13:0066(14)AR - Air Force, San Antonio Air Logistics Center, Kelly AFB, TX and AFGE Local 1617 -- 1983 FLRAdec AR
[ v13 p66 ]
13:0066(14)AR
The decision of the Authority follows:
13 FLRA No. 14
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
SAN ANTONIO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER,
KELLY AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS
Activity
and
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1617, AFL-CIO
Union
Case No. O-AR-235
DECISION
This matter is before the Authority on an exception to the award of
Arbitrator Joe D. Woodward filed by the Union under section 7122(a) of
the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) and
part 2425 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations. The Agency filed an
opposition.
The dispute in this matter concerns the suspension of the grievant
for one day primarily as a result of her conduct during a counseling
session with her supervisors. During the session the grievant refused
to remain and left the session despite being ordered by her supervisor
to remain and being advised that her refusal to remain would result in
disciplinary action. Ultimately, the grievant was suspended and she
filed a grievance which was submitted to arbitration on the issue of
whether the discipline was for just cause and, if so, whether the
suspension was reasonable.
The Arbitrator determined that the grievant had a duty to attend the
counseling session and remain until the session was completed. He
explained that if she found the session disagreeable, she had the right
under the parties' collective bargaining agreement to resort to the
grievance procedure to challenge the propriety of the counseling
session. He therefore ruled that the grievant inappropriately resorted
to the self-help of abruptly leaving and refusing to be counseled.
Consequently, he found that there was just cause for discipline and that
the one-day suspension imposed was a reasonable penalty. In so finding,
the Arbitrator rejected the Union's allegation that the grievant was
discriminated against because her husband was the business agent of the
Union. The Arbitrator held that the Union had not sustained by evidence
to even the slightest degree that consideration of the position of the
grievant's husband had motivated the disciplinary action against her.
Accordingly, as the award, the Arbitrator denied the grievance.
In its exception the Union contends that the award is contrary to
law. Specifically, the Union maintains that the award is
constitutionally deficient primarily because the discipline was partly
based on the grievant's protected expression of her views of her
supervisor. The Union also maintains that the award is contrary to the
Statute because the discipline of the grievant was based on
consideration of the union activities of her husband.
The Authority concludes that the Union fails to establish that the
award is contrary to law. As noted, the Arbitrator expressly determined
that the one-day suspension of the grievant was warranted solely on the
basis of the grievant's misconduct in refusing to be counseled.
Consequently, the Arbitrator did not find it necessary to consider the
Agency's additional allegations of misconduct and the Union's arguments
with respect to them. Thus, the Union's argument that the other
allegations of misconduct involved constitutionally protected expression
by the grievant provides no basis for finding the Arbitrator's award
deficient. Similarly, the Arbitrator expressly rejected the argument
that the grievant's suspension was improperly motivated by a
consideration of union activities, and the Union by repeating this
argument in its exception without substantiation fails to establish
otherwise. Accordingly, the Union's exception is denied. Issued,
Washington, D.C., September 22, 1983
Barbara J. Mahone, Chairman
Ronald W. Haughton, Member
Henry B. Frazier III, Member
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY