26:0691(85)CA - Army and Air Force, Army and Air Force Exchange Service, HQ, Dallas, TX and Army and Air Force Exchange Service, McClellan AFB, CA and AFGE Local 1857 -- 1987 FLRAdec CA



[ v26 p691 ]
26:0691(85)CA
The decision of the Authority follows:


 26 FLRA No. 85
 
 DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE
 ARMY AND AIR FORCE EXCHANGE SERVICE
 HEADQUARTERS, DALLAS, TEXAS AND
 ARMY AND AIR FORCE EXCHANGE SERVICE
 McCLELLAN AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA
 Respondent
 
 and
 
 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
 EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1857, AFL-CIO
 Charging Party
 
                                            Case No. 9-CA-60288
 
                            DECISION AND ORDER
 
    I.  Statement of the Case
 
    This matter is before the Authority under section 2429.1(a) of our
 Regulations based on the parties' stipulation of facts.  The complaint
 alleges that the Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1) and (8) of the
 Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) by
 refusing to provide the Union with the names and home addresses of all
 employees in the McClellan Air Force Base Exchange bargaining unit.  The
 General Counsel and the Respondent have filed briefs with the Authority.
  For the reasons discussed below, we find that the Respondent has
 committed the unfair labor practices as alleged.
 
    II.  Background
 
    By letter dated May 5, 1986, the President of AFGE Local 1857 (the
 Union) requested the Manager of the McClellan Air Force Base Exchange to
 provide the Union with the names and home addresses of all bargaining
 unit employees at the Exchange.  There are 82 employees in the unit, of
 whom 29 are regular full-time and 53 are regular part-time employees.
 In its request for the information, the Union cited American Federation
 of Government Employees, Local 1760 v. FLRA, 756 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.
 1986).  Later in May, the Respondent gave the Union a listing of the
 names, job titles and job locations of employees in the bargaining unit,
 but did not provide the employees' home addresses.  The Respondent has
 continued to refuse to provide the home addresses of employees to the
 Union.
 
    The parties have stipulated that the information requested by the
 Union constitutes data within the meaning of section 7114(b)(4) of the
 Statute which is normally maintained by the Respondent in the regular
 course of business;  is reasonably available and necessary for full and
 proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation of subjects within
 collective bargaining;  and does not constitute guidance, advice,
 counsel, or training provided for local management officials or
 supervisors relating to collective bargaining.
 
    III.  Positions of the Parties
 
    A.  The Respondent
 
    The Respondent asserts that this case presents an issue which
 distinguishes it from our decision on remand in the lead "names and home
 addresses" case, Farmers Home Administration Finance Office, St. Louis,
 Missouri, 23 FLRA No. 101 (1986), petition for review filed sub nom.
 U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Farmers Home Administration
 Finance Office, St. Louis, Missouri v. FLRA, No. 86-2579 (8th Cir. Dec.
 23, 1986).  The Respondent argues that in deciding that release of the
 names and home addresses of bargaining unit employees to the exclusive
 representative was not prohibited by law, the Authority placed great
 weight on an analysis of exception (b)(3) of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.
 section 552a(b)(3), which permits disclosure of information for a
 "routine use." The Respondent further argues that published statements
 of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which define routine uses
 of information in personnel records and include labor organizations as
 routine users of that information, were a key factor in the Authority's
 decision that disclosure of employees' home addresses to unions was
 permitted as a routine use under exception (b)(3) of the Privacy Act.
 
    The Respondent notes that the employees in this case are employed by
 the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) and are not subject to
 OPM regulations, and therefore the OPM routine use statement does not
 apply to them.  The Respondent also notes that the AAFES routine use
 statements do not include labor organizations as routine users of
 information in AAFES' systems of records, and therefore contends that
 disclosure of employees' home addresses to the Union cannot be made
 under exception (b)(3) of the Privacy Act.  Accordingly, the Respondent
 contends that the "routine user" theory which we applied in Farmers Home
 cannot be applied in this case.
 
    The Respondent asserts that we must decide this case by balancing the
 employees' right to privacy against the public interest in disclosure,
 and that in so doing we should reconsider our Farmers Home decision and
 apply the decision of the court in American Federation of Government
 Employees, Local 1923 v. United States, Department of Health and Human
 Service, 712 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1983).  Finally, the Respondent notes
 that in 1985 it had attempted to make a reasonable accommodation to AFGE
 by providing an alternate way for it to obtain the home addresses of
 employees;  however, the Respondent states that it does not pursue this
 point because we ruled on this theory in Farmers Home.
 
    B.  The General Counsel
 
    The General Counsel argues that our decision in Farmers Home is
 controlling in this case.  The General Counsel submits that the
 Respondent's refusal to provide the home addresses of bargaining unit
 employees violates section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute and constitutes the
 unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint.
 
    IV.  Analysis and Conclusions
 
    In our decision on remand in Farmers Home, we held that the release
 of the names and home addresses of bargaining unit employees to
 exclusive representatives is not prohibited by law, is necessary for
 unions to fulfill their duties under the Statute, and meets all of the
 other requirements of section 7114(b)(4).  Our decision in Farmers Home
 analyzed the two exceptions to the Privacy Act's bar to disclosure of
 personal information pertinent to the release of employees' names and
 home addresses:  exception (b)(2) concerning the Freedom of Information
 Act, and exception (b)(3) relating to "routine use" of information.
 
    The Respondent correctly notes that AAFES employees are not subject
 to OPM regulations;  that the employees' personnel files are not
 governed by the OPM's routine use statements;  and that AAFES' routine
 use statements do not include unions as routine users.  Therefore,
 disclosure of McClellan Air Force Base Exchange employees' home
 addresses to the Union may not be authorized under exception (b)(3) of
 the Privacy Act.
 
    However, this distinction does not affect the disclosure of these
 employees' home addresses to the Union under exception (b)(2) of the
 Privacy Act.  Exception (b)(2) states that if the disclosure of the
 requested information is required by the Freedom of Information Act
 (FOIA), the Privacy Act's bar to disclosure is not applicable.  5 U.S.C.
 section 552a(b)(2).  In Farmers Home, we discussed exception (b)(2) and
 applied the necessary balancing test unde