44:0954(79)AR - - IAF Local 13 and Panama Canal Commission, General Services Bureau, Balboa, Republic of Panama - - 1992 FLRAdec AR - - v44 p954



[ v44 p954 ]
44:0954(79)AR
The decision of the Authority follows:


44 FLRA NO. 79

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS

LOCAL 13

(Union)

and

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION

GENERAL SERVICES BUREAU

BALBOA, REPUBLIC OF PANAMA

(Agency)

0-AR-2081

(43 FLRA 1012 (1992))

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

AND REQUEST FOR STAY

April 28, 1992

Before Chairman McKee and Members Talkin and Armendariz.

I. Statement of the Case

This matter is before the Authority on a motion filed by the Agency seeking reconsideration of our decision in 43 FLRA 1012 (1992). The Agency also requests a stay in implementing the decision. The Union did not file an opposition to the Agency's motion for reconsideration and request for a stay. Because the Agency fails to establish that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting reconsideration of our decision, we will deny the Agency's motion for reconsideration and request for a stay.

II. The Decision in 43 FLRA 1012

In 43 FLRA 1012, we found, as relevant to the Agency's motion for reconsideration, that the Arbitrator properly awarded backpay for a period of approximately 10 years to certain firefighters for overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act. We rejected the Agency's contention that the statute of limitations contained in 31 U.S.C. § 3702(b), known as the Barring Act, prevented the Arbitrator from awarding backpay to the grievants for a period longer than 6 years prior to the filing of the grievance on November 25, 1989. We determined that the 6-year statute of limitations in 31 U.S.C. § 3702(b) applies only to claims brought before the Comptroller General and, because the issue in this case did not concern a claim brought before the Comptroller General, we concluded that the Barring Act did not apply. We cited the statement by the Claims Court in Acton v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 214, 223 (1990), reversed and remanded on other grounds, 932 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1991), that the 6-year statute of limitations in the Barring Act "only applies to claims brought before the Comptroller General." We found that the Arbitrator issued his award in response to a grievance filed by the Union pursuant to the negotiated grievance procedure and we noted the Arbitrator's recognition that the grievance included matters that had been raised by the Union for approximately 10 years. We concluded that the Arbitrator had acted within his authority in determining that the grievance covered matters that the Union had grieved in a timely manner and that his backpay remedy pursuant to the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596, was not limited by the 6-year statute of limitations in 31 U.S.C. § 3702(b).

III. Agency's Motion for Reconsideration

The Agency contends that the portion of our decision in 43 FLRA 1012 in which we held that the 6-year statute of limitations did not apply to the Arbitrator's award is contrary to 31 U.S.C. § 3702(b) and to 4 C.F.R. § 31.5(a). As noted by the Agency, 4 C.F.R. § 31.5(a) provides:

(a) Statutory limitations relating to claims generally. All claims against the United States Government, except as otherwise provided by law, are subject to the 6-year statute of limitations contained in 31 U.S.C. § 3702(b). To satisfy the statutory limitation, a claim must be received by the General Accounting Office, or by the department or agency out of whose activities the claim arose, within 6 years from the date the claim accrued. The burden of establishing compliance with the statute of limitations rests with the claimant.

The Agency contends that we misapplied the decision of the Claims Court in Acton v. United States and asserts that that decision means only that the 6-year statute of limitations does not apply to claims brought before the Claims Court. The Agency maintains that the Barring Act and 4 C.F.R. § 31.5(a) apply to any claims against the United States, whether filed with the Comptroller General or with an agency, and that the Comptroller General's interpretation of the Barring Act and the regulations is entitled to deference. The Agency states that it contacted a representative of the Office of General Counsel of the General Accounting Office, who advised the Agency that "to the extent he understoo