Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security Administration, Disability Insurance Program Staff, Chicago, Illinois, A/SLMR No. 1128
[ v01 p147 ]
01:0147(16)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:
1 FLRA No. 16
APRIL 9, 1979
MR. BILL LOFTIS
PRESIDENT
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO
300 SOUTH WACKER DRIVE
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60606
RE: DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM STAFF,
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, A/SLMR No. 1128,
FLRC No. 78A-152
DEAR MR. LOFTIS:
THE AUTHORITY HAS CAREFULLY CONSIDERED YOUR PETITION FOR REVIEW OF
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE.
IN THIS CASE, AS FOUND BY THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 3400 (THE UNION)
FILED AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE COMPLAINT AGAINST THE DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM STAFF, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS (THE ACTIVITY).
THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED THAT THE ACTIVITY VIOLATED SECTION 19(A)(1) OF THE
ORDER BY ENGAGING IN DILATORY TACTICS IN THE PROCESSING OF A GRIEVANCE.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE (ALJ) CONCLUDED THAT, IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES
OF THIS CASE, THE ACTIVITY'S REFUSAL TO PROCESS A GRIEVANCE BEYOND THE
SECOND STEP OF THE PARTIES' NEGOTIATED GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE, PENDING
COMPLETION OF A RELATED EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY (EEO) PROCEEDING,
DID NOT CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF SECTION 19(A)(1) OF THE ORDER.
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, IN AGREEMENT WITH THE ALJ, FOUND THAT THE
ACTIVITY'S CONDUCT WAS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE ORDER AND ORDERED THAT THE
COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED. IN SO CONCLUDING, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
STATED:
IN THIS REGARD, IT IS NOTED PARTICULARLY THAT AT ALL TIMES MATERIAL
THE (ACTIVITY) HAD
INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED WITH THE GRIEVANCE ONCE THE EEO
MATTER HAD BEEN
RESOLVED. MOREOVER, UPON BECOMING AWARE THAT NO FURTHER USE OF THE
EEO PROCEDURES WAS
CONTEMPLATED, THE (ACTIVITY) INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO RESUME
CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER
UNDER THE NEGOTIATED GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE, AND TO PROCEED TO
ARBITRATION IF THE (UNION) SO
DESIRED.
IN THE UNION'S PETITION FOR REVIEW, IT IS CONTENDED THAT THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION PRESENTS TWO MAJOR POLICY ISSUES: (1)
"WHETHER THE MEASUREMENT OF THE (A)GENCY'S BEHAVIOR IN TERMS OF
SUBJECTIVE GOOD FAITH IN THIS PARTICULAR TYPE OF CASE IS CONSISTENT WITH
THE INTENT AND PURPOSE OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER"; AND (2) "THE DECISION
PERMITS THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY TO ACT OUTSIDE OF HIS AUTHORITY BY
REGULATING THE SUBSTANTIVE TERMS OF A (N)EGOTIATED (A)AGREEMENT." WITH
REGARD TO THE FIRST ALLEGED MAJOR POLICY ISSUE, IT IS CONTENDED THAT A
UNILATERAL CHANGE IN THE NEGOTIATED PROCEDURE WHERE THE INHERENT EFFECT
IS TO INTERFERE WITH RIGHTS GRANTED BY THE ORDER WAS A PER SE VIOLATION
OF THE ORDER REGARDLESS OF THE ACTIVITY'S GOOD FAITH. IN CONNECTION
WITH THE SECOND ALLEGED MAJOR POLICY ISSUE, IT IS ASSERTED THAT THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN EFFECT CHANGED THE SUBSTANTIVE TERMS OF THE
PARTIES' AGREEMENT BY PERMITTING THE AGENCY, CONTRARY TO THE NEGOTIATED
AGREEMENT, TO HOLD A GRIEVANCE IN ABEYANCE RATHER THAN PERMITTING A
GRIEVANCE AND AN EEO ACTION TO PROCEED SIMULTANEOUSLY.
IN THE AUTHORITY'S OPINION, YOUR PETITION FOR REVIEW DOES NOT MEET
THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 2400.2 OF THE AUTHORITY'S TRANSITION RULES
AND REGULATIONS WHICH INCORPORATES BY REFERENCE SECTION 2411.12 OF THE
COUNCIL'S RULES. THAT IS, IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT THE DECISION OF THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY PRESENTS ANY MAJOR POLICY ISSUES, AND YOU NEITHER
ALLEGE, NOR DOES IT APPEAR, THAT THE DECISION WAS ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS.
THUS, AS TO THE FIRST ALLEGED MAJOR POLICY ISSUE, TO THE EFFECT THAT
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION ALLOWING THE AGENCY'S BEHAVIOR TO BE
MEASURED IN TERMS OF SUBJECTIVE GOOD FAITH IN THIS PARTICULAR TYPE OF
CASE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE INTENT AND PURPOSES OF THE EXECUTIVE
ORDER, THE APPEAL FAILS TO PROVIDE ANY BASIS TO SUPPORT A CONTENTION
THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION IS IN ANY MANNER INCONSISTENT
WITH THE PURPOSES AND POLICIES OF THE ORDER. RATHER, SUCH ASSERTION
AMOUNTS TO ESSENTIALLY A MERE DISAGREEMENT, WITH THE ASSISTANT
ASECRETARY'S DETERMINATION THAT THE ACTIVITY'S CONDUCT DID NOT VIOLATE
THE ORDER IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THEREFORE PRESENTS NO
BASIS FOR REVIEW. SIMILARLY, AS TO THE SECOND ALLEGED MAJOR POLICY
ISSUE THAT THE DECISION OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY PERMITS HIM TO ACT
OUTSIDE HIS AUTHORITY BY REGULATING THE SUBSTANTIVE TERMS OF THE
PARTIES' AGREEMENT, NO BASIS FOR AUTHORITY REVIEW IS PRESENTED. IN THIS
REGARD, THE APPEAL ONCE AGAIN FAILS TO PROVIDE ANY BASIS TO SUPPORT AN
ALLEGATION THAT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION IN EFFECT CHANGED THE
SUBSTANTIVE TERMS OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT BY PERMITTING THE AGENCY TO
HOLD A GRIEVANCE ABEYANCE. RATHER, AS PREVIOUSLY NOTED, THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOUND THAT THE ACTIVITY "AT ALL TIMES . . . INDICATED ITS
WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED WITH THE GRIEVANCE ONCE THE EEO MATTER HAD BEEN
RESOLVED" AND, UPON DISCOVERING THAT NO FURTHER USE OF THE EEO
PROCEDURES WAS CONTEMPLATED, "TO PROCEED TO ARBITRATION IF THE (UNION)
SO DESIRED." SEE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
MILWAUKEE DISTRICT OFFICE, MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
CASE NO. 51-3911(CA), FLRC 77A-135 (MAR. 21, 1978), REPORT NO. 148.
SINCE THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S DECISION DOES NOT PRESENT A MAJOR
POLICY ISSUE AND YOU NEITHER ALLEGE, NOR DOES IT APPEAR, THAT HIS
DECISION IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, YOUR APPEAL FAILS TO MEET THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR REVIEW AS SET FORTH IN SECTION 2400.2 OF THE
AUTHORITY'S TRANSITION RULES OF PROCEDURE WHICH INCORPORATES BY
REFERENCE SECTION 2411.12 OF THE COUNCIL'S RULES. ACCORDINGLY, REVIEW
OF YOUR APPEAL IS HEREBY DENIED. /1/
RONALD W. HAUGHTON, CHAIRMAN
HENRY B. FRAZIER III, MEMBER
CC: C.COHEN
DHEW
/1/ IN CONFORMITY WITH SECTION 902(B) OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT
OF 1978 (92 STAT. 1224), THE INSTANT CASE WAS DECIDED SOLELY ON THE
BASIS OF E.O. 11491, AS AMENDED, AND AS IF THE NEW FEDERAL SERVICE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE (92 STAT. 1191) HAD NOT BEEN ENACTED.
THE DECISION DOES NOT PREJUDGE IN ANY MANNER EITHER THE MEANING OR
APPLICATION OF RELATED PROVISIONS IN THE NEW STATUTE OR THE RESULT WHICH
WOULD BE REACHED BY THE AUTHORITY IF THE CASE HAD ARISEN UNDER THE
STATUTE RATHER THAN THE ORDER.