49:1189(113)CA - - FEMA HQ, Washington, DC & AFGE, Local 4060 - - 1994 FLRAdec CA - - v49 p1189

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[ v49 p1189 ]
49:1189(113)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:


49 FLRA No. 113

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

_____

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, D.C.

(Respondent/Agency)

and

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT

EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 4060, AFL-CIO

(Charging Party/Union)

WA-CA-20467

_____

DECISION AND ORDER

June 3, 1994

_____

Before Chairman McKee and Members Talkin and Armendariz.

I. Statement of the Case

The Administrative Law Judge issued the attached decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent did not violate section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) by refusing to recognize and bargain with the Charging Party.(1) The General Counsel filed exceptions to the Judge's decision and the Respondents filed an opposition to the exceptions.

Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations and section 7118 of the Statute, we have reviewed the rulings that the Judge made at the hearing and find that no prejudicial error was committed. We affirm the rulings. Upon consideration of the Judge's decision and the entire record, we adopt the Judge's findings, conclusions, and recommended Order.(2)

II. Order

The complaint is dismissed.




FOOTNOTES:
(If blank, the decision does not have footnotes.)
 

1. The General Counsel makes arguments regarding, among other things, the authority of Leo Bosner to act "on behalf of the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO" (AFGE National) during the time period relevant to this case. Exceptions at 10. Insofar as these arguments are intended to support an assertion that the Respondent violated the Statute by failing to recognize and bargain with Bosner as a designated representative of AFGE National, we disagree. The complaint alleges only that the Respondent violated the Statute when it "refused to recognize and negotiate in good faith with Local 4060." G.C.'s Exh. 1(b) at 2, para. 11. See also Judge's Decision at 1 (Judge stated the Respondent allegedly violated the Statute by failing to "recognize the Charging Party (Local 4060) and by refusing to negotiate in good faith with Local 4060 . . . ."). In fact, the complaint contains no reference to Bosner and no allegation that the Respondent failed to recognize or bargain with AFGE National. In this regard, we find that the Respondent was charged only with failing to recognize and bargain with the Charging Party (AFGE Local 4060) and that, to the extent that the Respondent's actions in connection with Bosner are in dispute, the dispute centers on Bosner's status as a representative of Local 4060, not as a representative of AFGE National.

2. We reject the General Counsel's argument that the Judge erred by failing to determine, under common law principles, that the Respondent violated the Statute by failing to recognize Bosner's "apparent authority[.]" Exceptions at 10. In this regard, the doctrine of apparent authority establishes, in certain circumstances, liability on the part of a principal for acts of the principal's agent. See generally 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency §§ 78-81 (1986). However, the General Counsel cites no authority, and we are aware of none, for the argument that the doctrine also establishes an obligation on the part of a third party to recognize such authority or precludes the third party from inquiring as to the extent of the authority. See id. at §§ 82-88. See also id. at § 83 n.73 ("The mere representation of the fact of agency does not create that relationship and the party to whom such representation has been made bears the burden of inquiring to determine if authority does in fact flow from the alleged principal.") (citation omitted).