18:0029(3)AR - Justice, INS and National Border Patrol Council, Local 1613, AFGE -- 1985 FLRAdec AR
[ v18 p29 ]
18:0029(3)AR
The decision of the Authority follows:
18 FLRA No. 3
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE
Agency
and
NATIONAL BORDER PATROL COUNCIL,
LOCAL 1613, AMERICAN FEDERATION
OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
Union
Case No. 0-AR-310
DECISION
This matter is before the Authority on exceptions to the award of
Arbitrator Robert C. Meiners filed by the Agency under section 7122(a)
of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute and part 2425
of the Authority's Rules and Regulations.
The dispute in this matter arose when the Agency ordered that Border
Patrol Agents in the Chula Vista Sector of California could no longer
wear Levis-style trousers instead of Agency uniform trousers. As noted
by the Arbitrator, the Levis were essentially identical to the uniform
trousers in appearance and the Union claimed that they provided somewhat
better protection to the wearer under rough field conditions. The Chief
Patrol Officer for the Sector had granted the Union's request on behalf
of the Agents for permission to wear the Levis for such rough duty.
Prior to the Agency's order requiring that only uniform trousers could
be worn, Agents wore the Levis-style trousers for rough duty for several
months. The Arbitrator found that although there was no written
agreement between the parties concerning the matter, local and regional
management officials were aware of and condoned the wearing of the Levis
and that a past practice had been established. The Arbitrator concluded
that management had violated the parties' collective bargaining
agreement by unilaterally changing the practice and, as a remedy,
directed that the Agents be allowed to wear the Levis for rough duty.
In its first exception, the Agency contends that the Arbitrator's
award conflicts with management's right under section 7106(b)(1) of the
Statute to determine the methods and means of performing the work of the
Agency. In support of this exception, the Agency essentially argues
that the uniform trousers provide ready identification of the wearer as
a representative of Governmental authority and therefore are necessary
for law enforcement purposes, and that the non-uniform trousers
interfere with such identification.
It is well-established that under section 7106(b)(1) of the Statute
management has the right to determine the methods and means to be used
in accomplishing or furthering the performance of its work. E.g.,
National Treasury Employees Union and U.S. Customs Service, Region VIII,
San Francisco, California, 2 FLRA 255 (1979); Planners, Estimators and
Progressman Association, Local No. 8 and Department of the Navy,
Charleston Naval Shipyard, Charleston, South Carolina, 13 FLRA 455
(1983). /1/ Further in that regard, in order to constitute a "means" of
performing work within the meaning of section 7106(b)(1), there must be
a direct and integral relationship between the particular
instrumentality the agency chooses to use and the agency's mission.
See, e.g., American Federation of Government Employees, Local 3525 and
United States Department of Justice, Board of Immigration Appeals, 10
FLRA 61, 61-63 (1982). Additionally, in disputes involving union
proposals related to management's choice of a particular method or
means, the Authority has determined that in order to be found violative
of management's right under section 7106(b)(1), the proposal must
directly interfere with management's right to determine the method or
means by interfering with the mission-related purpose for which the
agency established such method or means. See, e.g., U.S. Customs
Service, Region VIII, 2 FLRA at 260-61 (wherein the Authority held that
a proposed option of uniformed officers using other than their actual
full names on nameplates did not prevent management from requiring that
officers wear nameplates and did not interfere with management's stated
purpose for the nameplates, which was to personalize the Customs Service
and facilitate the public's dealings with the officers); American
Federation of Government Employees, National Immigration and
Naturalization Council and U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 8 FLRA 347, 349-51 (1982) (wherein the Authority
held that a proposal that numbers or some combination of letters and
numbers rather than names be used on identification plates to be worn by
uniformed employees did not interfere with management's stated purpose
for the plates, which was to provide for identification of the officers
and facilitate the work of supervisory personnel; and that a proposal
concerning agency grooming standards did not interfere with management's
purpose for the standards, which was to ensure that the officers were
readily recognized as representatives of the agency in their dealings
with the public); Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, California and
Federal Employees Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, 17 FLRA No. 76 (1985)
(wherein the Authority held that the Respondent Activity failed to show
that bargaining concerning the type of protective clothing to be worn by
employees would interfere with management's right to require that safety
clothing be worn). Cf., National Treasury Employees Union and U.S.
Customs Service, Washington, D.C., 8 FLRA 3, 3-4 (1982) (wherein the
Authority held that a portion of a proposal which would have excluded
uniformed personnel performing vehicle inspections from an agency
requirement for wearing uniform hats interfered with management's
purpose of readily identifying the wearer as a representative of the
Government).
In terms of this case, the Agency determined that Border Patrol
Agents will wear uniforms in performing their duties. It is not
disputed here that there is a direct and integral relationship between
the uniform wearing requirement and the Agency's law enforcement
mission. The issue before the Authority in this case is whether, as the
Agency alleges, the Arbitrator's award directing the Agency to continue
to permit the Border Patrol Agents in the Chula Vista Sector to wear
Levis-style trousers as part of their uniform for rough duty assignments
interferes with management's stated purpose for its uniform trousers,
namely, to provide ready identification of the wearer as a
representative of Governmental authority. Upon careful consideration of
the record before the Authority in this matter, the Authority concludes
that the Agency has not shown, and it is not otherwise apparent, how the
Levis-style trousers interfere with management's objective. Thus, as
found by the Arbitrator, the Levis are essentially identical to the
uniform trousers in appearance. Moreover, supervisory and management
officials permitted or condoned the wearing of the Levis for an
extensive period of time, which strongly indicates that there was no
detrimental effect on accomplishment of the Agency's law enforcement
mission as a result of the wearing of the Levis. In that regard, there
is no support in the record for the Agency's assertion that the
Levis-style trousers interfered with the identification of any wearer as
a law enforcement officer. Therefore, the Authority finds, contrary to
the Agency's assertion, that the Arbitrator's award does not conflict
with management's right under section 7106(b)(1) of the Statute.
In its second exception, the Agency contends that the Arbitrator's
award is inconsistent with and therefore does not draw its essence from
the parties' collective bargaining agreement. However, this exception
constitutes nothing more than disagreement with the Arbitrator's
interpretation of the parties' agreement and, consequently, provides no
basis for finding the award deficient. E.g., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms and National Treasury Employees Union, 12 FLRA 49 (1983).
Accordingly, the Agency's exceptions are denied. Issued, Washington,
D.C., May 14, 1985.
Henry B. Frazier III, Acting
Chairman
William J. McGinnis, Jr., Member
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
--------------- FOOTNOTES$ ---------------
/1/ See also Division of Military and Naval Affairs, State of New
York, Albany, New York and New York Council, Association of Civilian
Technicians, 15 FLRA No. 65 (1984), wherein the Authority found that
there was a direct and integral relationship between a uniform-wearing
requirement for civilian technicians of the National Guard and the
duties the technicians performed in furthering accomplishment of the
overall military mission of the National Guard and, therefore, held that
the uniform wearing requirement constituted management's choice of
methods and means of performing work within the meaning of section
7106(b)(1).