42:1019(72)NG - - NAGE Local R7-72 and Army, Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island, IL - - 1991 FLRAdec NG - - v42 p1019



[ v42 p1019 ]
42:1019(72)NG
The decision of the Authority follows:


42 FLRA No. 72

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

LOCAL R7-72

(Union)

and

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL

ROCK ISLAND, ILLINOIS

(Agency)

0-NG-1924

DECISION AND ORDER ON NEGOTIABILITY ISSUES

October 23, 1991

Before Chairman McKee and Members Talkin and Armendariz.

I. Statement of the Case

This case is before the Authority on a negotiability appeal filed under section 7105(a)(2)(E) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) concerning the negotiability of two proposals.

Proposal 1, the first sentence, requires the Agency to give employees the option of using annual leave or other paid leave in lieu of leave without pay (LWOP) during a shutdown due to lack of production or to promote production efficiency. The second sentence requires the Agency to grant employees a day of administrative leave for each day the employee takes LWOP, annual leave, or other leave during a shutdown. The third sentence provides that if a shutdown lasts an odd number of days, employees are required to take annual leave, other leave, or LWOP for the odd day. For the following reasons, we find that Proposal 1 is negotiable.

We find that Proposal 2, which precludes the Agency from requiring employees to wear particular protective equipment when riding motorcycles, is nonnegotiable because it directly and excessively interferes with management's right to determine its internal security practices under section 7106(a)(1) of the Statute.

II. Proposal 1

In the event that the employer shuts down or cuts back operations due to lack of production or to promote production efficiency, the employer shall grant employees the option of using annual leave or other paid leave in lieu of leave without pay during the period of the shut down. The employer further agrees to grant employees one day of administrative leave for each day the employee takes leave without pay, annual leave or other leave during the shut down. If the shut down lasts an odd number of days the employees will be required to take annual leave, other leave, or leave without pay for the extra day of the shut down.

A. Positions of the Parties

1. The Agency

The Agency contends that the first sentence of Proposal 1 directly interferes with management's right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute. The Agency asserts that the proposal denies it the "discretion to determine the appropriate leave to grant employees." Statement of Position at 3. Specifically, the Agency argues that management would be prevented from "placing an employee in a leave without pay status" during shutdowns or "requiring an employee to use annual leave." Id. at 2-3, 4. The Agency also argues that the proposal is inconsistent with 5 C.F.R. § 630.401 by allowing employees to "use sick leave for purposes other than those outlined" in the regulation. Id. at 3.

The Agency argues that the second and third sentences "deprive[] management of its rights to require employees to take leave, and prevents the closing of operations[,]" and, therefore, directly interfere with management's rights to direct employees and assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(A) and (B). Id. at 4. In support, the Agency cites Department of the Navy, Naval Underwater Systems Center v. FLRA, 854 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1988) (Naval Underwater Systems Center). The Agency also asserts that Proposal 1 requires management to grant administrative leave "for purposes other than those provided" by the Federal Personnel Manual (FPM) and, therefore, it is nonnegotiable because it is inconsistent with a Government-wide regulation. Statement of Position at 5.

Finally, the Agency asserts that Proposal 1 does not constitute an appropriate arrangement within the meaning of section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute. The Agency argues that because the proposal is inconsistent with a Government-wide regulation, 5 C.F.R. § 630.401, and with the FPM, section 7106(b)(3) is inapplicable. Further, the Agency asserts that there is no adverse effect on employees because "[e]mployees are aware of this pending closure during the entire year, therefore, it is entirely within the employee's control to plan his or her leave accordingly so the curtailment does not have an adverse effect." Id.

2. The Union

The Union asserts that Proposal 1 is an appropriate arrangement for "employees adversely affected by management's right to temporarily shut down or curtail operations." Petition for Review at 1. The Union contends that the employees "must take annual or other leave for the length of the shut down." Id. Proposal 1, the Union asserts, would enable employees to "receive administrative leave for each day of annual or other leave that they used" during the shutdown. Id. The Union argues that the proposal does not "prevent the [Agency] from implementing a layoff," therefore, the Agency "would still save money in utilities and other costs." Id. at 2.

B. Analysis and Conclusions

1. Preliminary Matter

The first sentence of Proposal 1 requires the Agency to give employees the option of using annual leave or "other paid leave" in lieu of LWOP during a shutdown due to lack of production or to promote production efficiency. The second sentence requires the Agency to grant employees a day of administrative leave for each day the employee takes LWOP, annual leave, or "other leave" during the shutdown. The third sentence of Proposal 1 provides that if a shutdown lasts an odd number of days, employees are required to take annual leave, other leave, or LWOP for the odd day.

The terms "other paid leave," as used in the first sentence of Proposal 1, and "other leave," as used in the second and third sentences of the proposal, are not defined in the proposal or by the Union in its petition for review. The Agency interprets these terms as including sick leave, compensatory leave, and administrative leave. See Agency Allegation of Nonnegotiability at 6 (attached to Union's Petition for Review).

Contrary to the Agency's assertion, we conclude that the terms "other paid leave" and "other leave" do not include administrative leave. We note two things. First, it is clear, that the terms "other paid leave" and "other leave" are synonymous. The first sentence of the proposal requires the Agency to grant employees the option, in certain circumstances, of using annual or other paid leave in lieu of LWOP. The second and third sentences require the Agency to grant administrative leave for the LWOP, annual, or other leave the employees took pursuant to the first sentence. When these sentences are read together, it is plain that the "other leave" encompassed by the second and third sentences is the "other paid leave" encompassed by the first.

Second, as the terms "other paid leave" and "other leave" are synonymous, reading the term "other paid leave" as encompassing administrative leave would mean that the second sentence would require the Agency to grant administrative leave to compensate for administrative leave already granted. There is no support in the record for this interpretation of the proposal. Accordingly, we interpret the terms "other paid leave" and "other leave" as excluding administrative leave. Noting the absence of any assertion to the contrary by the Union, however, we find, in agreement with the Agency, that the terms "other paid leave" and "other leave" encompass sick leave and compensatory leave.

2. The First Sentence of Proposal 1

The record reveals that the Agency curtails its operations "during holiday periods, i.e., the day after Thanksgiving and the Christmas/New Year period[.]" Statement of Position at 3. According to the Agency:

. . . some bargaining unit employees are not given the option of taking leave. For example, the agency must provide essential services such as fire protection, security, medical and other support services for tenant activities and personnel on the installation whose operations are not curtailed.

Id. The first sentence of Proposal 1 applies only to those employees who are not assigned to work during a shutdown and who are placed on LWOP. The sentence requires the Agency to grant these employees the option of using annual leave or other paid leave (sick leave or compensatory leave) instead of LWOP. For the following reasons, we find that this sentence is negotiable.

We note, at the outset, that the Agency makes no argument that providing employees with the option of using compensatory leave, pursuant to the first sentence of Proposal 1, is nonnegotiable. Therefore, we will not address such leave further. We reject, however, the Agency's assertion that by permitting employees to use "other paid leave," the first sentence of Proposal 1 is inconsistent with 5 C.F.R. § 630.401, a Government-wide regulation which sets forth the situations in which it is appropriate for an agency to grant sick leave.(1) We find nothing in the first sentence of Proposal 1 that requires the Agency to grant sick leave in circumstances other than those described in 5 C.F.R. § 630.401. Accordingly, there is no basis for concluding that the first sentence of Proposal 1 is inconsistent with 5 C.F.R. § 630.401.

The Agency also asserts that the first sentence of Proposal 1 "precludes the [A]gency from placing an employee in a leave without pay status during the period of the shutdown." Statement of Position at 2-3. As we understand this assertion, the Agency is arguing that agencies may require employees to take LWOP in a curtailment or shutdown of operations. However, the Agency cites no authority, and none is apparent to us, to support this argument. Contrary to the Agency's assertion, we note that the FPM defines LWOP as a "temporary nonpay status and absence from duty granted upon an employee's request." FPM chapter 630-27, subchapter 12-1, a. (July 24, 1986) (emphasis added). Further, the FPM provides that when agencies curtail operations, they "may allow employees to use LWOP, if requested, to cover the period." FPM chapter 610-10, subchapter 3-6, c. (June 30, 1969) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we reject the Agency's argument that it can require employees to take LWOP when it curtails or shuts down its operations.

We also reject the Agency's argument that the first sentence of Proposal 1 directly interferes with management's right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute. Nothing in the first sentence of Proposal 1 concerns the Agency's decisions to assign, or not to assign, work to employees during a shutdown. The proposal begins with "[i]n the event that the employer shuts down or cuts back operations." By its plain wording, the first sentence of Proposal 1 takes effect after management has decided to curtail or shutdown operations. Put differently, the first sentence of the proposal concerns only the leave status of employees who are not assigned to work during a shutdown. Because management has already decided to not make work assignments before the first sentence of Proposal 1 takes effect, we find that the first sentence does not directly interfere with management's right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute.

Finally, we note the Agency's argument that the first sentence of Proposal 1 is nonnegotiable because it denies management "discretion to determine the appropriate leave to grant employees." Statement of Position at 3. We have already addressed, and rejected, the Agency's argument that the first sentence would require the Agency to grant sick leave in a manner inconsistent with its obligations under applicable regulations. Moreover, as noted, the Agency makes no arguments regarding the use of compensatory time. To the extent that the Agency is arguing that it has the right to require employees to take annual leave during a shutdown, we disagree.

Initially, we note that the Authority generally finds that proposals which place restrictions on an agency's right to determine when annual leave may be used directly interfere with management's right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute. See American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1513 and U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island, Oak Harbor, Washington, 41 FLRA 589, 597-601 (1991) (Naval Air Station) and cases cited therein. Such cases have arisen in the context of normal, ongoing agency operations, however. As discussed above, the first sentence of Proposal 1 addresses a situation where the Agency has decided to temporarily curtail its operations and has decided further to assign, or not assign, work to certain employees during the curtailment. The first sentence of Proposal 1 addresses only the leave status of employees to whom the Agency has decided not to assign work. Consequently, as discussed above, the requirement that the Agency give employees the option of using annual leave does not interfere with management's right to assign work under the Statute.

We also note that the FPM allows agencies discretion to determine the status of employees if "[g]roup dismissal" is necessary "to better utilize funds or resources." FPM chapter 610-10, subchapter 3-6, c. (June 30, 1969). The FPM provides that:

agencies may detail employees to other duties; require employees to schedule annual leave for use during the non-duty period; or furlough employees if lack of work or funds is involved. . . . Agencies may allow employees to use LWOP, if requested, to cover the period."

Id. Consistent with this provision, agencies have discretion to decide among these leave options to better utilize funds or resources or, if there is a lack of work or funds, to choose to furlough employees within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 7511. Where an agency has discretion over a matter affecting conditions of employment, the agency is obligated under the Statute to exercise that discretion through bargaining unless the governing law or regulation specifically limits the exercise of discretion to the agency or the proposal or provision is otherwise nonnegotiable. American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1411 and Department of the Army, Fort Benjamin Harrison, 32 FLRA 990, 1060 (1988). See also 54 Comp. Gen. 503, 506 (1974) ("agency head . . . may relinquish discretion with regard to scheduling annual leave of employees . . . through the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements"). Accordingly, we reject the Agency's argument that where it has initiated a shutdown of operations, it has the right to determine the appropriate leave to grant employees.

In conclusion, we find that the first sentence of Proposal 1 is not inconsistent with 5 C.F.R. § 630.401 and does not directly interfere with management's right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B). Accordingly, in the absence of any other arguments by the Agency, we conclude that the first sentence of Proposal 1 is negotiable.

3. The Second and Third Sentences of Proposal 1 Do Not Excessively Interfere with Management's Right to Assign Work

The Agency argues that the second and third sentences of Proposal 1 require management "to grant administrative leave to employees during a shut down" and, therefore, "deprive[] management of its rights to require employees to take leave, and prevents the closing of operations." Statement of Position at 4. According to the Agency, these sentences directly interfere with management's rights to direct employees under section 7106(a)(2)(A) and to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B).

First, we find that nothing in Proposal 1 precludes management from curtailing its operations or shutting down. By its plain wording, "[i]n the event that the employer shuts down or cuts back operations[,]" the proposal takes effect after management has initiated a shutdown, or curtailment, of operations. Consequently, we find the Agency's citation to International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Union and Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Engraving and Printing, 33 FLRA 711, 722 (1988) (Bureau of Engraving and Printing) inapposite. The Authority found that the disputed proposal in Bureau of Engraving and Printing would have enabled employees to "thwart the [a]gency's decision temporarily to curtail its operations . . . ." Id. at 723. In contrast, the first sentence of Proposal 1 requires only that management give employees the option of taking annual leave or other paid leave (sick leave or compensatory leave) during a shutdown. It does not, as we noted above, prevent the Agency, in any manner, from curtailing its operations. Therefore, contrary to the Agency's assertion, Proposal 1 is distinguishable from the disputed proposal in Bureau of Engraving and Printing.

Second, we reject the Agency's assertion that the second and third sentences require management to grant administrative leave during a shutdown. As we read these sentences, they concern administrative leave to be granted and used after the Agency resumes operations. Compare American Federation of Government Employees, National Veterans Administration Council and U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, D.C., 41 FLRA 73, 79-81 (1991) (proposal requiring retroactive grant of administrative leave equal to time lost during a furlough when appropriated funds became available held consistent with Anti-Deficiency Act and not to interfere with agency's right to lay off employees). Therefore, the Agency's citation of Naval Underwater Systems Center is misplaced. Naval Underwater Systems Center concerned the negotiability of a proposal providing that during the period of a shutdown, furloughs of employees would be "the last resort when administrative leave cannot be given due to budgetary constraints." 854 F.2d at 3. As the second and third sentences of Proposal 2 clearly are distinguishable from the disputed proposal in Naval Underwater Systems Center, we will not address that decision further.

The Agency also contends that the proposal would require it to grant employees administrative leave for "purposes other than those provided by the FPM[.]" Statement of Position at 5. The Agency has not cited an FPM provision, and we are not aware of any provision, which precludes granting administrative leave in the circumstances described in the second sentence of Proposal 1. As such, we reject this argument. See National Treasury Employees Union and Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 41 FLRA 1106, 1126 (1991), petition for review filed sub nom. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms v. FLRA, No. 91-1493 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 8, 1991) (Authority rejected agency argument that provision granting administrative leave for employees to attend certain employee assistance treatment and counseling sessions was inconsistent with applicable FPM provisions).

However, by requiring the Agency to grant employees administrative leave after resumption of operations, the second sentence would preclude the Agency from assigning work to employees during the period of that administrative leave. For example, if an employee took 4 days of annual leave during a Christmas shutdown, the Agency would be obligated to approve 4 days of administrative leave for that employee at an unspecified time after the shutdown and, consequently, would be unable to assign any duties to the employee on those 4 days. By precluding the assignment of work to employees, the second sentence directly interferes with management's right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute and is nonnegotiable unless it constitutes an appropriate arrangement within the meaning of section 7106(b)(3). See Naval Air Station, 41 FLRA at 599-601.

The third sentence provides that if a shutdown lasts an odd number of days, employees would be required to use annual leave, other leave, or LWOP for the extra day that the Agency is shut down. Put differently, the Agency would not be required to grant administrative leave for the odd day. For example, if a shutdown extended 5 days, the Agency would be required to grant only 4 days of administrative leave. The third sentence of the proposal is not applicable unless the second sentence takes effect. That is, the third sentence relates only to the number of days of administrative leave the Agency would be required by the second sentence to grant to employees. We conclude, therefore, that both sentences are nonnegotiable unless they constitute an appropriate arrangement.

In determining whether a proposal is an appropriate arrangement under section 7106(b)(3), we first determine whether the proposal is intended to be an arrangement for employees adversely affected by the exercise of a management right. If the proposal is intended to be an arrangement, we next examine whether the arrangement is appropriate because it does not excessively interfere with the exercise of the management right. National Association of Government Employees, Local R14-87 and Kansas Army National Guard, 21 FLRA 24, 31 (1986) (Kansas Army National Guard).

The Union asserts that employees are adversely affected by the Agency's decision to curtail its operations and its requirement that employees use their earned leave during the shutdown. Proposal 1, the Union argues, is intended to ameliorate this adverse effect by enabling employees to receive administrative leave for the days of paid leave or LWOP they took during the shutdown. We conclude, based on the Union's statement, that the second and third sentences of Proposal 1 are intended as an appropriate arrangement to mitigate the adverse affects of management's decision to curtail operations.

We turn now to the issue of whether the second and third sentences of Proposal 1 excessively interfere with management's right to assign work. To resolve this issue, we balance the benefit to employees afforded by these sentences against the burden on the exercise of management's right. Kansas Army National Guard, 21 FLRA at 31-32.

Employees would benefit from the second sentence by receiving administrative leave for those days of annual leave, other leave, or LWOP which they were required to take during a shutdown. In effect, this sentence would provide employees paid time off to compensate them for the paid leave or LWOP they took during a shutdown.

We note, in this regard, that the second sentence is silent as to the scheduling of the administrative leave. Therefore, in the absence of an assertion to the contrary, we conclude that the second sentence would not limit the Agency's right to grant or deny leave on the particular days requested by employees. In other words, the second sentence would enable employees to request administrative leave at times of their choosing, subject to the Agency's right to deny the request based on workload considerations, thereby mitigating the employees' previous use of annual, sick, compensatory leave or LWOP at times chosen by the Agency. As such, by providing affected employees both with days off, with pay but without charge to leave, and with the opportunity to use that administrative leave at times most useful and convenient to them, the second sentence would provide employees with a significant benefit.

Next, we find that the second sentence does not excessively interfere with the exercise of management's rights. That is, the benefits accruing to employees under the second sentence outweigh the minimal burden imposed on the Agency.

The second sentence only applies after the Agency resumes its operations at the end of a temporary curtailment. In other words, the second sentence does not affect the Agency's decision to curtail its operations for any reason. We recognize that permitting employees to use administrative leave after the Agency resumes operations at the end of a temporary shutdown may have cost implications. The Agency has failed to specify what those costs entail. Therefore, we are unable to assess what weight that would have on our balancing. We do note, however, that the amount of administrative leave that potentially could be taken is not without limits. Only those employees who were not assigned work during the period of a temporary shutdown but who used annual, sick, compensatory leave or LWOP during the shutdown would be eligible to request administrative leave. Further, the length of the shutdown is within the Agency's control. Finally, nothing in the second sentence precludes the Agency from denying an employee's request for administrative leave based on workload requirement existing at the time of the request.

In conclusion, balancing the benefit that administrative leave would afford employees against the limited burden on management, we find that the second and third sentences do not excessively interfere with management's right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B). See National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 2119 and U.S. Department of the Army, Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island, Illinois, 42 FLRA No. 70 (1991) (proposal requiring an agency to place employees on administrative leave during a temporary shutdown found not to excessively interfere with the exercise of management's rights). Therefore, the second and third sentences are negotiable appropriate arrangements under section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute.

III. Proposal 2

Employees who ride motorcycles on the Rock Island Arsenal shall wear long pants, boots, gloves (full or half fingered), and eye protection unless the motorcycle is equipped with a windshield.

A. Positions of the Parties

1. The Agency

The Agency contends that Proposal 2 interferes with its right to determine its internal security practices under section 7106(a)(1) of the Statute because the proposal would preclude the Agency from requiring motorcyclists to wear protective equipment other than the items identified in the proposal. The Agency claims that the Union is attempting to preclude the Agency from requiring that motorcyclists wear a helmet as required by Army Regulation 385-55, Appendix B. According to the Agency, Proposal 2 "precludes the [A]gency from abiding by its plan to 'prevent accidents and thereby to safeguard its personnel and property.'" Statement of Position at 7.

The Agency asserts that Proposal 2 is not an appropriate arrangement because the Union has failed to show how the exercise of management's right to determine its internal security practices adversely affects employees. The Agency also argues that it is not clear how the "lesser safety standard" in the proposal benefits employees. Id.

2. The Union

The Union states that its proposal responds to the Agency's requirement that motorcyclists wear "long trousers, full fingered gloves, eye protection, helmet and high visibility garments." Petition for Review at 2. The Union asserts that, under its proposal, motorcyclists would "only be required to wear gloves, long trousers, eye protection and boots." Id. The Union contends that Proposal 2 is an "appropriate arrangement for those affected by management's decision to require riders to wear safety equipment." Id. The Union maintains that Proposal 2 does not prohibit the Agency from requiring safety equipment. Rather, the Union argues that "the specific type of equipment" that is required "is negotiable." Id.

B. Analysis and Conclusions

1. Proposal 2 Directly Interferes with Management's Right to Determine Its Internal Security Practices

An agency's right to determine its internal security practices under section 7106(a)(1) includes the right to determine policies which are part of its plan to secure or safeguard its personnel and physical property. This right extends to agency decisions that certain kinds of clothing and/or equipment are necessary for motorcycle operations on agency property. See, for example, American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1482 and U.S. Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, California, 40 FLRA 12, 15-16 (1991) (Marine Corps Logistics Base); International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Truck Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers of Jacksonville, Local Union 512 and Department of the Navy, Consolidated Civilian Personnel, Jacksonville, Florida, 32 FLRA 1200, 1204 (1988) (Consolidated Civilian Personnel).

The Agency states that the requirement in its regulations that motorcyclists wear certain protective equipment is designed to further its goal of safeguarding its personnel and property. Consistent with the Agency's statement and the cases cited previously, we find that the Agency has established a link between its goal of safeguarding personnel and property and its requirement that motorcyclists wear particular safety equipment. Accordingly, we find that the Agency's right to determine its internal security practices includes the right to determine the equipment and clothing necessary to protect motorcyclists on Agency installations and while on Agency business off the installation. See, for example, Marine Corps Logistics Base, 40 FLRA at 16; Consolidated Civilian Personnel, 32 FLRA at 1205.

The Union asserts that its proposal would limit protective equipment to "gloves, long trousers, eye protection and boots." Petition for Review at 2. As the Union explains its proposal, helmets would not be required protective equipment. The Union's statement is consistent with Proposal 2 and, consequently, we adopt it for purposes of this decision. Accordingly, by precluding the Agency from adopting different requirements for motorcyclists' protective equipment, Proposal 2 directly interferes with the Agency's right to determine what practices are necessary to safeguard its personnel and property. Therefore, the proposal directly interferes with management's right under section 7106(a)(1) to determine its internal security practices.

2. Proposal 2 Is Not an Appropriate Arrangement

Although Proposal 2 directly interferes with the Agency's right to determine its internal security practices, it is negotiable if it is an appropriate arrangement within the meaning of section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute. As noted previously, in determining whether a proposal is an appropriate arrangement under section 7106(b)(3), we first determine whether the proposal is intended to be an arrangement for employees adversely affected by the exercise of a management right. If the proposal is intended to be an arrangement, we next examine whether the arrangement is appropriate because it does not excessively interfere with the exercise of the management right. Kansas Army National Guard 21 FLRA at 31.

Here, the Union asserts, without further explanation, that Proposal 2 is "an appropriate arrangement for those affected by management's decision to require riders to wear safety equipment." Petition for Review at 2. Although the Union has not explained how employees are adversely affected by the Agency's requirements for particular protective equipment or how the proposal would mitigate such adverse effects, it is reasonably foreseeable that employees who do not possess the equipment necessary to comply with the Agency's requirements would incur personal expenses in order to purchase that equipment. See National Association of Government Employees, SEIU, Local R7-51 and Department of the Navy, Navy Public Works Center, Great Lakes, Illinois, 30 FLRA 415 (1987) (Navy, Great Lakes) (where union asserted that employees were adversely affected by additional costs necessary to comply with agency's requirement that motorcyclists wear a full face shield, the Authority found that the union's proposal, providing options to the shield, was intended as an appropriate arrangement). Proposal 2 would benefit employees by reducing or eliminating employees' need to expend personal funds to comply with the Agency's requirements. We conclude, therefore, that Proposal 2 is intended as an appropriate arrangement to mitigate the adverse effects of the Agency's decision to require certain motorcycle safety equipment.

In Navy, Great Lakes, the Authority concluded that the disputed proposal excessively interfered with exercise of the agency's right to determine its internal security practices. 30 FLRA at 418-20. We reach the same conclusion here. Although the Union asserts that Proposal 2 constitutes an appropriate arrangement, it makes no arguments in support of its assertions. The Union does not, for example, specify how many employees are affected by the Agency's safety requirements or how many of these employees would be required to purchase safety equipment. Put simply, the Union's argument that Proposal 2 constitutes an appropriate arrangement is unsupported. As such, we conclude that, by prohibiting the Agency from adopting certain requirements for motorcyclists' protective equipment, Proposal 2 excessively interferes with the Agency's right to determine its internal security practices and is nonnegotiable.

IV. Order

The Agency shall upon request, or as otherwise agreed to