16:0251(35)NG - AFGE, National Border Patrol Council and Justice, INS -- 1984 FLRAdec NG
[ v16 p251 ]
16:0251(35)NG
The decision of the Authority follows:
16 FLRA No. 35
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, NATIONAL BORDER
PATROL COUNCIL
Union
and
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
Agency
Case No. O-NG-673
DECISION AND ORDER ON NEGOTIABILITY ISSUES
The petition for review in this case comes before the Authority
pursuant to section 7105(a)(2)(E) of the Federal Service
Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute), and presents issues
concerning the negotiability of two Union proposals. Upon careful
consideration of the entire record, including the parties' contentions,
the Authority makes the following determinations.
Union Proposal 1
Item 3. To the maximum extent possible, no employee will be
detailed to the Cuban/Haitian Refugee Program for an aggregate of
more than seventy (70) calendar days in any one calendar year,
unless the employee freely volunteers for a longer period.
Union Proposal 1, effectively establishing limitations on the length
of certain temporary assignments, is to the same effect as Union
Proposal 13, in American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO,
National Immigration and Naturalization Service Council and U.S.
Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 8 FLRA
347 (1982), which the Authority found to violate the Agency's right to
assign work pursuant to section 7106(a)(B) of the Statute. In the cited
case, the disputed proposal sought to limit travel away from normal duty
stations to not more than 35 days unless the employee volunteered for a
longer period. It was found to be inconsistent with the management
right "to assign work," i.e., the discretion to determine the particular
employee to whom the work will be assigned and the discretion to
determine when the work which has been assigned will be performed.
The Union, in the instant case, contends, however, that the inclusion
of the phrase "to the maximum extent possible" in the proposal leaves
with the Agency discretion to exercise its reserved rights without
inhibition. In this regard, the Union states that "what is 'possible'
is left up to the agency to decide and management has both the option
and discretion of detailing an employee for more than seventy (70)
calendar days if, in their determination, it is not possible to do
anything to the contrary." Further, the Union asserts the phrase
constitutes a general, non-quantitative standard "for evaluating the
exercise of a management right . . . ."
The Authority examined the import of a similar phrase in Union
Proposal 3 in American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO,
Local 3483 and Federal Home Loan Bank Board, New York District Office,
13 FLRA No. 80 (1983). In that case the proposal required that "to the
extent practicable" critical elements be related to grade controlling
duties of a position. The question raised was whether the phrase "to
the extent practicable" rendered the proposal negotiable despite the
limitation imposed by the balance of the proposal on management's
discretion in identifying critical elements. The Authority found that
the inclusion of the phrase did not alter the conclusion that the
proposal was inconsistent with management's rights, pursuant to section
7106(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Statute, to direct employees and to assign
work because the proposal would subject substantive management decisions
regarding the establishment of critical elements to arbitral scrutiny
and possible revision.
In like manner, Union Proposal 1, herein, would subject to arbitral
review and possible revision the Agency's decision made pursuant to its
right to assign work at the temporary location for more than 70 days.
Therefore, notwithstanding the inclusion of the phrase "to the maximum
extent possible," based on Immigration and Naturalization Service and
the reasons and case cited therein, Union Proposal 1 is not within the
Agency's duty to bargain.
Union Proposal 2
Item 5. Each employee detailed to the Cuban/Haitian Refugee
Program will be entitled to one (1) 15-minute, long-distance call
each week at government expenses for the purpose of maintaining
contact with his/her family.
In agreement with the Agency, the Authority concludes that Union
Proposal 2 is inconsistent with a Government-wide regulation. Pursuant
to responsibilities assigned by 5 USC 5707(a), the General Services
Administration (GSA) has issued regulations governing travel allowances.
These regulations, incorporated in the Federal Property Management
Regulation (FPMR) 101-7 (1981) state in paragraph 1-1.3.b, with respect
to employee travel expenses that, "Traveling expenses which will be
reimbursed are confined to those expenses essential to the transacting
of official business." With specific regard to telephone calls, FPMR
101-7, paragraph 1-6.5, requires that charges for telephone calls must
be certified as being required "on official business" before
reimbursements will be made. Paragraph 1-6.4.b of the same regulation
enumerates those matters not considered official business:
b. Personal business. Telephone calls, telegrams, cablegrams,
and radiograms relating to leave of absences or extension thereof,
or to payment of salary or expense vouchers and answers thereto,
or those containing other matters of a purely personal nature,
must not be made or sent at Government expense, and charges
therefor shall not be allowed.
Additionally, 41 CFR 101-37.105-4 (1983) states, with regard to the
Federal Telecommunications System and other Government provided long
distance telephone facilities:
Use of Government facilities for personal reasons is prohibited
and could result in an employee's being fined, suspended, or
dismissed. 5 CFR 735.205 prohibits the use of Government property
for other than official approved activities.
The Union tacitly acknowledges that the telephone calls referred to
in the proposal do not, per se, constitute official Government business.
Rather, it asserts that such calls are necessitated by the Agency's
requirement that employees be away from home for extended periods and
that there is nexus between these phone calls and official business
because the resultant improvement in morale will increase employee
productivity and effectiveness. However, this Union contention cannot
be sustained. It is clear that the applicable Government-wide
regulations expressly exclude such personal telephone calls from the
ambit of "official business." Hence, since Union Proposal 2 is
inconsistent with a Government-wide regulation, pursuant to section 7117
of the Statute it is outside the Agency's duty to bargain.
Accordingly, pursuant to section 2424.10 of the Authority's Rules and
Regulations, IT IS ORDERED that the Union's petition for review be, and
it hereby is, dismissed. Issued, Washington, D.C., October 19, 1984.
Henry B. Frazier III, Acting
Chairman
Ronald W. Haughton, Member
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY