File 2: Opinion of Member Pope
[ v60 p853 ]
Dissenting Opinion of Member Carol Waller Pope:
The issue before the Authority is whether the Judge correctly found that the Respondent unlawfully repudiated two MOUs addressing work on Saturdays. For the reasons that follow, the Judge clearly was correct. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the majority applies an incorrect legal standard, misconstrues the contract terms at issue, and relies on argument the Respondent never made. Therefore, I dissent.
As for the appropriate legal standard, the majority fails to apply clear precedent requiring the Authority to resolve a contractual defense to an alleged unfair labor practice (ULP) by determining the meaning of the contractual provision relied on. It is undisputed, in this regard, that where, as here, a respondent defends its actions by relying on a contractual provision, the Authority ascertains the actual meaning of the contract provision using the standards and principles of interpreting agreements applied by arbitrators and the federal courts. See IRS, Wash., D.C., 47 FLRA 1091, 1111 (1993) (IRS). See also, e.g., United States Dep't of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Fed. Corr. Inst., Florence, Colo., 59 FLRA 165, 171-72 (2003).
The Respondent claims that, under Article 44, § 1 B (hereinafter Article 44), it was permitted to terminate the MOUs based on rescission of Executive Order 12871. See Exceptions at 17. [n1] Article 44 provides, in the first two sentences, that the Respondent: (1) agrees to bargain over matters under § 7106(b)(1) of the Statute in accordance with Executive Order 12871, and (2) will not use § 7106(a) of the Statute to circumvent this contractual obligation to bargain. The third and fourth sentences provide:
In the event Executive Order 12871 is rescinded and the Department chooses not to bargain 5 U.S.C. Section 7106(b), either party may reopen this Article to address the 7106(b) issues. However, agreements reached during the effective term of this Master Agreement will remain in effect unless changes are negotiated.
Joint Ex. 9 at 171.
The Judge interpreted Article 44 to mean that agreements reaching during the term of the master agreement, including the two MOUs in this case, remain in effect during the term of the agreement unless the parties negotiate changes to the MOUs. See Judge's Decision at 16-17. According to the Judge, "[t]he Union was under no obligation to negotiate changes in the MOU[s] because those agreements remained in effect" during the term of the agreement. Id. at 17. Applying IRS, it is indisputable, in my view, that the Judge's interpretation is supported. I note, in this regard, that neither the GC nor the Respondent offered evidence regarding the interpretation of Article 44, such as bargaining history. Thus, the provision must be interpreted pursuant to its plain wording.
Examining the plain wording, two things are evident. First, Article 44 and the agreements reached under Article 44 are dealt with quite differently. In particular, the parties agreed to a unilateral right to act only with respect to reopening Article 44 -- "either party" may reopen Article 44 upon rescission of Executive Order 12871. The parties did not agree on similar wording in connection with agreements negotiated under Article 44 -- the latter agreements remain in effect "unless negotiated." Second, the sentence addressing agreements negotiated under Article 44 is an express exception to the sentence addressing Article 44 itself. In this regard, the sentence addressing agreements negotiated under Article 44 begins with "[h]owever," an unambiguous signal that it sets forth a different rule from the one preceding it.
Reading the two sentences with any care whatsoever shows that: (1) the first permits either party to unilaterally reopen Article 44 for the purpose of addressing prospective issues arising from rescission of Executive Order 12871 and a decision by the Respondent to no longer bargain over § 7106(b)(1) matters; and (2) the second indicates that such reopening does not affect agreements over § 7106(b)(1) matters that were reached under Article 44. As applied here, the Respondent was permitted unilaterally to reopen Article 44 but was not permitted unilaterally to terminate the MOUs, which the Judge found (and the majority and I agree) had been bargained under § 7106(b)(1). As such, Article 44 does not provide a defense to the Respondent's clear and patent breach of the MOUs.
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the majority ignores both the difference in wording between the two sentences (one vesting rights in "either party," the other not) and the fact that the second sentence is an express exception to the first. As such, the majority's interpretation flaunts the standards and principles of interpreting collective bargaining agreements applied by arbitrators and the federal courts and, by extension, the Authority's [ v60 p854 ] established framework set forth in IRS. See, e.g., Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 493 (Marlin M. Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds., 5th ed. 1997) (general rule is to interpret agreement to give meaning to all of its parts).
The majority also ignores that IRS requires it to determine the meaning of Article 44. Indeed, the majority permits the Respondent to defend its actions on the basis of Article 44 without ever determining what Article 44 means. The majority concludes, in this regard, that the Respondent's interpretation of Article 44 as permitting it to reopen and terminate the MOUs is "reasonabl[e]." Majority Opinion at 16. However, the majority expressly finds that Article 44 is not clear on this point and refuses to determine whether the Respondent was in fact correct. See id. Thus, the majority excuses an alleged unfair labor practice on the basis of a contract provision it refuses to interpret.
Moreover, by applying a "reasonableness" standard to Article 44, the majority hopelessly confuses the standard for resolving a defense to a particular -- repudiation -- ULP with the standard for resolving general contractual defenses to all alleged ULPs. In so doing, the majority ignores that, while both defenses involve contract provisions, they operate in fundamentally different ways. In particular, when resolving a complaint alleging repudiation, the Authority determines, as relevant here, whether the respondent committ