Social Security Administration, Lansing, Michigan (Agency) and American Federation of Government Employees (Union)
[ v58 p 93 ]
58 FLRA No. 18
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
September 12, 2002
Before the Authority: Dale Cabaniss, Chairman, and
Carol Waller Pope and Tony Armendariz, Members [n1]
I. Statement of the Case
This matter is before the Authority on exceptions to an award of Arbitrator Marvin J. Feldman filed by the Agency under § 7122(a) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) and part 2425 of the Authority's Regulations. The Union filed an opposition to the Agency's exceptions.
The Arbitrator found that although the grievants' actions were improper, the Agency violated the parties' agreement by suspending the grievants for 2 days. As a remedy, he directed the Agency to give the grievants written warnings to be placed in their personnel files.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the remedial portion of the award is deficient. Accordingly, we set it aside.
II. Background and Award
Two employees were disciplined for violating the Agency's unauthorized system access rule. Under the rule, employees may not access their own Agency computer records or the records of family, friends or neighbors. The facts show that, in an effort to assist her recently widowed mother, one employee asked a colleague to review the information contained in her father's benefit records to determine if her father's death [ v58 p94 ] certificate had been posted. The colleague agreed. Thereafter, both employees received 14-day suspensions. Subsequently, the suspensions were reduced to 2 days. The employees filed grievances challenging the 2-day suspensions, and the grievances were submitted to expedited arbitration.
The parties did not stipulate the issues to be resolved. The Arbitrator stated that he would resolve the parties' dispute "solely upon the just cause provision" (Article 23, Section 1) of their collective bargaining agreement. Award at 6. [n2] In so stating, the Arbitrator noted that the original 14-day suspensions had been levied pursuant to the Agency's Table of Penalties, which was the subject of another arbitration proceeding. [n3]
The Arbitrator found that the grievants knew the unauthorized access rule and "knew that they had violated the rule." Award at 7. However, after reviewing the grievants' reputations and service records with the Agency, the Arbitrator found that "management overreacted in the matter at hand." Id. at 8. He concluded that although the grievants' activity "was certainly contrary to rule," the suspensions should not have been invoked since the grievants' actions did not result in any irreparable harm. Id. The Arbitrator modified the suspensions "into a written warning which will find its way into the personnel file of each [grievant]" and directed that the grievants be reimbursed for their suspensions. Id.
III. Positions of the Parties
A. Agency's Exceptions
The Agency contends that the award fails to draw its essence from the parties' bargaining agreement. In support of this contention, the Agency relies on United States Dep't of Justice, INS, Del Rio Border Patrol Sector, Tex., 45 FLRA 926 (1992) (INS, Del Rio), a case in which the Authority overturned an award setting aside a grievant's suspension. The Agency argues that, as in INS, Del Rio, the award in this case is deficient because the Arbitrator found just cause for the grievants' discipline but set the discipline aside in its entirety.
The Agency further argues that the award is contrary to § 7106(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. The Agency contends that despite the fact that the Arbitrator effectively found that it had "just cause" for disciplining the grievants, the Arbitrator "inexplicably set aside the discipline entirely." Exceptions at 6. According to the Agency, "[a] written warning does not constitute discipline under Article 23[.]" Id. at 6 n.2. The Agency asks that the Authority reinstate the Agency's discipline.
B. Union's Opposition
The Union disputes the Agency's assertion that the warning directed by the Arbitrator does not constitute discipline under the parties' bargaining agreement. The Union states that, "[n]otwithstanding any ambiguity in the nature and effect of a `warning' under § 3 of Article 23," Section 4 of Article 23 "would seem to be the operative provision." Opposition at 3. According to the Union, "the substance of the [A]rbitrator's directive matches a § 4 reprimand and does not match a § 3 warning." Id. at 4. The Union contends that since a reprimand is a form of discipline under the parties' agreement, the award merely mitigated the employees' discipline without being in conflict with the Agency's right to discipline.
The Union also maintains that this case is distinguishable from INS, Del Rio because here, unlike in INS, Del Rio, the "[A]rbitrator replaced one form of discipline with another . . . ." Id. at 5. Therefore, the Union asserts that the Authority should reject the Agency's claim that the award fails to draw its essence from the parties' bargaining agreement.
IV. Analysis and Conclusions
The Authority will find an award deficient as failing to draw its essence from a collective bargaining agreement when the appealing party establishes that the award: (1) cannot in any rational way be derived from the agreement; (2) is so unfounded in reason and fact and so unconnected with the wording and purposes of the collective bargaining agreement as to manifest an infidelity to the obligation of the arbitrator; (3) does not represent a plausible interpretation of the agreement; or (4) evidences a manifest disregard of the agreement. See United States Dep't of Labor (OSHA), 34 FLRA 573, 575 (1990).
As set forth in the Appendix to this decision, Article 23 reflects the parties' agreement concerning the types of discipline that the Agency may impose with respect to employees in the bargaining unit. The minimum form of discipline is an official reprimand under Article 23, Section 4. In addition to outlining reprimands [ v58 p95 ] and other disciplinary actions the Agency can impose, the parties also defined actions that the Agency can take in advance of discipline. Those actions consist of counseling and oral warnings "which are informal in nature and are not recorded." See Appendix, Article 23, Section 3. Nothing in Article 23 includes a provision for a written warning that would be placed in personnel files, which is what the Arbitrator directed. As noted, the specific provision on warnings that the parties negotiated in Section 3, provides for unrecorded oral warnings only, and such warnings do not constitute discipline. Furthermore, neither the Arbitrator nor the Union refers to any portion of the parties' agreement suggesting that written warnings were contemplated. Consequently, we find that the remedy directed by the Arbitrator does not comport with any of the disciplinary actions that the parties agreed the Agency could take in Article 23 of their agreement.
We are reluctant to ascribe to the award the meaning urged by the Union, namely, that "the substance of the [A]rbitrator's directive matches a § 4 reprimand . . . ." Opposition at 4. The Union's contention implicitly concedes that, taken literally, the "written warning" imposed by the Arbitrator does not constitute an Article 23, Section 4 "Reprimand." Had the Arbitrator intended to order the Agency to issue a written reprimand, the Arbitrator could have easily done so in a clear fashion. Instead, the Arbitrator devised his own remedy, which does not, on its face, fall within the confines of the parties' agreement.
As the Agency asserts, the award here is comparable to the award in INS, Del Rio. In that case, the arbitrator found just cause to sustain a disciplinary action. Despite that finding, however, the arbitrator set aside the disciplinary action in its entirety. On review, the Authority found that the award could not be derived rationally from the parties' agreement and evidenced a disregard for the agreement. As a result, the Authority concluded that the award failed to draw its essence from the agreement and set the award aside.
Similarly, in this case, the Arbitrator's imposition of a written warning does not constitute discipline as the parties have defined it under Article 23 of their collective bargaining agreement. In effect, the Arbitrator, after finding that the Agency had just cause to discipline the grievants, set aside the disciplinary action in its entirety. Because the Arbitrator found that the Agency had just cause to discipline the grievants, his award, which does not provide any form of discipline, does not represent a plausible interpretation of the agreement and, therefore, fails to draw its essence from the agreement. Accordingly, the award must be set aside. See, United States Small Business Admin., 55 FLRA 179, 182 (1999) (portion of award ordering agency to pay all costs of arbitration failed to draw its essence from parties' agreement where agreement stated that costs would be shared equally by the parties); United States Dep't of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons, United States Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kan., 53 FLRA 29, 33 (1997) (award deficient because arbitrator's assertion of jurisdiction over the grievance was not compatible with a plausible interpretation of the parties' collective bargaining agreement, which incorporated an e