United States, Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety, Administration (Agency) and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 3313 (Union)
[ v59 p85 ]
59 FLRA No. 15
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
(58 FLRA 333 (2003))
ORDER DENYING MOTION
August 29, 2003
Before the Authority: Dale Cabaniss, Chairman, and
Carol Waller Pope and Tony Armendariz, Members
This matter is before the Authority on the Union's motion for reconsideration of the Authority's decision in 58 FLRA 333 (2003). The Agency filed an opposition to the Union's motion.
Section 2429.17 of the Authority's Regulations permits a party who can establish extraordinary circumstances to request reconsideration of an Authority decision. See United States Dep't of the Air Force, 375th Combat Support Group, Scott Air Force Base, Ill., 50 FLRA 84, 85 (1995) (Scott AFB). In Scott AFB, theAuthority identified a limited number of situations in which extraordinary circumstances have been found to exist. These include situations where a moving party has established that the Authority erred in its remedial order, process, conclusion of law, or factual finding. See id. at 85-87. The party seeking reconsideration of a decision of the Authority has a heavy burden of establishing that extraordinary circumstances exist to justify this unusual action. See id. at 85.
In 58 FLRA 333, the Arbitrator determined that the Agency's reassignment of the grievant constituted a prohibited personnel practice under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(12) because the reassignment violated merit principles set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2301. We found the award deficient on the basis that the Arbitrator did not find a violation of any law, rule, or regulation that implements or directly concerns those principles, as required by § 2302(b)(12). The Union contends we erred. The Union claims that the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) policy relating to Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (Giglio Policy), constitutes the necessary rule implementing or directly concerning merit system principles. In addition, the Union claims that the issue of whether the Arbitrator found a violation of a law, rule, or regulation implementing or directly concerning merit system principles was not sufficiently raised by the Agency as an exception and had been waived by not having been raised to the Arbitrator.
We conclude that the Union fails to meet the heavy burden of establishing that extraordinary circumstances exist to justify reconsideration of 58 FLRA 333. The Union fails to establish that any of the situations identified as constituting extrao