979). The Respondent contends, in this regard, that Pittsburgh Plate Glass is readily distinguishable from the present case because in this case no evidentiary hearing was conducted on its direct conferral of benefits objection.

The Respondent further argues that if the Authority upholds its previous decision on the election objections and rules that it has engaged in an unlawful refusal to bargain, any remedy should be purely prospective in nature. It contends that a retroactive remedy would severely disrupt its operations; would be based upon a record devoid of any evidence of unlawful unilateral changes in working conditions; and would be unwarranted given that the Respondent "has not engaged in any willful acts of bad faith." Respondent's Brief at 2.

IV. Analysis and Conclusions

We conclude that the Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute by refusing to negotiate and by otherwise refusing to accord the Union its statutory status as exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the two bargaining units.

The Respondent admits that it is attempting to challenge the Union's certification through this unfair labor practice proceeding. With regard to the merits of its actions, it has raised in this proceeding only the two arguments we addressed in our decision in FDIC. After careful consideration of the Respondent's brief in this case, we conclude that the Respondent is merely attempting to relitigate that decision. It has offered no new evidence or previously unavailable evidence or special circumstances warranting an entitlement to relitigate issues that were or could have been litigated in the prior representation proceeding. See, for example, Texas Industries, Inc.; Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.

In so concluding, we have considered the Respondent's assertion that it has previously presented sufficient evidence on its objection to the RD's findings regarding the alleged direct conferral of benefits to warrant the holding of an evidentiary hearing. It argues that the failure to hold such a hearing presents serious due process problems. We note that the Respondent restricts this request for a hearing to its second objection.

The Respondent requests the hearing to determine whether the Union's conduct of providing free legal assistance to five employees was publicized by the Union or the five employees, thus affecting the results, and warranting setting aside, the election. There is no question that the Union provided the assistance. We find, however, that the Respondent has not, in FDIC or in this case, made an offer of proof sufficient to raise a substantial and material factual issue warranting a hearing. See Anchor Inns, Inc. v. NLRB, 644 F.2d 292 (3rd Cir. 1981) (Anchor Inns), in which the court held that a party is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if its objection raises substantial and material issues of fact. The court held that in order to obtain an evidentiary hearing, the objector's proffer of evidence must on its face warrant setting aside the election. The proffer "may not be conclusory or vague; it must point to specific events and specific people." 644 F.2d at 296. See also NLRB v. Claxton Mfg. Co. Inc., 613 F.2d 1364, 1365 (5th Cir. 1980) (Claxton). Further, in Bauer, a case cited by the Respondent, the court held that the test for determining whether material factual issues exist is that set forth in NLRB v. Griffith Oldsmobile, Inc., 455 F.2d 867, 668-69 (8th Cir. 1972):

It is incumbent upon the party seeking a hearing to clearly demonstrate that factual issues exist which can only be resolved by an evidentiary hearing. . . . Mere disagreement with the Regional Director's reasoning and conclusions do[es] not raise 'substantial and material factual issues.' . . .

676 F.2d at 316.

In Claxton, the court held that to obtain a hearing, the losing party bears a heavy burden; its affidavits must contain specific evidence of specific events from or about specific people. The court held that "conclusory allegations are not sufficient." 613 F.2d at 1366. In addition, the court held that when the objecting party establishes a right to a hearing, the Regional Director's investigation of objections will not be a substitute for a hearing. Due in part to the opinion in Claxton and other court decisions requiring evidentiary hearings in certain circumstances, the NLRB reexamined its procedures for disposing of post-election objections to the conduct of elections and amended its rules and regulations. The revised regulations state that a hearing "shall be conducted with respect to those objections or challenges which the regional director concludes raise substantial and material factual issues." 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(d); Erie Coke & Chemical Company, 261 NLRB 25 (1982).

The Respondent has not presented any evidence in either this proceeding or in FDIC as to the possible influence of the Union's conduct on other employees. See 38 FLRA at 963. As in the earlier case, there is no showing here to indicate that a hearing might establish that the Union or the terminated employees publicized the Union's representation of the employees in question during the election campaign. The Respondent offered no affidavits or other evidence to support its claim that the Union or the employees publicized the Union's conduct. Rather, the Respondent argues only that "it defies logic to conclude that no one was aware these employees were receiving free legal services from [the Union]." Respondent's brief at 29. This argument falls far short of the required offers of proof. It points to neither specific events nor specific people and is merely conclusory in nature. See Anchor Inns, 644 F.2d at 296. Thus, adopting the private sector standard, we conclude that the Respondent has not made an offer of proof sufficient to raise a substantial and material factual issue warranting a hearing. We find it to be significant, in disposing of this issue, that in FDIC we concluded that the Union's preelection conduct of providing free legal assistance to five employees did not materially affect the results of the nationwide election in which over 1,800 ballots were cast. 38 FLRA at 964.

Therefore, we reaffirm our decision in FDIC, and find that the Respondent has not raised any issue that is properly litigable in this unfair labor practice proceeding. The Respondent has admitted that it has denied the Union's requests to negotiate, and that since December 28, 1990, has refused to recognize the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees. Accordingly, we find that the Respondent has violated section 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute by refusing to negotiate and by otherwise refusing to accord the Union its statutory status as exclusive bargaining representative.

V. Remedy

A. A Prospective Bargaining Order Is Appropriate

The Union has requested that the Respondent be ordered to retroactively bargain regarding all changes in working conditions since certification. Taking into account the totality of the circumstances, we believe that a prospective bargaining order is appropriate.

In National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 910 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc), the court found, as relevant here, that the Authority has broad discretion to fashion appropriate remedies for unfair labor practices. Specifically, the court held that there is nothing in the language of the Statute that restricts the Authority's discretion to determine whether and when to direct retroactive bargaining orders as a remedy for an agency's refusal to bargain.

In the past, the Authority has imposed retroactive bargaining orders in certain defined situations. For example, such a remedy is appropriate where there has been a refusal to bargain over a specific proposal that had previously been held by the Authority to be within the duty to bargain. See Environmental Protection Agency, 21 FLRA 787, 790 (1986). The Authority has also ordered an agency to incorporate into the parties' collective bargaining agreement the specific terms of an interest-arbitration award retroactively to the date the award became final and binding. Id. Further, we have ordered retroactive bargaining orders in cases involving refusals to bargain over negotiable proposals. See U.S. Department of Defense Dependents Schools, Dependents Schools, Mediterranean Region, Madrid, Spain, 38 FLRA 755 (1990).

Although these examples do not exhaust the type of cases in which retroactive bargaining orders would be appropriate, we believe that a prospective bargaining order would promote an effective relationship between the parties in this case, which involves a new bargaining relationship. The Union has requested bargaining for an initial agreement. Thus, all issues remain open to the parties during negotiations. Indeed, the Union had offered no substantive proposals with its requests to negotiate, except for a dues withholding procedure. In these circumstances, we find that a prospective bargaining order will provide the parties in this new relationship with the flexibility to determine what will best serve their needs.

Accordingly, in the circumstances of this case, we conclude that a prospective bargaining order will best effectuate the policies and purposes of the Statute. We emphasize, however, that our remedy will not preclude the parties from giving retroactive effect to any agreement reached, on any matter. See, for example, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Customs Service, Washington, D.C. and Custom Service, Northeast Region, Boston, Massachusetts, 38 FLRA 989 (1990).

B. Reimbursement for Dues Withholding Not Authorized

The Union requests as a remedy that the Respondent reimburse it for moneys that should have been withheld from employees under dues withholding. We find that such a remedy is not authorized in this case.

Section 7115(a) of the Statute provides that if an agency receives from an employee in an appropriate unit a written assignment authorizing the deduction of dues, the agency shall honor the assignment and make an appropriate allotment to the exclusive representative. The legislative history of section 7115 indicates that the employee alone controls the manner of dues payment and that an agency's obligation to honor dues check-off authorizations is mandatory and nondiscretionary. American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2612 v. FLRA, 739 F.2d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1984), reversing Department of the Air Force, Griffiss Air Force Base, Rome, New York, 12 FLRA 198 (1983).

Under section 7115(a), once an employee is included in a bargaining unit, an agency is obligated to honor a dues assignment from that employee and make an appropriate allotment notwithstanding the terms of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Indeed, although the procedures that an agency will follow in deducting and remitting the regular and periodic dues to a union are matters subject to the duty to bargain, an agency is obligated to honor the dues assignment of a unit employee and make an allotment even if no agreement is in effect at the time. U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Mint, 35 FLRA 1095, 1099-100 (1990).

Thus, section 7115(a) of the Statute involves an employee's individual right to authorize a deduction of dues and to have that assignment honored. If no employee exercises this right, a union is entitled to no dues allotment from an agency. In this case, there no evidence or claim that the Respondent has refused to honor such assignments from employees or make any appropriate allotments to the Union. Indeed, a violation of section 7115(a) was not alleged in the complaint. The only apparent contention is that because the Respondent has refused to negotiate an agreement covering the procedures for deducting and remitting such dues to the Union, the Union is entitled to moneys that should have been withheld from employees had dues withholding been in force.

As the deduction of dues is not dependent on any agreement between an agency and a union, but, rather, is the result of authorizations from individual employees to their employers, and because no violation of section 7115(a) was alleged or found, we conclude that such a remedy is not authorized under the Statute.

C. An Award of Attorney Fees Is Not Warranted

We conclude that the Union has not established that an award of attorney fees is warranted. The Union does not explain on what grounds an award of attorney fees should be granted. In this regard, the Union does not even specify under what authority it seeks attorney fees.

With regard to the granting of attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (EAJA), the Authority's Rules and Regulations provide that awards under that Statute are available only to a respondent, other than the United States, who prevails against the General Counsel in an unfair labor practice proceeding. See section 2423.1 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations. Clearly, as the Union is a charging party, it is not entitled to an award of attorney fees under EAJA. See United States Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service and Internal Revenue Service, Austin District, and Internal Revenue Service Houston District, 23 FLRA 774, 781 (1986).

Under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596, an award of attorney fees must be based upon an award of backpay that corrects an improper or unwarranted personnel action. Id. at 782. Because we have awarded no backpay in this proceeding, attorney fees under the Back Pay Act are not authorized. In particular, we concluded above that a prospective bargaining order is appropriate in this case. Accordingly, we will deny the Union's request for attorney fees.

VI. Order

Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations and section 7118 of the Statute, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation shall:

1. Cease and desist from:

(a) Refusing to negotiate in good faith with the National Treasury Employees Union, the exclusive representative of two units of its employees certified on December 28, 1990, concerning the conditions of employment of those employees.

(b) Refusing to negotiate in good faith with the National Treasury Employees Union, the exclusive representative of two units of its employees certified on December 28, 1990, concerning an agreement covering the procedures for deducting and remitting the regular and periodic dues assignments of employees to such exclusive representative.

(c) Otherwise refusing to accord the National Treasury Employees Union its statutory status as the exclusive bargaining representative of the two units of its employees certified on December 28, 1990.

(d) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights assured them by the Statute.

2. Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Statute:

(a) Recognize the National Treasury Employees Union as the exclusive representative in the following two appropriate bargaining units that were certified on December 28, 1990, and, accord the National Treasury Employees Union its statutory status as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in these units:

All professional employees of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Division of Liquidation, Division of Accounting and Corporate Services and Legal Division (DOL) who are employed at Division of Liquidation Regional Offices, Consolidated offices and Liquidation sites nationwide, excluding all management officials, supervisors and employees described in 5 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(2), (3), (4), (6) and (7).

All nonprofessional employees of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Division of Liquidation, Division of Accounting and Corporate Services and Legal Division (DOL) who are employed at Division of Liquidation Regional Offices, Consolidated offices and Liquidation sites nationwide, excluding all management officials, supervisors and employees described in 5 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(2), (3), (4), (6) and (7).

(b) Upon request, negotiate in good faith with the National Treasury Employees Union about all conditions of employment of its employees in the two units certified on December 28, 1990.

(c) Upon request, negotiate in good faith with the National Treasury Employees Union concerning an agreement covering the procedures for deducting and remitting the regular and periodic dues assignments of employees in the two units certified on December 28, 1990, to such exclusive representative.

(d) Accord the National Treasury Employees Union and the employees in the two units certified on December 28, 1990, all rights and entitlements provided for in the Statute.

(e) Post at all facilities where bargaining unit employees in the two units certified on December 28, 1990, are located, copies of the attached Notice on forms to be furnished by the Federal Labor Relations Authority. Upon receipt of such forms, they shall by signed by the Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and shall be posted and maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all bulletin boards and other places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

(f) Pursuant to section 2423.30 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations, notify the Regional Director, Washington, D.C. Regional Office, Federal Labor Relations Authority, in writing, within 30 days from the date of this Order, as to what steps have been taken to comply.

 

NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES

AS ORDERED BY THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY

AND TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE

FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE

WE NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:

WE WILL NOT refuse to negotiate in good faith with the National Treasury Employees Union, the exclusive representative of two units of our employees certified on December 28, 1990, concerning the conditions of employment of those employees.

WE WILL NOT refuse to negotiate in good faith with the National Treasury Employees Union, the exclusive representative of two units of our employees certified on December 28, 1990, concerning an agreement covering the procedures for deducting and remitting the regular and periodic dues assignments of employees to such exclusive representative.

WE WILL NOT otherwise refuse to accord the National Treasury Employees Union its statutory status as the exclusive bargaining representative of the two units of our employees certified on December 28, 1990.

WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights assured them by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.

WE WILL recognize the National Treasury Employees Union as the exclusive representative in the following two appropriate bargaining units that were certified on December 28, 1990, and, accord the National Treasury Employees Union its statutory status as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in these units:

All professional employees of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Division of Liquidation, Division of Accounting and Corporate Services and Legal Division (DOL) who are employed at Division of Liquidation Regional Offices, Consolidated offices and Liquidation sites nationwide, excluding all management officials, supervisors and employees described in 5 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(2), (3), (4), (6) and (7).

All nonprofessional employees of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Division of Liquidation, Division of Accounting and Corporate Services and Legal Division (DOL) who are employed at Division of Liquidation Regional Offices, Consolidated offices and Liquidation sites nationwide, excluding all management officials, supervisors and employees described in 5 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(2), (3), (4), (6) and (7).

WE WILL, upon request, negotiate in good faith with the National Treasury Employees Union about all conditions of employment of our employees in the two units certified on December 28, 1990.

WE WILL, upon request, negotiate in good faith with the National Treasury Employees Union concerning an agreement covering the procedures for deducting and remitting the regular and periodic dues assignments of employees in the two units certified on December 28, 1990, to such exclusive representative.