[ v60 p140 ]
60 FLRA No. 33
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
(60 FLRA 20 (2004))
ORDER DENYING MOTION
August 16, 2004
Before the Authority: Dale Cabaniss, Chairman, and
Carol Waller Pope and Tony Armendariz, Members [*]
This case is before the Authority on the Union's motion to reconsider the Authority's decision in United States Dep't of Transportation, FAA, 60 FLRA 20 (2004).
Section 2429.17 of the Authority's Regulations permits a party who can establish extraordinary circumstances to request reconsideration of an Authority decision. See United States Dep't of the Air Force, 375th Combat Support Group, Scott Air Force Base, Ill., 50 FLRA 84, 84 (1995) (Scott AFB). In Scott AFB, the Authority identified a limited number of situations in which extraordinary circumstances have been found to exist. These include situations where a moving party has established that the Authority erred in its remedial order, process, conclusion of law, or factual finding. See id. at 85-87. The party seeking reconsideration of a decision of the Authority has a heavy burden of establishing that extraordinary circumstances exist to justify this unusual action. See id. at 85. The Authority has uniformly held that mere disagreement with the conclusions reached by the Authority do not constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting reconsideration. See, e.g., AFGE, Local 1617, 58 FLRA 183, 183 (2002).
In this case, the Union alleges that the Authority erred in concluding that the Arbitrator effectively directed the Agency to pay the grievant premium pay for the performance of representational duties on Columbus Day holiday in 2000 and to pay Union representatives premium pay for the performance of representational duties on Sundays and holidays. We conclude that the Union fails to meet the heavy burden of establishing that extraordinary circumstances exist to justify reconsideration of 60 FLRA 20. The Union fails to establish that any of the situations identified as constituting extraordinary circumstances are present. As the Authority stated in its decision, it is clear from both parties' submissions that the parties construe the award as mandating the payment of premium pay for employees who perform only representational duties on Sundays and holidays. The Authority's decision resolved the exceptions as so construed. Accordingly, we deny the Union's motion.
Member Pope, concurring:
I agree that the Union has not established that reconsideration of the Authority's original decision in this case is warranted.
I write separately only to emphasize the narrowness of that decision. In this regard, the original decision held that 5 U.S.C. §§ 5546 (a) and (b), which provide premium pay for an "employee who performs work" on Sunday or a holiday, respectively, do not entitle an employee to premium pay for performing union representational activities on such days. The decision did not address a union's right to negotiate over: (1) performing official union duties on these days under 5 U.S.C. § 7131(d); or (2) payment of differentials for use of such official time. See generally Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 107 n.17 (1983) (although employees on official time were not entitled to travel and per diem payments, Court presumed parties could negotiate for such payments). I leave the resolution of these issues to an appropriate case where they are presented to the Authority.
Accordingly, I concur.
Footnote * for 60 FLRA No. 33 - Authority's Decision