50:0048(11)AR - - AFGE, National Council of EEOC Locals No. 216 and EEOC, Philadelphia District Office - - 1994 FLRAdec AR - - v50 p48



[ v50 p48 ]
50:0048(11)AR
The decision of the Authority follows:


50 FLRA No. 11

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

_____

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF EEOC LOCALS NO. 216

(Union)

and

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT OFFICE

(Agency)

0-AR-2630

_____

DECISION

December 14, 1994

_____

Before the Authority: Phyllis N. Segal, Chair; Tony Armendariz and Pamela Talkin, Members.(1)

I. Statement of the Case

This matter is before the Authority on an exception to an award of Arbitrator Jerome H. Ross filed by the Union under section 7122(a) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) and part 2425 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations. The Agency filed an opposition to the Union's exception.

The award denied the Union's request for attorney fees. The Union argues that the award is contrary to law.

For the following reasons, we conclude that the Union has failed to establish that the award is deficient under section 7122(a)(1) of the Statute. Accordingly, we deny the exception.

II. Background and Arbitrator's Award

The Arbitrator sustained, in part, a grievance over the Agency's 14-day suspension of the grievant and reduced the suspension to an oral reprimand. The Authority denied the Agency's exceptions to that award in American Federation of Government Employees, National Council of EEOC Locals No. 216 and U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 49 FLRA 906 (1994).

The Union filed a request for attorney fees with the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator noted that, by sustaining a grievance that included a request for backpay as a remedy, his initial award "presumed that backpay will be paid, with any accrued benefits." Award at 1. Applying the standards governing an award of attorney fees under the Back Pay Act, the Arbitrator found that the Union was the prevailing party in the initial award but that payment of attorney fees was not warranted in