46:0693(66)AR - - AFGE Local 2017 and Army Signal Center and Fort Gordon, Fort Gordon, GA - - 1992 FLRAdec AR - - v46 p693
[ v46 p693 ]
The decision of the Authority follows:
46 FLRA No. 66
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ARMY SIGNAL CENTER
FORT GORDON, GEORGIA
(45 FLRA 817 (1992))
(45 FLRA 1182 (1992))
(46 FLRA 90 (1992))
ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION
November 27, 1992
Before Chairman McKee and Member Talkin.(*/)
I. Statement of the Case
This matter is before the Authority on the Union's request for reconsideration of our decision in 45 FLRA 817, request for reconsideration denied, 45 FLRA 1182, request for reconsideration denied, 46 FLRA 90. The Agency did not file an opposition to the Union's request.
We again conclude that the Union has failed to establish that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting reconsideration. Accordingly, we will deny the Union's request. We will not entertain further motions or arguments by the Union on these issues. See U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Navajo Area, Gallup, New Mexico and National Council of Bureau of Indian Affairs Educators, 35 FLRA 99, 107 (1990).
II. The Decision in 45 FLRA 817 and the Orders in 45 FLRA 1182 and in 46 FLRA 90
In 45 FLRA 817, we denied the Union's exceptions to an Arbitrator's award. The Arbitrator denied the Union's grievance that alleged that the Agency incorrectly evaluated the grievant's status in determining his rights as a civilian employee when the Agency conducted a reduction-in-force (RIF) and that the Agency failed to give appropriate weight to the grievant's military service, including his status as a disabled veteran. We concluded that the Union's assertions that the Arbitrator was biased and that the award was not based on law and regulation provided no basis for finding the award deficient.
In 45 FLRA 1182, we rejected the Union's argument that our decision was contrary to applicable laws, rules, and regulations. We found that the Union's request for reconsideration was merely an attempt to relitigate the merits of our decision in 45 FLRA 817. Because the Union's request did not establish extraordinary circumstances warranting reconsideration of the decision, we denied the request.
In 46 FLRA 90, we rejected the Union's argument that our decision was contrary to applicable laws, rules, and regulations. We found that the Union's request did not establish extraordinary circumstances warranting reconsideration of the decision, and we denied the request.
III. Request for Reconsideration
The Union contends that our decision and orders are deficient because they are contrary to law, specifically 5 U.S.C. §§ 3501 and 3502. According to the Union, both the Arbitrator and the Authority misapplied the definitions for "disabled veteran" and "preference eligible" found in the Dual Compensation Act of 1964, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3501 and 3502 and, therefore, the Arbitrator and the Authority failed to give appropriate weight for RIF purposes to the grievant's military service, including his status as a disabled veteran.
IV. Analysis and Conclusions
Section 2429.17 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations permits a party that can establish extraordinary circumstances to request reconsideration of an Authority decision. The Union has not established extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of section 2429.17 to warrant reconsideration of the Authority's decision in 45 FLRA 817 and the Authority's denial of the Union's previous requests for reconsideration in 45 FLRA 1182 and in 46 FLRA 90. Therefore, we will deny the request. See, for example, Department of Health and Human Services, Health Care Financing Administration, 44 FLRA 145 (1992); Michigan Air National Guard, Selfridge ANG Base, Michigan and The Association of Civilian Technicians, Michigan State Council, 34 FLRA 890 (1990).
The Union's request for reconsideration is denied.
(If blank, the decision does not have footnotes.)
*/ Member Armendariz has recused himself from participation in the resolution of this case because he is a life member of the Disabled American Veterans.