10:0436(73)AR - HHS, SSA, Louisville, Kentucky District and NFFE Local 1790 -- 1982 FLRAdec AR
[ v10 p436 ]
10:0436(73)AR
The decision of the Authority follows:
10 FLRA No. 73
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, LOUISVILLE,
KENTUCKY DISTRICT
Activity
and
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FEDERAL
EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1790
Union
Case No. O-AR-347
DECISION
This matter is before the Authority on exceptions to the award of
Arbitrator Rankin M. Gibson filed by the Agency under section 7122(a) of
the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) and
part 2425 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations. The Union filed an
opposition.
This matter concerned the reprimand of the grievant for certain
"unprofessional behavior." A grievance was filed protesting the
reprimand and the grievance was ultimately submitted to arbitration.
The Arbitrator stated the issue to be whether the Activity had just
cause to reprimand the grievant for her conduct. In discussing the
source of the reprimand, the Arbitrator noted that the charge of
unprofessional behavior derived from the provision of the parties'
collective bargaining agreement which provides:
Employees and Management shall conduct all relationships with
courtesy and professionalism.
However, the Arbitrator stated that it was uncertain what the parties
intended by the term "professionalism." The Arbitrator understood the
term to involve characteristics of a profession, in particular the
learned professions of law, theology, and medicine. The Arbitrator
noted that the Agency apparently employed professional employees, but
explained in terms of this case that such employees were expressly
excluded from the bargaining unit by the parties' collective bargaining
agreement. For these reasons the Arbitrator ruled that under the
parties' collective bargaining agreement, the grievant, a service
representative and a bargaining unit employee, "shall not be reprimanded
for 'unprofessional behavior'" and that under the circumstances
presented the grievant's lack of courtesy was excused. Accordingly, the
Arbitrator determined that the reprimand of the grievant was not for
just cause and ordered the reprimand expunged from Activity records.
In its exceptions the Agency contends that by reason of the
Arbitrator's determination that under the parties' agreement the
grievant was not subject to reprimand for unprofessional behavior, the
award does not draw its essence from the parties' collective bargaining
agreement and the Arbitrator exceeded his authority. In support the
Agency principally argues that the Arbitrator refused to apply a
provision of the parties' agreement to the bargaining unit employees it
was negotiated to cover.
However, the Agency's exceptions do not provide a basis for finding
the award deficient. The exceptions represent an attempt by the Agency
to have its own interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement
substituted for that of the Arbitrator, and consequently these
exceptions constitute nothing more than disagreement with the
Arbitrator's interpretation and application of the agreement provision
before him. Merely because the Agency or even the Authority may have
interpreted the agreement differently than the Arbitrator provides no
basis for finding the award deficient. As the Authority stated in
United States Army Missile Materiel Readiness Command (USAMIRCOM) and
American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1858, AFL-CIO, 2 FLRA
432 (1980), the question of the interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement is a question solely for the arbitrator in that it
is the arbitrator's construction of the agreement for which the parties
have bargained. In order for an award to be found deficient as failing
to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, it must be
established that the award is so unfounded in reason and fact and so
unconnected with the wording and purpose of the collective bargaining
agreement as to manifest an infidelity to the obligation of the
arbitrator; or that the award on its face does not represent a
plausible interpretation of the agreement; or that the award cannot in
any rational way be derived from the agreement or evidences a manifest
disregard of the agreement. Id. at 437-38. This collection of tests,
and the private sector cases they are derived from, make it clear that
an arbitrator's award cannot be undermined as not drawing its essence
from the agreement merely because a party believes that the arbitrator
misinterpreted the agreement.
In terms of this case, it is clear that the Arbitrator's resolution
of the dispute directly resulted from his interpretation of the word
"professionalism" as used in the agreement. And while we do not
necessarily agree with that interpretation, it cannot with certainty be
said that the award is so unfounded in reason and fact and so
unconnected with the wording and purpose of the agreement as to manifest
an infidelity to the Arbitrator's obligation, or that the award does not
represent a plausible interpretation of the agreement, or that the award
cannot in any rational way be derived from the agreement or evidences a
manifest disregard thereof. Accordingly, no basis is provided for
finding that this award is deficient as not drawing its essence from the
agreement.
Similarly, it has not been established that the Arbitrator exceeded
his authority. With no joint stipulation of the issue to be arbitrated,
the Arbitrator framed the issue as whether there was just cause to
reprimand the grievant for her conduct, and the Arbitrator on the basis
of his interpretation of the agreement resolved precisely that issue.
Consequently, no basis is provided in this respect for finding the award
deficient. See San Antonio Air Force Logistics Center, Kelly Air Force
Base, Texas and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1617,
7 FLRA No. 84 (1982); National Border Patrol Council and National
Immigration and Naturalization Service Council and United States
Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 3 FLRA
400 (1980). Accordingly, the Agency's exceptions are denied. Issued,
Washington, D.C., October 29, 1982
Ronald W. Haughton, Chairman
Henry B. Frazier III, Member
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
Leon B. Applewhaite, Member, dissenting:
I fully agree with my fellow members that mere disagreement with the
interpretation and application of a collective bargaining agreement does
not provide a basis on which an arbitration award will be found
deficient under the Statute. However, as has been consistently
recognized by the Authority, an arbitrator's award interpreting a
collective bargaining agreement is legitimate only so long as it draws
its essence from that agreement. E.g., Overseas Education Association
and Office of Dependents Schools, Department of Defense, 4 FLRA No. 17
(1980). In terms of this case, I disagree with the Authority's
determination that the Agency has not established that the Arbitrator's
award fails to draw its essence from the parties' collective bargaining
agreement.
As has been noted, the parties in this case expressly provided in
their collective bargaining agreement that employees and management
officials would conduct all relationships with professionalism.
Furthermore, and as was recognized by the Arbitrator, this agreement was
negotiated to cover bargaining unit employees, such as the grievant, but
did not cover professional employees. As also acknowledged by the
Arbitrator, the grievant was reprimanded specifically for unprofessional
behavior based on the failure of the grievant to conduct herself with
professionalism which in the Activity's view was required by the
parties' collective bargaining agreement. Nevertheless, the Arbitrator
found no just cause for the discipline by expressly rejecting
"unprofessional behavior" as a permissible basis on which to reprimand
the grievant essentially because, as a service representative and a
bargaining unit employee, she was not a professional and therefore could
not justifiably be reprimanded for unprofessional behavior. By
rejecting in this manner the reprimand of the grievant for
unprofessional behavior, the award, in my opinion, fails to draw its
essence from the parties' collective bargaining agreement by whatever
test it is judged. Thus, in my judgment it has been adequately
demonstrated that this award is so unfounded in reason and fact and so
unconnected with the wording and purpose of the parties' agreement so as
to manifest an infidelity to the Arbitrator's obligation in resolving
this dispute; that this award on its face does not represent a
plausible interpretation of the agreement; and that this award
evidences a manifest disregard of the agreement and cannot in any
rational way be derived from the agreement. Consequently, I am of the
opinion that the Agency has established that the award is deficient as
not drawing its essence from the parties' agreement, and accordingly I
respectfully dissent from the Authority's decision to deny the Agency's
exceptions. Issued, Washington, D.C., October 29, 1982
Leon B. Applewhaite, Member
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY