40:0359(36)CA - - Naval Resale Activity, Naval Station, Long Beach, CA and NAGE Local R12-173 - - 1991 FLRAdec CA - - v40 p359
[ v40 p359 ]
The decision of the Authority follows:
40 FLRA No. 36
Before Chairman McKee and Members Talkin and Armendariz.
I. Statement of the Case
This unfair labor practice case is before the Authority in accordance with section 2429.1(a) of the Authority's Rules and Regulations based on a stipulation of facts by the parties, who have agreed that no material issue of fact exists. The Respondent and the General Counsel filed briefs with the Authority.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1), (5), and (8) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) by failing and refusing to provide the Union with the names and home addresses of bargaining unit employees represented by the Union. For the following reasons, we find that the Respondent committed the unfair labor practice as alleged.
The Union is the exclusive representative of a unit of Respondent's employees. By memorandum dated March 6, 1989, the Union requested the names and home addresses of the unit employees it represents. By memorandum dated April 27, 1989, the Respondent refused to provide the Union with the home addresses it requested.
The parties stipulated that, within the meaning of section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute, the requested names and home addresses are normally maintained by the Respondent in the regular course of business, are reasonably available, and do not constitute guidance, counsel, or training provided to management officials or supervisors relating to collective bargaining.
III. Positions of the Parties
A. The Respondent
The Respondent disagrees with the Authority's decision in U.S. Department of the Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 37 FLRA 515 (1990) (Portsmouth Naval Shipyard), application for enforcement filed sub nom. FLRA v. U.S. Department of the Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, No. 90-1949 (1st Cir. Oct. 1, 1990). In that case, we reaffirmed the Authority's decision in Farmers Home Administration Finance Office, St. Louis, Missouri, 23 FLRA 788 (1986) (Farmers Home), and concluded that a union is entitled, under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute, to the names and home addresses of bargaining unit employees. The Respondent asserts that the Authority should apply the reasoning of the court in FLRA v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Management Service, 884 F.2d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 863 (1990), to find that the Respondent was not required to supply the Union with the requested information.
The Respondent contends that the disclosure of employees' home addresses is prohibited by the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. The Respondent argues, in this regard, that the requested information has not been established to be necessary, within the meaning of section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute, for discharge of the Union's representational responsibilities.
Finally, the Respondent asserts that "[t]he system of records that will be used to supply the union with the requested information is a Navy system . . . not an OPM system . . . ." Respondent's Brief at 1. According to the Respondent, the "routine use disclosure provisions of the applicable Navy system of records . . . precludes the disclosure of employee home addresses to unions, especially if there are alternative means of communications available to the labor organizations." Id. The Respondent incorporated in, and attached to, its statement a brief filed by the U.S. Department of Justice in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, wherein the Department of Justice argues that (1) employee home addresses may not be disclosed from official personnel files pursuant to the routine use notice published by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and (2) the OPM routine use notice does not apply to "the Department of the Navy payroll system of records, which would probably be the most accurate source of employees' current home addresses." Attachment to Respondent's Brief at 44 n.38.
B. The General Counsel
The General Counsel argues that the Authority's decisions in Farmers Home and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard are dispositive of the issues in this case. Noting that the Respondent concedes that the requested information is normally maintained by the Respondent in the regular course of business, is reasonably available, and does not constitute guidance, advice, counsel or training provided for management officials or supervisors, within the meaning of section 7114(b)(4), the General Counsel asserts that the Respondent's admitted failure to furnish the Union with the requested information violates section 7116(a)(1), (5), and (8) of the Statute.
IV. Analysis and Conclusions
In Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, we reaffirmed Farmers Home and concluded that the release of the names and home addresses of bargaining unit employees to their exclusive representatives is not prohibited by law, is necessary for unions to fulfill their duties under the Statute, and meets all of the other requirements established by section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute. We also determined that the release of the information generally is required without regard to whether alternative means of communication are available. We find that resolution of this case does not require consideration of whether alternative means of communication are available to the Union.
The parties stipulated that the requested information is normally maintained by the Respondent in the regular course of business, is reasonably available to the Respondent, and does not constitute guidance, advice, counsel, or training provided for management officials or supervisors relating to collective bargaining. Accordingl