American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1698 (Union) and U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Inventory Control Point, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Agency)
[ v56 p981 ]
56 FLRA No. 166
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1698
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INVENTORY CONTROL POINT
December 13, 2000
Before the Authority: Donald S. Wasserman, Chairman; Dale Cabaniss and Carol Waller Pope, Members. [n1]
Decision by Chairman Wasserman for the Authority.
I. Statement of the Case
This matter is before the Authority on exceptions to an award of Arbitrator Donald W. Jarrell filed by the Union under section 7122(a) of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) and part 2425 of the Authority's Regulations. The Agency filed an opposition to the Union's exceptions.
The Arbitrator denied a grievance alleging that the Agency violated the parties' collective bargaining agreement when it filled vacant positions using noncompetitive procedures. For the following reasons, we conclude that the Union has failed to establish that the award is deficient under section 7122(a) of the Statute. Accordingly, we deny the Union's exceptions.
II. Background and Arbitrator's Award
The Union filed a grievance alleging that the Agency violated the parties' agreement when it noncompetitively promoted eleven employees as a result of reclassifications based on accretion of higher-graded duties. When the grievance was not resolved, it was submitted to arbitration, where the Arbitrator described the issues as whether the "issue raised by the Union involves classification and[,] therefore, . . . is not a proper subject for arbitration" under the parties' agreement and whether the "promotions . . . were in fact the filling of vacant positions using noncompetitive procedures, a practice not allowed under the [parties'] [a]greement." Award at 1-2.
With respect to the first issue, the Arbitrator found that the grievance was arbitrable. In this connection, the Arbitrator determined that although the grievance indirectly involved a classification matter, the Agency provided "no evidence that the Union grievance challenge[d] either the integrity of the classification process or the manner in which the [disputed] positions . . . were classified." Id. at 2.
With respect to the second issue, the Arbitrator found that employees were often promoted through accretion. The Arbitrator also found that the Agency's practice of using accretion as the "normal way to promote employees" appeared to "differ" from the parties' agreement, "which clearly intends to limit the impact of accretion on opportunities for merit promotion." Id. at 8. However, the Arbitrator found that the Union was aware of the practice and the Arbitrator concluded that the Union's failure to challenge the practice for an extended period of time "suggests that [the Union] agreed with [the practice]." Id. at 9. The Arbitrator stated that "[p]ast practice by mutual agreement, where it differs from the written [a]greement, takes precedence over contract language . . . ." Id.
The Arbitrator concluded that the Union presented no evidence demonstrating that the disputed accretions differed in any significant manner from previous accretions executed in accordance with past practice. Accordingly, the Arbitrator determined that the Union failed to demonstrate that the Agency violated the parties' "[a]greement[,] as modified by past practice." Id. Therefore, the Arbitrator denied the grievance.
III. Positions of the Parties
A. Union's Exceptions
The Union contends that the past practice of accretions "is not controlling" in this case because a past practice cannot exist unless it involves a condition of employment. Exceptions at 4, citing United States Dep't of Labor, Wash., D.C., 38 FLRA 899 (1990). In this connection, the Union argues that the award is contrary to section 7103(a)(14)(B) of the Statute because the accretion process involves a classification matter and, therefore, is not a condition of employment. [n2]
The Union also argues that the award is contrary to 5 C.F.R. § 335.103(c)(3)(ii) because agencies are required to establish competitive procedures for promoting [ v56 p982 ] employees and because it is "contrary to law" to replace merit promotion with promotion through accretion. Exceptions at 6. [n3] The Union asserts that it "did not condone" the Agency's practice of using accretion as the normal way to promote employees, and that accretion is intended to be an exception to competitive promotion. Id. at 5.
B. Agency's Opposition
The Agency contends that the Union's exceptions do not establish that the award is deficient.
IV. Analysis and Conclusions
A. The Union's exception that the award is contrary to 7103(a)(14)(B) of the Statute is barred by section 2429.5 of the Authority's Regulations.
Under section 2429.5 of the Authority's Regulations, the Authority will not consider issues that could have been, but were not, presented to the arbitrator. [n4] See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local F-89, 50 FLRA 327, 328 (1995).
The Union argues that the parties could not create the disputed past practice in this case because the accretion process concerns a classification matter and, as a result, is excepted from the definition of condition of employment under section 7103(a)(14)(B) of the Statute. It is clear from the record that the Union was aware that the existence and enforcement of a past practice regarding accretion