42:0121(6)AR - - GSA, National Capital Region and Journeyman Pipefitters and Apprentices, Local Union No. 602 - - 1991 FLRAdec AR - - v42 p121



[ v42 p121 ]
42:0121(6)AR
The decision of the Authority follows:


42 FLRA No. 6

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

(Agency)

and

JOURNEYMAN PIPEFITTERS AND APPRENTICES

LOCAL UNION NO. 602

(Union)

0-AR-2015

DECISION

September 12, 1991

Before Chairman McKee and Members Talkin and Armendariz.

I. Statement of the Case

This matter is before the Authority on exceptions to an award of Arbitrator Charles E. Donegan filed by the Agency under section 7122(a) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) and part 2425 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations. The Union filed an opposition to the Agency's exceptions.

The Arbitrator found that the Agency violated the parties' collective bargaining agreement when it implemented new work schedules for certain unit employees without first consulting with the Union. The Arbitrator ordered the Agency, among other things, to make the affected employees whole by compensating them for lost overtime.

For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the case should be remanded to the parties for resubmission to the Arbitrator.

II. Preliminary Matter

In its opposition, the Union contends that the Agency's exceptions should be dismissed as untimely filed. We find that the exceptions were timely filed. Exceptions to an arbitration award must be filed within 30 days of the date of service of the award. 5 C.F.R. § 2425.1(b). The date of service is the date the arbitration award is deposited in the U.S. mail or is delivered in person. 5 C.F.R. § 2429.27(d). See U.S. Department of the Navy, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Virginia and National Association of Government Employees, 39 FLRA 692, 693 (1991). There is no dispute that the award was served by mail on the parties on September 25, 1990. Accordingly, under sections 2429.21 and 2429.22 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations, 5 days are added to the 30-day time period for filing exceptions. Further, the last day of the period so computed is to be included unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or a Federal legal holiday, in which case the period shall run until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a Federal legal holiday. 5 C.F.R. § 2429.21. To be timely, therefore, the Agency's exceptions had to be either postmarked by the U.S. Postal Service or received at the Authority no later than October 29, 1990. The Agency's exceptions were filed with the Authority on October 29, 1990, and, therefore, are timely.

III. Background and Arbitrator's Award

The Union represents a group of wage grade employees who work in the Agency's Steam Distribution Complex (SDC). The SDC is responsible for the transmission of high-pressure steam that is generated from two heating plants and transmitted through a system of underground tunnels to Federal buildings located in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. The Union and the Agency are parties to a collective bargaining agreement that became effective April 5, 1979.

Prior to June 11, 1989, the tour of duty for employees assigned to the SDC was 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., Monday through Friday. By letter dated June 1, 1989, the Agency informed the Union that two new shifts would be established for some of the SDC employees. The letter stated that the new schedules would include a weekend shift--Wednesday through Sunday, 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.--and an evening shift--Monday through Friday, 3:00 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. The Agency explained that the weekend shift "was needed to have employees available to perform necessary maintenance and repair work which necessitate shutting down portions of the steam transmission system." Award at 8-9. The Agency further explained that the "evening shift was established to have employees available to remove manhole covers for contractors performing repair work in the steam tunnels." Id. at 9. The new schedules became effective on June 11 and 12, 1989, respectively.

The Union grieved the Agency's change in work schedules. The Union contended that the change violated Article VII of the parties' collective bargaining agreement, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Section 1. The basic workweek shall consist of 5 calendar days of 8 hours each, and will normally be Monday through Friday. Work schedules may be changed in order to accommodate unanticipated changes in work requirements or availability of personnel provided employees whose scheduled workdays or work hours are changed are notified of the change in their basic workweek by Thursday of the week prior to the calendar week affected by the change. The union will be given as much advance notice as possible of management's intention to make modification to the work schedule.

Id. at 5.

The Agency denied the grievance on the basis that it was untimely filed. Thereafter, the Union invoked arbitration. The following stipulated issues were submitted to the Arbitrator:

1. Was the grievance filed by the Union in a timely manner in accordance with Article XXIV, Section 3, of the labor agreement?

2. Did management violate [A]rticle VII, Section 1 of the labor agreement when it implemented new work schedules in June 1989? If so, what should the remedy be?

Id. at 2-3.

With respect to the first issue, the Arbitrator found that the grievance was timely filed and arbitrable. No exceptions were filed to this determination.

As to the second issue, the Agency contended before the Arbitrator that "[d]evelopments in Federal [l]abor [r]elations since the negotiation of [the parties'] labor agreement in 1979 must be considered." Id. at 9. The Agency noted that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) had issued Government-wide regulations at 5 C.F.R. § 610.121 that required agencies to establish work schedules which coincide with work requirements. The Agency stated that it had amended its regulations to be consistent with 5 C.F.R. § 610.121. The Agency contended that "the controlling regulations and a reasonable construction of the contract language compel a conclusion that the [Agency's] work schedules were established in accordance with the labor agreement." Award at 10.

The Agency asserted that "the language of the regulation and the contract explicitly authorizes management to change work schedules as long as employees were properly notified." Id. at 13. The Agency contended that it had complied with the contract's notification requirement. The Agency further contended that if the Union were interpreting the contract language "to mean that management can only change work schedules when the need for the change is 'unanticipated[,]' [s]uch a construction would be preposterous." Id. The Agency claimed that the "only reasonable construction of the word 'unanticipated' as used [in Article VII, Section 1] is that it refers to work requirements that were not anticipated when the schedules were originally established." Id. at 14 (emphasis in original).

Before the Arbitrator, the Union contended that the Agency "made an arbitrary and capricious decision to change the working conditions as agreed to in the collective bargaining agreement" by changing work schedules "so that the affected employees were required to work weekends without the benefit of being paid the overtime [to which] they were legally entitled." Id. The Union also asserted that the Agency had failed to consult with the Union before changing these working conditions and had made the changes despite having lost an arbitration case over the same issue in February 1981. As a remedy, the Union requested the Arbitrator to rescind the Agency's decision, to restore the previous work schedules, and to award pay to the affected employees for lost overtime.

The Arbitrator found that the Agency violated Article VII, Section 1 of the contract when it implemented the new work schedules in June 1989. He stated that although management retains the right to schedule work for employees, it "can only change work schedules for reasons authorized by the contract." Id. at 17. In this regard, the Arbitrator stated that management could not exercise its rights in a manner that was "arbitrary or capricious" and could not make changes "for reasons not authorized by the contract." Id.

The Arbitrator noted that Article VII, Section 1 states that "work schedules may be changed in order to accommodate unanticipated changes [in work requirements]." Award at 17 (emphasis in award). The Arbitrator found that this language "is not ambiguous and therefore must be given its usual meaning." Id. at 18. Noting that "unanticipated" was defined in a dictionary as "not anticipated: unexpected, unforeseen and disconcerting lines of development[,]" the Arbitrator found that there "were no emergencies, crises or other unforeseen circumstances existing at the time of the work schedule changes by management." Id. at 18-19. The Arbitrator determined that the work schedules were not changed in order to accommodate unanticipated changes in work requirements. Rather, he concluded that the reason given by the Agency for the change--to increase efficiency--was not authorized by the parties' agreement. The Arbitrator also noted that he concurred with the findings of an arbitrator's award in 1981 in another case involving the same parties and a similar issue. In that case, the arbitrator held that the Agency's work assignments for May 17 and 18, 1980 were not "to accommodate unanticipated changes in work requirements or availability of personnel" and the Agency, therefore, had no authority to change work schedules. Id. at 19.

Having found that the Agency violated Article VII, Section 1 of the parties' agreement when it changed work schedules in June 1989 without consulting with the Union, the Arbitrator granted the Union's grievance and ordered the Agency to make the employees whole by compensating them for lost overtime.

IV. Positions of the Parties

A. Agency

The Agency contends that the award is deficient because it is contrary to law, a Government-wide regulation, and an Agency regulation. Specifically, the Agency asserts that the award is contrary to: (1) 5 U.S.C. § 6101 and 5 C.F.R. § 610.121(b), which give agencies the authority to establish work schedules and require agencies to schedule employees' regularly scheduled administrative workweeks to correspond with their actual work requirements; (2) GSA Order OAD P 6010.4, Chapter 12, e., an Agency regulation, which requires managers and supervisors to schedule employees' workweeks in such a manner as to meet actual work requirements; (3) section 7106(b)(1) of the Statute, as it relates to management's right to determine the numbers, types, and grades of employees assigned to a tour of duty; (4) 5 U.S.C. § 5542 and Federal Personnel Manual (FPM) Chapter 550, subchapter 1-3, which concern overtime pay; and (5) 5 U.S.C. § 5596, the Back Pay Act.(1)

As to 5 U.S.C. § 6101 and 5 C.F.R. § 610.121(b), the Agency asserts that it "has an obligation to revise an employee's administrative workweek to comport with the hours during which the employee will actually be required to work '(w)hen the head of an agency knows in advance of an administrative workweek' that such a revision is necessary." Exceptions at 6. The Agency further notes that the "Union and the grievants received notice well in advance of the schedule change." Id. at 7. Noting the above, the Agency contends that it was "acting in conformity with its obligations under law and regulation by rescheduling the employees to work when their services would be required." Id. The Agency asserts that the Arbitrator's interpretation of Article VII, Section 1 of the agreement and, consequently, the award itself, preclude management "from rescheduling employees' tours of duty to conform with its work requirements when it is able to anticipate the need for the rescheduling." Id. at 7 and 8. The Agency states that it is in "such a circumstance where [management] is required by law and regulation to reschedule employees' tours of duty." Id. at 8.

With respect to GSA Order P 6010.4, Chapter 12, e., the Agency contends that the award precludes management "from rescheduling employees' tours of duty to conform with its actual work requirements" as required by this regulation. Id. at 10. The Agency asserts that this regulation is binding on the parties. In support of its contention, the Agency relies on U.S. Department of the Army, Fort Campbell District, Third Region, Fort Campbell, Kentucky and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2022, 37 FLRA 186 (1990) (Fort Campbell).

Concerning 5 U.S.C. § 5542, FPM Chapter 550, and 5 U.S.C. § 5596, the Agency contends that the Arbitrator's remedy for lost overtime is contrary to such provisions. The Agency states that 5 U.S.C. § 5542 and FPM Chapter 550, subchapter 1-3 authorize overtime pay for a Federal employee only when the employee performs work for more than 8 hours in a day or 40 hours in an administrative workweek. The Agency asserts that as "the grievants did not work in excess of 8 hours in a day or in excess of 40 hours in an administrative workweek, the [A]rbitrator's award of overtime compensation is [deficient because it is] contrary to law and controlling regulation." Exceptions at 11. As to 5 U.S.C. § 5596, the Agency contends that the award is deficient because the Arbitrator did not make the requisite findings to award backpay under this provision. According to the Agency, the Arbitrator "could not make the requisite findings because there was no unjustified or unwarranted personnel action." Id. at 14 (emphasis in original). The Agency states that it acted "in conformity with law and [G]overnment-wide regulation by rescheduling the employees' tours of duty in advance of the administrative workweek when it foresaw the need for employees' services on another tour of duty." Id. at 14-15.

B. Union

The Union contends that the Agency violated the parties' collective bargaining agreement by changing a working condition without allowing the Union to bargain over the impact and implementation of the decision to change shifts. The Union "recognizes management's right to assign work" under section 7106(A)(2)(B) of the Statute. Opposition at 2. The Union asserts, however, that the Union must be accorded its rights under the Statute to bargain over the impact and implementation of the change in unit employees' work schedules.

The Union contends that the parties "jointly agreed that the [A]rbitrator would be limited to ruling" on "those issues stipulated before him for his opinion." Id. at 1 and 2. The Union asserts that the Arbitrator ruled on these issues and, therefore, his award is "just and within the confines of the law." Id. at 2.

The Union further notes that during the Agency's closing argument at the arbitration hearing, the Agency produced a document, GSA Order OAD P 6010.4, which the Agency claimed "supersede[d]" the parties' agreement and allowed the Agency to change employees' working conditions. Id. The Union contends that this document "was never made available to the Union until the day of arbitration." Id.

V. Analysis and Conclusions

A. The Award Is Not Contrary to Section 7106(b)(1) of the Statute

Section 7106(b)(1) provides that an agency may elect, but is not required, to negotiate "on the numbers, types, and grades of employees or positions assigned to any organizational subdivision, work project, or tour of duty[.]" A "tour of duty" is "the hours of a day (a daily tour of duty) and the days of an administrative workweek (a weekly tour of duty) that constitute an employee's regularly scheduled administrative workweek." 5 C.F.R. § 610.102(h). Therefore, an employee's daily tour of duty is his or her hours of work, and any change in the employee's work hours is a change in his or her tour of duty. See Scott Air Force Base. Further, once a provision which concerns matters which are covered by section 7106(b)(1) is included in an agreement, the provision is enforceable through grievance arbitration. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Engraving and Printing, Washington, D.C. and Washington Plate Printers Union, Local No. 2, International Plate Printers, Die Stampers and Engravers, 41 FLRA 860, 870 (1991).

In this case, the parties negotiated Article VII, Section 1, which concerns the hours of work and basic workweek of bargaining unit employees. Article VII, Section 1 provides that the employees' basic workweek shall consist of 5 calendar days of 8 hours each, and will normally be Monday through Friday. Section 1 also describes the circumstances under which the tours of duty of unit employees may be changed. In our view, Article VII, Section 1 represents the Agency's election to bargain over the days and hours that would constitute employees' tours of duty and the circumstances under which the tours of duty may be changed. See, for example, U.S. Department of the Navy, Philadelphia Naval Shipyard and Philadelphia Metal Trades Council, 39 FLRA 590, 598-599 (1990).

One stipulated issue before the Arbitrator was whether management violated Article VII, Section 1 of the parties' agreement when it implemented new work schedules in June 1989. The Arbitrator, interpreting and applying Article VII, Section 1, found that the Agency could "only change [the] work schedules [of unit employees] for reasons authorized by the contract." Award at 17. The Arbitrator further found that the work schedules of the affected unit employees were not changed in accordance with this provision. He concluded, therefore, that the Agency violated the parties' agreement.

We find that the Arbitrator merely enforced the parties' agreement concerning the tours of duty of unit employees, that is, the hours of work and basic workweek of unit employees at the Agency's facility. Consequently, we conclude that the Agency's contention that the award violates management's right under section 7106(b)(1) of the Statute provides no basis for finding the award deficient.

B. GSA Order OAD P 6010.4 Chapter 12, e. Provides No Basis for Finding the Award Deficient

The Agency contends that the award precludes the Agency from rescheduling employees' tours of duty consistent with an Agency regulation, GSA Order OAD P 6010.4, Chapter 12, e. The Agency asserts that this regulation requires managers to schedule employees in such a manner as to meet actual work requirements. We find that this contention provides no basis for finding the award deficient.

The Arbitrator found that the Agency could change work schedules only "for reasons authorized by [Article VII, Section 1 of] the [parties'] contract." Award at 17. That is, the Agency could change work schedules "in order to accommodate unanticipated changes" in work requirements. Id. (emphasis in Award). We have held that "collective bargaining agreements, and not agency rules and regulations, govern the disposition of matters to which they both apply when there is a conflict between the agreement and the rule or regulation." Fort Campbell, 37 FLRA at 194.

In this case, Article VII, Section 1 and GSA Order OAD P 6010.4, Chapter 12, e. both apply to the same matter, that is, the circumstances under which the Agency may change unit employees' work schedules. As interpreted by the Arbitrator, Article VII, Section 1 permits the Agency to change employees' work schedules only to accommodate unanticipated changes in work requirements. The Agency regulation requires the Agency to schedule employees to meet actual work requirements. We find that there is a conflict between Article VII, Section 1 and GSA Order OAD P 6010.4, Chapter 12, e. with respect to the circumstances under which the Agency may change unit employees' work schedules. Under Fort Campbell, Article VII, Section 1 takes precedence over the conflicting Agency regulation. Thus, the Agency's contention that the award is inconsistent with the Agency regulation does not provide a basis for finding the award deficient under section 7122(a) of the Statute.

C. The Agency Has Not Established that the Award Is Inconsistent with 5 U.S.C. § 6101

The Agency contends that the award is inconsistent with 5 U.S.C. § 6101. The Agency states that 5 U.S.C. § 6101 requires the Agency to "establish a basic administrative workweek of forty hours for each full-time employee and [to] establish work schedules." Exceptions at 6. We find nothing in the award which would prevent the Agency from "establishing a basic administrative workweek of 40 hours for each full-time employee in [the] organization" or an employee's work schedule. 5 U.S.C. § 6101. We find, therefore, that the Agency has not established that the award is inconsistent with 5 U.S.C. § 6101.

D. The Record Is Insufficient to Determine Whether the Award Is Inconsistent with 5 C.F.R. § 610.121(b)

The Agency asserts that the award is inconsistent with 5 C.F.R. § 610.121. Section 610.121(b) requires that the Agency: (1) schedule employees' work so as to accomplish the Agency's mission, and (2) schedule administrative workweeks to correspond with actual work requirements. The Authority has held that 5 C.F.R. § 610.121(b) is qualified by 5 C.F.R. § 610.121(a), which directs agency heads to establish conventional workweek schedules except upon a determination that the agency would be seriously handicapped in carrying out its functions or that costs would be substantially increased. See Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, 39 FLRA at 604 and Scott Air Force Base, 23 FLRA at 755-56. The Authority has also found that 5 C.F.R. § 610.121 is a Government-wide regulation within the meaning of section 7117(a) of the Statute. See Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, 39 FLRA at 603.

In our view, Article VII, Section 1 and 5 C.F.R. § 610.121 address the same matter, that is, employees' work schedules and the circumstances under which the Agency may change such schedules or tours of duty.

Under section 7117 of the Statute, Government-wide rules and regulations bar negotiation over and agreement to union proposals that conflict with them. Except for Government-wide rules or regulations implementing 5 U.S.C. § 2302, however, Government-wide rules or regulations do not control over conflicting provisions in a collective bargaining agreement if the agreement was in effect before the date the rule or regulation was prescribed. See 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(7). See also U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters III Corps and Fort Hood, Fort Hood, Texas and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1920, 40 FLRA 636, 641 (1991) (Fort Hood) (citing Fort Campbell).

Section 7116(a)(7) of the Statute is interpreted and applied by the Authority "narrowly." Fort Hood, 40 FLRA at 641. As such, provisions in a collective bargaining agreement control over conflicting Government-wide regulations "for the express term of the agreement during which the Government-wide regulation was first prescribed, but no longer." Id. Moreover, the enforceability of Government-wide regulations is not "dependent on negotiations upon the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement." Id. Instead, such Government-wide regulations become enforceable "by operation of law when the agreement expires." Id.

In this case, we find that the record is insufficient for us to determine whether, consistent with Fort Hood, Article VII, Section 1 takes precedence over 5 C.F.R. § 610.121 with respect to matters to which they both apply. In this regard, the record reveals that: (1) the parties' collective bargaining agreement became effective on April 5, 1979, for a 1-year period; (2) the parties' agreement contains a provision, Article XXVIII, that provides that the agreement automatically renews for a 1-year term commencing with the approval date of April 5; (3) 5 C.F.R. § 610.121 became effective on February 28, 1983; and (4) the new work schedules became effective in June 1989.(2)

We have held that an automatic 1-year renewal term could not preclude the enforcement of Government-wide regulations existing on the effective date of a new term of an agreement. See U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Contract Audit Agency, Central Region and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 3529, 37 FLRA 1218, 1228 (1990). Therefore, an automatic 1-year renewal would not preclude the enforcement of a Government-wide regulation if the regulation was in effect on the date of the new term of the collective bargaining agreement. Compare Fort Hood (based on the record, including the arbitrator's interpretation of a provision concerning the duration of an agreement, we found that a Government-wide regulation was not enforceable because the contract had not expired).

In this case, unlike Fort Hood, neither party presented evidence concerning the duration of the contract nor did the Arbitrator interpret and apply the duration provision (Article XXVIII) of the parties' agreement to determine whether the collective bargaining agreement or the Government-wide regulation controls the disposition of the grievance. Because it is not clear from the record whether, consistent with Fort Hood, the collective bargaining agreement or the Government-wide regulation controls the matter in dispute, we are unable to determine whether the award is deficient.

As the record in this case is insufficient for us to determine whether the award is deficient, we will remand the award to the parties for resubmission to the Arbitrator so that the Arbitrator can make the necessary findings as to whether the parties' agreement or the Government-wide regulation controls the disposition of this case. After making the necessary findings, the Arbitrator should resolve the grievance accordingly.(3)

If, after interpreting and applying Article XXVIII of the parties' agreement, the Arbitrator finds that Article VII, Section 1 controls the matter in dispute, the contract would be enforceable. If the Arbitrator finds that 5 C.F.R. § 610.121 controls the matter in dispute, then the award would be inconsistent with the Government-wide regulation. As discussed above, Article VII, Section 1, as interpreted by the Arbitrator, allows the Agency to change work schedules only in order to accommodate unanticipated changes in work requirements, whereas 5 C.F.R. § 610.121 requires that the Agency schedule administrative workweeks to correspond with actual work requirements and permits the Agency to change conventional workweek schedules upon a determination that it would be seriously handicapped in carrying out its functions or that costs would be substantially increased. Accordingly, Article VII, Section 1, as interpreted by the Arbitrator, does not permit the Agency to change unit employees' work schedules in circumstances where the Agency could change them pursuant to the regulation. Consequently, if the regulation controls, the award would be inconsistent with that regulation and, therefore, deficient.

VI. Decision

Pursuant to section 2425.4 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations, the Arbitrator's award is remanded to the parties for resubmission to the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator should determine whether the parties' collective bargaining agreement or the Government-wide regulation controls the disposition of the grievance and, after making such determination, resolve the grievance accordingly.

On receipt of the award, as clarified, either party may timely file with the Authority exceptions to that award.

APPENDIX

Relevant provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 6101 provide, in pertinent part, as follows:

§ 6101. Basic 40-hour workweek; work schedules; regulations

. . . .

(a)(2) The head of each Executive agency . . . shall--

(A) establish a basic administrative workweek of 40 hours for each full-time employee in his organization; and

(B) require that the hours of work within that workweek be performed within a period of not more than 6 of any 7 consecutive days.

(3) Except when the head of an Executive agency . . . determines that his organization would be seriously handicapped in carrying out its functions or that costs would be substantially increased, he or she shall provide, with respect to each employee in his organization that--

. . . .

(b) the basic 40-hour workweek is scheduled 5 days, Monday through Friday when possible, and the 2 days outside the basic workweek are consecutive[.]

Relevant provisions of 5 C.F.R. § 610.121 provide, in pertinent part, as follows:

§ 610.121 Establishment of work schedules.

(a) Except when the head of an agency determines that the agency would be seriously handicapped in carrying out its functions or that costs would be substantially increased, he or she shall provide that--

(1) Assignments to tours of duty are scheduled in advance of the administrative workweek over periods of not less than 1 week;

(2) The basic 40-hour workweek is scheduled on 5 days, Monday through Friday when possible, and the 2 days outside the basic workweek are consecutive[.]

. . . .

(b)(1) The head of an agency shall schedule the work of his or her employees to accomplish the mission of the agency. The head of an agency shall schedule an employee's regularly scheduled administrative workweek so that it corresponds with the employee's actual work requirements.

(2) When the head of an agency knows in advance of an administrative workweek that the specific days and/or hours of a day actually required of an employee in that administrative workweek will differ from those required in the current administrative workweek, he or she shall reschedule the employee's regularly scheduled administrative workweek to correspond with those specific days and hours. The head of the agency shall inform them employee of the change, and he or she shall record the change on the employee's time card or other agency document for recording work.

(3) If it is determined that the head of an agency should have scheduled a period of work as part of the employee's regularly scheduled administrative workweek and failed to do so in accordance with paragraphs (b) (1) and (2) of this section, the employee shall be entitled to the payment of premium pay for that period of work as regularly scheduled work under Subpart A of Part 550 of this chapter. In this regard, it must be determined that the head of the agency: (1) Had knowledge of the specific days and hours of the work requirement in advance of the administrative workweek, and (ii) had the opportunity to determine which employee had to be scheduled, or rescheduled, to meet the specific days and hours of that work requirement.

GSA Order OAD P 6010.4, Chapter 12, e. provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(e) Scheduling work to meet actual work requirements

(1) Each employee's regularly scheduled administrative workweek must correspond to actual work requirements. When managers and supervisors know in advance of an administrative workweek that the days and/or hours of a day actually required of an employee in that administrative workweek will differ from those required in the current administrative workweek, the manager or supervisor must reschedule the employee's regularly scheduled administrative workweek to correspond to those specific days and hours.

Article XXVIII provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

ARTICLE XXVIII

DURATION AND CHANGES

Section 1. This agreement as executed by the parties shall remain in full force and effect for a period of one year from the date of its approval by the Regional Administrator, GSA, NCR, and shall be automatically renewed from year to year thereafter except that either party may notify the other party of its intention to renegotiate a new agreement provided the other party is notified not earlier than 90 days nor later than 60 days prior to the anniversary date. Further, it is provided that this Agreement shall terminate at any time it is determined that the Union is no longer entitled to exclusive recognition under [the Statute].

On the request of either party, the parties shall meet to commence negotiations on a new agreement within 30 days after receipt of the request, unless otherwise agreed to by its parties.

 




FOOTNOTES:
(If blank, the decision does not have footnotes.)
 

1. The relevant text of 5 U.S.C. § 6101, 5 C.F.R. § 610.121, and GSA Order OAD P 6010.4, Chapter 12, e. is found in the Appendix to this