46:1277(119)CA - - VA, San Diego Regional Office, San Diego, CA and AFGE Local 490 - - 1993 FLRAdec CA - - v46 p1277

[ v46 p1277 ]
The decision of the Authority follows:

46 FLRA No. 119












(45 FLRA 1280 (1992))

(46 FLRA 878 (1992))



January 28, 1993


Before Chairman McKee and Members Talkin and Armendariz.

I. Statement of the Case

This matter is before the Authority on the Union's motion for reconsideration of our order in 46 FLRA 878, denying reconsideration of 45 FLRA 1280. The Agency did not file an opposition to the Union's motion for reconsideration.

We again conclude that the Union has failed to establish that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting reconsideration. Accordingly, we will deny the Union's motion. We will not entertain further motions or arguments by the Union on these issues. See American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2017 and U.S. Department of the Army, Army Signal Center and Fort Gordon, Fort Gordon, Georgia, 46 FLRA 693 (1992) (AFGE, Local 2017).

II. Our Orders in 45 FLRA 1280 and 46 FLRA 878

In 45 FLRA 1280, we determined that the Union's exceptions to the Arbitrator's award were untimely filed. Accordingly, we dismissed the Union's exceptions. In 46 FLRA 878, we rejected the Union's motion for reconsideration, in which the Union contended the Authority inconsistently calculates the 30-day time limit for filing exceptions to an arbitration award. In this regard, we noted that the Authority consistently calculates the 30-day time limit for filing exceptions to an arbitration award beginning on the date the award is served on the filing party. We further noted that the date of service is the date the arbitration award is deposited in the U.S. mail or is delivered in person. We found that the Union's motion did not establish extraordinary circumstances warranting reconsideration of our order in 45 FLRA 1280. Therefore, we denied the Union's request.

III. Request for Reconsideration

The Union contends that our order in 46 FLRA 878 is contrary to law because it "creates a conflict" with the decision of the Supreme Court in Irwin v. Veterans Administration, 111 S. Ct. 453 (1990) (Irwin). Motion at 1. Noting that section 7122(b) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) provides that "the award of an arbitrator may be appealed within thirty (30) days from the date it is served[,]" the Union claims that "the Court held [in Irwin] that service means receipt unless a contrary meaning is set forth by Congress." Id. at 1-2 (emphasis supplied by Union). Therefore, the Union requests the Authority to reconsider its order in 46 FLRA 878 and rule that "service in computing time limits under a statute means actual receipt unless otherwise authorized by Congress." Id. at 2-3 (citing Irwin, 111 S. Ct. at 456).

IV. Analysis and Conclusions

Section 2429.17 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations permits a party that can establish extraordinary circumstances to request reconsideration of an Authority order. The Union has not established extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of section 2429.17 to warrant reconsideration of the Authority's order in 46 FLRA 878. Therefore, we will deny the Union's motion. See, for example, AFGE, Local 2017.

The Union's reliance on the Court's decision in Irwin to support its motion for reconsideration is misplaced. In Irwin, the Court did not discuss section 7122(b) of the Statute, but rather discussed a different statutory provision, 42 U.S.C. º 2000e-16(c), which provides, in relevant part, that an employment discrimination complaint against the Federal Government "must be filed within 30 days 'of receipt of notice of final action taken' by the EEOC [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission]." Irwin, 111 S. Ct. at 454. The Union has not established that our order in 46 FLRA 878 is inconsistent with the Court's decision.

V. Order

The Union's motion for reconsideration is denied.

(If blank, the decision does not have footnotes.)