File 2: Chairman Cabaniss and Member Pope's Opinion
[ v58 p294 ]
Concurring Opinion of Chairman Cabaniss:
Rather than just refer back to an earlier decision, I write separately to express my beliefs regarding the key matter at issue here because of the important change to our precedent.
In making a determination as to whether a provision has been negotiated under § 7106(b)(3), the Authority has in the past employed the framework announced in Dep't of the Treasury, United States Customs Serv., 37 FLRA 309 (1990) (Customs Service). Under that test, the Authority determined whether the relevant contract provision: (1) constitutes an arrangement under § 7106(b)(3) and (2) abrogates the exercise of a management right. See, e.g., United States Dep't of the Air Force, Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, N.C., 55 FLRA 163, 167 (1999). In this case, however, the Authority holds that it would no longer employ the Customs Service framework to determine if a contract provision, as interpreted by an arbitrator, was negotiated pursuant to § 7106(b)(3) of the Statute. In its place, the Authority will examine whether the contract provision, as interpreted and applied by an arbitrator, excessively interferes with the exercise of a management right. I note in that regard that the Authority had used the excessive interference test prior to Customs Service.
In reviewing an arbitrator's interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, the Authority applies the deferential standard of review that Federal courts use in reviewing arbitration awards in the private sector. See 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a); AFGE, Council 220, 54 FLRA 156, 159 (1998). There is no such deferential standard, however, when an arbitrator's contract interpretation is challenged as being contrary to law, rule, or regulation: the analysis of the arbitrator's rationale is done de novo, and one looks at whether the arbitrator's reasoning is consistent with the "applicable standard of law," to determine whether the award violates § 7122(a)(1), i.e., whether it is contrary to law. That "applicable standard of law" is § 7106(b)(3) in this instance, and our case law uses § 7106(b)(3) to determine whether the agreement provision in question "excessively interferes" with an agency's § 7106(a) rights. Section 7106(b)(3) does not recognize or authorize the ability to use one § 7106(b)(3) "appropriate arrangement" legal standard for the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements (which must not "excessively interfere" with § 7106(a) rights), and then a different § 7106(b)(3) "appropriate arrangement" legal standard for the interpretation of those same collective bargaining agreements (which must not "abrogate" § 7106(a) rights). This attempted distinction is not provided for by §§ 7106 or 7122, and is not otherwise supportable. [ v58 p295 ]
Section 7114 of our Statute confirms that a § 7106(b)(3) conflict (or other matters discussed below) does not change after the appropriate arrangement language has gone into effect. Section 7114(c)(2) reflects an agency's right to review a collective bargaining agreement to determine whether it is in accordance with "the provisions of this chapter and any other applicable law, rule, or regulation." Actions taken to ensure that a provision is "in accordance with the provisions of this chapter" include, inter alia, whether a provision excessively interferes with the agency's rights and thus is barred by § 7106(b)(3). See, e.g., NTEU, 55 FLRA 1174 (1999) (disapproval of provision caused examination to determine whether provision excessively interfered with agency rights, in conflict with § 7106(b)(3)). Section 7114(c)(3) notes that, even where an agency does not approve or disapprove an agreement under § 7114(c)(2), the agreement then goes into effect and is binding, subject to those same "provisions of this chapter and any other applicable law, rule, or regulation."
Authority precedent does not change this conclusion. In AFGE, AFL-CIO, Local 1858, 4 FLRA 361, 362 (1980), the Authority held that an agency's failure to disapprove a provision does not otherwise make enforceable a provision that is contrary to the Statute or any other applicable law, rule, or regulation. In Veterans Admin., Washington, D.C. and Veterans Admin. Med. Ctr., Minneapolis, Mn., 15 FLRA 948, 953 (1984), the Authority dismissed a complaint against an agency accused of refusing to abide by certain contract provisions that the agency believed were in violation of "applicable law." The Authority held that, even though the agency's disavowal of the legality of the provisions was not timely under § 7114(c)(2), "such tardiness does not alter the result" of the agency's actions because of § 7114(c)(3). Id. Consequently, there is no basis for not finding that the standard of review under § 7114(c)(3) is the same as the standard of review under § 7114(c)(2), i.e., the use of an "excessive interference" test to determine whether a matter violates § 7106(b)(3).
In light of this statutory directive regarding the interpretation of collective bargaining provisions, regardless of whether the provision in question was challenged pursuant to agency head review, I find no justifiable basis for subjecting § 7106(b)(3) to a different interpretation (vis-a-vis an agency's § 7106(a) rights) when the same issue comes before an arbitrator. This lack of a justifiable basis is further reinforced by the fact that no other "provisions of this chapter and any other applicable law, rule, or regulation" discussed in § 7114(c)(3) are subjected to a different process when in arbitration. Most notably, § 7106(b)(2) is interpreted in the same manner regardless of whether the entity interpreting it is the Authority or an arbitrator. See GSA, 54 FLRA 1582, 1584 (1998) (Authority held that arbitrators must apply Authority precedent in resolving negotiability disputes).
I further find that the Authority's negotiability case law establishes the kind of substantive rights under a statute that are incorporated into a negotiated grievance procedure. See, e.g., NTEU, 53 FLRA 1469, 1490 (1998) (FDIC). In FDIC, the Authority discussed the differences between substantive rights and procedural rights, and noted that standards and burdens of proof are substantive in nature. Id. In discussing why a statute of limitations under 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) was substantive rather than procedural, the Authority noted that the statute in question "establishes standards by which violations of the FLSA [Fair Labor Standards Act] are to be judged, and supports a finding that Congress viewed this section as a substantive part of the FLSA." Id.
In assessing § 7106 against these comments, few would have difficulty finding that statute (and its implementing precedent) to be substantive rather than procedural in nature. It clearly establishes standards by which bargaining proposals and provisions, and conduct based thereon, are judged. Put another way, § 7106 affirmatively establishes both limitations and entitlements upon the rights and obligations of agencies and unions. Few statutes have such a substantive impact on the parties affected by it. Therefore, adherence to Authority negotiability precedent is nondiscretionary on the part of arbitrators.
In contrast to these concerns, the Customs Service decision essentially argues that negotiation of agreements, and arbitral interpretation of those same agreements, are different. What Customs Service does is to conflate the distinction between an arbitrator's deference in determining what a contract means (an essence analysis) with the total lack of deference to that same interpretation in terms of whether it conflicts with law (a de novo analysis).
It is apparent that the Customs Service decision disregards that distinction by attempting to provide arbitral deference where none is permitted. [n1] Several portions of the Customs Service decision are illustrative of this conflation. That decision rejected use of [ v58 p296 ] the excessive interference test because it "unduly impinges on the role of arbitration and arbitrators under the Statute." 37 FLRA at 315. The Authority also went on to explain that it believed Congress expected it to "narrowly review" arbitration awards. Id. at 315-16. The Authority's discussion is replete with references to narrow review authority and speaks in terms of all arbitration awards, yet we now know (and it is undisputed) that legal challenges to arbitration awards are not subject to some deferential standard regarding the arbitrator's application of law, rule, or regulation to the parties' agreement, and that the arbitration exception process does "impinge" on arbitrators as to legal issues by denying them the deference normally accorded them. While there may have been some doubt by the Authority in 1990 as to the extent to which an arbitrator's legal analysis would be accorded deference, that doubt was eliminated by the decision of United States Dep't of the Treasury, United States Customs Service, 43 F.3d 682, 686-87 (D.C. Cir. 1994), which stated that reviews of such legal questions would be "de novo." Id.
Therefore, I believe the Customs Service framework is in violation of §§§ 7106, 7114, and 7122(a) of the Statute. Accordingly, we should no longer follow it. Instead, we should utilize the Authority's negotiability precedent regarding "appropriate arrangements" to review the Agency's exceptions, including application of the "tailoring" requirement to the arbitrator's interpretation of the provision. Consistent with the approach taken by the majority here, I would, in future cases, apply the analytical frameworkset forth in KANG to determine if provisions, as interpreted by arbitrators, were negotiated pursuant to § 7106(b). [n2]
Concurring Opinion of Member Pope:
I believe, for the reasons set forth in my concurring opinion in BOP, Oklahoma City, 58 FLRA 109 (2002), that the abrogation test -- not the excessive interference test -- is appropriate to determine whether Article 27 is enforceable under § 7106(b)(3) of the Statute. I need not restate those reasons here. I also believe, for the reasons set forth in BOP, Sheridan, 58 FLRA No. 65 (2003) that the majority misapplies its own test. In my view, both fairness and Authority precedent demand that the Authority -- absent a conclusion by the majority that the award would also be deficient under the abrogation test -- remand this case for development of a record that permits a just application of the excessive interference test.
Applying the abrogation test, I would find, for the following reasons, that the award effectively abrogates the exercise of the Agency's rights to assign work, assign employees, and determine internal security practices.
The grievance challenged the Agency's decision to reduce the number of employees assigned to the housing units from one employee assigned per unit to one employee assigned per two units. In upholding the grievance, the Arbitrator ordered the Agency to assign one employee to each housing unit. I would find, consistent with virtually all the Authority decisions on this issue, that Article 27, as interpreted and enforced by the Arbitrator, affects the Agency's rights to assign work and determine internal security practices. See, e.g., BOP, Oklahoma City, 58 FLRA at 110-11.
I would find also that the award affects the Agency's right to assign employees. Unlike BOP, Oklahoma City -- where the award required the Agency to keep existing posts filled --the award in this case requires the Agency to create and fill additional posts. In this regard, the award differs significantly from others involving Agency decisions to leave posts vacant. In particular, the award reverses the Agency's decision to reduce the number of positions assigned to the housing units and requires the Agency to assign and fill additional positions. As such, it affects the Agency's right to assign employees. See AFGE, Local 3354, 54 FLRA 807, 812-13 (1998) (proposal requiring agency to maintain particular staffing level in particular division affects right to assign employees).
The award leaves no circumstance -- whether related to work reasons, security reasons, or both -- under which the Agency may choose not to assign one employee to each housing unit. Cf. BOP, Atlanta, 57 FLRA at 407 (agency may leave a work post vacant for good reason or if the post has no contribution to the level of safety); BOP, Guaynabo, 57 FLRA at 331 (agency may leave posts vacant in emergency situations). Because the award requires, without exception, that the Agency maintain particular staffing levels, I would find, consistent with my concurring opinion in BOP, Oklahoma City, 58 FLRA at 117, that it effectively abrogates the exercise of the Agency's rights.
Based on the foregoing, I would conclude that the award fails prong 1 of BEP and, as a result, is deficient. Also based on the foregoing, I believe that, unless the majority agrees that the award would be deficient under the abrogation standard, the award should be remanded for development of record evidence necessary to apply the excessive interference standard fairly.
File 1: Authority's Decision in 58 FLRA No. 66
File 2: Chairman Cabani