17:0103(21)AR - HHS, SSA, Charlotte, North Carolina District and AFGE Local 3509 -- 1985 FLRAdec AR
[ v17 p103 ]
17:0103(21)AR
The decision of the Authority follows:
17 FLRA No. 21
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA
DISTRICT
Activity
and
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,
LOCAL 3509, AFL-CIO
Union
Case No. O-AR-418
DECISION
This matter is before the Authority on exceptions to the award of
Arbitrator Harold D. Jones, Jr. filed by the Agency under section
7122(a) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute and
part 2425 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations.
The grievance involved herein concerned the grievant's reassignment
from the position of claims representative trainee, GS-7, to the
position of service representative, GS-7. A grievance was filed and
submitted to arbitration claiming that the reassignment was not in
accordance with the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The
Arbitrator determined that the Activity had reassigned the grievant in
order to avoid having to take disciplinary action against him, which
action would have to be in accordance with Article 22, Disciplinary
and/or Adverse Actions, of the parties' agreement. Consequently, the
Arbitrator ruled that the reassignment was not in accordance with the
agreement and directed that the grievant be returned to the position of
claims representative trainee, GS-7.
In one of its exceptions the Agency essentially contends that the
award, by directing the Activity to assign the grievant back to the
position of claims representative trainee, GS-7, is contrary to
management's right to assign employees under section 7106(a)(2)(A) of
the Statute. In support of this exception, the Agency primarily argues
that the remedy interferes with its right to assign employees and that
the remedy has no basis in the parties' agreement. The Agency asserts
that Article 22 cited by the Arbitrator relates solely to disciplinary
actions taken by the Activity and that the agreement contains no
prohibition against taking other actions in lieu of discipline. In
opposition to this exception, the Union essentially argues that the
award is not contrary to section 7106(a) because it simply enforces
appropriate arrangements that the parties have properly negotiated for
employees adversely affected by the exercise of any authority under
section 7106(a).
The Authority has uniformly held that the plain language of section
7106(a) provides that "nothing" in the Statute shall "affect the
authority" of an agency to exercise the rights enumerated in that
section. E.g., Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization and
Federal Aviation Administration, 5 FLRA 763, 767 (1981). Therefore, the
Authority has consistently held that no arbitration award under a
negotiated grievance procedure may interpret or enforce a provision of a
collective bargaining agreement so as to improperly deny an agency the
authority to exercise its rights under section 7106(a) of the Statute.
Id. Under the language of section 7106(a)(2)(A) of the Statute and
under the decisions of the Authority, it is clear that management has
the right to assign employees in the agency, and it is likewise clear
that the award at issue in this case interferes with the Activity's
exercise of that right by rescinding management's assignment of the
grievant from the position of claims representative trainee, GS-7, to
the position of service representative, GS-7. However, in these same
decisions the Authority has indicated that because the rights of
management set forth in section 7106(a) are subject to section
7106(b)(2) and (3), /1/ an award that is claimed to interfere with
rights under section 7106(a) that enforces an applicable procedure or
appropriate arrangement which has been negotiated by the parties may not
necessarily be contrary to section 7106(a). See id. at 768-69. Thus,
in Internal Revenue Service, Austin District and National Treasury
Employees Union, NTEU Chapter 52, 9 FLRA 672, 674 (1982), an award that
simply enforced a properly negotiated appropriate arrangement under
section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute was determined not to be contrary to
section 7106(a) of the Statute. In IRS the appropriate arrangement for
employees adversely affected by management's exercise of its authority
to take disciplinary action which the parties had negotiated under
section 7106(b)(3) provided that "(r)eassignments will not be used in
lieu of discipline." The arbitrator in that case determined that the
attempted reassignment of the grievant by the activity violated that
provision and ordered that the grievant be made whole for the violation.
As part of its exceptions the agency argued that the arbitrator's
enforcement of that provision was contrary to management's right to
assign employees under section 7106(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. In
rejecting this argument, the Authority explained that the provision
enforced by the arbitrator was properly agreed to as an appropriate
arrangement which operated to prevent the use of reassignments in lieu
of discipline in order that the legal, regulatory, and collective
bargaining agreement procedures, protections, and arrangements afforded
an employee against whom disciplinary action is taken may not be
circumvented.
In terms of this case, in contrast to IRS and contrary to the
argument of the Union that the Arbitrator was simply enforcing an
appropriate arrangement, the Arbitrator did not enforce a negotiated
provision of the parties' collective bargaining agreement providing an
appropriate arrangement for employees adversely affected by the
Activity's exercise of the authority under section 7106(a)(2)(A) to
assign employees. Although the Arbitrator ruled that the reassignment
was not in accordance with the agreement, the only provision cited in
this respect relates to discipline and adverse actions. The provision
does not in any respect relate to reassignments and in no manner
purports to restrict the Activity's assignment of employees. Thus, the
prohibition against the reassignment of the grievant was not founded on
any specific negotiated agreement of the parties and was solely the
creation of the Arbitrator. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has
acknowledged that an arbitrator may legitimately bring his or her
judgment to bear in reaching a fair solution of a dispute, the Court at
the same time stated that an arbitrator may not legitimately "dispense
his (or her) own brand of industrial justice." Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). Consequently,
the award, which interferes with management's right to assign employees
in the agency and which does not constitute the enforcement of an
applicable negotiated appropriate arrangement, is contrary to section
7106(a)(2)(A) and must be modified.
Accordingly, the award is modified to provide as follows: /2/
It is the Award of the Arbitrator that the Form 623-A for the
period October 1, 1980 through September 30, 1981 given Mr. Jerry
W. Drye by the Employer on October 21, 1981 was in accordance with
the Negotiated Agreement. Accordingly, no remedy is directed.
Issued, Washington, D.C., March 5, 1985
Henry B. Frazier III, Acting
Chairman
William J. McGinnis, Jr., Member
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
--------------- FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
/1/ Section 7106(b) pertinently provides:
(b) Nothing in this section shall preclude any agency and any labor
organization from negotiating--
. . . .
(2) procedures which management officials of the agency will
observe in exercising any authority under this section; or
(3) appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected
by the exercise of any authority under this section by such
management officials.
/2/ In view of this decision, it is not necessary to address the
other exceptions to the award.