48:0395(36)DR - - DOD, NG Bureau, NC Air NG, Charlotte, NC and John A. Teague, Jr. and ACT, Tarheel Chapter - - 1993 FLRAdec DR - - v48 p395
[ v48 p395 ]
The decision of the Authority follows:
48 FLRA No. 36
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
NORTH CAROLINA AIR NATIONAL GUARD
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA
JOHN A. TEAGUE, JR.
ASSOCIATION OF CIVILIAN TECHNICIANS
ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
August 27, 1993
Before Chairman McKee and Members Talkin and Armendariz.
I. Statement of the Case
This case is before the Authority on an application for review filed by the Association of Civilian Technicians (Union) under section 2422.17(a) of the Authority's Rules and Regulations. The Activity filed an opposition to the application.
Following an election in which a majority of valid votes counted was cast against exclusive recognition, the Union timely filed objections to the election with the Regional Director (RD). In her Decision and Order on Objections, the RD dismissed the Union's objections and stated that the results of the election would be certified.
We conclude that compelling reasons exist for granting review of the RD's decision and order pursuant to the provisions of section 2422.17 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations. Accordingly, we grant the application for review.
II. Background and Regional Director's Decision
On August 16, 1990, the Union was certified as the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit consisting of all eligible nonprofessional Wage Grade and General Schedule employees of the Activity. The parties then entered into negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement. Thereafter, on January 10, 1992, the Union requested the assistance of the Federal Service Impasses Panel (Panel) to resolve six proposals on which the parties were at impasse.
On May 7, 1992, prior to Panel resolution of the impasse, the Petitioner filed a petition for decertification of the exclusive representative. As a result, on June 24, 1992, the Panel notified the parties that it was holding the matters before it in abeyance pending the final outcome of the representation proceeding. The Union and the Activity never entered into a collective bargaining agreement.(1)
On July 6, 1992, after the parties had agreed to an election date, the Union orally proposed to the Activity certain procedures to govern campaign activities prior to the election. Although the Activity informed the Union that it would get back to it in a few days, the Activity failed to do so. On July 17, having received no response to its oral proposals, the Union sent written proposals to the Activity. Subsequently, by letter dated July 23, the Activity informed both the Union and the Petitioner that, prior to the election, each would have equal access to the Activity's bulletin boards and that each would be permitted to campaign in the parking lots. More specifically, the Activity's letter stated that from July 24 until July 29, campaigning would be permitted in the parking lots for one hour both before and after work and during the lunch hour. The letter concluded with the statement that, "[t]o preclude disruption of work, [Union] representatives not employed by the Agency will not be permitted to visit the various work, lunch, and break areas for pre-election campaigning." RD's Decision at 6 (quoting Joint Exhibit 2). The Union did not attempt to contact the Activity's designated representatives following receipt of the Activity's letter.
On July 29, 1992, the RD conducted a secret ballot election in accordance with the provisions of an Agreement for Consent Election. The tally of ballots showed that of 133 valid votes counted, 60 were cast in favor of the Union and 73 votes were cast against exclusive recognition. Following the election, the Union filed 10 objections to conduct by the Activity which, it alleged, improperly affected the election results.(2) As relevant here,(3) the objections state:
5. The Activity refused to negotiate with the Union concerning adequate times and locations for [the Union] to campaign prior to the election;
6. The Activity unduly limited the time periods during which [the Union] would be permitted to campaign prior to the election;
7. The Activity granted [the Union] unreasonable access to bargaining unit employees to campaign prior to the election; and,
8. It was inappropriate to process the petition in this case due to the improper delay by the Federal Services Impasses Panel to resolve the contractual impasse which existed between the Activity and the Union.
Id. at 3. An investigation was conducted and a hearing was held on these objections.
The RD dismissed Objection 5, concerning the Activity's obligation to bargain over procedures to govern campaign activities prior to the election. The Union argued before the RD that "the Activity's failure to respond to its July 6 verbal proposal and its delay in responding to its July 17 letter [containing written proposals] is a refusal to bargain." Id. at 8. In rejecting the Union's argument, the RD first observed that "[t]he Activity's failure to respond to the July 6 verbal proposal does not appear justified and initially caused a delay in communications between the parties." Id. The RD further observed, however, that the Union "remained able to contact the Activity's representative concerning campaign guidelines but instead chose to wait 11 days to do so." Id. at 9. The RD therefore found that the Union was equally responsible for the lack of communication.
With regard to the Union's July 17 written proposals, the RD concluded that the Activity's July 23 response was "timely under the circumstances." Id. The RD additionally concluded as follows:
[D]espite the Union's characterization of the July 23 letter, I find that this letter restated the Activity's current policy concerning visitors and constituted counterproposals on the Activity's part. The Union, however, failed to respond directly to these counterproposals. Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, I do not find that the Activity's conduct amounts to a refusal to bargain. Rather, the Union failed to pursue negotiations on this issue.
The RD also dismissed Objection 6, in which the Union argued that the "Activity's limitations on the time when Union officials could campaign in the parking lot severely restricted the Union's access to the unit employees." Id. In arriving at this finding, the RD found that the "Activity restricted only the time periods the Union and the Petitioner could campaign in the parking lots" and that "[t]he record clearly shows that the local Union officials and the Petitioner campaigned during work time despite being told not to do so." Id. at 9-10. The RD noted that the Activity had placed no restrictions on campaigning away from the premises and that the Union had engaged in this form of campaigning. Finding that "the same rules concerning time limitation applied equally to the Union and the Petitioner[,]" the RD concluded that "the Activity did not unduly limit the time periods during which the Union was permitted to campaign." Id. at 10.
In dismissing Objection 7, the RD similarly rejected the Union's contention that the Activity's refusal to grant non-employee Union officials access to various work areas severely restricted its access to unit employees. The Union argued before the RD that "the Activity allows access to other non-employee visitors and this restriction is based solely upon Union activity and is thus unlawful." Id.
The RD found that "the Activity did not grant the Union unreasonable access to unit employees prior to the election." Id. at 11. In arriving at this finding, the RD initially determined that there was "no evidence of unlawful motivation" and that the "Activity applied its existing policy concerning visitors in a non-discriminatory manner." Id. at 10. More specifically, the RD observed that visitors to the Activity's premises are not permitted to wander about as they please and that the Activity does not grant unrestricted access to its various work areas, as the Union had sought. The RD further found it to be of "no consequence that during the 1990 campaign a lower level supervisor witnessed a non-employee Union official unescorted in a work area but took no action." Id. at 11. In this regard, the RD observed that "[a]n occasional lapse in policy does not constitute a full scale departure from that policy." Id. Finally, the RD observed that: local Union officials and the Petitioner actively campaigned during work time and at work areas despite the Activity's instructions not to do so; there were no restrictions on campaigning away from the premises; and non-employee Union officials held campaign meetings off the Activity's premises. The RD therefore rejected this objection.
The RD also dismissed Objection 8, in which the Union argued that "the decertification election was barred since the services of the Panel ha[d] been invoked over several proposals that the parties bargained to impasse." Id. at 12. The Union argued before the RD that the "parties would have executed a collective bargaining agreement upon the Panel's resolution of these proposals and that agreement would [have] preclude[d] the decertification election." Id.
In addressing this objection, the RD discussed section 2422.3(b) of the Authority's Rules and Regulations, which provides that where there is a certified exclusive representative of the employees, a petition for decertification will be considered untimely if filed within 12 months after the certification of the exclusive representative. The RD noted that such a petition is timely if there is no collective bargaining agreement in effect. The RD additionally observed that the petition for decertification was filed approximately 21 months after the Union was certified,and that despite the ongoing negotiation process, no collective bargaining agreement had been executed. Therefore, the RD found, in accordance with section 2422.3(b) of the Authority's Rules and Regulations, that the Union had not established that a contract bar exists. The RD accordingly concluded that the petition was timely.
Having found that no objectionable conduct occurred, the RD stated her intent to issue a Certification of Election Results.
III. Positions of the Parties
A. Application for Review
The Union argues that its application for review should be granted on the grounds set forth in 5 C.F.R. section 2422.17.(4) In particular, the Union assert