26:0088(10)AR - HHS, SSA and AFGE -- 1987 FLRAdec AR
[ v26 p88 ]
26:0088(10)AR
The decision of the Authority follows:
26 FLRA No. 10
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
Agency
and
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO
Union
Case No. 0-AR-1253
(24 FLRA No. 2)
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The case is before the Authority on a motion filed by the Agency
seeking reconsideration of the Authority's decision of November 10,
1986, dismissing the Agency's exceptions to the Arbitrator's awards of
August 6 and 7, 1986, as untimely filed.
II. BACKGROUND
In its decision, the Authority determined that under section 7122(b)
of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute and sections
2425.1, 242.921 and 2429.22 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations,
any exceptions to the Arbitrator's bench awards of August 6 and 7 had to
be filed with the Authority within 30 days of the dates those awards
were rendered, that is, no later than the close of business on September
4 and 5, 1986, respectively. In reaching that determination, the
Authority rejected the Agency's assertion that because no representative
of the Agency was present at the hearing, the time limit for filing
exceptions should begin to run from the date the transcript of the
proceeding was mailed to the Agency. The Authority found that it was
well settled based upon precedent, particularly in cases involving other
related bench rulings between these same parties, that bench awards are
final when rendered and ripe for filing exceptions with the Authority at
that time. The Authority also found that the record record clearly
indicated that while the Agency did not participate in the August 6 and
7 hearings, it voluntarily chose not to do so and, thus, acted at its
own peril. The Authority therefore concluded that the time limit for
filing exceptions expired on September 4 and 5 and that the Agency's
exceptions filed on October 23, 1986, were untimely. Accordingly, the
Authority dismissed the exceptions.
III. AGENCY'S MOTION
In its motion for reconsideration, the Agency alleges that the
Authority's decision is based on erroneous findings and interpretations
of the facts in the case. In support of this allegation, the Agency
argues that the Authority erred in concluding that the Agency
voluntarily chose not to participate in the arbitration proceeding on
August 6 and 7, 1986, asserting that the Arbitrator denied the Agency
its right to be represented. The Agency further alleges that the
Authority erred in its interpretation of its Rules and Regulations in
finding that the Agency's exceptions were untimely filed. In support of
this allegation, the Agency asserts that the time for filing the
exceptions began to run from the date the transcript of the proceeding
was mailed to the Agency and not from the date of the awards.
Additionally, the Agency asserts that its interpretation of the time
limits is correct and should be applied because it requested such an
interpretation from the Authority in a motion on August 29, 1986, and
the Authority did not rule on that motion. The Agency further asserts
that it could not have filed complete exceptions until it received the
transcript.
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Section 2429.17 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations permits a
party that can establish "extraordinary circumstances" to request
reconsideration of a decision of the Authority. However, in this case,
we conclude that the Agency has not established "extraordinary
circumstances" within the meaning of section 2429.17. Rather, the
arguments presented by the Agency constitute nothing more than
disagreement with the merits of the Authority's decision and an attempt
to relitigate the matter.
As to the Agency's assertion that the Authority erred in finding that
the Agency voluntarily chose not to participate in the hearing, portions
of the transcript of the hearing quoted by the Agency in its motion for
reconsideration support the Authority's finding. The Agency official
who sought to attend the hearing expressly emphasized that he would not
participate as a representative of the Agency in the proceeding. The
Arbitrator denied his request to attend as an observer, noting that the
ground rules established by the parties and practice followed in earlier
proceedings in this dispute required the exclusion of all individuals
except a lead representative and technical advisor for each party.
Thus, contrary to the Agency's assertion, it was afforded an opportunity
to be represented in the proceeding but it refused to participate. The
Agency can not now complain that it was not represented in the hearing.
American Federation of Government Employees and Social Security
Administration, 25 FLRA No. 12 (1987), slip op. at 3. The Agency's
disagreement with the Authority provides no basis for reconsidering the
decision in this case.
As to the Agency's assertion that the Authority erred in finding that
the Agency's exceptions were untimely under the Authority's Rules and
Regulations, it is readily apparent from the cases cited in the order
dismissing the Agency's exceptions that the Agency knew or should have
known at the time of the proceeding before the Arbitrator on August 6
and 7, 1986, that the time limits for filing exceptions to a bench award
begins to run from the date the award is rendered and not from the date
the transcript of the hearing is mailed to the parties. U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration and
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, 22 FLRA No. 16
(June 13, 1986). Moreover, the Agency knew or should have known that
there was no merit to its argument in its motion of August 29, 1986,
that the time limit should run from the date of mailing of the
transcript. See id.; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Social Security Administration and American Federation of Government
Employees, AFL-CIO, 23 FLRA No. 19 (August 15, 1986). The Agency's
disagreement with the Authority's interpretation and application of its
Rules and Regulations provides no basis for reconsidering the decision.
Furthermore, as to the Agency's assertion that the Authority did not
rule on its August 29 motion, the Agency renewed that motion in its
untimely exceptions and it is clear that the Authority considered and
rejected all supporting arguments in the motion in the order dismissing
the exceptions. Finally, we note that even having elected not to
participate in the August 6 and 7 proceedings, the Agency was not
prevented from filing timely, legally sufficient exceptions. The Agency
could have requested the Arbitrator to provide it with a summary of his
bench decisions on the dates in question and the Agency could have filed
exceptions based on such a summary within the prescribed time limit. We
conclude that the Agency's assertions do not establish the existence of
any extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of section 2429.17 of
the Rules and Regulations.
V. DECISION
The Agency's motion for reconsideration is denied.
Issued, Washington, D.C., March 9, 1987.
/s/ Jerry L. Calhoun, Chairman
/s/ Henry B. Frazier III, Member
/s/ Jean McKee, Member
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY