File 2: Opinion of Memnber Pope

[ v60 p838 ]

Opinion of Member Carol Waller Pope, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

      Below, the majority held that the entire six-section proposal was nonnegotiable based on paragraph 5, which, according to the majority, impermissibly affected the Agency's right to assign work. The majority acknowledged the parties' agreement that paragraph 6 of the proposal was bargainable at the Agency's election under § 7106(b)(1) of the Statute but held that "[n]othing in Authority precedent suggests that this fact" affected the conclusion that the proposal as a whole was nonnegotiable. ACT II, 60 FLRA at 347 n.8. I disagreed with the majority's finding that paragraph 5 was outside the duty to bargain and its refusal to apply the "dominant requirement" test to assess the relationship between paragraph 6 and the rest of the proposal. Id. at 351. I stated I would find that paragraphs 1 through 5 are negotiable, that paragraph 6 is not the dominant requirement, and that, as a result, the entire proposal is within the duty to bargain.

      The Union requests reconsideration, arguing that paragraph 5 is within the duty to bargain (along with paragraphs 1 through 4) and that paragraph 6 does not affect the negotiability of the proposal because it is not the dominant requirement. See Motion at 2. The majority denies reconsideration on the grounds that: (1) the Union's argument regarding paragraph 5 is an attempt to relitigate the decision below; and (2) the Union's argument regarding the "dominant requirement" test has been raised for the first time on reconsideration and, as such, the Authority did not err in refusing to apply the test. Majority Opinion at 4-6.

      I agree with the majority that the Union's attempt to relitigate the majority's conclusion that paragraph 5 is outside the duty to bargain does not establish extraordinary circumstances. Thus, despite my dissenting opinion in ACT II, I agree that reconsideration is not warranted on that ground.

      I part company with the majority in its treatment of the Union's dominant requirement argument, however. For the reasons that follow, I believe the majority commits serious legal error in rejecting the Union's argument and I dissent on this point.

      There is no question -- and the majority concedes -- that in ACT, the majority did not address or apply the "dominant requirement" test. See Majority Opinion at 5. This was legal error. Now, in refusing to recognize its error, the majority holds that it was not required to apply the "dominant requirement" test because the [ v60 p839 ] Union did not argue it. See Majority Opinion at 4-5. This is also legal error.